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This thesis describes the research which has been undertaken into a particular area of policy making in 
the UK, that of the process of designing and implementing programmes aimed at helping industrial 
firms to become more competitive. Investigations have focused on how the design process is 
conducted within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which has lead responsibility for 
industry in Whitehall. 
The research had Uvo primary aims. First was to provide a detailed description of the process of 
designing programmes. Based on the research findings it is proposed that the process comprises the 
components of'Issue Identification', 'Programme Implementation', and 'Evaluation and Feedback'. 
The thesis discusses the private nature of the work involved in programme design, and that 
consequently researchers are often unable to directly observe the activities comprising the process. It 
is suggested that the veil of secrecy surrounding the development of programmes has prevented 
substantial debate of this research topic. As a civil servant employed in the DTI , the author has been 
able to review the activities involved 'first hand', and uncover numerous aspects of the process 
previously not investigated. Based on the analysis of five case study examples, a systems model has 
been developed which provides a detailed description o f the structure of the design process, and the 
mechanisms that are employed. 
The second aim of the research was to develop proposals for improving current arrangements, towards 
achieving better value for money in the design and operation of support programmes. The thesis 
describes how a Business Process Re-engineering approach was adopted to exploit the detailed 
knowledge of the design system which had been gained, with the aim of discovering deficiencies in the 
current process and developing proposals for. overcoming problems. Investigations showed that the 
current guidance provided to officials employed in programme design is inadequate in ful ly supporting 
them in the task. It is suggested that this deficiency can be overcome through the introduction of a new 
set of comprehensive guidance, to be contained in an alternative document referred to as the Handbook 
for Programme Design and Operation. The handbook, it is proposed, would comprise good practice 
advice across the broad range of activities involved in programme design. Proposals for further 
improving the design process through the introduction of effective knowledge management were also 
developed, and these are again set out in the thesis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO T H E R E S E A R C H 
1.1 Introduction 
The subject of the research described in this thesis falls within the domain o f public policy, and is 
concerned with policy making. However the research focuses on a particular part of policy making, 
that of the design and operation of programmes which aim to support firms, especially those in the 
industrial sector, in becoming more competitive. It is appropriate to consider the design o f such 
programmes as being an integral part of policy making. The government white paper Modernising 
government (Cabinet Office, 1999) states: 
'''Policy making is the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes 
and actions to deliver 'outcomes' - desired changes in the real world\ 
(Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 15). 
This thesis looks at how civil servants take ministers' aspirations for businesses and develop and run 
activities targeted at achieving the government's objectives. The author felt it to be an area where he 
could usefully contribute to the growing wealth o f knowledge which has been created in the public 
policy arena. He was encouraged by the comments o f other researchers in the field, especially 
Hogwood, who wrote: 
''There is plenty ofwifinished business in public policy studies in Britain, and clearly sufficient interest 
in public policy for that business to be pursued\ 
(Hogwood, 1995, p. 71). 
Thus the scene was set for undertaking the research described in this thesis. 
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The hypothesis to be substantiated in this thesis is that the efficiency of the programme design process 
within government may be improved through making better use of the corporate knowledge o f scheme 
design, built up over the years. In substantiating this hypothesis it was also intended that a useful 
contribution to knowledge could be made. 
In the United Kingdom (UK) the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has lead responsibility in 
government for promoting industry and business generally (Rhodes, 1988, p. 330). Over the years the 
department has introduced many programmes aimed at helping firms compete in the global 
marketplace. Historically DTI's remit has been industrially defined (DTI, 1992, p. i), although in more 
recent years policy has been widened to place an increased level of emphasis on businesses more 
generally. Whilst the aim of this research was to produce a set of outcomes of relevance to the 
Whitehall departments as a whole, the focus of research was placed on DTI, given its leading role. 
Research has also been weighted towards schemes helping industrial firms, reflecting DTTs historical 
focus on this sector. As discussed in section 1.9 below, there are good reasons for supposing 
procedures adopted within DTI are essentially the same as employed elsewhere in Whitehall, and thus 
the research results wil l be of wider application. 
In researching DTI programme activities the emphasis has been placed on programmes employing the 
mechanism of grant funding to encourage firms to adopt good practice, be it to undertake more 
research and development or to adopt better management practice. The author highlights at this point 
that the emphasis is always placed on the encouragement of organisations to take desired actions. 
Officials do not adopt an attitude of telling people what to do. Research also investigates awareness 
activities which normally are not the subject of grant funding, but where departments award contracts 
to organisations to develop and run projects aimed at helping firms understand the business issues. 
These areas were chosen for study on the basis that they feature regularly in the business support 
policies delivered by governments of the developed world (Cunningham and Barker, 1992, section 2, 
parts 2-4); (see also chapter 3, section 3.2.2). These types of interventions are contrasted with 
28 
situations where, for example, research and development (R&D) and Technology Transfer is promoted 
as a result of a government undertaking large scale procurements for, say, military equipment (Clark 
and Guy, 1998, pp. 388-389). 
In selecting the programmes to focus upon in his research, the author took his lead from the 
government white paper DTI - the department for Enterprise (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-27, 33-37, p. 41). 
This white paper is viewed as a landmark in shaping programme policy within DTI , and its influence is 
still visible in terms of the programmes operated by the department in the year 2000. Activities 
described in the white paper may thus be considered as having played a strategic role in helping the 
government achieve its aims. 
The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988 p. 41) signalled the launch of the now famous Enterprise Initiative 
(El), which was launched at around the time of publishing the paper. El acted as an umbrella for 
promoting DTPs business support activities. In so far as the subject areas of research was concerned, 
the Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative, the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), Managing into the 
90s (M90s) and the Manufacturing, Planning and Implementation (MPI) programmes, were considered 
by officials as the high profile schemes operated under El . These interventions, including the role of 
El, were therefore targeted in the research, and they are described in detail in appendices D to H 
respectively. Section 1.10 below contains further discussion of the selecting of the case study 
examples. 
Confidence that the case study examples are representative of programme design and administration 
more generally was drawn from the KM Treasury The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in 
Central Government (HMT, 1997, p. 29, pp. 32-33). The 'Green Book' stipulates that in introducing 
and operating programmes, the Whitehall departments must prepare ROAMEF statements which set 
out cases for support in terms of the Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, and arrangements for scheme 
Monitoring, and Evaluation and Feedback. The need for departments to conform to ROAMEF 
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procedures enforces a discipline on the design process, which results in conformity in approach across 
Whitehall, including the individual directorates within DTI. 
The author felt he was in a good position to study programmes in the chosen areas. He has been 
employed by DTI since January 1985, working principally in the area o f the design and administration 
of programmes aimed at helping firms become more competitive. He was first employed at the level 
of PTOl (Professional and Technology Officer - Grade 1), and then as a Grade 7 heading a Unit. Both 
positions have allowed him to build a weight of experience in programme design, and how the 
department operates more generally. He therefore anticipated that he was in a strong position to 
undertake research of the development process within the department. The author is aware that the 
Civil Service, in keeping with other organisations, has its own specific culture, derived from a history 
of events, which provide the framework dictating the ways in which departmental business is 
undertaken. By way of helping the reader to put into context the findings o f research, chapter 2 
explains a number of terms and the background to procedures related to the process of designing and 
administering programmes. 
Section 2.2 begins by discussing the differences between 'initiatives', 'schemes', 'programmes' and 
'projects'. At this point it is worth summarising the findings of section 2.2. The terms 'initiatives', 
'schemes', and 'programmes' are often used interchangeably, and are used to describe 'umbrella' 
activities under which a number of sub-activities wi l l be supported. For example, in programmes for 
which the main subject is R&D, a programme w i l l normally comprise several discrete R&D projects. 
Section 2.2 also draws a distinction between Research and Technology (R & T) schemes and 
'advisory' schemes. R & T programmes is the general term used to describe schemes focusing on 
technical activities such as R&D, and Technology Transfer. Advisory schemes focus on providing 
advice to firms, and include 'awareness' programmes and those initiatives concerned with encouraging 
firms to use consultants. 
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Chapter 2, section 2.3 discusses the structure of financial administration in the running of schemes, and 
section 2.4 introduces the three sets of primary guidance which are available to officials engaged in the 
design process. Section 2.5 outlines the changes in policy in recent years towards the support of 
businesses, which reflects a less interventionist stance by the government. Finally, section 2.6 provides 
an outline of the grade structure within DTI . People unfamiliar with the Civil Service and the 
background to programme development in government are commended to read chapter 2 before 
moving on to subsequent chapters. Conversely, those familiar with the procedures involved should 
pass over it. The following sections in this chapter record how the idea for the research came about, 
how the research objectives were developed, and the research questions designed to meet those 
objectives. Then follows a precis of the work undertaken in support of drafting this thesis, it does so 
by summarising the content of each the successive chapters, which describe the investigatory work 
undertaken and the results achieved. 
1.2 Conceiving the Idea for Research 
Two stimuli prompted the author to undertake the research described in this thesis. The initial 
stimulus which motivated the author arose from the government's fervent wish to ensure that value for 
money (VFM) is achieved in all activities undertaken on its behalf. The government's desire to 
achieve better VFM was announced with the publication of the government white paper Efficiency and 
Effectiveness in the Civil Service (HMSO, 1982, pp. 5-6), which introduced the Conservative 
Government's Financial Management Initiative (FMI). FMI represented the government's drive to 
achieve value for money in the activities undertaken on its behalf across the Whitehall departments. 
Given FMI's drive for efficiency, the author stood back and reflected on the process of designing and 
operating support programmes for helping Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) to improve 
their competitiveness. He felt that current arrangements could be improved. Over time a wealth of 
experience in operating programmes had been developed across Whitehall, and this corporate 
knowledge base was continually being built upon. However the author observed that insufficient 
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reference to this knowledge, even within DTI itself, was being made by those engaged in programme 
design. Therefore he concluded that the process o f developing programmes was probably less than 
optimal, as officials were not making use of corporate experience to help inform them in the design 
process. It was thought that lack of use stemmed from the difficulties associated with accessing 
corporate knowledge, and identifying the means to correct this problem was thought highly desirable. 
The corporate knowledge base was seen as comprising two, principal elements. First people carry 
personal knowledge on programme design in their heads, that is, tacitly. Second, programmes are 
usually subjected to evaluation to ensure that V F M has been achieved (Guy, 1998, p. v), and the 
resulting evaluation reports contain details on the efficacy of approaches adopted in running schemes. 
However there are difficulties in accessing these sources of knowledge. Whilst people can be 
questioned in relation to their experiences, the employee count in the Civil Service is high. DTI itself 
employed in excess of 11,000 personnel in 1995 (HMSO, 1995c, p. 85), and it is impractical for 
officials to know about and track the work undertaken by all their colleagues to determine that which 
may be of relevance to them. 
The total number of evaluation reports is also large. For example, a list of the evaluation reports 
completed between 1983 and 1992 was compiled by DTI evaluators, principally for their own use 
(appendix A, p. 2). A total of 131 DTI reports were listed. Since the list was compiled many more 
reports have been prepared. The list is not generally available within the department, and indeed no 
definitive list of reports has since been prepared within DTI, let alone across government. The large 
number of evaluation reports, coupled with a lack of detail on their availability, renders the task of 
identifying relevant documents very difficult for officials. In talking to colleagues, the author found 
that with the exception of those evaluations directly related to peoples' responsibilities, officials 
generally make no reference to reports of previous programmes. 
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Other factors were also observed to be contributing to the difficulty of accessing the corporate 
knowledge base. Government departments were being subjected to continuous change (Doig, 1995, p. 
191; Doig and Graham, 1998, p. 489; Theakston, 1998, p. 13) which precipitated in DTI, as elsewhere, 
the movement of people inside and outside the department, with some lost to the Civi l Service 
altogether through severance and early retirement. In many cases knowledge was therefore being lost 
completely. The author had witnessed many of his colleagues leaving the department on severance 
terms or early retirement. Others had moved to other departments. From these observations the author 
concluded that, oyerall, the design process was unlikely to be as efficient as it could be, and therefore 
potential for improvement existed. The author would add that for many years it has been an unwritten 
rule that, 'to get on in the Civil Service' officials must change their posts every two years. Thus as 
officials become experienced in their jobs, they have then tended to move on, reducing access to their 
expertise by those they leave behind. 
A further factor was identified. The 'Competitiveness White Paper', Realising our potential (HMSO, 
1993, pp. 11-15) signalled a shift in policy in DTI from traditional support of R&D programmes 
towards placing the emphasis on encouraging firms to begin making more use o f the new technologies 
which had already been developed. The view was also expressed within DTI that its Innovation 
Budget, from which its R&D support is mainly funded, was small at around £100 Million compared 
with that spent by industry, or, for example, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) through its defence 
contracts. Ministers argued that DTI's contribution was 'swamped' by the contribution of others, and 
therefore of an insufficient size to make a significant difference. 
Against this background, it was felt that DTI's limited resources could be more efficiently spent on 
helping firms raise their competitiveness by improving access to new technologies and businesses 
processes. For example, the white paper (HMSO, 1993, p. 15) refers to the setting up of a network o f 
'One Stop Shops', which resulted in DTI introducing the Business Links (BLs). The author considers 
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that the shift in policy also reflected the former Conservative Government's less interventionist stance, 
a topic which is discussed ftirther in chapter 2, section 2.5. 
A senior official (Grade 6) on learning o f the author's research relayed his concerns over the shift of 
emphasis in policy. These concerns stemmed from the resulting cessation o f many of the department's 
traditional activities, which were regarded by officials as being o f value to industry. (The author 
concurs. For example, inspection of appendix K, (p. 164, shows that an evaluation report found the 
closure of a scheme to be a matter of regret). There was a fear that valuable experience of how to 
operate these programmes would slowly leach away, resulting in a loss o f knowledge of how they add 
value, and of how to set them up and run them (Dunleavy, 1995, pp. 62-63). The official informed the 
author that senior officials had informally approached ministers with a proposal to review what had 
been undertaken in order that the lessons could be captured for possible future use. Ministers flatly 
refused to countenance the idea. Whilst not viewed as a primary objective o f research, the author took 
the view that findings recorded in this thesis should provide a valuable archive for those wishing to 
look back over the history of programme development. 
The author resolved to investigate the possibilities of improving the design process. He began by 
seeing i f any articles had been published on designing support programmes for industry.. He asked the 
DTI Library to undertake a search of the titles and abstracts. Using the keywords 'government 
schemes', 'mechanisms', 'success', and 'failure', the sources of information located and interrogated 
were National Audit Office Reports; the ISMEC, Compendex, and the Current Technology Index 
databases; the Havard Business Review; Textline (reference to the OECD annual review of industrial 
policy); Profile UKNEWS, CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read Only Memory) searches - Whinaker's 
Bookbank, British National Bibliography, Books in Print (US); SIGLE (a database of 'grey' literature, 
i.e. pamphlets and reports etc.); and finally the BLAISE Conference proceedings database. The search 
took in articles and reports covering the period 1977 to 1992. Around forty references were identified 
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but nothing of direct relevance to the research among these was found. He also undertook an initial 
survey of the literature but found little of relevance. 
The author proposed that the lack of reference in the literature to the process was largely due to the 
work of officials in this area being an essentially private activity. The requirement to respect the 
requirement of the Official Secrets Acts (1989), coupled with the need to also respect the 
confidentiality of ministers and senior officials, creates a 'veil of secrecy' (Hennessy, 1990, p. 4, 344) 
which shrouds policy making from external examination (Weller and Stevens, 1998, p. 579). This 
suggested that the level of published knowledge on the process of designing support policy was fikely 
to be low, as had been initially indicated by interrogating the publications database. It was therefore 
thought that there was significant scope for research to extend the level of understanding of the design 
process, and thus make a useful contribution to knowledge. This opportunity represented the second 
stimulus for undertaking the research. The author, as a civil servant, was in a position to study the 
design process directly from an 'insider's' perspective, and make that contribution to knowledge. 
Given Hogwood's (1995, p. 71) views about there still being much to do and the level of interest in 
researching public policy, these latter observations provided the second, and perhaps the greatest, 
impetus for the author to undertake his research. The author considered the design and implementation 
of programmes to be a specific but very important part of policy making, as programmes often 
represent the means by which ministerial policy is carried out. He felt he had been presented with a 
genuine opportunity to make a useful contribution to knowledge, simultaneously with identifying 
means of improving the design process to achieve greater value for money. Thus two overriding 
objectives which comprised an initial rationale for undertaking the research had been identified, and 
may be stated as follows: 
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a) To contribute to knowledge in the area of policy by obtaining a description of the process o f 
designing and administering programmes which help firms become more competitive^ through 
detailed research of that process; 
b) To exploit the findings of research to Identify ways in which the design process can be improved to 
become more efficient and effective, such that value for money is increased. 
In regard of (b) above, the author was not devoid of ideas at the beginning. He had observed the 
practice o f issuing guidelines to officials engaged in programme work. These guidelines are intended 
to help individuals understand what they are required to do in developing and administering 
programmes. They effectively steer people through the process to ensure policy is adhered to. In 
particular, successive versions o f the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DT\, 1992, 1996a, 1999a), which 
are aimed at helping officials engaged in developing Research and Technology (R & T) schemes, enjoy 
widespread use and are highly regarded by those who make use of them. Indeed, the author himself 
has experienced many occasions of needing to refer to the guidelines for assistance, and has found 
them helpful. 
The author considered the practice of issuing guidance to be an example of good practice. It suggested 
to him that the introduction of a new set of guidelines, to be called the Handbook for Programme 
Design and Operation, containing a broad range of advice based on the lessons learned in practice in 
designing and operating programmes, would be one way of improving access to corporate knowledge. 
Thus the third objective (c) below was defined: 
c) As part of (b), to develop proposals for a set of good practice guidance for inclusion in a future 
Handbook for Programme Design and Operation. 
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1.3 The Rationale for Research 
Before embarking on what was thought to be a significant research exercise, the author considered it 
first necessary to carry out preparatory studies to demonstrate that there existed a clear rationale which 
justified undertaking the proposed investigatory work. The objectives (a) and (b), described above, 
were seen as defining the principal strands o f a rationale. In the case of the former, it had to be 
demonstrated that it was likely that the proposed research had the potential to make a significant and 
useful, contribution to knowledge. For the latter, it had to be established that the research had practical 
value in addressing the problem of improving access to corporate knowledge. These considerations 
suggested that three research'questions should be posed. The following sections firstly discuss how the 
questions were derived, and secondly summarise the responses provided in chapter 3. It was 
concluded that a clear rationale existed. 
1.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
Potential to make a contribution to knowledge was seen as to exist i f it could be demonstrated that the 
levels of understanding about the process o f designing and administering support programmes was low 
and exhibited gaps such that investigations would be worthwhile in terms o f making a credible 
contribution. 
Hence the first question posed for research to answer was: 
(i) "What is the current, documented understanding of the process of designing and operating support 
policy, how well is the system described, and do significant gaps in existing knowledge exist"? 
Although 'secrecy' considerations meant it unlikely that there would be a volume of articles on the 
research topic, the author felt that a close examination of the literature would nevertheless yield useful 
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information. It was important to establish the level of current knowledge and confirm gaps existed. A 
formal study of the literature was carried out to help determine the current status o f knowledge. 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.1, records the findings of this study. It was found that the topic of this research 
was under investigated, with research work traditionally focusing on the 'core executive' (Smith, 
Marsh, and Richards, 1993, p. 567). Weller and Stevens, (1998, p. 583) were found to uphold the 
author's suspicion, that lack of reference in the literature is mainly due to civil servants having to 
maintain confidentiality over the intricacies of policy making. Examination of the literature also 
revealed study of policy making to be essentially undertaken by 'outsiders' who would suffer restricted 
access to the process itself. Study of the literature confirmed Smith, Marsh, and Richards's views, with 
little of significance to the research being found. Thus it was concluded that policy making within 
government is an area in which much could be learnt, and it followed that the proposed research would 
therefore be able to make a useful contribution to knowledge. 
1.3.2 Identifying General Interest in Improving the Designing Process 
The second objective (b) above concerned finding ways o f improving the process of designing 
programmes, which pointed to further factors requiring to be considered in identifying a credible 
rationale. Section 1.2 above indicated good grounds for supposing that the process was not making 
best use of the corporate knowledge base within government, and improved access to collective 
experience could be beneficial. However a good reason for studying the design process and 
investigating possibilities for making it function better was required. It had first to be established that 
there was likely to be a sufficient level o f general interest in the deliverables of research to render the 
research task of value. A way of predetermining the levels of interest was to gauge the level o f 
government involvement in supporting firms in the developed world. It was thought that widespread 
activity in this area could be interpreted as implying the likelihood of general interest in the research 
deliverables. The second research question to be answered was then: 
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(ii) "Is the level o f activity by governments internationally, in delivering support policy, sufficient to 
warrant investigation of the processes involved"? 
• 
Chapter 3 section 3.2.2, looks at the levels of spend by governments on programmes aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of firms. The author took the view that an economic rationale had to be 
identified. I f spend on such support policy was high, then there would likely be an interest in measures 
which could be taken to help bring about cost savings. The literature survey concluded that levels of 
spend are high, and that, in identifying ways to improve V F M , the planned research would be widely 
viewed as of value. It was therefore concluded that there was likely to be a sufficient level of interest 
in the research results to justify the investigatory work. 
1.3.3 Establishing Evidence of Deficiencies 
Having established that there was potential to make a credible contribution to knowledge, and that the 
results of research were likely to be of benefit to the public sector more widely, the final stage in 
establishing a case for undertaking the proposed studies was to gain evidence of there being problems 
with the current design process. In conversation the expression ' i f it ain't broke don't fix it ' is often 
heard. The author is amongst those who support this philosophy. There is little value to be obtained, 
he argues, from modifying something which is already working efficiently. Hence he felt the need to 
gain more substantive evidence which would give reasonable grounds for supposing problems with 
current procedures. The third research question to be placed aimed to establish grounds for thinking 
that there was room for improvement; that is: 
(ii i) "Is there any evidence to suggest that current procedures are in substantial need of improvement"? 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.3 provides the evidence which indicated problems with the current system of 
designing policy for support programmes. Dunleavy (1995, p. 52) and Kl i jn , Koppenjan, and Termeer 
(1995, p. 437) refer to policy mistakes made in the UK and elsewhere. Dunleavy (1995, p. 54) 
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proposes that problems are particularly acute in the UK, with Theakston (1998, p. 17) suggesting civil 
servants' input to policy making as being too weak. Concerns were also expressed over Whitehall's 
capacity to develop policies having been damaged by successive reorganisations in recent years, with 
many commentators proposing the need now for review and improvement. Dunleavy (1995, p. 62) 
continues, referring to the shift in emphasis away from policy towards a concentration on the 
management issues. He also highlights the writing o f f of 'intellectual capital', as less use was made of 
experienced civil servants in favour of politically aligned 'think tanks' and outside experts. Greater 
reliance has also been placed on younger, inexperienced civil servants. The setting up of the 'Next 
Steps Agencies' (Efficiency Unit, 1988) has also contributed to a loss of expertise, with experienced 
officials moved out from their traditional, policy making roles (Dunleavy, 1995, p 62-63). DTI is seen 
as not having escaped these changes. The National Audit Office (NAO) in their report The 
Department of Trade and Industry's Support for Innovation (NAO, 1995, p. 13) refer to the department 
having both reduced the number o f headquarters staff and reorganised its functions. 
Finally, the government's white paper Modernising government. Cabinet Office (1999, p. 15) provides 
support for the view that deficiencies exist in the current process. It refers to the previous emphasis on 
management reform, but highlights that little attention has been paid to the policy process. The 
likelihood of serious problems existing in policy making and, by inference, in that part of policy 
making concerned with the development of support programmes had been confirmed. The white paper 
(Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 9) also related the government's commitment for improvement, thereby 
supporting the author's rationale to research ways of making the design process better. 
1.4 Specifying the Research Task 
Section 1.3 above set out the three, initial research questions to be answered in establishing a clear 
rationale for the research, and outlined the work described in chapter 3, the ^Literature Review', which 
was undertaken to provide answers to these questions. A rationale for the research was seen to exist. 
In answering the initial questions it had been established that there were significant gaps in the 
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knowledge of designing and implementing programmes, that good reasons existed for supposing 
current arrangements were less than optimal, and that It was probable that there was wide interest in 
improving matters. It was hence decided to proceed with the main research task, which was concerned 
with investigating in-depth the design and administration process. 
Section 1.2 above described the overriding objectives for the research, which can be summarised as 
being (a) to make a contribution to knowledge, and (b) to discover ways in which the current design 
process could be improved. As in the case o f substantiating the rationale for research, these twin 
objectives provided the point o f reference for defining the investigatory tasks to be carried out. The 
following text describes how three further questions were identified for research to answer, such that 
the two objectives were met. The text also contains summaries of the work undertaken and the 
conclusions reached. 
1.4.1 Strategy for Discovering the Nature of the Design and Administration 
Process 
To improve the understanding of how programmes are introduced and operated, and in forming the 
basis for identifying how improvements could be made, it was seen as first necessary to carry out a 
detailed study of the present process. The fourth question for research to address was then: 
(iv) "What is the scope of the process describing the designing and implementing policy for 
introducing and operating programmes which support firms in becoming more competitive, what 
comprises that process in terms of the elements which make up the whole system, and how do 
these elements interrelate in delivering support policy"? 
The objective in answering this question was to gain a comprehensive understanding about the design 
and implementation process, identifying the component systems which comprise the process and how 
these in turn operate and interrelate with each other. 
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Chapter 3, the 'Literature Review' was able to provide guidance for how research of the design process 
should be conducted. Although reference to the process was restricted, study of the literature 
nonetheless yielded some useful information and guidance. Weller and Stevens (1998, pp. 582-583) 
were found usefully able to suggest the'structure o f the design and administration process as 
comprising 'Issue Identification', 'Programme Implementation', and 'Evaluation'. Section 3.2.5 of the 
review also describes how within 'Issue Identification', quality in the process of developing 
programmes is enhanced by adopting a structured approach in scheme design. 
As introduced in section 1.1 above, the approach centres around the production o f ROAMEF 
(Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring, and Evaluation and Feedback) statements (Guy, 1998, 
p. 33), which represent the case for support. It is shown that the ROAMEF concept is set out in the 
Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) guidance the 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997, pp. 32-33). The 'Green 
Book' requires the Whitehall departments to adopt the ROAMEF approach, and thus examination of 
the guidelines to see what work is carried out under each of the ROAMEF headings was recommended 
as a first step in gaining insights to the design of programmes. 
The literature review also refers to the accountability o f ministers to the public concerning the activities 
which their respective departments undertake on their behalf It is necessary that ministers are able to 
demonstrate that programmes have secured value for money, and therefore the importance o f 
evaluating the performance of programmes is stressed. Programme evaluation has another very 
important role. As indicated by Weller and Stevens (1998, pp. 582-583), the results of evaluation can 
be usefully fed back into the design process, towards ensuring future schemes are better able to meet 
government objectives (Guy, 1998, p. I ) . 'Evaluation including Feedback' is then a strategic part o f the 
overall, design process. An initial look at a few evaluation reports prepared by DTI showed them to 
contain comprehensive information relating to the delivery strategies employed within programmes, 
and their performance in terms o f meeting programme targets. The latter was seen as particularly 
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important in determining good practice in relation to proposals for improving the process (research 
objective (c)). Evaluation reports were therefore seen as a valuable source of evidence, requiring them 
to be investigated as part of the research. 
1.4.2 Obtaining a Detailed Description of the Design and Administration 
Process 
Chapters 5 to 8 inclusive describe the detailed research undertaken into the process o f designing and 
implementing support programmes. Together they provide insights into the large number o f 
mechanisms to be involved. The approach adopted was to develop a hierarchical model which would 
describe the overall process and its component parts. Chapter 5 is concerned with the describing of the 
overall process, with chapters 6, 7, and 8 providing details o f the system components comprising that 
process. 
Chapter 5, section 5.2 explains how a variety of controls act to constrain what officials can and 
cannot do in running support programmes. Attainment of V F M is a key requirement, and must 
be demonstrated before programmes can receive approval. The process of development is also 
constrained by the need to conform to European Commission (EC) policy on State Aids (SA, 
1998), UK Legislation, and UK Government Policy, As part of 'pol icy ' it is necessary for 
officials in designing programmes to first prove the existence of 'market failure', that is, o f 
problems in the functioning of the market which are faced by SMEs and other organisations. 
Market failure may be defined as a situation in which market forces are not operating in a way 
which supports the competitiveness of firms, and the root causes of problems cannot be solved 
by the actors involved (Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, p. 19). Not unexpectedly, 
budgetary limitations place further constraint on the scope of any programme. 
Section 5.3 investigates the sources of evidence which are interrogated by officials particularly 
in identifying instances of market failure. As described earlier, evaluation reports are an 
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important source of evidence, as they indicate new or continuing problems. Professional 
journals and other reports are also consulted. In the past, government Advisory Committees 
have been useful in identifying market failures. Officials also talk to external bodies including 
Higher Education Institutions (KEIs) and consultants, and to colleagues having experience o f 
operating schemes. People wil l additionally call on their own experiences. On occasions, 
officials wil l commission research studies to investigate potential problems in the market. 
Chapter 6 begins the task o f investigating the discrete parts of the process as proposed by 
Weller and Stevens (1998), being concerned with 'Issue Identification'. The author proposes 
that 'Identification of Issues' is very much about the design phase of the process, and in 
particular the development of programme ROAMEF statements. The drafting o f ROAMEFs is 
examined in detail in this chapter. It is proposed that the approval of ROAMEF statements be 
treated as part of programme design, as during the vetting process the initial proposals are often 
improved upon. Section 6.4.2 shows 'Approval' to be a sequential process consisting of a 
number of stages and analyses how the process acts to improve VFM. 
Chapter 7 investigates the implementation phase of schemes, which is principally about 
programme administration. The first area to be investigated is the role of monitoring within 
programmes. Section 7.2 differentiates between two types of monitoring. The first, 
programme monitoring, is concerned with tracking the overall performance of programmes in 
order that problems encountered can be quickly corrected. The second is project monitoring, 
where the progress of individual projects within programmes is tracked to ensure overall 
scheme objectives are being met. 
Section 7.3 analyses the activities which are carried out under the heading o f general administration. 
The activities include such tasks as managing contracts placed with organisations for the undertaking 
of research projects, and the management of grants. Also researched is the management o f consultancy 
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schemes. Normally external organisations are contracted to run these schemes on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, requiring measures such as the issuing of scheme guidelines to make sure that 
contractors adhere to government policy. The use of guidelines is discussed in section 7.4. The role of 
competitive tendering in securing VFM is studied in section 7.5. The writing of Invitation To Tender 
(ITT) specifications is described and the procedures of the tendering process detailed. Her Majest>''s 
Treasury (HMT) requirements for the handling of public funds are described in section 7.6. Section 7.7 
looks at the steps which officials take to promote programmes and section 7.8 the procedures which can be 
adopted in closing schemes. 
Chapter 8 looks at the subject of 'Evaluation and Feedback'. Section 8.2 pinpoints its strategic 
role in adding value in the design process by providing lessons from experience. Section 8.3 
discusses the planning o f evaluations, describing the sequence of events in the evaluation 
process. That 'Evaluation' is about testing the validity of a programme's rationale, and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in meeting objectives is highlighted. The steps 
involved in 'Evaluation and Feedback', beginning with the setting o f objectives in programme 
ROAMEF statements, are set out. The need to assess VFM is stressed. The development o f 
evaluation methods based on the sampling of programme beneficiaries is also discussed. 
Section 8.4 investigates the content of evaluation reports, to provide examples o f previously 
adopted assessment strategies, and show the value of the reports in determining good practice. 
The corporate organisation of'Evaluation in DTI is detailed in section 8.5. As a process 
'Evaluation' is implemented as a distributed function, with evaluators working in the individual 
directorates responsible for programme design and implementation. Interestingly it is recorded 
how DTI annually develops overall plans for evaluation projects across the department, which 
are approved by the Secretary o f State. Chapter 8 saw completion of developing the systems 
model describing the process o f designing and implementing programmes. 
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1.5 Testing the Model 
Having described the process, the next step was to test the integrity o f the design model. This was 
affected by analysing the case study examples to see i f the structure of the design process predicted by 
the model could be identified in their development and operation. The testing of the model is 
summarised in chapter 9, which found the design model to fit the design process indicated in the case 
studies. The case study examples are described in appendices D to H. Appendix D (pp. 77-80) 
describes the Enterprise Initiative (EI), appendix E (pp. 81-94) the Research and Technology (R & T) 
initiative, appendix F (pp. 95-105) the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), appendix G (pp. 106-126) the 
Managing into the 90s (M90s) programme, and appendix H (pp. 127-141) the Manufacturing, Planning 
and Implementation (MPI) programme. 
1.6 Identifying Potential Improvements 
Having obtained a full description of the current process, it was suggested that the system be again 
investigated in detail from the perspective o f identifying how the design process might be improved. 
The aim was to discover the areas where deficiencies and problems existed, and consider how 
shortcomings could be corrected. The fiflh research question then was: 
(v) "In what areas may improvements be introduced and what should those improvements comprise"? 
The literature review, chapter 3, section 3.7 proposes that Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
could be adopted as an approach for finding ways in which to introduce change for improvement into 
the design process. As part of the re-engineering exercise it is further suggested that the introduction 
of knowledge management to raise the efficiency with which the design process is undertaken also be 
investigated. Following growing practice in the private sector, ways of helping DTI and other 
government departments in becoming learning organisations through effective knowledge management 
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was seen as a vital. Research, it was suggested, should therefore investigate what features of 
knowledge management are required to help departments become learning organisations. 
Chapter 10 describes the detailed work which was undertaken in drafting proposals for improving the 
process. Based on a BPR approach, section 10.4 reviews the current process and makes 
recommendations for correcting identified deficiencies. Section 10.5 develops the findings and 
investigates how knowledge management can be introduced to bring further improvements. One of the 
recommendations is that a Handbook for Programme Design and Implementation be produced, which 
advises officials on good and bad practice in programme design and administration. Proposals for the 
new Handbook are seen as meeting the third research objective (c). Towards the preparation of the 
guidance, appendix tC (pp, 158-187) investigates good and bad practice derived from analysis o f 
running schemes within DTI. Analysis centres around the assessment of programme performance as 
described in the evaluation reports prepared in regard of the case study examples described in 
appendixes D to H. Finally, chapter 11 records the conclusions drawn from the research. 
1.7 Developing the Research Strategy 
Chapter 4 details how the research method was developed for answering the research questions (iv) and 
(v). In developing the strategy it was seen as important to identify a set of approaches which would 
enable the right information to be collected, such that the research questions could be addressed, and 
for conclusions to be drawn such that the research objectives were achieved. Chapter 4 describes how 
an ethnographic approach, using the case study method, was adopted as the basis for the research 
strategy. 
The reasoning behind the choice of research approach is set out. In deciding upon the underlying 
approach of the research strategy, the author was faced with the choice o f adopting a principally 
'deductive' or 'inductive' method. Chapter 4, section 4.3 discusses the arguments involved. It was 
argued that the subject o f the author's research was essentially one o f the 'social world', and that an 
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inductive, anti-positive approach was considered more fitting for meeting the objectives of research. 
Whether to adopt an ethnographic approach as against employing action research techniques is then 
debated in section 4.5. A strategy based on the use of ethnography was argued to be better suited to the 
author's situation. Ethnography with its emphasis on building an understanding o f the behaviour o f 
subjects, through observing the actors concerned from the perspective of being a member of their 
community, would allow the author to capitalise on his position within DTI (Gill and Johnson, 1997, 
pp. 112-114). Many researchers commend ethnography as an important means o f gaining access to 
events and groups that are otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 1994, p. 88). 
Section 4.6 discusses the specific research methods which were adopted. The importance of being able 
to 'triangulate' different sources of evidence is stressed. Research based on case studies is proposed as 
best fitting the research problem. An important consideration, however, is whether to adopt a single or 
multiple case strategy. Initially it was thought that the research subject should be treated as a single 
case study, but this is rejected in favour of a multiple case approach. As the identification of best 
practice was a primary concern of research, a multiple case approach seemed more fitting. An 
additional consideration in favour of adopting a multiple case study strategy was that it would promote 
the collection of evidence from several sources and support the process of triangulation. 
Section 1.4.2, above, described the development of a hierarchical model to describe the process of 
designing and administering programmes. Chapter 4, section 4.6 discusses that it was decided to 
deploy a modelling technique called IDEF, (IDEF is the acronym for Integrated DEFinition 
Methodology , which was developed by the US Air Forces ICAM Programme (Wisnosky and Batteau 
1990, p. 8; Ranky, 1990, pp. 18-19; Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 172). 
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1.8 Collecting the Evidence 
Chapter 4, section 4.7 discusses the strategy for conducting the case study research to obtain the 
information required to model the design process. Three underlying principles are identified as 
requiring to be in place: 
(i) use multiple sources of evidence; 
(ii) establish a case study database; 
(iii) ensure the existence of a chain of evidence. 
For (i), section 4.7.1 proposes that a number of types of data source be interrogated for gathering 
evidence. Examples are documents, interviews, and participant observation. With respect to (i i) , 
section 4.7.8 describes the formation of a case study database, which included the filing o f interview 
records, and observations made during the course of attending official meetings. Arrangements to 
ensure the building of a 'chain of evidence' (ii i) through clear cross referencing are detailed in section 
4.7.9. 
1.9 Generalisability of Research Findings 
Although research would focus on the design of support policy within DTI, it was necessary to ensure 
that the research results would be applicable more widely in the public sector. I f the results could not 
be widely exploited, then an essential element of the rationale for undertaking the research task was 
seen to be severely limited. There would be little interest within the wider community in the research 
outcomes i f they could only be usefully applied within DTI, The sixth and final question for research 
to answer was posed as follows: 
(vi) "What scope is there for exploiting the results of research beyond DTI"? 
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The question, in fact, must be asked in nvo parts. First is the issue o f whether the research method is 
likely to provide results which are generalisable. The second is whether the process of designing and 
administering programmes in DTI is typical of procedures adopted elsewhere. 
Regarding the first point, concerns are often expressed in relation to case studies over the ability to 
generalise from their findings (Yin, 1994, p. 10; Gi l l and Johnson, I997,pp. 119-121). Many of these 
concerns stem from the generalisability of theories derived from case studies, but the author suggests 
that his research is about exploring and describing phenomena rather than deriving causal relationships. 
Stake (1995, p. 7) acknowledges that usually in case studies only a small number o f cases are normally 
investigated but, he argues, these are studied in depth and people can still learn much which is 
generalisable. The argument is discussed in chapter 4, section 4.8.1. The author argues that much of 
what happens within DTI is common to the other Whitehall departments, and the observations made 
from examining the case studies described in this thesis should therefore apply more widely within 
government. Section 1.1 above introduced the role of the Treasury'Green Book'(1997), which gives 
rise to a uniformity in approach across Whitehall, by requiring departments to adopt the ROAMEF 
approach in programme design and operation. This is discussed further in chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
Chapter 9, section 9.3 continues this discussion, and considers the potential to exploit the findings of 
research more widely, by governments elsewhere. 
1.10 Selection of Case Study Examples 
DTI has run a large number of programmes over the years, and its history of programme development 
stretches back into the days of the former Ministry of Technology (MinTech) [Interviews I and 2] 
(Ernst & Young, 1990, p. 1). Obtaining an exact number is difficult, but the author estimates that the 
figure lies in the 'several hundreds'. For the purposes of this research it was considered impractical to 
attempt to review all these schemes. Instead it was decided to target activities operated under the 
umbrella activity of the Enterprise Initiative (EI). El covered the period of 1988 to 1994 and is 
regarded as one of DTPs highest profile initiatives, featuring prominently in the government white 
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paper DTI - the department for Enterprise {HMSO^ 1988, p. 41). Although primarily a vehicle for 
promoting DTI's services to business, the resource expended on ensuring its success is felt to have 
been sufficiently great for El to be treated in this research as a case in its own right. 
A number of programmes operated under EI, and of these, the author regards the Research and 
Technology (R & T) Initiative, the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), the Managing into the '90s (M90s), 
and the Manufacturing, Planning and Implementation (MPI) programme, as having been the most 
strategic and infiuential, and that these should therefore represent the remaining four cases for research 
to focus upon. A further advantage seen in concentrating on these examples is that they are sufficiently 
recent for documentation to be readily available and for the people associated with their introduction to 
still be likely to be available for interview. Sufficient time has also elapsed since their introduction for 
evaluatory work to have been undertaken by the department's assessors. Although the case study 
examples were central to the research, the author took the opportunity to consider some schemes prior 
to and post El. 
To summarise, this chapter has defined the subject o f research as the investigation of the process of 
designing and implementing programmes in government, that are aimed at helping firms to become 
more competitive. It has been argued that the research falls within the domain o f public policy and 
administration. The research objectives have been defined, and the research questions to be asked have 
been put. To help the reader in gaining an understanding o f the research topic, the next chapter, 
chapter 2, provides some useful background to the design process. Some of the historical factors 
which have influenced the design process, and a number of the commonly used terms, are explained. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO THE DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
SUPPORT POLICY WITHIN THE DTI 
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2. BACKGROUND TO THE DESIGN AND ADMDVISTRATION OF 
SUPPORT POLICY WITHIN THE DTI 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain to the reader certain elements which contribute to the culture 
of designing and administering support programmes in DTI. In so doing it is intended to help the 
reader understand the content of this thesis, by introducing commonly used terms and the historical 
background which has influenced the way in which the process is conducted. Such explanations are 
also regarded as helpful, as they enable observations to be interpreted by the reader from a similar 
perspective as that held by the civil servants involved (Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 96). 
Explanations begin in section 2.2 below, which discusses the use of the terms 'initiatives*, 
'programmes', 'schemes', and 'projects', and the relationships with overall policy making. Section 2.3 
discusses the structure of financial administration in the running of schemes, and section 2.4 introduces 
the three sets of primary guidance which are available to officials engaged in the design process. 
Section 2.5 outlines the changes in policy in recent years towards the support of businesses, and here 
the opportunity is taken to discuss the government's move towards a less interventionist stance. 
Finally section 2.6 provides an outline o f the grade structure within DTI . 
2.2 Policy, Initiatives, Schemes, Programmes, and Projects 
Reading the literature and listening to the conversations of officials, the author has observed that the 
above terms are often used interchangeably when discussing the development and administration of 
activities to support industry and commerce. The author himself is as guilty as anyone! It is therefore 
important at this stage to be clear as to what is meant by each term in the context of this research. 
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Firstly 'policy'. The author discussed how policy development may be defined with Dr. Peter Bentley 
(Director of Finance in DTI's Business Link Directorate) who is an experienced, senior official in the 
area of policy design. He took the view that policy design could be divided into two levels. At the 
macro level the process is concerned with developing overarching government policy covering such 
topics as 'Competition', 'Nationalisation of Publicly Owned Industries', and to 'Support Industry and 
Commerce'. At the lower,"detailed level, design of policy is about the design and administration of 
interventions which enable the government to realise its macro policy objectives. In Dr. Benlley-s 
view, it is this latter area with which officials engaged 'at the coal face' are primarily concerned. 
The author agrees with Dr. Bentley's descriptions of the two levels o f policy activity, and emphasises 
that it is that element of policy making which is primarily concerned with the designing of strategies 
which deliver ministerial objectives; that is programme development, which is the focus of the research 
recorded in this thesis. Others adopt a similar stance. Guy (1997, pp. 1-3) in discussing evaluation of 
policy, adopts a model which centres around the role of policy making as being essentially about the 
development o f programme strategies for delivering overall, policy objectives. Guy (1997) usefully 
refers to programme strategies as 'support policy', and for the purposes o f this research the author has 
adopted this context to describe the subject o f interest of his research. That is, research of support 
policy related to the design and operation of programmes that help firms in industry and commerce to 
improve their competitiveness. 
It is important at this stage to discuss the terms 'initiative', 'programme', and 'scheme', as in the public 
sector they are of^en used to mean the same thing. DTI's Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, 
p. 19), which are concerned with Research and Technology (R & T) funding, define a scheme as "i? 
broad area of related activities", and a programme as applying to a specific subject area within an 
'umbrella' scheme. Within a programme, the guidelines continue, there wi l l be a number of projects, 
and the government's LINK scheme is given as an example o f the 'scheme', 'programme', 'project' 
hierarchical structure. 
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Unfortunately, in actual practice the above convention is not universally adhered to. For example, in 
the SMART (Small Firms Merit Award for Research and Technology) activity in which SMEs may 
receive grants for R&D projects, the activity which contains no programmes is referred to as the 
SMART scheme, rather than a programme. In the previous Consultancy Initiatives (see appendix F, 
pp. 95-99) the term 'initiative' described a set of programmes under which firms could receive funding 
towards consultancy work. The Regional Supply Office programme involves no funded projects at all, 
being about supplying firms with information related to purchasing. In contrast the Business Link 
activity, which again centres around helping firms obtain information, is referred to as an 'initiative'. 
For the purposes of this research the author has decided that the terms 'initiative', 'scheme' and 
'programme' be used interchangeably, and be used to describe a policy heading which serves as an 
'umbrella' under which a number of related activities take place. 
For the purposes of this research, schemes within DTI can be broadly divided into the two categories of 
I ) Research and Technology (R & T) programmes, and 2) advisory schemes. R & T programmes are 
concerned with encouraging organisations to embark on technology related projects, such as those 
which involve R&D and technology transfer. Examples of schemes promoting R&D in firms are the 
SMART (Small firms Merit Award for Research and Technology) and SPUR (Support for Products 
Under Research) programmes. An example of a scheme for which the promotion of technology 
transfer is the principal theme is the BIOWISE programme. Advisory schemes are concerned with 
providing firms with the information they need to become more competitive. They can be divided into 
three further programme types. The first concerns 'awareness' programmes which aim at encouraging 
firms to adopt best practice in their business operations by raising their awareness of the business 
issues which they face. 
Second are consultancy schemes which aim to plant good management practice into SMEs by 
encouraging them to use external expertise, usually consultants, to help them implement programmes 
for change. Third are schemes such as the Business Link Initiative, which aim to provide firms with 
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access to the broad raft of business information they need to become and remain competitive, 
appendix E provides case study examples of R & T Programmes. Appendices F, G, and H provide 
examples of advisory activities. Figure 2.1 below describes diagrammatically the structure o f 
programme support. 
DTI 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
PROGRAMMES 
R & T 
PROGRAMMES 
ADVISORY 
PROGRAMMES 
R&D 
PROGRAMMES 
TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
AWARENESS 
PROGRAMMES 
CONSULTANCY 
INITIATIVES 
ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION 
Figure 2.1 The Programme Support Structure. 
2.3 Financial Administration of Programmes within DTI 
Discussion of the financial arrangements within DTI to administer programme expenditure must be set 
in the context of the wider need for the department to ensure that it spends its overall budget wisely, 
and manages its affairs efficiently. In turn, the systems that have been installed in DTI to manage 
expenditure effectively, must be viewed in the light of Treasury requirements for departments to 
achieve value for money (VFM) in spending public funds. 
The Treasury guidance Government Accoimting (HMT, 1999) sets the scene. Guidance begins by 
informing the reader that the Crown, ^'being the executive power, is charged with the management of 
all the revenue of the State, and with all payments for the public service", (chapter 1, section 1.1 
paragraph 1.1.1). The guidelines continue by referring to the Crown acting with advice from its 
responsible ministers, making known to the House of Commons the financial requirements o f the 
government. In return the Commons grants supplies, and the ways and means to meet them through 
taxes. The participation of the House o f Lords the guidance advises, is confined to "assenting to such 
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financial provisions of the Commons as require statutory authorisation^', (paragraph 1.1.1). 
Summarising, the guidance states: ""thus the Crown demands money, the Commons grant it, and the 
House of Lords assent to the grant" (HMT, 1999, paragraph 1.1.2). 
The pivotal role of the Treasury in implementing the collection and appropriation o f government 
revenues is indicated through inspection of Government AccowUing (HMT^ 1999). The guidelines 
advise that "within Government, the central responsibility for financial relations with Parliament falls 
to the Treasury" (paragraph 1.2.1). Guidance points to the Treasury Officers of Accounts, who were 
"_/7r5/ appointed in 1872 to assist and advise officers who rendered appropriation accounts upon all 
technical points concerned with book-keeping and accounts'' (paragraph 1.2.2). Attention is drawn to 
their duties from the beginning being closely linked with the development of the system of 
parliamentary control of expenditure, including the accounting and audit arrangements to secure that 
control (paragraph 1.2.2). 
Lipsey (2000, pp. 15-16) develops the discussion. He refers to the twin functions o f the Treasury of 
running the economy and the control of the overall level of public spending, both o f which are essential 
to any system of government. Here he comments that Britain, like France, is unusual in placing 
responsibility for both economic policy and public finances in a single institution, (Lipsey, 2000, p. 
81). Historically, the former role majored on the development o f macroeconomic policy, including 
fiscal and the related monetary policy. However recently, Lipsey proposes, the importance o f 
macroeconomic policy has declined, as people have questioned the Treasury's ability to influence 
events such as to smooth out economic fluctuations (p. 16). Emphasis instead has shifted towards 
providing a stable framework for economic policy, concentrating on the microeconomic factors such as 
the promotion of competition, (see section 2.5 below). 
Turning to the second area of responsibility, Lipsey suggests the Treasury's function in controlling 
government expenditure is necessary as spending levels are now too high to allow individual 
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departments control, albeit that they are subject to parliamentary oversight (p. 16). Interestingly he 
suggests that the origins of the Treasury, and in particular its control over finance, can be traced back 
over nearly one thousand years; before the Domesday Book (p. I ) . As the controller of government 
expenditure the Treasury enjoys a position of power and influence in Whitehall that has been built up 
over many years (Lipsey, 2000, pp. 1-10, 174). Rhodes (1988) usefully summarises the role o f the 
Treasury as: 
" The 'guardian' interest is enshrined in the Treasury. It negotiates with the service and lead 
departments the level of central funding of current expendititre through grants and the total ceiling on 
capital expenditure". 
(Rhodes, 1988, p. 105). 
Lipsey (2000, p. 174) highlights that no department can implement a new policy involving expenditure 
without Treasury approval. Individual items of spend over specified levels are also subject to the 
Treasury's consent (for an example in the Department of Trade and Industry see chapter 6, section 
6.4.4 of this thesis). They cannot, Lipsey proposes, spend more without Treasury's official licence. In 
theory, Lipsey observes, expenditure levels are agreed between each of the individual departments and 
the Treasury, with the departments and their ministers defending their proposals against criticism in 
negotiations. However he likens 'control' "to the language of war" (p. 170), in which suggests Lipsey, 
"the Treasury holds the whip hand"' (p. 174). He records departments viewing the Treasury as 'all 
powerful', and seemingly holding all the cards (pp. 142-143). Lipsey (1999, p. 141) relates the prime 
motivation of the Treasury's spending controllers to contain expenditure, to them viewing themselves 
as the taxpayers' representative in government, acting to limit the spending instincts of the Whitehall 
departments. Some see the Treasury's role to be to examine and resist proposals for greater 
expenditure from the spending departments. 
Lipsey (1999, p. 148) suggests that in reality the Treasury does not seek to mount a large scale assault 
on public spending, as it believes that it would be politically impractical to do so. He highlights for 
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example the interventionist policies enacted in the post-war years that have generally failed (p. 145). 
Rather the Treasury seeks to hone the growth of public spending. Lipsey proposes that the Treasury is 
not necessarily hostile to spending. The three criteria of economy, that is that everything should be 
carried out as cheaply as possible, efficiency (the minimisation of waste), and effectiveness (policies 
designed with clear objectives and wherever possible measurable outcomes), i f met, give grounds for 
expenditure (pp. 141-142). Detailed discussion of how the latter criterion is achieved in relation to 
programme development, is contained in chapter 6, sections 6.2 to 6.3.6, and chapter 8, sections 8.2 to 
8.3). 
The government white paper Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service HMSO (1982), 
reflects the desire to see arrangements put in place to achieve economy, efficiency, and policy 
effectiveness, in every aspect of departmental business. The paper sets out a number of actions 
to be undertaken by government departments to improve the management of resources within 
Whitehall. The efficiency measures described in the white paper provided a framework for 
better resource management and are essentially still in place today. This framework of 
measures has therefore set the management environment for policy development during the 
entire period covered by this thesis. Under the heading of "Financial Management", the white 
paper HMSO (1982, pp. 5-6, 21 -27) details the aims of the Financial Management Initiative 
(FMl). The objective of FMI is set out below: 
"The aim of the financial management initiative is to promote in each department an organisation and 
system in which managers at all levels have: 
a) a clear view of their objectives and means to assess and, wherever possible, measure outputs or 
performance in relation to those objectives; 
b) well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources, including a critical scrutiny 
of output and value for money; 
c) the information (particularly about costs), the training and the access to expert advice that they 
need to exercise their responsibilities effectively". 
(HMSO, 1982, p. 5) 
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Of the above aims, it is (a) and (b) which are of particular interest to this research. Objective 
(a) is essentially about evaluation of policy, which is discussed in chapter 8. Objective (b) is, 
as suggested by its description, very much about ensuring value for money and the 
establishment of systems to help good value to be achieved. 
The white paper HMSO (1982, p. 5) refers to departments being called upon to examine the 
way they manage all aspects of their programmes, and to work out the best pattern of 
managerial responsibility, financial accounting and control. Within DTI, the set o f guidance 
called the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b) was introduced in response to the Paper. 
Representing the primary source of reference in developing and administering interventions, 
the Finance Handbook (DT\, 1996b, section 2.1, paragraph 2.1.2) describes the structure and 
operation of the financial management systems which were put in place to meet the white 
paper's requirements. The DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b) makes clear that the 
principles of FMI apply to DTI, stating that "economy, efficiency, effectiveness and value for 
money now underpin everything we do" (DTI, 1996b, paragraph 2.1.2). The purpose of the 
research was to take a detailed look at what officials 'do' in the area of developing policy for 
support programmes to achieve value in the design and implementation of support policy. 
The DTI Finance Handbook (\996b, section 3.1, 3.2) shows how in the department overall 
strategic control of the management systems, which are aimed at ensuring that the department's 
resources are administered effectively and efficiently, is the responsibility of the Departmental 
Management Group (DMG). Chaired by the Permanent Secretary, its other members comprise 
the Chief Scientific Advisor to the Government, the Directors General (formerly known as 
Grade 2 staff), and the Director, Finance and Resource Management. Heads of other 
management units attend when topics with which they are directly concerned are on the DMG's 
agenda. The Financial Resource Management (FRM) Directorate provides the secretariat. 
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The Finance Handbook (1996b) describes the strategic nature of DMG's role, stating: 
'^DMG takes decisions on and monitors resources for the Department as a whole. It therefore takes 
responsibility for ensuring that systems designed to promote efficiency, economy and accountability 
are in place throughout the Department and are working satisfactorily. It also deals with issues that 
affect the whole Department or cut across a number of different Commands", 
DTI (1996b, paragraph 3.1.4) 
The Finmice Handbook DTI (1996b) also describes the role of the Departmental Strategy 
Group (DSG). Chaired by the Permanent Secretary, the DSG has responsibility for considering 
the wider policy objectives of the department and co-ordinating detailed policy, such as the 
introduction and operation of individual programmes, to ensure that they are supportive of 
wider policy goals. The agenda for DSG is described as being driven by the Permanent 
Secretary with the assistance of the Director of the Central Policy Unit (CPU). Other members 
include the Chief Scientific Advisor, the Directors General, the Chief Economics Advisor, and 
other directors when issues relevant to them are being discussed. 
2.4 DTI Guidance Available to Officials on Programme Development 
In analysing the process of designing support policy, the author observed that three documents 
form the principal source of guidance to officials, these being the H M Treasury *Green Book' 
(HMT, 1997), the DTI Finance Handbook DTI (1996b) discussed above, and successive 
versions of the Innovation Budget Guidelines, the latest version used for drafting this thesis 
being circulated in 1999 (DTI, 1999a). Inspection and comparison o f these documents shows 
that, from the perspective of providing advice on how to design policy for the introduction o f 
support programmes, the Innovation Budget Guidelines (1999a) are the most comprehensive 
source of guidance in the development process. From his experience, the author is also able to 
state that they are additionally the most widely referenced. These observations are discussed in 
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greater detail in chapter 10, sub-section 10.4.1. In charting the design process, emphasis has 
been placed on analysing the contents o f the Innovation Budget Guidelines (1999a). 
Reflecting policy developments within the department, the Innovation Budget Guidelines {\999a, p.7) 
have been given a number of specific titles over the years, but have remained focused on promoting 
innovation using funds drawn from DTI's Innovation Budget. To avoid confusion this title has been 
adopted in this thesis to cover all versions of the guidance. Both the DTI Finance Handbook {\996h) 
and Innovation Budget Guidelines (1999a) are restricted in circulation to officials within DTI and are 
not normally available for public inspection. 
2.5 Changes in Government Policy for Supporting Companies 
Study of government white papers and the various issues of DTI guidance to officials on programme 
development shows how in recent years there has been a shift in emphasis in government policy away 
from funding both large and small companies towards supporting primarily SMEs. In the Research 
and Technology (R & T) area, policy has moved from encouraging the development of new products to 
one of placing greater emphasis on prompting firms to make more use of the 'new' technologies 
already existing in the marketplace. In latter years greater emphasis has been placed in policy making 
on aiding the dissemination of business information and technology transfer. This practice appears to 
have been widely adopted within the European Union and the national governments of the member 
Slates (Clark and Guy, 1998, pp. 380-390), Promoting innovation has also become a key objective of 
the UK Government (DTI, 1999a, pp. 9-11) and more widely across Europe (Clark and Guy, 1998, pp. 
389-390). 
These changes may be seen in the context of the UK Government adopting a less interventionist 
stance. Professor Coates, in Industrial Policy in Britain (Coates, 1996, pp. 4-7), 'sets the scene' for 
discussion. Coates (1996, p. 6) proposes that since 1945 there has been an on-going debate relating to 
industrial policy between a broadly 'social democratic' strategy centred around creating, 
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supplementing and managing the market, and a neo liberal one organised around defending the market. 
Coales (1996) continues by suggesting that now debate has developed into a 'tussle' between the 
liberal position and those who take an 'interventionist' stance advocating policy to shape the market. 
In the case of the latter, he records the view of liberal economists and policy-makers who "have 
advocated (and continue to advocate) a very specific and highly restricted role for the state and its 
dealings with industry" (Coates, 1996, p. 6). However interestingly, Lipsey (1999, p. 3) suggests that 
it is not the first time that a non interventionalist stance has been adopted in the UK, nor is it a 
relatively recent phenomenon. He points to Gladstone's seven years as chancellor from 1859 to 1866, 
and the Treasury's instinct for austerity being "reinforced by the doctrines of the economic liberals, 
who were the apostles of free markets, and low state spending" (p. 3). 
The argument put forward by the 'liberals' for adopting a non interventionist policy centres around the 
characteristics of markets to act as a powerful incentive for actors to work efficiently to survive, to 
develop new products and services, to work with each other in complex decision making in the 
economy without intervention, and "allow people greater freedom of choice (Coates, 1996, pp. 6-7). 
The task of government is to create an environment in which markets can function effectively. These 
views, Coales suggests, have been dominant in the Conservative Party since 1979, the year of their 
election to government, and have now become ingrained in political thinking. Hover and Plant (1989), 
refer to governments in the UK and the United Slates wishing to limit the state's role in relation to 
industrial policy. 
Richards and Smith (1997, pp. 62-69) take up the debate reviewing the resultant policy changes within 
the DTI. They argue that the previous 'Heath government' was predominately interventionist, with the 
Conservative's introduction of the Industry Act of 1972 (p. 67), (see chapter 5, section 5.2.2 of this 
thesis) heralding a more interventionist period. Richards and Smith (1997, p. 67) quote a former 
Permanent Secretary (name withheld) as saying that the industry culture within DTI has been one of 
intervention, lending assistance to firms and areas of the Country which have experienced difficulties. 
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They suggest that the ethos in DTI has been very much about sponsoring and advocating the interests 
o f industry; a view with which the author is able to agree. 
Richards and Smith (1997, pp. 67-68) suggest the appointment in 1979 of Sir Keith Joseph as the 
Secretary of State (SoS) for Trade and Industry saw the beginning o f change within DTI. Reflecting 
the ' laissez-faire' predilection of the then Prime Minister, Lady Margaret Thatcher, a process of 
disengagement from industry was embarked upon (Richards and Smith, 1997, p. 68). However the 
author proposes that it was Lord Young, when he was DTPs Secretary Of State (SoS) who 
implemented the most significant changes. Richards and Smith (1997, pp. 68-69) concur, recording 
how Young 'harnessed and crystallised' the change in political direction, re-naming the department in 
1988 as The department for Enterprise' and refocusing its activities on extending the free market and 
wealth creation. Richards and Smith (1997) refer to Young's commitment at the time to reduce 
government intervention and "civil servants and ministers telling industry what to do" (Richards and 
Smith, 1997, p. 68). 
The impact o f recent Conservative Government thinking on industrial policy is evidenced in the 
January 1988 government white paper DTI - the department for Enterprise (HMSO, 1988, pp. 1-5, 6-7, 
22-27, 33-37, 41). The white paper refers to the government building on its work which began in 1979 
towards creating open markets (pp. 6-7). Towards achieving their aims, a number of the nationalised 
industries had been returned to the private sector through privatisation. Publication of the white paper 
saw significant change in the government's policy towards helping business, and in the author's 
opinion was a landmark document which set the scene for policy development within DTI ever since. 
For example, the present Labour Government has continued using many of the microeconomic tools 
employed by the previous Conservative' administration, such as the promotion o f competition, free 
trade and the better working of the labour market, (Lipsey, 2000, p. 16), (see also section 2.5.2 below). 
It is worth noting that, based on information received by the author Irom senior colleagues, the drafting 
of the Paper was very much Lord Young's *baby', and reflects much of his thinking discussed above. 
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Often referred to by officials as the DTI White Paper, the document (HMSO, 1988) set out the new 
policies and organisation of DTI. The Paper also referred to the need for further changes in the future, 
as DTI adjusts to reflect changes in the business environment and evaluates the effectiveness of its 
policies. The Paper then continued, any changes will be made within (he framework of the 
coherent and consistent rationale summarised in the objectives described in this paper" (HMSO, 1988, 
p. 41). The changes in ministerial policy which have most affected the area o f designing support 
schemes covered by this research are summarised below. 
2,5.1 The Support For Innovation Scheme 
The author, having joined DTI in January \98S, witnessed many of the changes wrought by the DTI 
White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 33-37). When he first joined DTI, the author spent much of his time 
identifying R&D projects to be supported through the award of grants under the department's Support 
For Innovation (SFl) scheme. At this time and until 1988, whilst emphasis was placed on smaller 
firms, no upper limit was placed on the size of company who was eligible to apply for funding. No 
distinction, for instance, was made between companies which were totally independent, and those 
belonging to groups o f larger, multinational organisations. A view often expressed to the author was 
that smaller firms who were members of large company groups could be 'starved' by the headquarters 
operation of the necessary cash to fund project work, and in consequence were no better placed than 
independent SMEs to resource project work. 
The DTI guidelines (which are undated but from the author's experience would suggest a drafting date 
of circa 1987) for awarding grants under SFl, Innovation Support For Business: Guidelines For 
Officials DTI (1987) describes the support available under the Scheme. In the introductory section it 
states that SFl ''may be provided for both manufacturing and service industry projects. It is directed 
principally at applied R&D projects and is only available exceptionally for basic research^' (DTI, 
1987, "Introduction", paragraph 1.2). 
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The SFI guidelines continue by describing the types of projects which are eligible for grant funding. 
These included up to 25% funding of single company projects where the total project costs did not 
exceed £500K. For collaborative projects involving applied research up to 50% o f total costs was 
made available, but 25% in the case of projects for which development was the subject of the work. 
No reference to company size is made. However circumstances changed with the introduction o f the 
DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988) as discussed below. 
2.5.2 The DTI White Paper 
As introduced in chapter I , section 1.1, study focused upon schemes introduced as a result of the DTI 
While Paper, that is DTI - the department for Enterprise (HMSO, 1988). Thus the DTI White Paper is 
significant for the research described in this thesis, as the policy described in this document shaped the 
schemes which were the subject of investigations. The white paper sets out the background to change. 
In its introductory chapter, (p. 3) the white paper advises that DTPs budget had fallen by more than a 
quarter since 1979/80 and that the balance of funding had shifted. Most of the reduction in budget was 
attributed to a decline in support for the nationalised industries, whilst spend on innovation had been 
substantially increased. The loss of the 'enterprise nation' and with it economic decline in the UK is 
cited as the rationale for change. Whilst acknowledging improvement in the UK's economic 
performance since the Second World War, the white paper draws attention to our growth rate being 
below that o f the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and Japan, (HMSO, 1988, p. 1). The 
reasons for poor economic performance were Maid at the door' of an education system which 
discouraged young people from developing business careers and neglected the skills of management 
and innovation. The unavailability o f suitable training for the majority o f people in the workplace was 
also cited as a further factor preventing the UK from realising its potential, (p. I ) . Poor industrial 
relations and corporatism were blamed for hampering the ability of the Economy to change and adapt. 
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Nineteen Seventy Nine was regarded as a "major turning point" (p, 2) and the white paper (HMSO, 
1988) continues by describing other changes which had taken place since then to improve the 
Economy. The Paper highlighted the government's twin aims o f reducing inflation and the 
encouragement of enterprise, and reported improvement in the climate for both wealth creation and 
enterprise. For example, inflation was seen as being under control, and changes in the tax system had 
restored incentives for individuals. Venture capitalists had returned to the marketplace and 
deregulation and competition had provided greater scope for businesses to develop. 
Success of policies were demonstrated by instances such as the UK having become second to Japan in 
terms of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and top in terms of productivity growth, since 
1981. Enterprise was also cited as an example of improvement in the Economy, with the net number 
o f businesses increasing by an average of 500 firms a week, since 1979. The DTI White Paper (HMSO 
1988, p. 2) then drew attention for the need to continue with the pursuit of improvement. Although 
productivity growth in the UK had been high, the nation's productivity was described as remaining 
between a third and a half that of competitor nations. Several underlying causes for continuing poor 
performance were listed. Spend on R&D by the private sector was seen as a smaller proportion of 
GDP and growing more slowly in the UK than elsewhere. Skills and training of employees were lower 
than in the main competitor economies, and the enterprise culture and the efficiency and 
competitiveness of both industry and commerce were seen as requiring further encouragement. 
Open markets and individuals were described as the foundations of government policy to address 
problems. For the former, continuation of competition policy (e.g. competition law including 
monopolies, referral of mergers to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), and restrictive 
trade practices), privatisation, deregulation, and international trade negotiations, were stated as the 
primary means for creating open markets. In the case of the latter, and the area o f interest to research, 
among DTI policies mentioned to help drive up competitiveness of firms was raising peoples' skills. 
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particularly in management, and the introduction of new DTI initiatives encouraging self-help in 
companies. 
Turning to future spend in DTI, the white paper stresses that many of these policies do not require 
government spend, for example, competition and deregulation. Whilst implying a role for government 
in improving the Economy, the 'non interventionist' stance of the government was also portrayed. The 
paper states: 
"TV/e tmderlying theme of spending is to improve the fimctioning of the markets, to avoid taking 
decisions which should be taken by the private sector, while contributing positively to economic 
activity\ 
(HMSO, 1988, p. 3). 
The white paper continues by illustrating how the government, and In particular DTI , will improve the 
Economy by helping firms raise their competitiveness. The importance o f firms having sufficient 
information relating to business opportunities and problems to make reasoned, strategic business 
decisions is emphasised. The paper emphasises that "The need to transfer information underpins a 
whole range of DTI policies and spending" (HMSO, 1988, p. 3). Future policies were lo be focused on 
improving management skills in strategic decision making by broadcasting information on best 
practice and raising awareness of the value of seeking external, business advice. Transfer o f 
technology into firms was also described as a key component o f policy, technology transfer being seen 
as having potential to increasing competitiveness and thus an important activity for management in 
business to undertake. Reference to the key role o f information' was again made, with the white paper 
stressing the importance of future policy focusing on encouraging collaboration between businesses 
and research institutions. DTFs role to act as a catalyst for technology transfer by providing 
information and encouraging firms to try new approaches was emphasised (p. 3). 
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The decision to substantially increase spend on consultancy services for SMEs is stated, and a shift in 
spending emphasis within programmes described. With reference to the latter, the DTI White Paper 
(HMSO, 1988, pp. 3-4) announced a move away from single company funding for R&D projects, in 
favour of placing emphasis on collaborative research and technology transfer. A notable exception was 
the SMART scheme, on which funding was to be increased, (p. 37). Suspension o f support for 
development work in R&D projects was also signalled, in line with the government taking a less 
interventionist position. The white paper argued that: 
'"Firms themselves are best able to assess their own markets and to balance the commercial risks and 
rewards of financing R&D and innovation. Tlie Government should not take on the responsibilities 
which are primarily those of industry'\ 
(HMSO, 1988, p. 33). 
The DTI While Paper also indicated a shift in emphasis from helping companies in general to focusing 
on helping Small to Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), (p. 3). An SME was defined as an 
independent firm employing less than 500 staff. In later years this figure was reduced to companies 
employing less than 250 people (DTI, 1996a, p. 16)). 
2.5.3 Research and Technology Programmes 
The white paper continued by concluding that 'near-market' research or development leading directly 
to the introduction of commercial products should not be the responsibility o f government to fund. 
Instead it was argued that reliance on the decisions of firms may result in levels o f innovation which 
fails to maximise the Country's potential, therefore DTI*s future innovation policy should focus on 
longer term, collaborative, 'away from the market' research (HMSO, 1988, p. 33). From his own 
experience of appraising applications under the previous SFI scheme, many of the projects flinded 
involved the development of products ready to be released into the market. Under the revised 
conditions imposed by the white paper, such applications would have been judged ineligible for 
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funding. Indeed the author had experience of one, single company application which failed to gain 
approval before the Paper was published, and was immediately rejected despite considerable effort 
having been put into develop proposals. 
The 1988 version of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1988), prepared immediately after the 
publication of the DTI White Paper, reflects the changes in policy. For the first time the guidelines 
refer to the Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative, which was launched shortly after publication 
of the white paper (HMSO, 1988). In discussing the support available under the R & T Initiative the 
guidelines state: 
"Support is limited to collaborative rather than single company projects, in order to encourage those 
arrangements, both between companies and benveen companies and universities and like bodies 
required for the greater exploitation of scientific and technological advances in the UK", 
(DTI , 1988, paragraph 2.8). 
The guidelines (DTI, 1988, paragraph 1.5) continue by emphasising that support provided under each 
of these umbrella schemes must be primarily focused on pre-competitive, 'away from the market' 
research. Eligibility for funding was restricted to independent firms employing less than 500 people. 
The R & T Initiative is discussed in appendix E. 
2.5.4 New Schemes announced in the DTI White Paper 
The white paper heralded the introduction of a new range o f business support initiatives, referred to 
collectively as the Consultancy Initiatives (CI). The Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-27) describes the aim 
of C! as being to address the perceived lack o f management skills in Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) by providing firms with support to encourage them to use outside consultancy 
services to help them develop their management skills. Six initiatives, each covering a specific 
business topic such as 'Design' and 'Marketing*, were announced. CI is discussed ftirther in 
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appendix F. 
2.5.5 Co-ordinating Business Support 
With the objective o f making DTI's support more accessible to people, publication o f the DTI White 
Paper saw the launch of the Enterprise Initiative (EI), which acted to co-ordinate DTFs schemes. The 
Paper set out the role of El as being to bring together the department's services for industry and 
commerce, offering a range of initiatives to help businesses innovate and become more competitive 
(HMSO, 1988, p. 41). Brigading DTI's services included bringing together support for R&D work, 
consultancy schemes, and awareness activities. The role of EI is discussed in greater detail in 
appendix D. 
2.5.6 Policy Developments post the DTI White Paper 
A sequence of government white papers has followed the publication of the DTI White Paper. 
In discussing governmental functions, they have tended to be broader in focus, looking at 
activities across the Whitehall departments rather than an emphasis on the role of DTI. 
Publication of these papers has seen the emergence of 'competitiveness as an overriding theme, 
with publications referred to within government as The First Competitiveness White Paper', 
'The Second Competitiveness White Paper', The Third...', and so on. Each has built on the 
themes introduced in the DTI White Paper, an approach which has substantially continued 
under the present Labour Administration (The Stationery Office, 1998). A further feature of 
the white papers introduced by the previous Conservative Government is to use these 
documents to report progress on meeting policy objectives set out in previous issues, as well as 
setting out new and revised policies. 
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The Innovation Budget Guidelines DTI (1996a, p. 8) refers to three white papers published 
since the DTI Paper which have set out the broad policy aims that DTI aims to achieve in the 
areas of Innovation and Technology. They are: 
o Realising our potential (The Science, Engineering and Technology White Paper), (HMSO, 
1993), the first Competitiveness White Paper, 
o Competitiveness - Helping Business to Win, (HMSO, 1994a), the second Competitiveness 
Paper, 
• Competitiveness - Forging Ahead, (HMSO, 1995a), the third Competitiveness Paper, 
The guidelines make clear reference to a shift in emphasis away from funding R&D work, stating: 
"Tliese White Papers reflect a ?iew emphasis in DTI activities to create a new climate conducive to 
innovation in its widest sense, promoting adoption of management and other best practices and 
assisting companies to gain access to and use technology effectively and know-how rather than 
providing support for the development of technology via R&D grants. One consequence is a 
continuing shift in overall pattern of spending towards technology access and away from technology 
development". 
(DTI, 1996a, p. 8). 
In the author's opinion, it was the publication of Realising our potential (HMSO, 1993) which brought 
about the most change. The DTI programme evaluation report, DT! Funded Research Projects At 
Research And Technology Organisations, in commenting on policy states: 
"However in J993 the White Paper changed the way in which budgets would be spent on Research and 
Development (R&D) and this had a major effect on the fimding for.research at RTOs (Research and 
Technology Organisations) 
(DTI, 1996a, p. I ) . 
The view expressed within DTI at the time of its publication was that DTI's spend on collaborative 
R&D was small in comparison with that elsewhere, such as by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). DTI's 
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spend at around £iOOM (DTI, 1992, p. iv) was compared with the MoD's spend on Defence R&D 
which was running at around £2,600M (HMT, 1990). Therefore it was argued that it was more 
sensible for DTI to spend its limited resources on helping firms exploit existing technologies, rather 
than placing emphasis on developing new ones. Thus spend from the Innovation Budget became 
increasingly weighted towards technology transfer at the expense of supporting R&D projects. 
2.6 DTI Grade Structure 
To assist the reader in forming his or her own views on the content of the thesis, references to people in 
the Civil Service also include details of the Grade of the individuals concerned. Over the years the 
author has found that generally people were familiar with the grade structure in the Civil Service and 
had an understanding of the levels of responsibility held. However there have been recent changes to 
the traditional hierarchy, and to avoid possible confusion the author though it useful to briefly set out 
those which have taken place in DTI. An internal DTI report. Implementing the Civil Service Wliite 
Papers in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, I996e, chapter I ) , provides the background to 
establishing a new management regime within the Civil Service. The report (chapter 5, paragraph 5.1) 
makes references to two government white papers. The first. Continuity and Change (HMSO, 1994b), 
set out the government's proposals for leaner and flatter management structures, and the introduction 
of more flexible pay arrangements. The second. The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and 
Change (HMSO, 1995b), staled the govemment's commitment to introduce these changes, and also the 
abolition of Grades 1 to 5 from April 1996. 
Another internal DTI paper. Department of Trade and Industry: Guidance on Allocating Posts to Pay 
Ranges (DTI, 1997c, p. 3, and annex A) , was subsequently drafted in response to the white paper 
(HMSO, 1995b). The guidance refers to the white paper confirming: 
''the Government's intention to proceed with pay and grading delegation to Departments from April 
1996. From that date, Departments became responsible for pay and grading decisions affecting their 
s t a f f \ 
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(DTI,'1997c, p. 3). 
The DTI Paper (DTI, 1997c) set out the new arrangements for Pay and Regrading in DTI. It describes 
how the junior and middle management grades, which comprised six levels in total, were to be reduced 
into three Pay Bands ' A ' , ' B ' , and ' C , with ' C being the highest in seniority. For each Seniority 
Band a number of Pay Ranges were defined, into which staff would be placed in accordance with their 
previous grading. The new arrangements came into effect in April 1997. The guidance (DTI, 1997c) 
provided a table showing the approximate equivalencies between the old grades and the Pay Ranges. 
Inspection of this table reveals the relationships between the previous middle management grades and 
their Pay Range (PR) designations in the new structure (this research obtained much information from 
people employed in the middle and senior levels of the Service, but not from the junior grades). The 
relationships are shown below: 
Old Grades New Bands New Pay Ranges 
Higher Executive Officer (HEO) Band B , PR7 and PR8 
Senior Executive Officer (SEO) Band C PR9 
Grade 7 (Section Head) (G7) Band C PR 10 
Grade 6 (Deputy Branch Head) Band C PRl 1 
The DTI report on Implementing the Civil Service Wlute Papers (DTI, 1996e, chapters 2 and 3) details 
the changes in the Senior Civil Service. Former Grade 5s' (Branch Heads) became Directors of 
Directorates, whilst former Grade 2 personnel (Head of Command) became Director Generals. Many 
of the Grade 3 and 4 staff left on Early Retirement, with only a handful o f people formerly at Grade 3 
level securing a position of Deputy Director General. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
A brief history of how government policy towards supporting business has changed in recent years, 
and the way in which those changes have impacted on the process of designing support programmes 
within DTI, has been detailed. How programme expenditure is managed has been explained, and the 
relationships between the present and previous grade structures described. It has also been shown that 
central to the changes in government policy has been the move from an interventionist stance in 1979 
to the more non-interventionist position which has latterly been taken. This shift can be seen as being 
in step with developments elsewhere. For example, Phillips (1992, pp. 104-112) refers to the adoption 
of the free market ideology in the United States (US) which has led to a non-interventionist stance 
being taken. 
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3. T H E L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 
3,1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 Background to the Research 
Chapter I set out the initial rationale for considering the research project described in this thesis. There 
is still much to learn in the area of public policy and a strong interest In doing so. Against this 
background, the aim of the research described in this thesis has three important objectives. The first is 
to make a contribution to knowledge through study of the activities involved in a specific and 
important area of policy making, that of the process of designing policy for the introduction and 
operation o f programmes which focus on supporting firms in becoming more competitive. The second 
aim is to identify ways in which the policy process can be improved, and in support of this the third 
objective is to develop proposals for the introduction of a set of good practice guidance for inclusion in 
a future Handbook for Programme Design and Operation. 
Chapter 1 posed six questions for research to answer, in support of achieving these objectives. The 
first three of these were targeted at establishing a credible rationale for undertaking the main body of 
research work. The questions, and how their answers were seen as contributing to a rationale, are 
summarised in sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.1.4 below. Responding to these questions represented the 
first task o f the "Literature Review". 
On the assumption that a clear rationale existed, three further questions were put for research to 
consider. The first two of these are given in sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6, together with outlines of why 
they were being asked. The aim of these questions was to derive a detailed model which described the 
design and administration process, and then to find ways of introducing improvement. To help in 
responding to these questions, the second task o f the literature review was to identify the lines o f 
investigation, and the approaches which should be adopted in discovering ways to make the design 
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process more efficient. Finally, chapter I raised the issue o f generalisability o f research results, which 
is outlined in section 3.1.7. 
3.1.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
Chapter 1, section 1.3.1 raised the first issue for research to consider, which was would the work of this 
thesis be likely to contribute to knowledge? It was explained how the 'veil o f secrecy' which shrouds 
policy making from external examination, suggests that the level of published knowledge on the 
process of designing support policy is likely to be low. Chapter 1, section 1.2 had provided grounds 
for thinking such was the case. An initial survey of the literature revealed little relevant to the subject 
o f this research. It was hence thought that there was significant scope for research to extend the level 
o f understanding of the design process, and thus would make a useful contribution to knowledge. The 
author, as a civil servant, was in a position to study the design process directly, and make that 
contribution to knowledge. 
However, before embarking on the main body of the research project, it was first necessary to confirm 
the existence of critical gaps in current knowledge of the process within the research community. The 
first research question posed was therefore: 
(i) "What is the current, documented understanding o f the process of designing and operating support 
policy, how well is the system described and do significant gaps in existing knowledge exist"? 
The response to this question is provided in section 3.2.1. 
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3.1.3 Establishing Level of Interest in Designing Support Policy 
Section 1.3.2 raised the second issue for research to resolve, which concerned the likely levels of 
interest in identifying ways to improve the process of designing support policy. It was argued that the 
case for undertaking the proposed research would be strengthened i f it could be shown that activity and 
spend by governments world wide in promoting the competitiveness o f their businesses was 
significant. High levels of activity and spend would render it likely that proposals to increase VFM 
would be well received. The second question posed for research was therefore: 
( i i ) "Is the level of activity by governments internationally in delivering support policy, sufficient to 
warrant investigation of the processes involved"? 
This issue is addressed in section 3.2.2 
3.1.4 Establishing Evidence of Deficiencies 
Chapter 1, section 1.3.3 discussed the third issue contributing to a rationale, which centred around 
there needing first to be positive evidence of problems existing with the current process. The third 
research question was to establish grounds for thinking that there was room for improvement, that is: 
(ii i) "Is there any evidence to suggest that current procedures are in substantial need of improvement"? 
The answering of this question is detailed in section 3.2.3. 
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3.1.5 Discovering the Nature of the Design Process 
In seeking ways to affect improvement, it is first necessary to gain a ful l understanding of the current 
process, that is, what comprises the system and how its individual components function and interrelate 
to deliver support activities. The fourth question for research to answer was hence: 
(iv) "What is the scope of the process describing the designing and implementing policy for 
introducing and operating programmes which support firms in becoming more competitive, what 
comprises that process in terms of the elements which make up the whole system, and how do 
these elements interrelate in delivering support policy"? 
As previously discussed, secrecy surrounding the policy process was likely to have limited research 
into the design of support policy, and hence in answering this question the author would 
simultaneously 'plug' a significant gap in present knowledge on the topic. The question is discussed in 
section 3.3, where the scope of the process is defined, and the areas to be researched proposed. 
3.1.6 Identifying Potential Improvements 
Having obtained a full description of the current process, it was suggested that the system be 
investigated in detail to identify potential areas for improvement, and how current arrangements may 
be bettered. The fifth research question then was: 
(v) "In what areas may improvements be introduced and what should those improvements comprise"? 
Improving the process is discussed in section 3.4. 
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3.1.7 Generalisability of Research Findings 
Although research would focus on the design of support policy within DTI, there is a need to make 
sure that the research results are likely to be generally applicable in the public sector. In this way the 
potential benefits of the research are maximised. 
The sixth and final question to be answered was then associated with generalisability: 
(vi) "What scope is there for exploiting the results o f research beyond DTI"? 
An initial discussion of this issue is undertaken in section 3.7, towards the bottom o f this chapter. 
The following text records the review of the literature. 
3.1.8 Building on Current Knowledge 
In regard of the purpose of a literature review, Yin (1994) states: 
"•Budding investigators think that the purpose of a literature review is to determine the answers about 
what is known on a topic; in contrast, experienced investigators review previous research to develop 
sharper and more insightful questions about the topic". 
(Yin, 1994, p. 9) 
As a result of reviewing the literature, the author was able to define several supplementary questions 
which helped probe the process of designing and administering programmes more deeply. 
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3.2 Establishing the Rationale 
3.2.1 Current Understanding of Designing Support Policy 
This section of the literature review aims to establish the first component of rationale, by confirming 
grounds for thinking that research work would lead to a contribution of knowledge. Existence of 
rationale would be indicated by answering the first research question, which sought to determine the 
current level of understanding in designing support policy. 
The subject of the research described in this thesis falls within the arena o f public policy. The 
literature on public policy records the substantial amount of research which has already been 
undertaken, and the associated large and wide ranging debate conducted by researchers on this topic. 
However it is important to emphasise once again that the research described in this thesis is concerned 
with investigating a particular area of policy making. The focus for research is the process o f 
developing policy delivery, particularly for the introduction of programmes, which support firms, 
mainly in the industrial sector, to become more competitive. 
Chapter I , section 1.2 referred to a preliminary survey of titles and abstracts conducted by the DTI 
Library, which had indicated little on the research subject. However the author wanted more 
substantive evidence of the design process not being widely studied. An initial, detailed inspection of 
the literature was carried out. It was noted that articles on policy tended to major on the 
implementation of policy; a matter which is open to public scrutiny, rather than on the private aspects 
of policy making of which programme design forms part. For instance a number o f articles were 
discovered discussing topics such as policy relating to the delivery of healthcare services. However 
very little documented research was found relating to how officials within government take a policy 
line introduced by ministers, and then design and operate programmes to realise ministers' aspirations. 
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Returning to the literature, others were able to give the author confidence that his initial observations 
were correct. For example Smith, Marsh, and Richards (1993, p. 567) state that it is generally accepted 
that government departments are the key institutions for policy-making in Britain. They are the focus 
of the policy process and yet, say Smith, Marsh, and Peters (1993), they have received little attention 
by researchers. Research work has tended to major on the Prime Minister and the 'core executive', 
with what studies that have been undertaken of departments focusing on their organisational structures. 
Although most policy is made within government departments there is, they suggest, "very little 
research on the way in which departments make policy..." (Smith, Marsh, and Richards, 1993, 
p. 589). 
These observations are not altogether surprising. Many researchers of public policy in the UK, and 
elsewhere, refer to the 'shroud of secrecy' which surrounds the development process (HMSO, 1989; 
Hennessy, pp. 344-379, 1990; Smith, 1998, p. 65; Wellerand Stevens, 1998, p. 579). Smith, Marsh, 
and Richards (1993, p. 571) record many claiming the absence of research is the result of excessive 
secrecy. Weller and Stevens continue advising that ''Policy advising must remain a confidential 
process, to protect the relationships between ministers and their advisers" (Weller and Stevens, 1998, 
p. 583). Lipsey (1999, p. 39) agrees. He states that civil servants advice must be secret, as ministers 
might be embarrassed i f appearing to be in conflict with their advisors. Civil servants are under an 
obligation to keep the confidences to which they become privy in the course of their work (Hennessy, 
1990, p. 344). They are thus discouraged from public discussion o f the intricacies o f their work. 
Also study of the literature shows review of policy to have been essentially undertaken by people 
employed outside government, rather than insiders such as civil servants. Their ability to research and 
debate the inner workings of the policy machine is severely restricted, as they are not able to benefit 
from having first hand experience gained from direct involvement. Furthermore, they are denied 
access to information held by government officials by their need to respect confidentially. Hi l l (1997, 
p. 25) suggests that much is kept secret unnecessarily. Taken together, it was concluded from the 
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aforementioned observations that the intricacies of policy making, which include the design o f support 
programmes within government, is an area which lo-dale has not been subjected to close examination. 
The research described in this thesis illuminates one small, but very important part o f the policy 
making process, that of designing support policy. The author as the researcher, it is argued, was 
strategically placed to study the process of designing support policy. He was uninhibited by the 
restrictions on the flow of information from within the policy making process to the research 
community at large. As a civil servant he was able to study the design process from the position of an 
insider, having direct access to the people tasked with the introduction of support activities and the 
documentation which is created in the design and implementation of policy. Furthermore, the author 
had the important advantage of being responsible for the design and delivery of support programmes 
himself, and would therefore be able to call on his own experience in the research task. 
Thus from his privileged position the author would be able to unveil the policy process and reveal the 
activities which take place. By answering the research questions posed, he would be able to place in 
the public domain an analysis of the mechanisms involved in designing and delivering support policies, 
such that ministers' policy objectives are met. It was anticipated that in so doing, he would make a 
useful and interesting contribution to knowledge. 
3.2.2 Public Support for Industry 
This part of the literature survey concentrated on answering the second research question, which was 
concerned with establishing an economic rationale to undertake research work. The aim was to 
confirm that most countries in the developed world have industrial policies on which large sums of 
money are expended by the national governments, thus rendering investigating ways of improving the 
design process worthwhile. Rhodes (1988, p. 328) useftilly defines industrial policy as a set o f 
measures employed by governments to influence the decisions of individual enterprises, so as to 
improve the overall stale of the industrial economy. The author argues that the introduction o f 
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programmes to support firms is one such example of the measures which governments can take, and 
their design part of the development of industrial policy. 
The first factor contributing to an economic rationale is the importance of the role which government 
plays in international competition, and how it can influence the competitive advantage of industry 
(Porter, 1990, p. 617). The extent of government involvement is indicated by the literature, which 
shows that, over time, most of the world's developed nations have implemented industrial policies, 
implicitly or explicitly, aimed at directly or indirectly improving the competitiveness of industry. 
The extent of the practice of countries helping firms become more competitive is indicated in the 
literature. Rothwell and Zegveld (1985, pp. 165-172), Porter (1990, pp. 626-653), Cunningham and 
Barker (1992, section 2, parts 2-4), and Dodgson and Bessant (1996, chapter 5, pp. 77-153, ) , for 
example, list the United States (US), Canada, Japan, Korea, Singapore, United Kingdom (UK), Eire, 
France, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Austria, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark as 
amongst such nations. To these is added at the pan-European level, policy aimed at improving 
competitiveness which is delivered by the European Union (EU), (Sharp, 1991 pp. 59-72; Guy, 1998, 
pp. 2-6). 
The scale of activity is also indicated by the range of policy instruments deployed by the developed 
nations in raising compethiveness. Porter(1990, pp. 626-653), Rothwell and Zegveld (1981, p. 61), 
Linder and Peters (1990, p. 113), Sharp (1991, p. 63), and Clark and Guy (1998, p. 388) show that 
devices used include public enterprise (e.g. innovation by publicly owned industries), scientific and 
technical research (public support of work undertaken in research laboratories and research 
associations), education (general education. Higher Education Institutes (HEI) courses, apprenticeship 
schemes), information (information networks and centres, advisory or consultancy services, database 
services), financial (grants, loans, subsidies), taxation (company, personal, tax allowances), legal and 
regulatory (patents, environmental and health regulations, monopoly regulations), political (planning, 
encouragement of mergers), procurement (central and local government o f purchases of goods and 
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contracts for services), commercial (trade agreements), and overseas agents (defence sales 
organisations), and the definition of standards. 
Porter (1990, pp. 644-647), and Cunningham and Barker (1992, section 2, parts 2-4) further describe 
instances of firms receiving funding from national governments in the form of public contracts, 
awarded to undertake activities such as R & D in the defence and health areas, for example. Research 
in this thesis however focuses on those policies which aim to encourage firms to take particular actions 
by offering grants and raising awareness o f the competitive issues they face. 
Many of the developed economies adopt support policies which aim to help firms to become more 
competitive by direct means. Such strategies it is argued, centre around providing support which 
encourages and helps companies to take appropriate actions in response to the rapid, and of^en 
unpredictable, changes of a globalised market (Porter, 1990 pp. 626-627; Senge, 1990, p. 4; Drucker, 
1995, pp. 39-40, 75-77). Encouragement and support is often given in the form of financial grants to 
firms, and by the support of projects which help provide access to companies to the knowledge they 
require in building and implementing business strategies for growth. The literature reveals the extent 
of governments' commitment to implementing support policy for industrial firms, and provides 
examples of how the policy instruments have been adopted. Starting with the European Community, 
much support for industry has been provided under programmes funded under the Single European Act 
of 1987, prior to which its policies to promote research, development and technology were mostly 
based on action under Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, (Sharp, 1991, p. 59). The Act provides the 
legal basis for the implementation o f Community policies on advanced technologies. 
The industrial credentials o f the Single European Act are displayed in the opening line of the text 
which the Act adds to Part III of the European Community Treaty a Title (Title V I , Article I30F), that 
is: 
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"the Community '5 aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and technological base of European 
industry and to encoifrage it to become more competitive at an international leveP\ 
(Sharp, 1991, p. 59). 
The Act also describes the two tier structure of support: an umbrella programme adopted unanimously 
by member states called The Framework Programme, which comprises a number o f sub programmes 
each having a specific technology theme. The Framework Programme was adopted in 1987 by the 
Council o f Ministers, it is operated as a staged activity with programme content and objectives 
reviewed every five years (Sharp, 1991, pp. 65-67). The fourth stage o f the programme. Framework 
IV was voted funding of ECU 13.2 billion (EU, 1999) with the provision of support in the form of 
grants being a principal funding mechanism (Sharp, 1991, p. 69). 
Sharp (1991, p. 66) quotes the principal European Community (sub) programmes which the European 
Community has funded within the Framework Programme. Examples of these are ESPKIT (European 
Strategic Programme for R & D in IT) which promotes competitiveness in IT (Information 
Technology) technologies, primarily micro-electronics and systems development. RACE (R & D in 
Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe) aims to establish European competence in 
broadband communications by developing the technology and standards, whilst BRITE/EURAM 
(Basic Research in Industrial Technologies, Advanced Materials for EURope) supports the industrial 
Research and Development (R & D) of materials technology, materials and production. 
Cunningham and Barker (1992, section 2, parts 2-4) provide examples of industrial support 
programmes funded by individual countries. For instance, reference is made to the former Federal 
Republic of Germany's technology policy, under which spending o f around 53.5 billion DM was made 
during 1986 (p. 627). Aimed at modernising the economy, "the improvement of the technical 
opportunities for innovation leading to increases in the efficiency and competitiveness of industry 
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is quoted as a prime objective (p. 649). Examples of specific activities funded as a result o f 'po l icy ' 
are the BMFT's Materials Research Programme, which between 1985 and 1994 was expected to spend 
some 1.1 billion DM. 
A further example of the former West Germany's support for industry is the general promotion of 
industry's capacity to undertake R&D and the dissemination o f key technologies (p. 657). Indirect 
support in the form of tax related measures was employed to encourage firms to take action. On the 
supply side, policy aimed to promote the development o f skilled staff, whilst on the demand side, firms 
could receive tax concessions on specified investments. A scheme to promote R & D in SMEs was also 
operated and total spend during 1987 was approximately 762.5 million DM. 
In France, the Industrial Research and Development Ministry o f Industry, Mining, Post and 
Telecommunications and Tourism (MIPTT) has general oversight of industrial policy (p. 608). For 
1985 funding o f industrial R&D was around 15 MdF. Initiatives funded by MIPTT include the PMFE 
programme (Programme for the mastery of the development o f the electronic fabric), which funded 
basic research in microelectronics and Information Technology (p. 612). PMFE also funded the 
dissemination of programme results and apprised firms of the importance of emerging developments. 
Spend on PMFE amounted to some 4 MdF. MIPTT has also provided around 2MdF of support for the 
electronic industries, encouraging, for example, universities to work with firms in developing their use 
of Computer Aided Design (CAD). 
The Danish Government is quoted as having launched several schemes to promote industrial 
technology (p. 712). These include financial support to firms undertaking research, encouraging 
companies to collaborate with governmental research establishments, stimulating technology transfer 
and the acquisition o f foreign technology. The Technology Development Programme (p. 717) aimed 
to overcome problems in diffusing information technologies into the small firms sector. Aimed at 
organisations employing equal or less than 200 staff, funding amounted to around Dkr 1,200 million 
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during 1985, and included provision of R&D grants, knowledge acquisition, awareness campaigns, 
demonstrator projects, and training. 
In Japan, responsibility for the implementation of industrial policy falls to MITI (Ministry o f 
International Trade and Industry), which is quoted as having a total spend of Y 100,000 million in 1990 
(p. 500). An example of initiatives supported by the Japanese Government is MIT l ' s Basic 
Technologies for Future Industries project, which was a ten year programme starting in 1981. The 
programme aimed to establish mass production techniques for the biotechnology industry. MITI 's 
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) receives 15% of MITPs budget, and functions to 
promote the development of natural resources, upgrading of production technology, standardisation in 
industry and through subsidies to encourage R&D in Japan's private sector. 
"77/e United States has no explicit industrial policy and no Department or Ministry of Industry" 
(Arnold and Guy 1986, p. 32). However evidence suggests the operation of an industrial policy by 
default. Of the $3.2 billion invested in industrial research during 1989, Cunningham and Barker 
(1992) point to the contribution of $650 million contributed by the Federal Government (p. 297), 
Other ways in which the Federal Government has aided industry include tax incentives provided with 
the introduction of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act. The Act provides an accelerated cost 
recovery scheme for writing o f f certain investments. For example, during the period 1981 -5, 
companies could receive tax credits (25 per cent) for R & D expenditure which was in excess of their 
average expenditure in a base period, normally three years (Arnold and Guy, 1986, p. 48). During 
1982 the US Government introduced the Small Business Innovation Research Programme (SBIR) 
(Arnold and Guy, 1986, pp. 48-49). The objective of SBIR is to encourage innovation by 
strengthening the role o f small, innovative companies in Federal Government funded R&D. Under the 
programme, a proportion of the government's R&D budget is allocated for fijnding R&D in small 
firms which, to be eligible, must employ less than 500 people and at least 51% owned by American 
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citizens. Arnold and Guy (1986) quote planned expenditure under SBIR for 1987 as being $450 
million. 
Finally, in the UK., the Department o f Trade and Industry (DTI) has lead responsibility for industrial 
policy (Rhodes, 1988, p. 330). Details of programmes operated by DTI are given in the annual Trade 
and Industry: The Govenvnents Expenditure Plans, published by HMSO (1995c). For instance the 
1998-1999 edition (DTI, 1998), serves to provide examples of measures introduced by the department 
to help firms. Among the initiatives described is the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme, which 
underwrites loans to small enterprises that lack the security to offer against conventional finance (p. 
63), (Rhodes, 1988, p. 329). Started in 1981, the net cost of running the initiative in the financial year 
1997/98 was £43.7 million. 
A further example is the operation of the Business Link programme, which aims to provide SMEs with 
a local, one-stop shop facility providing a range o f business support services (DTI , 1998, p. 65). 
Expenditure on Business Links in the financial year 1997/98 was £136.7 million. To help forge 
partnerships between Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) and SMEs, the Foresight LINK programme 
provides grants in support of collaborative R*S:D, whilst the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS) funds 
the placement o f graduates into firms to help the transfer of technology from Higher Education 
Establishments (HEIs) into SMEs. In the case of the former, a total of £10 million in grants were 
awarded in the financial year 1997/98 (p. 70). During the same period, public expenditure on the latter 
was around £18 million (pp. 73-74). Interestingly Rhodes (1988, pp. 328-329) refers to the 
introduction of the UK Industry Act 1972 by the previous Conservative Government, which provided 
for a range of selective assistance, including support for capital-intensive projects in specific industrial 
sectors, for example wool textiles. The Industry Act 'providing for' the operation of support activities 
serves to demonstrate that Acts of Parliament can have a key role in policy development, and this role 
should therefore be subjected to investigation. Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 discusses the role o f 
parliamentary Acts in the operation of support programmes. 
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The above examples serve to show that the implementation of support policy among the countries o f 
the developed world is widespread. The examples further demonstrate the high levels of activity and 
investment involved. It was therefore concluded that a rationale to undertake the research existed on 
economic grounds. The levels of support provided by governments to help firms is of an order which 
suggests that there wil l be widespread interest, in proposals to improve VFM. 
Of the policy instruments available to governments to further the competitiveness o f SMEs, the two of 
interest to this research are the provision of financial grants, and the award of contracts to run activities 
aimed at helping firms. Examination of the above examples shows these instruments to have been 
widely adopted, serving to reinforce the notion that the research results wi l l be of general interest. 
From his experience, the author also thought that use of these two instruments had facilitated a high 
level of innovation in the design of delivery strategies in programmes, and would therefore provide a 
rich area for study. 
3.2.3 Deficiencies in the Current Process 
The purpose of this part of the review was to address the third research question, by confirming the 
presence of evidence indicating the existence of problems with present arrangements for policy design. 
Dunleavy (1995, pp 52-59) and Kl i jn , Koppenjan, and Termeer (1995, pp. 437-439) begin the debate. 
They provide evidence indicative of problems, referring to policy mistakes made in the UK and 
elsewhere. Dunleavy (1995, p. 52) proposes that problems are particularly acute in the UK, with 
Theakston (1998, p. 17, 19) providing further indication of difficulties in Britain, citing the new 'Blair' 
Government as finding the Civil Service's input to policy development as being too weak. He also 
refers to Whitehall insiders' concerns over the Civil Service's policy-making capacity having been 
damaged in recent years, with commentators proposing that the policy development process is in need 
of review and improvement. A number of reasons for problems are suggested by researchers. In 
91 
tendering their hypotheses, many begin by citing the changes which have taken place in the UK civil 
service in recent times. Theakston (1998, p. 13), refers to the massive transformation of Whitehall 
since 1979, while Doig and Graham (1998, p. 489) highlight the public sector as having been subjected 
to significant organisational and cultural change. 
Barberis (1995, pp 39-40) continues, referring to the May 1979 election of the Thatcher Government. 
He points to the manifesto commitment o f reducing Civil Service numbers, and securing value for 
money. Doig (1995) highlights the significance o f these commitments, saying: 
"what begun after the 1979 General Election as an exercise to reduce the public sector's size and cost 
developed during the 1980s into continuous change to its organisation, fimctions and structio-e". 
p. 191 
DTI has not escaped these changes. For example the National Audit Office (NAG) in their report The 
Department of Trade and Industry's Support for Innovation (NAO, 1995, p. 13), refer to the 
department having reduced the number of headquarters staff engaged in managing innovation policy. 
Reference is also made to DTI having significantly reorganised the remaining staff, with many of the 
technology functions placed in the department's sector divisions. 
In addition to the realisation of VFM, Doig (1995, pp. 191-195) describes the emphasis placed on two 
other main thrusts of activity, discovery of what needed to be done by the Civil Service, and improving 
performance through introduction of good management practice. Barberis (1995, pp. 39-40) describes 
the principal occurrences which precipitated change in these areas. He records a number of measures 
taken by the Conservative Government, including the appointment o f Sir Derek Rayner as the Prime 
Minister's Adviser on Efficiency, and the setting up of the Efficiency Unit which launched several 
scrutinies of the Whitehall departments. A particular landmark (Barberis, 1995) was the introduction 
of the Management Information Systems for Ministers (MINIS) into these departments. Introduction 
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of MINIS also prompted a wider debate on management information systems, out o f which came the 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI) (HMSO, 1982, pp. 5-6). 
However Dunleavy (1995, pp. 62-63) challenges the wisdom of the development o f what he refers to 
as "a cult of 'best practice research' in management theory - in which all pretence of scientific 
valuation is jettisoned ..." (Dunleavy, 1995, p. 62). He suggests the cult of managerialism with its de-
emphasis of policy work and focus on reorganisation, has given rise to problems. He highlights the 
writing o f f of 'intellectual capital', with Conservative ministers shifting away from using their 
experienced, senior civil servants for providing policy advice, in favour o f politically aligned 'think 
tanks' and external experts. Thus not only is their experience being wasted but, suggests Dunleavy 
(1995, pp. 62-63), they are denied the opportunity to grow their knowledge and with time run the 
danger of becoming 'de-skilled*. 
Dunleavy (1995) also highlights the resulting 'pushing down' o f the responsibility for giving policy 
advice, down the civil service hierarchy. He also refers to the increased reliance on young civil 
servants, who whilst being intellectually self confident, highly talented people, lack proper experience 
in the fields they administer. Lipsey (1999, pp. 76-77) concurs. He highlights the move away from the 
previous practice of submissions to ministers being prepared by junior officials which were then 
commented on by senior staff up the 'hierarchy', to the current practice of most submissions going 
forward directly from junior staff without vetting. This, Lipsey proposes, has not been cost free, with 
the inherent loss of quality control through not employing the knowledge held by the more experienced 
people. 
Smith (1998, p. 62), signals problems having arisen from the introduction of the Next Steps agencies, 
which resulted from publication in 1988 of the Efficiency Unit's the Next Steps — the Ibbs report ( Ibbs, 
1988), The key institutional innovation of Ibbs was the splitting o f f of parts of departments 
responsible for implementing policy into semi independent executive agencies (Barberis, 1995, p. 40; 
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Hogwood, 1995, p. 69; Smith, 1998). Dunleavy (1995, p. 63) takes up the theme. For him, problems 
have been compounded by the 'agencijication process', where the separating o f f o f staff with in-depth 
managerial skills or professional knowledge has served to accentuate difficulties. He argues that the 
ceaseless reorganisation and efficiency savings have reduced core competencies in the Whitehall 
departments to resource key tasks, and manage contractors effectively, Worryingly Dunleavy (1995, p. 
63) highlights the marginalisation and removal of those civil servants experienced in providing policy 
advice. Loss of access to their knowledge is implied by his conclusion that as a result much of the 
'collective memory' of departments has been written off. Hogwood suggests that how departments 
wil l adapt to undertake policy functions when much of the practical expertise lies within agencies "will 
be one of the most interesting developments of the 1990s" (Hogwood, 1995, p. 69). 
Finally the government's white paper Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999) provides 
support for the view that deficiencies exist in the current process. The Paper defines policy making as 
"the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to 
deliver 'outcomes' - desired changes in the real world" (p. 15). It continues by referring to the 
previous emphasis on management reform which has brought improved value for money, but 
highlights that little attention has been "paid to the policy process, and the way it affects government's 
ability to meet the needs of the people" Cabinet Office (1999, p. 15). 
The likelihood of serious problems existing in policy making had thus been confirmed. Concern had 
been expressed by ministers over the Civil Service's ability to innovate new policies. Members of the 
research community had cited the far-reaching changes introduced into the Civil Service in recent 
years as the primary cause. Reduction in staff numbers and the introduction of agencies had 
contributed to a loss of experience, a problem made more severe by greater reliance being placed on 
younger, inexperienced people. Researchers also suggested these problems were not confined to the 
UK (Weller and Stevens, 1998, pp. 579-581). 
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As previously argued in chapter 1, section 1.1, the design of support policy is part o f policy making, 
and the problem areas identified were thus likely to be present in the design process. The NAO report 
on DTI's support for innovation suggested such to be the case, finding there to be scope to improve on 
current arrangements to enhance overall cost effectiveness, (NAO, 1995, p, 9). The literature 
suggested there are other causes of ineffectiveness in policy design. Government departments, 
including DTI, are 'traditional' organisations which have built up their structures over many years 
(Peppard and Rowland, 1995, pp. 5-6). These structures, they argue, are inadequate for responding to 
today's rapidly changing markets. Drucker (1993, p. 142) agrees with this sentiment, highlighting the 
urgent need to make government more effective. 
3.3 The Process of Designing Support Policy 
The fourth research question sought to establish the scope of the design process and the nature of the 
components which comprise the process. Answering this question was fundamental. Obtaining a 
description of the whole process and an understanding of how it functions to meet policy goals was 
germane to making a contribution to knowledge, and the first step in identifying where improvements 
could be made. Section 3.2.1 above suggested that surveying the literature was unlikely to yield 
substantial insights into how support policy is designed, as much of the process is hidden from public 
view. Nevertheless the author considered it equally unlikely that the literature would be completely 
silent on the subject, and that information on elements of the process would be in the public domain. 
In addition the author was aware of documentation in circulation within government which contained 
information relating to the design process. Review of the literature was hence continued. 
To help the research task it was first necessary to establish an understanding of what defines the 
process of designing support policy, to enable research effort to be focused on those areas which were 
directly relevant. Hill (1997, pp. 19-21) was helpful in providing guidance on how study of the design 
function should be undertaken. He refers to many researchers adopting systems theory to analysing the 
policy process. The principal merit of systems theory Hil l (1997, pp. 20-21) continues, is that it 
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provides a means of conceptualising what are often complex phenomena. In a systems approach to the 
analysis of the policy process, the political system under examination is treated as a 'black box' of 
decision making, the decision process representing the function which converts policy inputs into 
policy outputs. An added advantage of investigating policy from a process viewpoint is that it is useful 
in breaking down the policy process into a number of discrete stages, each of which may then be easily 
subjected to detailed analysis. In this vein. Hill (1997, pp. 128-129) refers to many researchers making 
a distinction between policy making, policy implementation, and the evaluation of policy outcomes, in 
describing a model for the overall process. 
In reading the literature the author observed that the terms 'policy making' and 'implementation', are 
open to different interpretation. In the case of the latter for example, Lindblom (1980, p. 65) describes 
under the heading of "Implementation As Policy Making", the practice in the United States o f Congress 
issuing imprecise statements of policy, leaving those tasked with administering policies to design the 
specific implementations, including the required legislation. For Lindblom (1980, pp. 64-68), 
implementation covers the design of policy at the detailed level, and is taken to include the operation 
and subsequent evaluation of policy. As highlighted in section 3.2.3 above, the white paper 
Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999) agrees with this interpretation, referring to policy 
making as the "process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and 
actions to deliver outcomes" (p. 15). 
The process of the translation of political goals into activities, and through these interventions the 
delivery of outcomes, represents the central focus of this research. The author argues however, that for 
investigating that part of policy making which is concerned with programme development, a modified 
model employing alternative, more narrowly defined descriptions for the processes of policy making 
and implementation, would be more appropriate. Again Hil l (1997) was able to help, usefully 
suggesting that a study of a particular policy wil l include focus on political manifestos and white 
papers at one end of the spectrum, through the provision of parliamentary Acts, to actions undertaken 
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after the passing of legislation (p. 141). Implementation, he proposes, is conventionally seen as 
comprising those activities undertaken after the passing of the legislation that allows proposed 
interventions to be introduced, (and by implication those activities occurring before implementation, 
such as the drafting o f white papers, as being part of policy making). 
The author agrees with this view. In the process of designing policy for support programmes aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of industry, officials normally work in an environment in which the 
necessary parliamentary Acts are in place to provide the legal framework for what is proposed. 
However, as is discussed in chapter 6, sub-section 6.3.3.5, events have not followed the exact sequence 
as suggested by Hi l l , regarding the introduction of the programmes that are the focus of this research. 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 discusses the role of parliamentary Acts, and explains how for DTI the 
Industry (HMSO, 1982), and Science and Technology (HMSO, 1965) Acts have been particularly 
important in providing the necessary legislation to operate its support programmes (see also Interview 
2). 
Hil l (1997, p. 129) continues the discussion by pointing to some researchers such as Van Meter and 
Van Horn (1975, p. 445) considering implementation as those actions by people, or groups, that are 
directed at the achievement of objectives set out in prior policy decisions (policy making). 
Implementation can thus be viewed as ''puttingpolicy into action'' (Hi l l , p. 129). Here 'white papers', 
can be regarded as one of the 'inputs' to the policy implementation process (Hil l , 1997, pp. 129, MO-
M I ) . Dr. Kenneth Poulter, head of DTI's Management Best Practice Directorate, when in 
conversation with the author, proposed that white papers represent ministers 'wish lists' for what they 
want to achieve. They can therefore be viewed as containing statements of government policy. In 
designing and administering programmes, the author has observed that officials w i l l often take the 
broad policy aims set out in government white papers, and from these develop the detailed policy for 
the introduction of support programmes (see chapter 5, section 5.3.10, chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.9 
and 6.3.3.5). 
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However Hill (1997, pp. 137-138) highlights that policy making frequently continues "during the so 
called [policy] implementation phase"" (p. 137). He refers to the processes of 'concretisation' of 
policy, or movement back and forth between policy and action, as taking place. For instance, suggests 
Hi l l , implementers are not always working with policy that has clearly defined objectives. The author 
would add that at times policy may be written deliberately vague, such as to allow wide interpretation 
in implementation. In an interview with Mr. John Cammell, Head of the previous Manufacturing 
Management and Technologies (MMT) Division of DTI [Interview 2], he viewed the Science and 
Technology Act (HMSO, 1965) as being indecisive, thereby always allowing officials to find 
something in its content that allowed them to do what they wanted to do. 
Sometimes well defined policy emerges as a result of complex phenomena during implementation 
(Hil l , 1997, p. 133). Thus policy implementation is suggested by some as being best considered as a 
policy/action continuum, involving interactive and negotiative processes between those who seek to 
put policy into effect, and those responsible for particular actions (p. 137). These observations 
suggested that the process of designing and administering support programmes, forms an integral part 
of policy design. 
Designing policy may be considered as part of the process of developing and providing advice to 
ministers (Hennessy, 1990, 494-495; Weller and Stevens, 1998, p. 579; Lipsey, 1999, p. 38). The 
author, from his experience in designing and delivering support policy, had witnessed the task as one 
o f developing policy proposals which 'advise' by giving recommendations for the introduction o f 
programmes [Interview 5]. These proposals are submitted to ministers or senior officials acting on 
their behalf, for their approval to implement a recommended policy action, that is, a proposed 
programme. Looking on policy design as policy advising, Weller and Stevens (1998) were helpful in 
defining the extent of the design and administration process. Policy advising they argue comprises 
"the whole process of understanding the problems, co-ordinating the responses andformulating their 
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advice - in essence, the whole policy cycle from issue identification through to implementation and 
evaluation'' (Weller and Stevens, 1998, p. 582). 
For the purposes of his research the author equated issue identification to that of developing the 
rationale for introducing programmes (see section 3.3.1 of this thesis), and adopted a narrower 
definition of implementation, taking implementation to comprise the subsequent introduction and 
administration of programme activities. Evaluation is seen as integral part of the design process, with 
the results providing inputs (Feedback) to inform policy making (Femandez-Ballesteros, 1992, p. 205; 
Guy, 1998, pp. 32-35). 
The attainment of a description of the principal components of the design process then prompted the 
supplementary research question of "what process elements comprise each of the three components of 
'Issue Identification^ 'Programme Implementation', and 'Evaluation including Feedback'"? However 
Hil l , (1997, pp. 128-129) points to certain disadvantages on the use of what he calls the 'top-down' 
model for the study of policy implementation. A top-down approach is characterised by 
disaggregating the policy process into the components of policy making, policy implementation, and 
the evaluation of policy outcomes (the traditional, more general definition of implementation being 
adopted here). He suggests that arguments for adopting a top-down model rely on being able to view 
the policy making process as setting aims for implementation, the realisation of which can 
subsequently be measured (p. 138). 
While acknowledging the merit of breaking down the policy process in this way, this view Hil l (1997, 
p. 138) suggests, is seen by some researchers, for example Hjem and Porter (1981); Hjem and Hull 
(1982), as providing an insufficient foundation for research of the implementation process. He 
proposes that for many researchers making the distinction between policy making and implementation, 
implementation is defined in terms of its relationship with policy, that is that actions taken by people 
during implementation are directed towards the attainment of objectives set out in prior policy 
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decisions (p. 129). However, as discussed above, policy making often continues into implementation, 
as specific objectives are not always well defined. 
There are other considerations to be taken into account. For example Hil l (1997, p. 135) proposes that 
many government actions do not involve the introduction o f new programmes of activity, but instead 
involve adjustments to the way existing activities are carried out. This, the author suggests, is an 
example o f what Lindblom (1977, pp. 313-317) calls incrementalism, and is discussed flirther in 
section 3.5 of this chapter. Other researchers therefore argue for a *bottom-up' approach for study of 
implementation (Hil l , 1997, p. 138). They propose that focusing research on the individuals and 
organisations engaged in implementation, studying how decisions are made, the rules, procedures, 
structures, and policy instruments involved, be more appropriate for analysing what goes on in policy 
implementation. Hill (1997p. 139) continues, suggesting that to understand implementation, the 
researcher must attempt to find a conceptualisation based on the empirical evidence of the complexity 
and dynamics between individuals and groups, tasked with translating policy goals into specific 
actions. 
Usefully Hill (1997, p. 151) concludes that where there is an "explicit (op-initiated, goal-directed 
activity (p. 151), deployment of the top-down model may be appropriate; especially he argues when 
policy inputs and outputs are measurable in quantifiable terms. Experience of policy under Mrs. 
Thatcher's government he continues, has provided a number of examples where policy goals have been 
clear. It is the author's view that the subject of his research, the design and administration o f support 
programmes is, taking Hill 's comments, best approached by adopting a top-down, systems modelling 
approach. He bases this view on the majority o f programmes being studied were conceived and 
operated under Mrs. Thatcher's government, and would thus be expected to have been designed from 
clearly stated policy objectives. 
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The author argues that such is the case. As indicated earlier, the author is able to confirm that white 
papers provide a policy input to the implementation process, as described in chapter 5, section 5.3.10 
and chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.9 and 6.3.3.5 of this thesis. Inspection of the white papers relating to 
the development of support programmes, show them to set out clear goals for implementation policy to 
achieve. For example the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-25) describes the government's aim 
to improve the quality o f management in small businesses, and describes the introduction of six 
consultancy initiatives. The intention to support 1,000 consultancy projects every month is stated as a 
target. The white paper Competitiveness - Helping Business to Win, (HMSO, 1994a, p. 68), sets out 
the government's aim to establish a network of Regional Supply Offices (RSOs) to promote best 
practice in supply chain relationships. The paper continues by describing the terms of reference of the 
RSOs, which were to include providing information on sourcing opportunities for purchasers and 
suppliers. 
However the author considered that Hill 's observations supporting the argument for adopting a bottom-
up approach to conceptualise the implementation process, were nevertheless still valid. He was 
concerned with discovering what people do in the implementation task. Hill (1997, pp. 151-152) 
suggests that it can be prudent to adopt a mix of both approaches. The author therefore concluded that 
a modelling approach which broke the process of designing programmes into the principal components 
of'issue identification', 'implementation' (that is programme administration), and 'evaluation 
including feedback', (Weller and Stevens, 1998, p. 582), but that would investigate in-depth the actors 
and processes involved within each of these components, would be best suited for the research 
application. Hill (1997, p. 11) proposes that the policy process frequently involves both public and 
private bodies, and refers to many researchers advocating the need to study the relationships beuveen 
the interest groups external to the state, and those within the state (p. 70). The concept of policy 
networks is thus suggested (pp. 70-74), and their role to facilitate consultation by government, reduce 
policy conflict, and to help make policy making determinable, is described. The topic of policy 
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networks in section 3.3.2 below. The following section 3.3.1 begins the process of providing insights 
into the mechanisms involved. 
3.3.1 Framework for Designing Support Policy 
Policy making is a complex process. For instance, Minogue (1993, pp. 10-18) suggests the task of 
policy design is rendered difficult by public policies having to address the complexity of the world of 
social and economic interaction. Lindblom (1980, p. 5) agrees, describing "policy making as cm 
extremely complex process ... and whose boundaries remain uncertain''. Review o f the literature 
shows that steps are taken to help officials in dealing with the complexities involved by introducing a 
structured approach to developing proposals for support policy. Study of this framework enabled a 
more detailed description of the design process to be gained, and pinpointed topics for research. 
As introduced in chapter 1, section 1.1, a significant step towards enhancing the likelihood of 
introducing support strategies which match their policy aims is represented by the pioneering work o f 
the UK DTI in developing the ROAMEF concept (Guy, 1998, p. 33). ROAMEF, which stands for 
^Rationale', 'Objectives', 'Appraisal', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation' and 'Feedback', eases the task 
by providing a framework for officials to use in the design of support policy. Under each heading, for 
example 'Rationale', officials are required to provide certain information which collectively 
contributes to a case for intervention. The ROAMEF structure is set out initially in the HM Treasury 
publication the 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997, pp. 32-33), which provides guidance for the Whitehall 
departments and government agencies in the evaluation of programmes and preparation of cases for 
financial support. The Green Book advises government departments of the need to adopt the 
ROAMEF approach in preparing support cases. In requiring adherence to the ROAMEF format, H M 
Treasury imposes a structure on the process of developing support cases, the elements of that structure 
being represented by each of the ROAMEF headings. 
102 
It is at this point worth noting that the reference to 'Feedback' is a recent addition (Guy, 1998, p. 33). 
The author observes, from conversations with colleagues and study o f internal documentation, that it 
remains common practice for officials within DTI to continue referring to these cases for support as 
'ROAME Statements', or more often simply as 'ROAMEs'. The practice wi l l be continued in this 
thesis. 
In addition to the 'Green Book' two other, principal sets of guidance relating to policy design were 
found to be in widespread use within DTI. The first is the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b), and 
the Innovation Budget Guidelines for use in drafting proposals for Research and Technology 
( R & T ) related activities, (DTI, 1988, 1992, 1996a, 1999a). Inspection of both sets of DTI guidance 
reveals them to reflect HM Treasury policy, with both advising staff o f the need to use the ROAME 
approach when preparing cases for support. Guidance thus shows the drafting of ROAMEs to be at the 
heart of programme development. 
From his experience the author has found that the successive issues o f DTl's 'Innovation Guidelines' 
are the most comprehensive and frequently referenced source of help by officials. Inspection of the 
1999 version shows it to state: 
''A ROAME is a formal accounting document containing the justification for support, explanations of 
what the programme will do, objectives to be achieved, outcomes that will result. Justification and 
explanations of the costs involved, and the arrangements for monitoring and evaluation. It is the 
primary source docimient which should act as both guide and aide-memoir to the programme or 
project". 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 27). 
Guidance continues by pointing to the role of ROAME statements as 'proposal documents' which set 
out the case for support. The benefits of preparing a ROAME statement are highlighted, which are 
quoted as including: 
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• ''preparing it encourages the project officer to distil thoughts and arguments about the 
proposal, 
• it is a vehicle for persuading peers and the approving authority of a proposal's merit, 
• it is a management tool for regulating activities over the life of a programme or project 
at departmental. Directorate, and Project Officer levels, 
• it is an accounting docimtent, forming part of the audit path showing the purpose for 
which public funds have been requested". 
DTI (1999a, p. 28). 
As discussed above, Weller and Stevens (1998) suggested that the scope of the design process 
comprises Mssue Identification', through 'Programme Implementation', to 'Evaluation'. Study of 
guidance contained in the HM Treasury 'Greenbook' (HMT, 1997) the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI , 
1996b, section 3.4, 9.1) and the DTI Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1996a, 1999a, chapter 4) 
reveals the process of developing ROAMEs as one of identifying and discussing the issues surrounding 
a case for intervention. It is therefore proposed that the drafting o f ROAMEs be one of issue 
identification. 
Inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines reveals the nature of the issues involved and what the 
process entails. The guidelines explain what information officials must provide under each of the 
ROAME headings, that is, 'Rationale', 'Objectives', 'Appraisal', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation and 
Feedback', for a good case for support to be seen as argued. Under 'Rationale', officials are advised to 
first demonstrate the existence of market failure, that is, the identification problems in the operation of 
the market, and to describe the nature of those problems (Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, pp. 9-10), 
(DTI, 1996a, pp. 35-39, DTI, 1999a, pp. 32-36). Only i f problems are properly understood, it is 
argued, can effective strategies be developed for their reduction, and realistic objectives set for 
monitoring and evaluation of programme performance. The need to demonstrate how a proposed 
delivery strategy is expected to reduce market failures is emphasised. Others emphasise the 
importance of determining market problems and the development of strategies for their reduction. For 
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Lindblom (1977, p. 317), economic policy making revolves almost entirely round the analysis of 
market interactions, and the strategies to influence them such as to address identified problems. 
Officials are also reminded in guidance that interventions must be conformant with policy.. 
Good practice in sening 'objectives' is also discussed in guidance (HMT, 1997, pp. 5-6; DTI, 1996a, 
pp. 39-41, 1999a, pp. 36-39). 'Objectives' must be set which clearly state what the actions are 
designed to achieve, and be consistent with the rationale. Officials are advised that they must be 
realistic in setting objectives, and wherever possible choose targets which are measurable. 'Appraisal' 
and 'Monitoring' are mainly concerned with 'Programme Implementation'. Two types of'Appraisal ' 
are described. To begin with, 'Appraisal' is described in guidance (HMT, 1997, chapter 2; DTI, 
1996a, pp. 41-42, 1999a, pp. 39-40) as the process of evaluating strategic options for meeting 
objectives, selecting those most likely to achieve stated aims. The requirement to consider associated 
risks and uncertainties is discussed, and guidance given on how the eligibility of recipients of 
government funding may be determined. 'Appraisal' secondly refers to the reviewing of applications 
for grants to see that project proposals are supportive of programme aims. The need to assess the 
ability of project participants to see project work through in terms of financial and staff resources is 
stressed. 
'Monitoring' is the systematic collection of financial and management information during 
implementation (HMT, 1997, p. 33; DTI, 1996a, pp. 42-43, 1999a, p. 41-42), to track whether 
objectives are being met and to obtain an early warning of potential problems. Monitoring is also 
viewed as a continuous process, reviewing requirements as circumstances change or new information 
comes to light. Data collected via monitoring additionally provides useful information to the process 
of'Evaluation'. In preparing ROAMEs, officials must provide details of the 'Appraisal' and 
'Monitoring'" strategies to be deployed. Finally 'Evaluation' itself is discussed. As part o f the 
evolutionary process, guidance has been further improved by highlighting the need for the lessons 
learned during 'Evaluation' to be fed back to those in the design process (DTI, I996a„ p. 43, 1999a, p. 
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42; HMT, 1997, pp. chapter 3; Guy, 1998, pp. 32-35). Thus evaluation may inform decisions on future 
policy, and thus people can learn from experience. 
At this point the author wishes to highlight that while the Treasury's 'Green Book' is in the public 
domain, the DTI Finance Handbook {UY\, 1996b) and Innovation Budget Guidelines (a restricted 
document) have not been published. Surveying the three sets of guidance reveals that the DTi 
Innovation Budget Guidelines (DT\, 1992, 1996a, 1999a) provides the most detailed guidance. The 
decision was therefore taken to use the Innovation Budget Guidelines as the starting point in collecting 
detailed evidence of how the design process operates. That the 'Innovation Guidelines' contain 
additional, restricted information helps support the view that published information on the process wil l 
exhibit gaps. 
3.3.2 Contributors to the Process of the Design and Delivery of Support Policy 
In designing and delivering business support programmes, the author was aware from his experience 
that officials do not work in isolation. A number of different players he observed, are involved in the 
design and delivery of support programmes. He was thus interested to consult the literature to obtain 
guidance on how the interactions between the players might be analysed. Hil l (1997, p. 138) takes up 
the theme. He refers to the close collaboration characterising the policy making system. Developing 
the discussion, Borzel (1998, pp. 253-263), usefully refers to people being aware that ''policy making 
involves a large number and wide variety of actors" (p. 254). He highlights the functional 
interdependence of public and private actors in policy making. Bdrzel continues by pointing to many 
researchers finding the concept of policy networks as being a useful analytical tool to analyse the 
relationships between the various actors involved within a particular policy sector. He relates some 
authors taking the view that policy nenvorks are best understood as 'webs' o f relatively stable and 
continual relationships, which act to pool and orchestrate dispersed resources towards solutions of 
common policies. Policy networks, Borzel suggests, comprise all actors involved in the design and 
implementation of policy, (Borzel, 1998, p. 260). 
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Rhodes (1997, p. 199) takes up the theme. He suggests ''policy networks of resource-dependent 
organizations are a defining characteristic of the British policy process^'. For example government 
departments are 'non-executant', they do not deliver services and must involve others such as private 
sector organisations and special purpose bodies (pp. 100, 113). Service delivery Rhodes continues, 
must therefore involve the linking of organisations. In discussing policy networking, Rhodes (1988, 
pp.327-343) refers to the concept of producer networks. He proposes that there exists a producer 
network focused on DTI policy making, (Rhodes actually states the Department of Industry - Dol 
rather than DTI, but this department was merged with the British Overseas Trade Board to form the 
DTI, [Interview 3]). 
The range of organisations in the industrial policy community Rhodes (1988) suggests is extensive (p. 
334), and involves the DTI's dependence on industrial organisations for the delivery of services and 
the provision to it of expertise in particular sectors (pp. 327, 338). Rhodes also advises of economic 
interests such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), who through their privileged positions 
can lobby government (p. 340). However, Saward (1990, p. 600) observes the previous Thatcher 
government had as part of its economic strategy the keeping of an arms-length relationship with bodies 
such as the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). 
The author observed that closer working relationships were developed with the CBI under John 
Major's government. For example in DTI, officials including the author, collaborated with the CBI on 
their scoping study to assess the innovation capabilities of organisations in each o f the CBI regions. 
Jordan (1990, pp, 471-472) supports the views of Rhodes and Borzel. He proposes that 'policy 
communities' involving a myriad of interconnecting organisations comprising both government and 
non government bodies, are responsible for policy design and implementation. The interrelationships 
established between members results in the community functioning as a policy network. Hi l l , (1997, p. 
139) highlights the need for research to focus on the actors and agencies, and their interactions, to 
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identify 'what goes on'. Thus an examination of those bodies in DTI's producer network that are 
involved in the process of designing and administering of programmes, and how they relate to the 
process, was a primary area for research to investigate. The subject is discussed in chapter 10, section 
I0.5-I3. 
3.3.3 Summary of Findings 
To summarise, study of the literature had so far provided a 'broad brush picture' o f the process of 
designing support policy, and how it could be investigated. Section 3.3 proposed that a systems 
approach be adopted. It was also suggested that developing policy could be broken down into the 
components of policy making, policy implementation, and evaluation. The process of developing 
programme support policy was argued as being part of what is conventionally accepted as policy 
implementation, but that in reality policy making continues in the programme development process. It 
had been shown that the process of designing support policy to therefore comprise the principal 
activities of 'Issue Identification', 'Programme implementation', and 'Evaluation including 
Feedback'. The latter is discussed in the context of incrementalism, showing how the complexity of 
the design process normally prevents the introduction of optimum solutions, rendering it necessary to 
adopt a process of *trial and error' in scheme development, in section 3.5. 
In section 3.3.1, study of the guidelines to officials engaged in the design process within DTI had 
started to provide detail on what is involved in the design process, and thus indicated where research 
effort should be focused. A structure for the development of cases for support had been identified. 
The requirement for officials to present cases for support in the form of ROAME statements, defined 
that structure. 'Issue Identification', it was argued, is synonymous with preparing ROAMEs, that is, 
the development of support cases. Inspection o f guidance to officials has outlined the nature o f those 
issues, and simultaneously indicated the areas of activity involved in the remaining areas of 
'Implementation', and 'Evaluation'. 
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Development of cases for support is key to policy design, and how well the task is undertaken germane 
to the performance of programmes and hence, of the policies from which they derive. Weller and 
Stevens (1998, pp. 579, 582-583) agree, referring to the crucial nature of the task. Therefore the 
preparation of ROAME statements, investigating the procedures adopted by officials in building each 
section of these cases, represented a prime area for research. Inspection o f the 'Innovation Budget' 
guidance revealed it to be detailed, and therefore represented a good starting point for study of the 
design process. It was also considered important to investigate the actual mechanisms adopted in 
programme administration to help gain information on the procedures adopted during programme 
implementation. How a programme is administered has a direct bearing on the ability of a programme 
to meet its objectives, which, via the evaluation process, contributes to future policy making. 
Programme administration is thus a key determinant of policy design. Inspection o f the 'Innovation 
Guidelines' found them to be again detailed in this area, and study of their content likely to reveal 
much regarding the mechanisms involved-. 
'Evaluation' (including 'Feedback') had been revealed as strategic to the design process, and therefore 
a topic which should be researched. On inspection, the author found the subject to be well debated in 
the literature. Section 3.4.2 below records the survey of the literature in this important area, and 
discusses its findings in the context of the government departments becoming 'learning organisations'. 
Finally, section 3.3.2 had suggested that the process of designing and administering programmes was 
supported by a producer network, and how DTI employed the organisations in this network to gain 
information and deliver its programmes was an important area for research. 
3.4 Identifying Ways of Improving the Design Process 
Section 3.2.3 of this chapter had found there to be evidence of problems with the current process of 
designing support policy. Researchers had also suggested mistakes in policy making were widespread. 
Section 3.2 revealed the high levels of spending on industrial support policy, indicating that 
deficiencies in the process were likely to be expensive in terms o f wastage. The author hence 
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considered the posing of the fifth research question, "in what areas may improvements be introduced 
and what should these improvement comprise?", to be fully appropriate. The objective of this stage of 
the literature review, was to identify the approaches to improvement which are most likely to yield 
significant benefits. This objective is in step with government policy. The govemment while paper, 
Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999), recognises the need for improvement, and states the 
government's commitment to implement change. The white paper informs the reader, "Modernising, 
government is central to the Government's programme of renewal and reform" (Cabinet Office, 1999, 
p. 6). The Paper continues by stating the government's wish to see policy making improve, becoming 
more strategic and able to deliver services of high quality with efficiency. How to approach the search 
to discover areas needing improvement was the nest issue to resolve, and ways forward are discussed 
in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below. 
3.4.1 Business Process Re-engineering 
Davis (1996) proposes a way forward in introducing change. He suggests Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR) as being an appropriate analysis technique for finding ways to improve the 
performance of recurring procedures and activities. The author views the design process to be one 
such example, new programmes continually being introduced to meet changing needs. Peppard and 
Rowland (1995, pp. 6-21) continue, viewing BPR as a useful tool for examining current processes and 
bringing about improvements in performance. For them BPR is about finding ways in which to 
introduce change into organisations such that business performance is improved. They cite many 
examples of benefits accruing to firms through their BPR projects. The application o f BPR to effect 
change in the current process of designing support policy was then viewed as a topic for research to 
investigate. 
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3.4.2 Knowledge Management 
Section 3.2.3 above had alluded to a growing lack o f experience in the design process. The author 
viewed this problem as a 'knowledge' related issue. The 'management of knowledge' is now seen by 
many researchers as fundamental to the successful operation o f public and private organisations alike, 
and through their success to the health of the world economies. As part of BPR, investigating ways of 
introducing Knowledge Management into the design process was thus considered to be of value. 
Drucker (1995, pp. 75-77) takes up the theme. Referring to ''the society of organizations'' 
(Drucker, 1995, p. 76), he suggests every few hundred years society fundamentally reorganises itself. 
Drucker proposes that we are at present, experiencing such a change, a transformation to a knowledge 
based society in which, he proposes, we are aiming towards a world civilisation. 
In this new society, knowledge, Drucker (1995) argues, is the primary resource for individuals and the 
overall economy. The economists' traditional factors of production, he suggests, becomes secondary 
to the importance of knowledge. However, continues Drucker, specialised knowledge can only be 
productive when it is integrated with a task. Hence he proposes that a "knowledge society is also a 
society of organizations: the purpose and function of every organization, business or non-business 
alike, is the integration of specialized knowledge into a common task''' (Drucker, 1995, p. 76). It is part 
o f an organisation's role Drucker stresses, to put knowledge to work (p. 77), on its processes. 
The UK Government is among those recognising the importance of knowledge and its management. 
The government's Competitiveness white paper. Our Competitive future: Building the Knowledge 
Driven Economy states: 
"In the increasingly global economy of today, we cannot compete in the old way. Capital is mobile, 
technology can migrate quickly and goods can be made in low cost countries and shipped to developed 
markets. British businesses must compete by exploiting capabilities which its competitors cannot 
easily match or imitate. These distinctive capabilities are not raw materials, land or access to cheap 
labour. They must be knowledge, skills and creativity, which help create high productivity business 
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processes and high value goods and services. Tliat is wliy we will only compete successfully in future 
if we create an economy that is genuinely ''knowledge driven "", 
(Stationery Office, 1998, p. 10). 
The Knowledge White Paper considers government to have a major part in the knowledge driven 
economy. A new approach to policy making is seen as required. Government, it is argued, needs to be 
as innovative and creative as the private sector in its policy making, and in support o f this needs to 
make best use of peoples' talents. Such creativeness and innovation is viewed as fundamental to civil 
servants delivering better value from public assets. 
People having access to each other's knowledge in policy making was seen as important. Despite the 
rigour imposed by developing cases in the ROAMEF format, there are reasons for believing that 
adherence to the ROAMEF procedures is, in itself, insufficient to develop strategies having a high 
probability of success. The 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997) in its introductory chapter states: 
"Although a great deal of information can be brought within and presented in terms of a formal 
framework, this can never do more than inform the final decision. Analysis can show how alternative 
choices compare in many ways, but there will always be further strategic, or pragmatic issues to which 
those responsible for final decisions must also give weight", 
(p. 1). 
Weller and Stevens (1998) agree, referring to the " 'craft-like "' nature o f policy making (p. 583). Ho\y 
to deploy Knowledge Management, such that officials can tap into each other's experiences in 
designing support policy, was then an issue for the research to resolve. The importance of Knowledge 
Management in helping civil servants is acknowledged by the announcement of the setting up of a 
Knowledge Management Unit within DTI (Stationery Office, 1998, p. 61). The author concluded that 
his research would make a useful contribution to the work of the Unit. 
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As part of knowledge management, The Competitiveness Wliite Paper (Stationery Office, 1998, pp. 60-
61) refers to the importance of people across Whitehall sharing best practice in policy making. A 
Centre for Management Policy Studies is to be established, which is to act as a 'storehouse' for best 
practice. The white paper A^oi/er/iw/z/ggovermwe/?/(Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 16, 39) continues the 
theme, referring to the need for best practice to be identified and spread within government. The 
potential for benchmarking to help transfer best practice from others such as commercial organisations 
is also stressed. Identification of best practice in designing support policy and how it may be deployed 
to good effect in the workplace, was thus seen as another priority area for the research. It followed that 
how benchmarking techniques could be employed to improve the design and administration of 
schemes, was a question for research to answer. 
Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999) refers to learning from experience", and continues 
"Government should regard policy making as a.continuous, learning process, not as a series of one-off 
initiatives" (p. 17). Section 3.5 below discusses how 'Evaluation' is used to feed back experiences in 
operating programmes into policy design, as part of the learning process. It was thought, however, that 
'Evaluation and Feedback' is but one mechanism to affect learning. In looking at ways of introducing 
Knowledge Management, an important deliverable for research was consequently seen as identifying 
what other measures could be introduced to enable better sharing of corporate experience. 
Senge (1990, pp. 3-10) takes up the learning theme. He refers to the illusion held by many, ""that the 
world is created of separate, unrelated forces" (Senge, 1990, p. 3). For him the goal is to develop 
'learning organizations', in which people continually expand their capabilities to achieve the results 
they desire. Garvin (1993, pp. 78-91) continues, commending learning organisations as fundamental to 
continuous improvement. The speed of learning, Senge argues, is a major differentiator for business in 
the 1990s'. In a market that has become global, and increasingly dynamic and complex, work must 
become learning orientated. It is, he suggests, no longer sufficient for one individual to be responsible 
for learning on behalf of the organisation. ''The organizations that will truly excel in the future will be 
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the organizations that discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at oU levels in 
an organization" (Senge, 1990, p. 4). 
The mastery of certain basic disciplines, Senge continues, is the thing which differentiates learning 
organisations from traditional 'controlling' organisations (Senge, 1990, p. 5). Senge lists among these 
Personal Mastery, Mental Models, and Team Learning. A key area for research to address was seen as 
identifying what elements o f knowledge management are required to encourage acceptance of these 
disciplines to help departments become learning organisations. How to help departments to become 
learning organisations through deploying Knowledge Management, such that officials can tap into each 
others experiences in designing support policy, was then another issue for research to address. 
To summarise, the government has stated its desire and commitment to seek improvement in the 
process of policy making. Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) had been identified as an 
appropriate approach for finding ways in which to introduce change for improvement into traditional 
organisations such as government departments. It was suggested that research adopt BPR as a means 
of identifying ways to improve the designing of support policy. It was also proposed that the 
introduction of ICnowledge Management be also considered as part o f BPR, to raise the efficiency with 
which the design process is undertaken. Scope was seen to employ benchmarking techniques, and 
secure improvement through greater use o f best practice. Learning had been identified as an important 
factor contributing to competitive advantage. Research, it was suggested, should therefore also 
investigate what features of Knowledge Management are required to help departments become learning 
organisations. 
3.5 Policy Evaluation and Learning 
Section 3,4,2 had highlighted the importance of helping government departments to become learning 
organisations. Section 3.3.1 had found 'Evaluation and Feedback' to be strategic to the design process, 
and involved the process of officials learning from their experiences. Thus 'Evaluation and Feedback' 
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was seen by the author as being an important part of the design process to investigate. Not only was it 
strategic to the process, but as a learning activity it had the potential, as part of overall knowledge 
management, to help departments become learning organisations. Investigation of 'Evaluation and 
Feedback' was therefore considered desirable, and a survey of the literature was undertaken in this 
area. 
Guy (1998, p. 1) *sets the scene' for discussing 'Evaluation and Feedback'. He refers to policy 
makers' role to take decisions on behalf o f the public, and they are thus accountable to the electorate. 
In this context governments have a responsibility to demonstrate that public funds have been wisely 
spent. It is generally recognised that, at a national level, governments need to commit programme 
expenditure to programmes in a number of areas such as health, transport, and unemployment benefit. 
The total sums involved are large, and unsurprisingly, steps are taken to make sure that publicly funded 
programmes operate efficiently. Thus Wellerand Stevens (1998, p. 579) refer to evaluation being 
routinely undertaken. Knox and McAIister(1995, p. 413) point to policy evaluation having become an 
integral part of the public policy process, and viewed as a core political and managerial activity 
(Palfrey, Phillips, Thomas, and Edwards, 1992). 
The need for evaluation is well recognised by the UK Government. DTPs Finance Handbook (DT\, 
1996b, section 2.1, 3.4) demonstrates the UK Government's commitment to 'Evaluation' as a means of 
helping to secure value for money across Whitehall. It summarises the aims o f the white paper 
Efficiency in the Civil Service (HMSO, 1982), which introduced the Conservative Government's 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI). The white paper sets out among the aims o f FMl that 
departments must have clear objectives describing what they wish to achieve, and measure their 
performance in terms of meeting those objectives. Such evaluatory work is seen as a necessary part of 
departments making best use o f resources towards achieving V F M . 
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As shown in section 3.2.2 above, monies spent on industrial support programmes are in themselves 
significant, and governments in the developed world take steps to ensure VFM when committing 
public funds to these schemes. For instance Rhodes (1988, p. 47), points to the emphasis placed on the 
need to analyse policy and its consequences. Guy (1998, p. 1) takes up the theme, highlighting the 
importance of evaluation and the supportive monitoring systems to help secure value for money. He 
points to their initial introduction as the means of providing policy makers with accurate assessments 
of the results of policy actions to meet the challenge of accountability. 
Numerous examples of programme evaluations exist. Among them are the evaluation of two 
programmes operated by the Irish Department of Enterprise and Employment; the Basic Research 
Grants scheme operated by Forbairt, (Forfas, 1998), and the evaluation of the A M T in Ireland 
initiative, (Forfas, 1995). Other examples are the evaluation of Finland's Electronic Publishing and 
Printing Programme (TEKES, 1998), in the UK the evaluation of the DTPs Regional Office 
Technology Transfer Programme (DTI, 1993) and the Small Firms Merit Award for Research and 
Technology (SMART) scheme (DTI, 1994a). 
Weiss (1998, pp. 4-5) places a different emphasis on evaluation. She highlights the purpose of 
evaluation as being to measure the effects of programmes against their objectives as a way of 
contributing to subsequent decision making relating to current and future programmes. Guy (1998, p. 
32) continues, describing how the rationale for evaluation has evolved. He highlights the role of 
evaluation as generally that of improving the performance of the system being evaluated, with 
increased emphasis now placed on providing quality inputs to inform policy-making. 
The process of evaluating programmes and reviewing policy decisions can be viewed as an example o f 
the phenomenon which Lindblom, (1977, pp. 313-317) refers to as 'incrementalism' in policy making. 
He highlights the increased emphasis being placed on scientific policy making in the form of economic 
planning in the governments of the market-oriented polyarchies of Western Europe (p. 313). Lindblom 
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(1977, p. 313) emphasises the importance placed on planning. He points to many people considering 
that the survival of the market-oriented polyarchies depends on their ability to plan effectively. 
Continuing, he suggests two approaches to policy making and planning are identifiable, which he 
describes as the 'synoptic' and 'strategic' approaches respectively (Lindblom, 1977, pp. 314-317). In a 
synoptic approach the policy maker attempts to arrive at optimal policy designs by taking account of 
all of the issues involved. The policy maker would, he proposes, attempt to forecast long term trends, 
and involve the justification of one project in relation to others. Lindblom (1988, p. 171) discusses the 
process further. He describes an 'all embracing' approach which involves the policy maker in the 
ranking of the policy objectives in terms o f their values (having first surveyed people to assess those 
values). This stage is then followed by the listing o f the multitude o f policy options, which would then 
be compared, and those that are likely to deliver the best outcomes in terms of value selected (p. 171). 
A synoptic approach is thus intellectually demanding, calling for competency across a broad range of 
topics in analysing the policy options (Lindblom, 1977, p. 314). 
However, suggests Lindblom (1977, pp. 314-317), a synoptic approach is normally impractical. 
People he observes ^"cannot iniellecntally master all their social problems^' (p. 314). No policy maker 
can fully formulate policy, and few attempt it (Lindblom, 1980, p. 65). It assumes, he adds, 
""intellectual capabilities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even 
more absurd as an approach to policy when time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem 
is limited, as is always the case" {Undblom, 1988, p. 172). They cannot therefore cover all 
contingencies in all possible cases, (Lindblom, 1980, p. 65). The author would agree. From his direct 
experience of developing programmes he is able to confirm that officials are made aware o f budgetary 
limitations, and the need therefore to prioritise in the allocation of funds, (DTI, 1999a, p. 44, 
paragraph 5.3.1), (see also chapter 5, section 5.2.6 o f this thesis). Instead, Lindblom (1977, pp. 314, 
317) proposes that the alternative approach of what he describes as the "intellectital strategic 
approach" be more practical, and to be the most frequently adopted way to proceed in the western 
polyarchies. Whilst remaining intellectually informed, a strategic approach to policy design reflects 
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the limited capabilities of human beings, with people resorting to various methods such as 'trial and 
error' and 'habitual' responses to categories o f issues to simplify problem solving (Lindblom, 1977, p. 
314). 
However Lindblom (1977) highlights the inevitability of an incomplete analysis when adopting a 
strategic approach, and suggests that it is therefore common for policy makers "/o proceed 
incrementally and sequentially in the design process with close interplay between end and means" (p. 
314). Lindblom, (1988) refers to this phenomenon as "77ie Science of Muddling Through'' (pp. 171-
172). Here emphasis is placed on the continual improvement of policy, making a series of advances 
towards solving problems rather than attempting to implement truly optimised solutions from the 
beginning (Lindblom, 1988, p. 174). In this process Lindblom (1977, p. 317; 1980, p. 68) points to the 
dependence on feedback on re-determining the 'means' and the 'ends', as policy is incrementally 
adjusted to correct deficiencies experienced following the introduction of each 'trial and error' step. 
Policy, he argues, is thus constantly pushed in new directions with new information. 
Thus Guy (1998, pp. 32-35) records the growing concern being expressed for the linkages between 
evaluation and policy design. He highlights the concept o f learning from experience, which is 
recognised as a fundamental element of the development process. He describes the concept of the 
Evaluation and Learning System Approaches (ELSAs), and how the learning process is realised by the 
feedback of evaluation findings to the decision process. Weiss (1998, pp. 4-5) argues that armed with 
objective information on programme outcomes, people can reach wise decisions in policy-making. 
There is now widespread recognition of the importance of learning through the application of feedback. 
Guy (1998, pp. 11-18) and Knox and McAlister (1995, p. 413) suggest many institutions are now 
paying increased attention to the role of 'Evaluation' in informing the process of developing policy. 
Guy (1998, p. 21-23) provides further details o f how evaluation helps policy, by looking at the 
extensive monitoring evaluation system developed by the European Commission (EC) to evaluate and 
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monitor EC Research and Technical Development (RTD) programmes. He suggests the system shows 
evaluation can improve the performance o f programmes in several ways. 
At the project level, evaluation provides the potential to improve the performance o f individual 
projects, by feeding back the lessons learnt in the process of monitoring and evaluation. For example 
dissemination of'best practice' in 'participation' can help organisations create and absorb knowledge. 
Feedback can also help participants to develop new networks, and raise the exploitation of project 
results. 
At a programme level, day to day operation can be enhanced with feedback from the evaluation 
process. Such inputs can act as steering mechanisms which allow programme managers to review 
programme composition and implementation efficiency, and then 'fine tune' programme delivery to 
better meet objectives. 
Van de Vail (1992) concurs. Referring to what he calls Programme Adjustment (p. 197), he records 
how af^er a programme has been implemented, monitored, and its impact measured, people often seek 
advice on ways to increase its effect. He suggests "o/ this stage evaluation moves away from the 
analytical task of evaluative investigation, to the instrumental task of advisory intervention^'' (Van de 
Vail, 1992, p. 197). Put another way, epistemological values are now accompanied with policy values. 
Femandez-Ballesteros (1992, p. 205) agrees, elucidating evaluation as being pivotal in the design 
process. The feedback of results provides a system of self correction and improvement of social action 
and policy. Van de Vail (1992) relates how at each stage of an evaluation, the perspective of the policy 
problem can change and the programme targeted at the problem refocused. He cites the following 
example from Dutch industrial innovation initiatives, where the policy problem was redefined over 
time. 
''The problem: How can innovation in small and medium sized firms be promoted? This was 
reformulatedfirst in terms of how should the firms cope with information overload, second 
how should the firms cope with information under used?" (p. 197). 
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Guy (1998, p. 21) goes a step further, proposing that evaluation at the policy level can provide 
important inputs which contribute to the content of policy, and help demonstrate the efficacy o f 
proposals. Fernandez-Ballesteros (1992) agrees, describing how evaluation undertaken at the end of an 
intfervention can help inform the 'decision makers'. By way of example he points to the execution of 
this process in four, basic programmes for the elderly delivered by the National Institute for Social 
Services in Spain. 
A prime deliverable of'Evaluation' is the drafting o f evaluation reports. Study of these documents 
shows them to comment on the performance of programmes in terms o f meeting their policy 
objectives, and achievement of VFM. They record the delivery mechanisms adopted, and the 
administration procedures which have been employed. Also highlighted are problems which have been 
identified, and steps which should be taken to improve future performance are recommended. 
Evaluation reports are hence a rich source of data, both for this research and to officials designing 
policy strategies. Study of evaluation reports was also seen as useful in determining best practice in 
policy design and delivery, by relating their observations on performance to the delivery strategies 
employed (see appendix K, pp. 161-187). Evaluation reports are discussed in greater detail in chapter 
8, section 8.4. 
The government's white paper Modernising government, (Cabinet Office, 1999) also places emphasis 
on the importance of Evaluation and Feedback. "Learning the lessons of successes andfailures of 
policies and programmes" (p. 20) is quoted as means to aid development o f robust policies which are 
focused on outcomes. Analysis o f how officials deploy the lessons learned from 'Evaluation' was 
therefore viewed as a strategic area for research to investigate in describing the design process. In 
support of helping DTI and other departments becoming learning organisations, and seeing how best 
evaluatory findings can be presented to the design process, was viewed as an additional question for 
research to answer. 
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In summary, evaluation and the feedback o f findings is strategically important to the design process, 
and is widely employed in the public sector. Evaluation is necessary to confirm the attainment of value 
for money, flagging problems which may be occurring or have occurred. It is also plays a fundamental 
role in the learning process in policy making. It allows the lessons learned in policy implementation to 
be captured and fed back into the design process, both to 'tune' policy in the process of its 
implementation, and help inform policy makers of the issues to be addressed. 
3.6 Sources of Information 
3.6.1 Official Files 
Copies of internal minutes, letters sent and received by officials, together with other documents such as 
minutes of meetings and reports, are held on official, registered files. It is very important that records 
of DTI activities are held in this way. DTI's Record Management Manual (DTI, 1996d) provides 
guidance to officials on the management of records. In its forward. Sir Peter Gregson, the then Deputy 
Secretary of the department writes: 
"Good records management is essential to the work of the Department. Our files should contain a 
reliable, complete wid retrievable record of what the Department has done. Tlie Department needs 
this record to help it pursue consistent policies, learn from past experiences and deal with people and 
companies in a fair and informed way. The Department also needs the record to show that it has used 
its resources well, to answer the questions Parliament asks about its performance and to leave to 
history an accoimt of its stewardship". 
(DTI, 1996d, p. 2). 
Files thus record many of the activities associated with the design process. They were therefore 
regarded as a primary source of documentary evidence for research, and their inspection likely to 
provide valuable insights. The Records Management Manual (DTI, 1996d, pp. 3-4) continues by 
highlighting the legal requirement to maintain records, as described in the Public Records Acts of 1958 
(HMSO, 1958) and 1967 (HMSO, 1967) respectively. The Records Management Manual continues by 
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emphasising the Acts requiring every government department to put arrangements in hand to organise 
and control their records as efficiently and economically as possible. Good Records Management is 
thus essential. The manual states: 
"7/7 government departments registered files and registry systems are central to Records 
Management", 
(DTI, I996d,p. 5). 
The Records Management Manual provides further information on the structure of file management 
(pages 5-40). Within DTI registered flies are held in File Registries. Each individual section normally 
has its own file registry. A member of the section, under the Section Head, is assigned as the Record 
Manager and is responsible for the organisation o f files and their storage on the section. The Manual 
(DTI, 1996d, pp. 6-17) advises that the Record Manager is responsible for opening new files, and when 
a file exceeds 2.5 centimetres in thickness to open a new part to that file. Each registry maintains a list 
of the files which it opens, and those which are held on the section. 
Files not in immediate use are sent to DTI's Central File Store (DTI, I996d, p. 6) for storage until 
again needed, or archiving. The latter case applies to files which have been 'closed', once all file 
activity ceases following the completion o f programme work. Officials are advised however that files 
not chosen for permanent preservation must be destroyed after a certain period of time has elapsed. 
This applies to the majority o f files concerned with programme introduction and operation. The 
Records Management Manual (DTI, 1996d, p, 57-59) advises that registered files are reviewed 
approximately 10 years after registration, and those deemed to be of no long term administrative use, 
or contain information of historical value, are destroyed. In the author's experience the figure o f 
around 10 years is typical. The destruction of files, the author observes, gives rise to possible loss of 
knowledge with time. This was considered to be another problem for research to resolve, and the issue 
is taken up in chapter 10, section 10.5.9. 
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The author in the course of the literature review observed other problems. DTI does not hold a central 
file list which is widely available to officials. Furthermore the Central File Store w i l l not release files 
to people without the authority of the Record Manager. From his own experience the author has found 
this practice, coupled with the absence of a composite file list, seriously handicaps accessing 
information held on file. Ways of improving the situation was an issue for research to address, and is 
discussed in chapter 10, section 10.5.9. 
3.6.2 Forwarding and Copying of Papers 
As discussed in the above, officials create and receive a variety of written documents. The author is no 
exception, and is both a direct and copy recipient o f ' m a i l ' . The majority o f the documents received 
are related to the design process, and therefore were regarded as having potential to reveal insights into 
the mechanisms involved. Historically, material such as internal minutes has been generated in paper 
format, but increasingly officials communicate with each other using electronic mail. Many 
'electronic* messages are not printed out and filed, if, for example, their content is deemed as being 
incidental. Hence the author ensured that information having relevance to his research was printed out 
or placed 'on disc' for future reference. 
3.7 Wider Exploitation of Research Results 
Section 3.3.1 above discussed the role of the HM Treasury publication the 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997), 
which provides a framework for designing support policy. That government departments across 
Whitehall are required to adhere to this guidance suggested that the 'Green Book' enforces a common 
approach to the design process. Given the likelihood of conformity in the design process across 
Whitehall, potential was seen to apply the knowledge gained from research more widely across 
government. Scope to exploit the results beyond central government was also suggested by reference 
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in the 'Green Book' to local govemment and others outside Whitehall using the guidance contained 
within the Book (HMT, 1997, p. vii). 
3.8 Conclusions 
Chapterl identified six research questions to be addressed, which for convenience were again listed in 
sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.1.4 above. The first three o f these questions concerned determining a clear 
rationale to undertake the proposed work. The next Uvo were aimed at understanding die design 
process, and finding ways of examining the process to uncover problems and identify ways o f 
correcting these difTiculties. Finally the sixth question was aimed at providing confidence that research 
results could be of general use beyond the Department of Trade and Industry, which represented the 
focus for studies. 
The 'Literature Review' had revealed there to be a good rationale for the research, and enabled an 
initial understanding of the design process to be obtained. How further information could be derived 
was indicated. BPR was identified as an approach to uncover inefficiencies in the present system, and 
exploitation of Knowledge Management was suggested as a strategy for addressing difficulties. The 
observations which were made, and the conclusions drawn with respect to addressing the research 
questions, are now summarised. 
3.8.1 Confirming a Rationale 
Question (i) , Contribution to Knowledge - The first research question aimed to confirm that there 
was an opportunity for research to contribute to existing knowledge in public policy. A detailed survey 
o f the literature had indicated that little was written on the mechanics of designing and administering 
support programmes, thus affording an opportunity to make a contribution to knowledge. It was 
suggested that the absence of substantial debate on the subject was due to the process being essentially 
a private activity within govemment departments, as civil servants must respect the Official Secrets Act 
(HMSO, 1989) and the confidentiality of ministers. However, as a civil servant, the author was on the 
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'inside' and therefore well placed to investigate the system and make the desired contribution to 
knowledge. It was also suggested that a substantial amount of policy work is carried out in the area of 
designing support policy, and hence it is proposed that there is much of interest for research to 
discover. 
Question (i i ) . Establishing Level of Interest in Designing Support Policy - An economic rationale 
for undertaking the research was found to be present. Study of the literature had revealed the role of 
governments in helping their industries to become competitive to be an economically important one. 
Study had also revealed the UK. and the majority of the governments in the developed world to have 
implemented policies aimed at improving the competitiveness of their industries. Thus a high level of 
activity was perceived as being undertaken, and that implementing support policy was widely spread 
among nations of the developed world. Examination of the expenditure of governments in supporting 
industrial firms had shown the levels of spend involved to be substantial. This gave grounds for 
thinking that i f efficiency measures could be introduced, then significant cost savings could be made, 
or more achieved with the same levels of funding. 
It was therefore concluded that, given the high levels of spend, and because helping industry to become 
more competitive is an activity commonly practised by the countries o f the developed world, there is 
likely to be interest in ways of improving the design process. The literature had additionally shown 
there to be a number of policy instruments available to governments to raise the competitiveness of 
SMEs. Of these instruments, it is the grant mechanism and the use of contracts to operate support 
activities which are of principal interest in this research. The literature revealed wide use o f these 
mechanisms elsewhere, lending weight to the judgement that research findings would find wide 
interest. 
Question ( i i i ) . Establishing Evidence of Deficiencies - Studying the literature had confirmed 
evidence of problems arising from inefficiency in the process o f policy making. Policy mistakes had 
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been observed to have been made due to inefficiency. It was proposed that problems were attributable 
to the structural changes within the Civil Service which have taken place in resent years. Access to 
expertise has been rendered difficult by these changes, as people are moved out of their traditional 
policy jobs. They have also resulted in loss of expertise through reductions in staff numbers. These 
observations tally with those of the author, who has witnessed many of his colleagues leaving their 
posts (see chapter I , section 1.2). Greater reliance has been placed on younger, inexperienced staff, 
which has further served to reduce the system's access to the specialised expertise it requires. The 
ability of policy makers to create effective policies has consequently been restricted. A report by the 
National Audit Office (NAO, 1995) has supported this view, and shown DTI not to have escaped 
problems. As an integral part of policy making it is concluded that, in turn, problems probably existed 
with the process of designing support policy. 
The present Labour Government has stated its commitment to improve the process of policy making, 
and finding ways of improving the design of support policy to overcome likely problems, was therefore 
seen as important. It was therefore concluded that this presented research with a worthy goal for 
research to achieve. Taking this observation together with the observations made in response to the 
second research question (ii) , indicating potential interest internationally in increasing VFM, and the 
opportunity to contribute to knowledge in an area where much policy making is undertaken, a clear 
rationale for undertaking the research was perceived. 
3.8.2 Main Research Phase 
Responding to the remaining three of the six research questions is principally undertaken in the main 
phase of the research, which is discussed in the following chapters. Reviewing the literature had 
however begun to provide answers that could be built upon, and provided useftil direction as to where 
investigations should be focused. 
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Research Question (iv), Discovering the Nature of the Design Process - Although little in the 
literature was expected to be found, further study had nevertheless enabled a *broad brush picture' of 
the process to be constructed. It had shown the process to comprise the principal activities of 'Issue 
Identification', 'Programme Implementation', and 'Evaluation including Feedback'. The next step for 
research was to investigate the individual mechanisms employed in each o f these three stages. The 
application of systems theory to investigate the process of policy making had been successfully 
adopted by others, and it was therefore proposed that the systems approach be employed by the author 
in his research (section 3.3). However, it is concluded that there is a need to simultaneously adopt a 
'bottom up' approach, to reveal the detail of what happens at each stage. Chapter 4, sections 4.6.1 and 
4.6.2 discuss the use of the Integrated DEFinition Methodology (IDEF) 0 as the systems modeller for 
mapping the design and implementation o f support programmes, and section 7 the methods for 
collecting the research data. 
The concept of policy networks was introduced (section 3.3.2), and that a significant producer network 
supports the activities of DTI. Investigation of the external agencies interacting with the design 
process was recommended to help gain a full understanding of how the design process operates. It was 
hence concluded that research of the network of organisations supporting the process was necessary. 
One such body is the CBI. The role of network participants is discussed in those sections dealing with 
the 'inputs' to the design process. They are chapter 5, section 5.3, chapter 6, sections 6.2.3, 6.3.3, and 
6.3.6. Rhodes (1988) had indicated the role of Acts of Parliament in providing for the introduction of 
support programmes (section 3.2.2). The role of parliamentary Acts was hence seen as integral part of 
designing and operating schemes, and how they infiuence the process was therefore seen as an 
important avenue for research to investigate (section 3.2.2). The subject is discussed in chapter 5, 
section 5.2.2. White papers were observed to be an input to the design process, representing statements 
of govemment policy which are interpreted by officials in introducing actions. Consequently white 
papers are viewed as playing an important part in programme design, dictating that their role should be 
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investigated. The role of white papers is discussed in chapter 5, section 5.3.10, and chapter 6, sub-
sections 6.2.3.9 and 6.3.3.5. 
Research had revealed the provision o f guidance to officials engaged in the design process, and initial 
study of this guidance as circulated within DTI , had uncovered further detail o f what the overall 
process comprises. The successive versions of DTl's Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI 1992, 1996a, 
1999a) were found to be particulariy informative. Officials must present cases for support in the form 
of ROAME statements, which enforces a structure to this crucial part o f the design process. It was 
suggested that development of ROAME statements represented the task of 'Issue Identification', and 
study of the procedures adopted by officials in building each section o f these statements was hence a 
prime area for research. It was also proposed as important to investigate the mechanisms adopted in 
'Programme Implementation'. It was argued that the manner in which a programme is administered 
has a direct bearing on performance and thus the results o f subsequent evaluation. Programme 
administration is thus a key component o f programme design, and study o f the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines was again suggested as a good source of evidence to begin investigations. 
Section 3.5 has also served to highlight the strategic nature of'Evaluation and Feedback' in designing 
support policy, and thus important in gaining an understanding of the total process. The literature has 
shown evaluation and the subsequent feedback o f evaluatory findings to be widely employed in the 
public sector. Evaluation is essential to ministers being answerable to the public in making sure that 
value for money is realised. However from a process viewpoint the value of 'Evaluation' lies in the 
learning process, whereby the lessons learnt in programme delivery can be fed back and exploited in 
future programme policy design. How officials evaluate schemes and present evaluation results to the 
design process so that experience may be exploited in future policy decisions ('Feedback'), was 
therefore considered as a prime topic for research. Study o f programme evaluation reports were also 
identified as potentially rich sources of information relating to delivery strategies and their 
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performance. These reports should be targeted in research to help provide detail on the design process, 
and in determining good practice in programme design. 
In researching the activities involved in designing support policy, review of the literature had shown 
that study o f registered files would be likely to yield evidence of the activities undertaken in designing 
support policy. Officials are required to place on file, minutes and other documents related to policy 
design. Issues to be resolved were identified as the potential loss of knowledge with time, as files 
reach the end of their lifetimes, and difficulties of access is not helped by the absence of a central list 
describing the files held across the department. 
Research Question (v), Identifying Potential Improvements - The fifth research question was 
concerned with discovering potential ways in which the process o f designing support policy could be 
made better. The literature has suggested ways forward. 
Section 3.4.1 showed how the government had been seen as 'going on the record' regarding its 
commitment seek improvement in the process of policy making. Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR) had been identified as an appropriate approach for finding ways in which to introduce change 
for improvement into traditional organisations such as government departments.' It was suggested that 
research adopt BPR as a means of identifying ways to improve the designing of support policy. The 
use of BPR is discussed in chapter 10, section 10.3. As part o f BPR it was also proposed in section 
3.4.2 that the introduction of Knowledge Management to raise the efficiency with which the design 
process is undertaken also be investigated. The government had signalled its wish to improve the 
process of government through the better use of knowledge. Ways o f helping DTI and other 
government departments in becoming learning organisations through effective Knowledge 
Management was seen as a vital (section 3.5). Research, it was suggested, should therefore investigate 
what features of Knowledge Management are required to help departments become learning 
organisations, and this issue is taken up in chapter 10, section 10.5. As part of the learning process, it 
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was considered important to see how evaluation findings should be presented to the policy making 
process. Exploitation of 'Benchmarking' to improve efficiency by importing external good practice 
lessons was also suggested worthy of investigation. Benchmarking is discussed in chapter 10, sub-
section 10.5.11.1. 
Research Question (vi), Generalisability of Research Findings - Finally, the ^Literature Review' 
had begun addressing the issue regarding the generalisability of the research results. The literature had 
indicated that the research results were likely to be exploitable more widely within government. It had 
shown the use of the ROAME concept to be widely used across the Whitehall departments, and hence 
the results of research likely to be of broad interest within government. A requirement of research was 
to provide evidence which would serve to confirm that such potential existed. The issue is dealt with 
further in chapter 9, section 3.4. 
3.8.3 Taking Research Forward 
To conclude, the following issues were to be investigated by the main body of the research project: 
Research Question (iv); Discovering the Nature of the Design Process - "What is the scope of the 
process describing the designing and implementing policy for introducing and operating programmes 
which support firms in becoming more competitive, what comprises that process in terms o f the 
elements which make up the whole system, and how do these elements interrelate in delivering support 
policy"? 
Specifically what are the mechanisms involved in each o f the stages of: 
(a) Mssue Identification', 
(b) 'Programme Implementation', 
(c) * Evaluation including Feedback'. 
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Research Question (v): Identifying Potential Improvements - In what areas may improvements be 
introduced and what should those improvements comprise? 
Supplementary questions articulated to direct research into areas likely to be fruitful in generating 
practical proposals were as cited as follows: 
(a) how should departments exploit Knowledge Management to become learning organisations (see 
section 3.4.2), and to help this happen specifically how to: 
(b) employ knowledge management such that officials can tap into each others experiences in 
designing support policy (see section 3.4.2), 
(c) present evaluatory findings to the design process (see section 3.5), 
(d) to use benchmarking techniques to import good practice employed elsewhere? (see section 3.4.2). 
(e) Identify solutions for resolving the specific problems identified with DTI's File Management 
System, concerning the potential loss o f files with time, and difficuhies surrounding fi le access 
(see section 3.6.1). 
Generalisability of Research Findings — what scope is there for exploiting the results o f research 
beyond DTI? 
The following chapter, chapter 4, discusses the development of the research strategy employed in 
answering the above research questions. An ethnographic approach using the case study method was 
adopted. 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 investigate and map the design process in response to Research Question (iv). 
Chapter 5 which follows begins the task by developing a detailed overview of the design process. 
Chapter 6 then investigates the mechanisms adopted in the first o f the three component processes, that 
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is 'Issue Identification'. Chapter 7 continues the mapping exercise, looking at the approaches adopted 
in 'Programme Implementation*, and chapter 8 investigates the process of'Evaluation and Feedback'. 
Finally, chapter 10 develops proposals for improving the design process in response to Question (v). 
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C H A P T E R 4 
R E S E A R C H M E T H O D O L O G Y 
133 
4. R E S E A R C H M E T H O D O L O G Y 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter I proposed, before embarking on a detailed analysis of the design process, it was first 
necessary to identify a clear rationale for doing so. The first three of six research questions were 
posed, aimed at determining the existence of a rationale. Chapter 3 described how a survey of the 
literature had revealed the required rationale to be present. Whilst the role of'Evaluation and 
Feedback' in the programme design and administration was well discussed, there was little published 
information relating to other components o f the process. There appeared to be good grounds for 
thinking that the results of research would be of value across a broad cross section o f the public sector, 
and there was evidence of problems inherent in the current design process. A rationale thus 
established, three further questions were posed for the main body of the research task to answer as 
follows: 
(iv) Discovering the Nature of the Design Process - "What is the scope of the process describing the 
designing and implementing policy for introducing and operating programmes which support firms in 
becoming more competitive, what comprises that process in terms of the elements which make up the 
whole system, and how do these elements interrelate in delivering support policy"? 
(v) Identifying Potential Improvements - "In what areas may improvements be introduced and what 
should those improvements comprise"? 
(vi) Generalisabiiity of Research Findings - "what scope is there for exploiting the results of 
research beyond DTI"? 
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The following text records how the research strategy was developed such that these questions could be 
answered, and hence the research objectives fulfil led. It is shown that a strategy based on ethnography 
using the case study method was adopted. 
4.2 Positioning of Research 
It was considered that the problem of how to improve the overall process of programme introduction 
was essentially a 'management' issue, and hence research fell into the domain of'management study'. 
Management is primarily concemed with the macro and micro behaviour and activities of human 
beings (Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 27), and hence is essentially dependent on the social sciences 
(Lupton, 1970, pp. 3-9). In designing the research methodology it was therefore logical to treat the 
research subject as falling within the area of social science, and hence to look at previous practice 
adopted within the field in developing a research strategy. 
4.3 The 'Deductive' versus Inductive' Debate 
The assumptions adopted by each o f the two approaches directly influence the choice of research 
methods (Gill and Johnson, 1997, pp. 28-38). Therefore, in developing the research strategy, it was 
important to consider their strengths and weaknesses in terms of their underlying assumptions. When 
deciding on a research strategy. Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 28) propose that researchers in the social 
sciences often choose between adopting a substantially 'deductive' or 'inductive' approach. The two 
approaches are regarded by many researchers as being distinct, as they make different philosophical 
assumptions about the way in which the social world is studied. For example Burrell and Morgan 
(1980, pp, 1-2) state that researchers make explicit or implicit assumptions regarding the way the social 
world is researched, which they describe as "^epistenwlogical assumptions about the grounds of 
knowledge". 
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Two opposing, incommensurable epistemologies are identifiable (Bryman, 1984, pp. 75-80), and often 
in social science these are described as taking a positivist (or quantitative) as against an anti-positivist 
(or qualitative) position (Gill and Johnson, 1997, pp. 28-34). Positivisls take an objective view, 
regarding social phenomena as occurring 'naturally' (Ryan, 1970, p. 13; Cassell and Symon, 1994, p, 
2). They consider that study of the social world should be undertaken using a deductive method, as 
employed by researchers of the natural sciences (Keat and Urry, 1981, 3-26). Thus key to positivism is 
the development of theories, which postulate the causal relationships between two or more concepts 
(Cassell and Symon (1994, p. 2). Theories are then rigorously tested through empirical observation to 
gain confidence in their validity, or implausibility,(Gill and Johnson, 1997, pp. 28-31; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, pp. 1-6). In this way positivists seek means to predict events in the social world (Cassell 
and Symon, 1994, p. 2). Typically a deductive approach wil l involve the setting up and mounting of 
experiments, by way of substantiating the credibility of a theory (Patton, 1987, p. 15). 
Anti positivists adopt a very different ethos. They see the social world as essentially relativistic 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1980, p. 5). For them understanding social phenomena from the perspective of 
the participants is key. They view the social world as comprising component actors whose activities 
are determined by their frames of meaning (Burrell and Morgan, 1982, p. 5; Giddens, 1976, p. 79, cited 
in Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 36, 1993, p. 69). Therefore they argue, explanations o f social events wi l l 
only be adequate i f in their derivation the researcher understands and references these 'meaning 
frames' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 8). 
Others concur, referring to the need to understand human endeavour in the context of the meaning 
systems adopted by the group or society under study (Mishler, 1979, pp. 1-2; Van Mannen, 1979, p. 
520; (Halfpenny, 1979, pp. 803-804). Thus, it is argued, events " can only be understood from the 
point of view of individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied'' (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1980, p. 5). Lispet, Trow, and Coleman (1956, p. xi i) refer to it being recognised that 
knowledge of men's social relations is a prerequisite to obtaining an understanding of their behaviour 
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in any organisation to which they belong. This implies close involvement by the researcher with the 
social phenomena being studied. Anti-positivists also question the wisdom of proffering theory as the 
basis for starting research. They emphasise instead that theory arises inductively out of the analysis of 
subjective accounts, derived from empirical observation of the actors being studied (Gill and Johnson, 
1997, pp. 33-34; Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pp. 2-3; Ryan, 1970, p. 43). 
Gill and Johnson (1997, pp. 33-37), and Burrell and Morgan (1980, p. 5) point to the emphasis on 
qualitative research methods in preference to quantitative approaches by anti-positivists. Qualitative 
methods are particularly suited to exploration and discovery (Patton, 1987, p. 15). Here many 
researchers refer to the process of'induction' as being a key feature o f qualitative investigations, where 
the phenomenon under study unfolds its nature during examination (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6; 
Van Maanen, 1982; Waddington, 1994, p. 108). Inductive designs start with initial observations and 
then build towards establishing general paUems, without the restrictions imposed by pre-conceived 
hypotheses. This approach contrasts with the quantitative, deductive methods, which involve 
experimental designs requiring the hypotheses to be identified prior to research beginning. 
"Qualitative analysis is not guided by hypotheses but by questions, issues, and a search for patterns" 
(Patton, 1987, p. 15). Typically an inductive, qualitative approach involves research methods such as 
observation, interviews, and the study of documentary evidence (Patton, 1987, p. 15; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967-, p. 18; Yin, 1994, p. 80). 
4.4 Choice of Research Approach 
Comparison of the underlying, epistemological assumptions adopted in the two approaches suggested 
an inductive strategy be the more appropriate for the purposes of this research. At the outset the author 
had no clear idea of exactly how the programme design process could be improved, and thus he was 
unable to suggest any interventions having potential to improve that process. Consequently no specific 
hypotheses could be proffered as to how such interventions would act to bring about improvement, and 
given this absence of prior theory the deductive approach seemed unsuitable. Rather, an essential 
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feature o f investigations was the discovery of ways to improve programme development as against 
starting with any firm ideas. Consequently an inductive strategy, with its potential for theory to arise 
in the process of research, was perceived as more appropriate. Furthermore, research deliverables were 
seen as more likely to be expressed in subjective terms rather than being definitive. Confidence that a 
qualitative approach was preferable was drawn from Van Maanen (1979, p. 520). He suggests that 
qualitative methods, with their focus on translating data in order to come to terms with meaning, rather 
than being concerned with the frequency o f phenomena, are more appropriate for investigating the 
socialworld. 
Other factors lent weight to adopting an inductive approach. In contrast with the priori nature of 
positivism, many of the inductive tradition argue that theory which develops out o f systematic, 
empirical research is more likely to fit the data, and hence have a higher probability of being 
(practically) useful, plausible and accessible (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pp. 2-18). These were seen as 
important characteristics of the research, as it was essential that resulting proposals should stand a good 
chance o f introduction in the workplace by being perceived as pragmatic by managers and users alike. 
Furthermore, anti-positivists argue the superiority of the qualitative approach, with its inherent 
flexibility arising from emphasis on discovering unanticipated findings, and ability to modify the 
research strategy in response to these findings (Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 36; Stake, 1995, pp. 41-42). 
4.5 Research Design: General Approach 
Researchers investigating management subjects within an inductive framework often choose between 
research designs based upon action research or an ethnographic approach. Gil l and Johnston (1997, p. 
59) point to the fonmer as having been valuable for investigating phenomena in the management world. 
Rapoport (1970, pp. 499) refers to the aims o f action research as contributing to the practical concerns 
of people in an immediate, problematic situation. Whilst these aims appeared well matched to the 
workplace orientation of the problems described in chapter 3, action research was rejected as 
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impractical, as the methodology involves planned intervention by the researcher into the processes 
being studied (Rapoport, 1970, pp. 499-503). 
The author did not have, nor did he consider he would be given, authority to interfere with the process 
of programme design within individual sections, without having evidence that performance would be 
improved and not impaired. Prior to completion of the research work, no such evidence was available. 
On the other hand ethnography, which centres upon ^^comprehending the behaviour of subjects in their 
natural everyday settings through an inductive development of an etnpathetic understanding of those 
actors' rationality'' (Gill and Johnston, 1997, p. 112), was seen as an approach which would allow the 
author to directly utilise his position as a civil servant as a means to conduct effective research. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995. pp. 6-8) propose ethnography as being an approach which allows the 
researcher to understand people's behaviour in the context of the meanings that guide their responses. 
They suggest participant observation as providing the means by which the investigator can learn about 
the culture of the people that are the subject of study. Advocacy for adopting an ethnographic research 
design was strengthened by the experiences of others. Denzin (1989, pp. 156-180) refers to participant 
observation being well suited to analysing ''complexforms in interaction" (p. 180). For Denzin "The 
ethnographer attempts to discover the practices and meanings that the members of the group take for 
granted: in so doing the culture of the group is grasped' (Denzin, 1989, p. 157). Participant 
observation, he suggests, is about doing ethnography, and entails the description, classification, and 
interpretation of a specific group's way of life. Participant observation he continues "/5 a commitment 
to adopt the perspective of those studies by sharing their day to day experiences" (Denzin, 1989, p. 
156). 
Participant observation was viewed as particularly valuable in allowing the author to capitalise on his 
position of responsibility for the development and administration o f support programmes, thereby 
allowing him to observe the process first hand. For example, Madge (1953, pp. 130-131) highlights 
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the ability of participant observation to enable the researcher to draw the correct inferences from his 
study of the acts o f the group by being able to attach the same meanings as the group being studied. 
Yin (1994, p. 88) sees the technique as providing the opportunity to gain access to events and groups 
that are otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation. Continuing with this theme, participant 
observation allows the researcher to penetrate the various forms of 'misinformation' often endemic in 
social settings (Douglas, 1976, p. 28), whilst Mintzberg (1973, p. 226) advocates the methodology to 
provide access to what people can actually do. Denzin (1989, p. 158) agrees referring to the focus in 
participant observation being on uncovering how persons live their experiences in iheir daily lives. 
For Van Maanen (1982), the objectives of revelation and disclosure take precedence over explanation 
and prediction in qualitative research. These observations relating to the role of participant research in 
uncovering * what goes on' was considered important in overcoming the secrecy issues surrounding the 
process of programme design (Roy, 1960, pp. 158-168; Lupton, 1963, p. I , pp. 202-203; Golding, 1979, 
cited in Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 101-103), alluded to in chapter 1, section 1.2, and chapter 3, section 
3.2.1. The author had the advantage of being in a privileged position, being able to exploit his position 
as a civil servant to gain access to information which is normally inaccessible to researchers. He had 
direct access to other people employed in the Civil Service who were engaged in the design process, 
and restricted documentation held on file and elsewhere. His involvement in the process would also 
allow him to directly observe the actions of others, and allow him to comment on the process of 
developing policy from the perspective of being 'one of the natives' (Madge, 1953, p. 131-133). The 
author's direct involvement in the design of support policy was seen as providing a further, important 
advantage. He would be able to interrogate his own knowledge gained from first hand experience of 
developing and introducing programmes. These advantages were seen as drawing directly on the 
strengths of an ethnographic approach, lending support to the argument for adopting such a research 
strategy. An ethnographic approach would allow the author to capitalise on his special position, to 
gain valuable insights normally 'hidden' from external agencies. 
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4.6 Research Design: Specific Methods 
The above set out the case for adopting ethnography and using participant observation as a particular 
research method. However anti-positivists argue that design of research strategy depends not only on 
consideration of the philosophical issues, but also on those of a technical nature (Bryman, 1984, p. 75). 
Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 133-134) refer to the need for methodological pluralism, suggesting that, in 
designing a research strategy, there is seldom one best method to adopt. The need for 'methodological 
pluralism' in studying social phenomenon is articulated by many anti-positivists. Trow (1957, p. 33) 
suggests that ''different kinds of information about man and society are gathered most fully and 
economically in different ways", with methodological choice determined by the nature of the problem 
under investigation. Other considerations argue for a multi-method approach. Hammersley and 
Atkinson, (1995, pp. 230-232) point to the strengthening of findings in qualitative research, i f such 
findings are derived from results obtained from using a number of different, research methods. Brewer 
and Hunter (1989, pp. 16-21) concur, arguing that activities such as causal investigation, collecting and 
analysing data, and hypothesis testing benefit from this process o f triangulation. Triangulation of 
methods is further seen as helpful in overcoming bias in the research process (Denzin, 1970, pp. 25-26; 
Jick, 1979, pp. 602-610). 
Before deciding on the suite of research methods which were to be employed, the author first 
considered how investigations should be structured. Research based on case studies was viewed as 
best fitting the research problem. Case studies focus on understanding the dynamics in single settings 
(Eisenhardl, 1989, p.534). Yin (\994) refers Xo case siudxes as''the preferred strategy when "how" 
and "why" questions are being posed (explanatory research), when the investigator has little control 
over events, ofid when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within in some real-life context'* 
(Yin, 1994, p. 1). Yin (1994, p, 3) argues die advantage o f case studies lies in their ability to help 
understand complex, social phenomena. Merriam (1988, p. 6) agrees, recommending a research design 
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based on case study methods as being suitable for studying puzzling phenomenon systematically, 
particularly in situations where the researcher has little or no control over events. Importantly Yin 
points to the usefulness of case studies in policy and public administration, research. 
Hartley (1993) also argues the relevance of case studies in contextual settings and defines case study 
research strategy as follows: 
"Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period of 
time, of one or more organizations, or groups within organizations, with a view to providing an 
analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon under study. The phenomenon is not 
isolated from its context (as in say a laboratory research), but is of interest precisely because it is in 
relation to its context" 
(p. 209). 
The above definition neatly encapsulates those proffered by other contemporary proponents such as 
Stake (1995) and Yin (1994). They show how case studies, as a research method, can be used in 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory investigations, (Yin, 1994, pp. 4-5; Stake, 1995, pp. 3-4). 
Stake (1995, p. 41) continues suggesting qualitative studies are suitable for studying cases to seek out 
patterns of anticipated, as well as unanticipated relationships. Patton (1987, p. 19) suggests case studies 
as being particularly useful when one needs to understand some particular problem in-depth, and in 
situations undergoing change (Hartley, 1993, p. 213). Finally Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 131) refer to 
ethnography normally involving intensive study of a small number of cases. 
These attributes were considered equally important in the research. Firstly it was necessary to explore 
the bounds of the programme design process, and discover the component activities which comprise 
the process. It was also required to identify the participant actors, their roles and social connectivity. 
Secondly the author then wished to adequately describe the processes, roles, and interactions in terms 
of the holistic view, such that finally how each contributes to the delivery of effective schemes, could 
be determined. 
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Yin (1994, pp. 1-15) and Hartley (1993, p 213) summarise the commonly agreed conditions described 
in the methods literature, for which it is appropriate to adopt a case study strategy: 
• when information is sought about relationships which are hard to obtain by other methods such as 
surveys, 
• where new processes or behaviours, or ones which are little understood are being explored 
• where the contextual setting is important 
• where building or adding to theory through an inductive approach is required 
• where the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not clear 
• when informal, unusual or secret organisational behaviour is being explored. 
The majority of the above conditions aligned with this study's research objectives and the questions 
posed. 
An important consideration was whether to adopt a single or multiple case strategy. It was thought that 
the research situation should be treated as a single case study. Yin (1994, p. 40) recommends use of 
the single case study design in the revelatory case. Single case designs, he suggests, are well suited to 
situations where the researcher has the opportunity to examine phenomena previously inaccessible to 
investigation. Time was also a consideration, as being a fu l l time employee, the author's resources 
were inevitably restricted. Yin (1994, pp. 44-45), and Gil l and Johnston (1997, p. 14) suggest a single 
case approach can be appropriate in these circumstances. It was logical that the focus for study be 
DTI. Being employed by the department its activities were easily accessible to the author, thus 
providing potential to speed the research process. However, it was felt that identification of best 
practice being a primary concern o f research, suggested a multiple case approach more fitting. Yin 
(1994, pp. 38-39, p. 44) refers to the possibility o f a single study containing more than one case. Since 
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several individual programmes previously operated by DTI were to be investigated, the research 
situation was judged better fitting the single study/multiple case model. 
The advantages of adopting the single study/multiple case design over a single case study method were 
considered as supportive in achieving research aims. The former would be helpful in determining 
potential best practice through facilitating comparison between cases (Yin, 1994, p. 41). It was 
realised that whilst the processes involved in the development and introduction of each programme 
were inevitably not identical, from the author's knowledge o f the systems involved (for example, the 
need to adhere to the ROAME principle), the circumstances surrounding each case were likely to be 
sufficiently close to provide a framework for comparison. However some researchers suggest that 
evidence collected from several cases based on different sites is often regarded as having greater 
credibility and leading to research conclusions which are more robust (Firestone and Herriott, 1983, 
pp. 14-19; Merriam, 1988, p. 174). Nevertheless Yin (1994, p. 45) argues that the rationale employed 
for adopting single case designs, for example, their suitability for researching the revelatory case, 
usually cannot be satisfied by multiple cases. These and the above observations indicated a single 
study/multiple case design as best fitting the research situation. The approach would facilitate the 
unveiling of the design process, with the credibility o f conclusions strengthened through examination 
of several case study examples. 
4.6.1 Modelling the Process of Designing Support Policy 
Chapter 1 had defined the first research question as what comprises the process of designing support 
policy? The literature review had shown the design process to comprise the component activities o f 
'Issue Identification', which included developing ROAME Statements, 'Programme Implementation', 
and 'Evaluation including Feedback'. As the first step in making a contribution to knowledge, it was 
necessary to explore the bounds of the programme design process, and discover the component 
activities which comprise the process. It was also required to identify the participant actors, their roles 
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and social connectivity. Obtaining a ftjll description of the process was also necessary, in preparation 
for identifying ways in which the process could be improved. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3, had suggested that the appHcation of systems theory could be usefiilly applied 
to discover the nature of the design and administration process and Ranky (1990, pp. 18-29), relates 
how system modelling techniques have evolved specifically for helping answer this type of question. 
He refers to system modelling being useful for obtaining representations of the procedures and 
activities within complex manufacturing systems and, importantly for this research, other types o f 
system. System modelling, Ranky suggests, is primarily adopted for studying existing systems and in 
helping the design of new ones. Ranky (1990, p. 18) defines a system "as a set of interacting 
components with relationships between theni'\ The author argues that in adopting the case study 
method, the process of designing support policy may be treated as a system. Stake (1995, p. 2) agrees, 
viewing a case as a '"boundedsysteni" which can be viewed as an object for study.. System modelling, 
which is based on structured systems analysis, was therefore viewed as an appropriate approach for 
analysing the designing of support policy. 
Ranky (1990, pp. 18-19) usefully provides some background to systems modelling, which helped 
confirm the suitability o f the approach and identify an appropriate analytical method for researching 
the design of support policy. Structured systems analysis and design methods were first used in the 
early 1970s, as an aid to designing large computer systems. It was subsequently realised that the 
structured methods could be equally well applied to analyse and model physical systems. Wisnosky 
and Batteau (1990, pp. 8-11) develop the theme. They refer to the United States Airforce creating a 
programme called Integrated Computer-Aided Manufacturing ( ICAM), with the aim of defining an 
architecture for the 'factory of the future'. A major development arising out of ICAM was the 
Integrated DEFinition Methodology (IDEF). IDEF can be ''used to perform enterprise analysis, 
process definition, and activity/process modelling'^ (Wisnosky and Batteau 1990 p. 8; Hanrahan, 2000). 
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The IDEF modelling technique, Ranky (1990, p. 19) argues, is a useful tool both to identify and 
describe the elements o f a system, and to analyse how they cause change with time. Wisnosky and 
Batteau (1990, p. 8) refer to a series of IDEF ' models with IDEFO performing function modelling, for 
answering the question "what do i do"? 
Wisnosky and Batteau (1990, p. 8) suggest IDEF to be a 'technology' which has grown extensively in 
its use. Ranky (1990, p. 19) reports the subsequent adoption of IDEF techniques to large numbers o f 
large and small projects outside manufacturing. Others agree. Peppard and Rowland (1995, p. 172) 
refer to the widespread use of IDEFO in BPR, to map an existing process prior to introducing 
improvements. Section 3.4.1 of the literature review discussed the use o f BPR in helping to identify 
options for improving the design process. From the aforementioned observations, it was concluded 
that IDEFO is an appropriate method for analysing the process o f designing support policy. 
4.6.2 Use of IDEFO 
Wisnosky and Batteau (1990, pp. 8-9) and Ranky (1990, pp. 19-21) explain the use o f IDEFO. IDEFO 
adopts the principle of ^'successive decomposition", creating a tree-like structure of diagrams, called 
boxes, which describe the make up of the system in increasing levels of detail as one moves down the 
tree. Referred to as the parent diagram, the top box (Level 1) provides a description of the overall 
system. Below the parent are a series of child diagrams which describe the major components which 
comprise the overall process. The process elements making up each of these 'childs' is then described 
in the next level down of boxes (Level 3). The resulting hierarchical tree of parent and child diagrams 
represents a static model of the system or process. The procedure of successively breaking the system 
down into smaller and smaller components, is repeated until the required level of detail is reached. 
I ^ In de\-eloping IDEF ihe United Stales A i r Force's initial step yxzs to identify the first three stages regarded as essential for the specificaiioo and anal>-sis 
phases o f projects, for example function/actinly modelling (IDEFO). infonnaiion modelling ( I D E F I ) . and d>-namic modelling (IDEF2) 
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Peppard and Rowland (1995, p. 172) emphasise the importance of gaining a good understanding of 
how a process functions, but simultaneously warn o f becoming overwhelmed with too much detail. 
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the features of the IDEFO concept: 
Control(s) 
Input(s) 
Activity or 
Process 
Output(s) 
Mechanism(s) 
Figure 4.1 IDEFO Diagram Activity Box 
The arrows in IDEFO diagrams indicate the direction o f f low of entities such as informalion. Each side 
of an IDEFO box has particular significance. The left hand side is for Mnputs', the right for 'outputs', 
the top side is for 'controls' or alternatively called 'constraints', and finally the bottom side of the box 
is for 'mechanisms' which are used to convert inputs to outputs. The IDEFO notation adopts the 
principle that inputs on the left hand side are converted into outputs on the right hand side, using the 
mechanisms described, but influenced by the constraining factors. 
4.7 Collecting the Evidence 
Having decided to adopt the IDEFO modelling technique, the next step was to collect the data from the 
case studies which would allow the building of the model, with the 'inputs', 'outputs', 'constraints' and 
'mechanisms' for each of the system components to be determined. Yin (1994, pp. 90-99) was helpful 
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in proposing how investigations should be conducted. He suggests that quality case studies arise from 
applying three principles in case study research. They are: 
(i) use multiple sources of evidence; 
(i i) establish a case study database; 
(i i i ) ensure the existence of a chain of evidence. 
4.7.1 Multiple Sources of Evidence 
Yin (1994, pp. 91-92) argues that a major strength o f case studies is the potential to use a number of 
different sources of evidence during investigations. This opportunity, he suggests, enables the 
researcher to undertake the important process of'triangulation'. Triangulation involves the 
development of convergent lines of enquiry, in which evidence drawn from two or more sources of 
information relating to a phenomenon serves to corroborate each other in pointing to a particular 
conclusion. Conclusions based on multiple sources of corroborative evidence, Yin (1994, p. 92) 
proposes, are likely to be more accurate and attract greater credibility when viewed by others 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, pp. 230-232). 
Yin (1994) and Stake (1995, pp. 112-115) acknowledge four types of triangulation. Yin (1994) lists 
them as follows: 
"7. of data sources (data triangulation) 
2. among different evaluators (investigator triangulation) 
3. of perspectives on the same data set (theory triangulation), and 
4. of methods (methodological triangulation/\ 
(p. 92). 
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Of these, Yin (1994, p. 92) proposes 'data triangulation' is the more appropriate for case study 
research. 
In considering the data sources to be examined in the research described in this thesis, Yin (1994, pp. 
79-90) was again helpful. He proposes that no one source of data has complete advantage over 
another, but suggests six important sources as: 
• documentation: e.g. letters, minutes of meetings, and formal studies or evaluations on the same site 
as under study; 
• archival records: e.g. organisational records, lists of names, and personal records; 
• interviews: e.g. structured, semi-structured, and unstructured; 
• direct observation: the researcher acts as a passive observer, directly observing the phenomena of 
interest on the ' f ield ' site. Observation is made using either formal and/or casual data collection 
activities; 
• participant observation: the researcher can be actively involved in the case study situation, and can 
participate in the activities being studied; 
• physical artefacts: e.g. a technological device, tool or instrument or other physical evidence 
employed within a case study example. 
In the context of this research, the value of interrogating each of these data sources were considered as 
in the following sections. 
4.7.2 Documentation 
With the exception of preliterate societies, Yin (1994, p. 81) emphasises the relevance of documentary 
evidence to case studies (Patton, 1987, p. 7). Documentary evidence, he suggests, is important in case 
studies to provide specific details, and corroborate information from other sources. Documents have 
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an explicit role in data collection within case studies, and hence systematic searching for relevant 
documents should form a significant part o f gathering information. Section 3.6.1 o f chapter 3, the 
"Literature Review" explained how officials raise registered files on which are held papers recording 
the activities comprising the design process. Thus registered files are a rich source o f documentary 
evidence. During the course of his research the author obtained a number of registered files, and 
through examination of their contents was able to gain useful data relating to the design process. 
Chapter 3 section 3.6.1 further discussed the receipt by the author o f papers forwarded or copied to him 
in the normal course of his duties. These were studied from a research perspective, and those of 
specific interest to his investigations were stored in a research folder or electronically for further 
analysis. 
Chapter 3 section 3.5 highlighted the availability of programme Evaluation Reports. Evaluation 
reports record the process of evaluating programme performance in terms of the effectiveness of the 
delivery mechanisms deployed to meet policy objectives. Evaluation reports were therefore studied to 
help determine best practice in policy implementation and identify weaknesses in current procedures. 
Evaluations are undertaken by staff independent of those who operate the programmes to maintain 
impartiality in the assessment exercise. They may be undertaken by officials or external contractors. 
Balance in evaluation is also aided by the questioning of people outside the departments who are 
independent of those who set policy (see chapter 8, section 8.4). 
The author considered whether he should place different weightings on the evaluations studied. Some 
were undertaken by internal assessors, other by external consultants. Study o f the reports also showed 
them to vary in length. He came to the view that they should be treated as having equal weight. A 
number of considerations led to this conclusion. Evaluation of programmes is normally undertaken in 
accordance with DTI and HM Treasury guidance (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 1996b, 1999a; HMT, 1997), and 
thus the assessment strategies wil l be similar, irrespective of whether work is undertaken by officials or 
external contractors. Guidance enforces commonality in approach, stating the procedures to be 
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adopted and the parameters to be measured, (see chapter 8). Furthermore, as evaluators always have 
autonomy from those responsible for scheme management, the evaluatory environment for both 
independent and in-house teams, are alike. 
The author discussed these points with Dr. Peter Bentley (PR11), who had responsibility for 
'Evaluation' in DTI's Business Link Directorate. Dr. Bentley supported the author's views. He 
usefully added that the additional value of independent evaluations, stemmed from their role of 
supporting ministers. If, for example, a Minister is required to answer a Parliamentary Question 
relating to a programme, his response wil l be perceived as having greater credibility, i f he is ab^to 
refer to an external evaluation, rather than an assessment undertaken internally. However, from the 
officials' viewpoint, the lessons learned from external and internal evaluations, carry equal weight. 
The author also consulted Dr. Ray Lambert, a senior economist in DTI's Innovation Policy and 
Standards Directorate. Dr. Lambert endorsed the understanding held by Dr. Bentley and the author. 
He added that variability of length in evaluation reports was more a function of peoples' verbosity, 
rather than indicating any differences in depth of the analyses! 
4.7.3 Archival Records 
Yin (1994, pp. 83-84) proposes that archival records may be relevant in case study research. Chapter 2 
discussed DTI's Record Management System, (DTI, 1996d) and how closed files are held in the 
department's Central File Store. Files thought to contain documents relevant to the research of this 
thesis, were retrieved from the Store for study. In addition the author had archived several editions of 
DTI's Functional Directory, covering the period 1993 to 1999. These were useful in reminding him of 
organisational changes which had taken place in the department, and also in helping to identify 
officials with particular experience. 
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4.7.4 Interviews 
Yin (1994, pp. 84-86) refers to the essential nature of interviews to case study research (Patton, 1987, 
p. 7). He suggests interviews as an important source of information, ''as most case studies are about 
human affairs''' (p. 85), Yin (1994) proposes interviews in case study research fall into the three 
categories 'open-ended', 'focused', and 'structured', which are undertaken along the lines o f a formal 
survey. Yin highlights the use of structured interviews in situations where it is necessary to adopt 
sampling procedures, to measure the weight of opinion supporting particular views or intentions 
relating to a case study phenomenon. He cites by way of an example, the surveying of neighbourhood 
residents and shopkeepers as part of a case study. The author considered the focus o f his research to be 
orientated towards uncovering the mechanisms comprising the process o f designing support policy, 
rather than obtaining information in areas of policy design which could be pre-determined. The use of 
structured interview techniques was hence rejected. 
Open-ended interviews are the most commonly employed in case studies (Yin, 1994; Denzin, 1989, p. 
158). Open-ended interviews, Yin (1994, p. 84) proposes, feature asking interviewees not only for 
their opinions but also for factual information relating to events (Patton, 1987). Thus Yin suggests an 
interviewee can be considered as an informant, providing the researcher with insights into the 
phenomena being investigated (Denzin, 1989, pp. 157-158). Furthermore Yin argues that respondents 
can 'signpost' to other sources of relevant evidence and help suggest alternative lines of enquiry. 
The author concluded semi-structured interviews to be extremely relevant to his research, and 
employed the technique during his investigations. As discussed above, the uncovering of activities 
involved in designing support policy was an essential feature of research. The provision o f insights by 
individuals was therefore viewed as fundamental in revealing what happens in the process. Seeking 
views on the merits or otherwise on policy decisions was seen as useful in helping to determine what 
is, or is not, good practice. Also seen as useful was the advantage o f receiving suggestions on lines o f 
enquiry, and information on the location o f other, relevant evidence. It is perhaps worth recording that 
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in practice the author found open-ended interviews to be valuable. In the majority o f cases, colleagues, 
on learning 'what the author was about', became very enthusiastic to help and volunteered much 
information that could not be expected to be obtained by other means (Patton, 1987). Finally, focused 
interviewing techniques were also employed. They are particularly useful in corroborating specific 
facts Yin (1994, pp. 84-85). Indeed the author found them useful in confirming initial findings based 
on earlier observations made elsewhere. Usefully, on occasions further insights were revealed. 
Twenty seven face to face interviews were conducted, and a sample of these is contained in appendix 
B (pp. 8-69). Following each interview the questions posed and the responses given were recorded in 
interview notes. In these notes the author also recorded his observations and the draft conclusions 
which he drew from each interview, in the majority o f cases, the interview records were then passed to 
the interviewees for comment, and any remarks received incorporated into the text. In many cases 
people added further points which had subsequently come to mind. Where additions were of a 
substantial nature, copies of the drafts were returned to the interviewees for their final observations 
before accepting the reports as representing accurate records of discussions. 
Slake (1995, pp. 20-21) refers to the evolutionary nature of questions posed in case studies. The 
researcher begins with his or her etic issues which are to be addressed, and the questions posed wil l be 
based on only partial information. As the investigator's knowledge of the case builds, questions wil l 
be modified and restated. Ernie issues also emerge, from discussion with people involved in the case 
under study. These emic issues serve to further modify existing questions and add others. Thus as 
answers to questions increase the researcher's understanding o f the subject under investigation, he or 
she is able to focus on particular issues o f interest. In the course o f his research, the author observed 
the interviews tending towards a more structured format, as his understanding of the specific issues to 
be resolved became more apparent. 
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Evidence gathered from the interviews was supplemented by a number of ad-hoc discussions with 
colleagues, held as part of the author carrying out his day to day work. The author took the 
opportunity when talking to his colleagues, to raise and discuss points o f interest to the research. In 
conversation the opportunity to clarify certain points was also taken. In such instances the points 
raised were recorded in the author's official notebook, with the observations made subsequently 
transferred into the text of the thesis. 
Yin (1994, p. 85) warns against asking leading questions in interviews, as to do so endangers the 
corroboratory value of evidence obtained. The author took special care in this area. He applied the 
knowledge gained from attending a DTI interviewing course, which advised on how to pose *open 
questions'. The value of asking open questions lies first in avoiding interviewees being influenced in 
their responses by views held by the questioner. Secondly, by withholding information that he or she 
holds, the interviewer encourages interviewees to examine their personal knowledge in answering 
questions, and communicate all which is relevant to the interviewer. 
4.7.5 Direct Observations 
Yin (1994, pp. .86-87) recommends direct observation o f such activities as meetings as being useful in 
providing additional information on the subject being studied. The author observes that the term 
'direct observation' is being used in the context of the researcher assuming the role of a passive 
observer. Since the author was himself very much part o f the design process, he could not take this 
role, and 'direct observation' was consequently discounted as a viable research mechanism. 
4.7.6 Participant Observation 
Yin (1994, pp. 87-88) refers to the special nature o f participant observation, in which the researcher is 
not just a passive observer, but instead can be actively involved in the system being studied (Denzin, 
1989, pp. 156-157). He highlights the advantages of participant observation. Participant observation 
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enables the researcher to make observations relating to a case study, and he suggests the observation of 
events such as meetings, and the actions of people in the workplace, as being useful in collecting case 
study evidence. For Yin (1994, p. 88), participant observation provides access to events or groups 
which are otherwise normally inaccessible to investigation, A second advantage he proposes is the 
ability to perceive reality from the point of view of someone inside the case study rather than external 
to it. Gi l l and Johnson (1997, pp. 103-105, 113-114) agree, and refer to participant observation as 
providing the means of access to the knowledge which individuals possess about their situations within 
organisations, and their understanding of others within those organisations (Denzin, 1989, pp. 156-158; 
Waddington, 1994, p. 108). 
Yin's (1994) observations were seen as pertinent to research issues. Chapter 3 referred to need for 
secrecy in the process of policy development, which tends to prevent access to the process by those 
extemal to the Civil Service. As discussed in section 4.6 above, the author was able to study the design 
process as a full participant in that process. As a member o f the Civil Service he was not barred from 
accessing others involved in policy design, and had direct access to the documentation which has been 
generated in support of the process. Being a civil servant he was also able to perceive 'reality' as an 
'insider'. The author was thus in a very special position, not only because he had ease of access to the 
information sources he required to interrogate, but also as an experienced individual employed to 
design and implement policy, he was able to interpret what he observed in the same context as that 
adopted by the Civil Service community at large (Madge, 1953, pp. 130-131). Participant observation 
was therefore considered as an appropriate research tool, and formed an important part of the overall 
research strategy. 
The author was aware of the issues surrounding impartiality. While recognising the strengths of 
participant observation. Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 114) refer to the danger that by being immersed in 
the every day lives of the actors being studied, the researcher internalises the actors' culture. In 
response to this observation, the author would argue that being a civil servant of many years, he has 
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already internalised the Civil Service culture. In so far as investigating the design process is 
concerned, he cannot now de-intemalise his knowledge o f the system. Instead he would argue that 
through the process of triangulation; that is by consulting a number of different information sources, 
including the interviewing o f people involved in the design process and evaluation reports, the latter 
involving opinion collected from external sources, he has taken the necessary steps to avoid bias in 
arriving at the research findings. The topic is discussed further in section 4.8.2 below. 
In the course of his normal work during the research period, the author was required to attend 
numerous meetings with colleagues. These meetings provided an excellent opportunity to witness the 
role of others in designing support policy, and from his observations comment on the activities 
involved. Observations made during the course of policy meetings supplemented information gathered 
from documentary sources and interviews. Observations were recorded by the author in his official 
note book, and following further study transferred into the text of this thesis. 
4.7.7 Physical Artefacts 
Section 3.3.1 of chapter 3, the literature review, had shown how officials are provided with guidance in 
executing the process of designing support policy. Three particular sets of guidance were identified: 
The 'Green Book' (HM Treasury, 1997), the DTI Finance Handbook 1996b), and iht Innovation 
Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1996a 1999a). These sets o f guidance can be regarded as 'tools' that are 
employed by officials in the design process to help them develop programmes which are ' f i t for 
purpose' and provide value for money. Detailed examination of these sets of guidance was undertaken, 
as a first step in developing an IDEFO static model of the process of designing support policy. 
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4.7.8 Case Study Database 
Yin (1994, pp. 94-98) emphasises the need to maintain a data or evidentiary base recording evidence 
collected during Investigations as a separate entity from evidence and conclusions as presented in a 
report. Stake (1995) concurs, advising that "///e researcher should have a data storage system"" (p. 55). 
The purpose of such a repository o f data is that it provides direct access by other researchers to the 
'raw' data, allowing them to directly view this evidence and not be limited by what is contained in 
written reports. In this way original evidence may be subjected to secondary analysis by others, 
independent of conclusions drawn by the original investigator. The ability to challenge the original 
findings in this way Yin (1994) suggests, enhances the reliability of case studies. The author would 
add from his own experience, that access to the original evidence helps in self checking one's findings 
to ensure initial conclusions are valid. 
Case study notes are normally the most common records of evidence in a database (Yin , 1994, p. 95), 
and may take several forms including records of interviews, observations and document analysis 
(Stake, 1995, p. 55). In support of writing this thesis, the author, as described earlier, produced a 
written record of each interview, which was held electronically on disc. In addition, notes of 
observations made during official meetings and ad hoc discussions with colleagues were held in his 
notebook. Observations drawn from the literature were also recorded and held on disc, and where 
possible paper copies of relevant documents were held by the author in research folders. 
4.7.9 Maintaining a Chain of Evidence 
Yin (1994, p. 98-99) argues that to increase the reliability of information in a case study, it is necessary 
to maintain a 'chain of evidence', which allows an observer to follow the derivation of evidence from 
the initial research questions to ultimate conclusions, and, i f he or she wishes, to undertake the reverse 
process. The chain should allow the reader to move from one part of a case study to another, with clear 
cross referencing to the methodological procedures and the evidence derived. In this way the reader is 
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able to consider all the evidence collected during a case study, the analysis process, and the results 
derived, to ensure no evidence has been lost or overlooked, thereby prejudicing the accuracy of the 
conclusions reached. Thus i f a chain of evidence is maintained, Yin (1994) argues, the quality and 
construct validity of the case will be increased. 
In drafting the thesis, the author ensured that such an 'audit trail ' was built into the text. Conclusions 
were cross referenced to those parts of the text which contained the discussion of observations, and 
that had led to those conclusions being drawn. In turn, observations were cross referenced to the 
sources of evidence with which they were associated, that is, interviews and discussions held, 
meetings, documentary evidence, and personal knowledge. 
4.8 Methods Limitations 
4.8.1 Generalisation 
The case study method was chosen as being the most appropriate approach for the research task, that is, 
the investigation of the process of designing support policy within DTI. However a concern commonly 
expressed among researchers regarding case studies, is over the issue o f their generalisability (Stake, 
1995, pp. 7-8, 85-88; Gill and Johnson, 1997, p. 124). Yin (1994, p. 10) refers to the common 
complaint made about case studies, over the difficulties of generalising from one case to others. 
Gill and Johnson (1997, pp, 124-125) take up the theme. They refer to some researchers questioning 
whether theory derived from the research of a small number of cases still holds good for explaining 
causal relationships in a wider range of situations. However the author argues that the focus for his 
research was to explore and describe the phenomena comprising the process o f designing support 
policy, investigating the activities involved and their interrelationships, rather than about developing 
theory which would explain the relationships between events. Hence the generalisability of theory was 
not considered as a significant issue in the case of this research. Yin (1994, p. 35) supports the 
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author's view, referring to the problem of'internal validity' of case studies in which the aim is to 
establish causal relationships as not being an issue for exploratory or descriptive studies. 
Yin (1994, pp. 30-31) relates the problem seen by some researchers of "statistical generalization" in 
case studies. Doubts may be cast on the confidence with which inferences can be drawn from a small 
sample about the general behaviour o f a larger population. His response is to propose that cases are 
not 'sampling units', and suggests: 
"A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalization as the method of 
generalizing the results of the case". 
(Yin, 1994, p. 31). 
The author would additionally argue that the purpose of case study research, as previously observed, is 
to uncover the activities involved in the area o f study. 
The question of'external viability' of case studies is also frequently questioned (Yin, 1994, pp. 35-36). 
Stake (1995, p. 7) takes up the debate. He acknowledges that in case studies normally only a.single 
case or just a few cases wil l be investigated, and thus represent only a small sample, but argues that 
these wil l be studied in-depth. His observations were seen as according with the author's research 
project, it being focused upon a single situation, the DTI, but involving in-deplh investigation of a 
number of support programmes. 
Stake (1995) continues arguing that "case studies are undertaken to make the case understandable" (p. 
85). They are not, he suggests, undertaken primarily to understand other cases. He proposes that of^en 
a case is o f interest to readers for 'its own sake', with their interest in generalising from it being small. 
However generalisation is possible. Stake (1995, pp. 85-86) suggests, because people can learn much 
"which is generaP' from a single case study. He proposes that certain activities, issues, and responses 
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occur repeatedly, and hence particular generalisations can be made. People reading case study reports. 
Stake (1995) continues, can form new generalisations by adding the knowledge which they gain to that 
which they already hold on similar situations with which they are already familiar. The author viewed 
these aspects of case studies as important and relevant to improving the design process across 
govemment. People elsewhere in Whitehall were seen as likely to recognise the procedures adopted 
within DTI in making policy. Govemment departments are in the business o f designing and delivering 
policy (Cabinet Office 1999, p. 15), and thus officials in other departments are likely to have 
experienced similar situations as people employed within DTI. 
Looking specifically at the process of designing support programmes, further grounds for supposing 
that procedures adopted elsewhere in Whitehall were similar to those adopted by DTI , were based on 
the content of the Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997). As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.3.1, the 
book requires Whitehall departments to adopt the ROAME framework in developing cases for support. 
That all departments are required to adhere to the Treasury's guidance helps enforce conformity in the 
approach to programme development across Whitehall. Thus it was supposed that the mechanisms 
employed by DTI in designing support policy were close to those used elsewhere, and therefore 
research findings would be applicable to other parts of government. Discussion o f this topic is 
developed further in chapter 9, section 9.3. 
Yin (1994, pp. 34-35) raises a further concern often expressed in relation to generalising from case 
studies. This relates to construct viability. Researchers, he suggests when beginning their 
investigations, frequently define the phenomena to be studied in too broad detail to enable useful 
generalisations to be made. To address the problem Yin (1994) advocates two steps be taken: 
• that the specific changes to be studied in relation to achieving research objectives be identified, 
• show that selected measures allow direct assessment of the changes to be studied. 
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For the puqjoses of this research a wider but still precise interpretation o f change' was adopted, to 
include the phenomena which were the target of study such as, for example, the processing o f 
information in drafting documentation, and changes in understanding as officials learn more about 
specific market failure. 
The author was content that construct viability was satisfied. The "Literature Review" had shown that 
the areas of prime interest were the development of programme ROAME statements, 
'Implementation', and 'Evaluation including Feedback'. Means o f discovering the elemental processes 
involved were provided by examination of documentary evidence including registered files and 
evaluation reports. The use o f interviews as a further way of collecting evidence was discussed above 
in section 4.7.4. 
Yin (1994) proposes that construct viability is enhanced in case study research by the use of multiple 
sources of evidence as part of convergent lines of enquiry, maintaining a chain of evidence, and having 
work reviewed by the key informants. Section 4.7.1 discussed the use of multiple sources of evidence 
and the adoption of 'triangulation' in interpreting the evidence collected. Section 4.7.1 further 
explained the steps taken in this research to maintain a chain of evidence. Finally also recorded was 
the procedure of asking each interviewee to check the content of interview reports, including the 
accuracy of the inferences drawn from these interviews. 
A further step was taken by the author help ensure the credibility of his thesis. Dr. Peter Bentley, then 
Director - Finance and Assessment, of the Business Link Directorate in DTI, was asked to read and 
comment on the final thesis. Dr. Bentley, as a senior official with many years experience of designing 
and administering support policy, was able to make useful observations regarding the content o f the 
thesis, and his comments were included in the final draft. Thus the author considered he had 
conformed with recognised 'good practice' in case study research. 
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4.8.2 Problems with Participant Observation 
Section 4.7.6. discussed the author's role as a participant observer in researching the process o f 
designing support policy. However some researchers highlight difficulties in adopting this mode o f 
observation. For example Gill and Johnson (1997) highlight the possible danger of the researcher 
becoming involved in peoples' lives to the extent whereby he or she internalises the culture o f the 
people under investigation, prejudicing the researcher's ability to maintain a neutral stance in 
observing events, ''''That is they actually become a member of the organization, or 'go native"^ (Gill 
and Johnson 1997, p. 114). 
The author understood the dangers associated with participant observation. At the time of beginning 
his research, the author had worked in the Civil Service for around 12 years, specifically within DTI in 
designing support policy for several years. He was thus very much part of the system which was the 
subject of investigation. However the author took the view that the strengths of his being a member o f 
the community under study outweighed the disadvantages. To begin with section 4.7.6 showed a 
strength of participant observation to be in providing access to events which are normally inaccessible. 
Participant observation therefore allowed the author to capitalise on his position as a civil servant, to 
unveil activities normally hidden from public view. Secondly participant observation afforded the 
ability to interpret observations from the same perspective as the subjects being studied. This was 
viewed by the author as important. It helped him understand the emphasis which is placed on certain 
matters, such as ministers' agendas, and relate actions to priorities which are unique to the Civi l 
Service. Understanding the culture helped, for example, in differentiating between phenomena 
associated with addressing market failures, from those concerned with responding to organisational 
imperatives. 
There is a further consideration which lends weight to the argument for adopting the role o f participant 
observer. Douglas (1976) argues that for all social research, direct experience is "the most reliable 
form of knowledge about the social world' (Douglas 1976, p. 7), He continues suggesting that people 
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are not always able to articulate what they experience accurately, and without personal experience of 
the phenomenon it is more difficult for the researcher to check the credibility of what is being 
communicated. For Douglas, 'depth-probes' facilitated by participant observation: 
"are vital in getting at the deeper, more secret aspects of social life, those about which the members 
often would not talk or possibly even think. In these forms the researcher's knowledge of his own 
feelings becomes a vital source of data". 
(Douglas 1976, p. 16). 
Douglas (1976, p. 16), and Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 114) emphasise the importance in participant 
observation, of the researcher maintaining his or her commitment to being impartial in both 
investigating the phenomena being studied and in developing conclusions. Maintaining 'objectivity' in 
this research was helped by the analysis o f evaluation reports, some of which were prepared by bodies 
external to the Civil Service, the study of relevant articles contained in the literature more widely, and 
gaining the views o f staff employed in external organisations. 
4.9 Mapping the Design Process 
The following chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 describe the research which was undertaken to obtain a model 
providing a detailed description of the design process. To aid the reader in following the research 
through. Figure 4.2 below contains a flow chart of the design process, showing the principal elements 
and their sequence in the process. The flow diagram was derived from the results o f analysing the 
design system (see chapter 8, section 8.8). 
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Policy Framework 
Development of Programmes Aimed 
at Improving the Competitiveness 
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Figure 4.2 Flow Chart of the Process of Designing and Administering Programmes 
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CHAPTER 5 
MODELLING THE PROCESS OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT: 
TOP L E V E L ANALYSIS 
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5. MODELLING THE PROCESS OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT: TOP 
L E V E L ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background 
This chapter records the first stage of the task of building a detailed model of the process of designing 
support programmes. The aim is to develop a top level (Level 1) IDEFO diagram providing a 
description of the overall process. 
Chapter 1, section 1.2 defined three research objectives; to make a contributio"n to knowledge, to find 
ways of improving the design process, and to identify proposals for introducing a set of good practice 
guidance for use in programme design and administration. In order to achieve these objectives, 
Chapter I , sections 1.3 to 1.4, and 1.6 and 1.9 posed six questions for research to answer. The first 
three of these were concerned with ensuring that a clear rationale for the research existed. The 
"Literature Review" provided sufficient evidence to suggest that such a rationale was present. The 
process of designing and running support programmes appeared to be an area not subjected to 
extensive study, suggesting an investigation of the process would be lead to a contribution to 
knowledge being made. Much of the process is conducted ' in private' by officials, but as an official 
engaged in the task the author was in a position to study the mechanisms involved. 
The review also revealed the evidence of problems with current arrangements, and showed there was 
likely to be an interest in finding ways to improve the design process. Governments of the developed 
world spend significant levels of finance towards helping improve their industries. Finally chapter 3, 
section 3.4.1 had suggested that BPR be employed as an approach to help identify where problems lay 
with the design process, and that solutions based on the introduction o f Knowledge Management 
represented a credible strategy for tackling difficulties (see section 3.4.2). 
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5.1.2 The Main Research Task 
Having established that the research was likely to prove worthwhile, it was decided to continue with 
investigation of the design process. Chapter I , section 1.4.1 suggested that making a contribution to 
knowledge and finding problem areas with the current system were dependent on obtaining a detailed 
description of the design process. Thus the fourth research question was put: 
Discovering the Nature of the Design Process (Question iv) - "What is the scope of the process 
describing the designing and implementing policy for introducing and operating programmes 
which support firms in becoming more competitive, what comprises that process in terms of the 
elements which make up the whole system, and how do these elements interrelate in delivering 
support policy"? 
•i 
Chapter 3, section 3.3 suggested that the systems modelling approach had been previously used by 
many researchers to conceptualise the policy process. Chapter 4, which discussed the development of 
the research strategy, showed in section 4.6.1 how systems modelling techniques could be employed to 
obtain the required description, and argued the case for using the IDEFO modeller. The purpose of this 
chapter is to record the first stage in the process o f building a system model o f designing support 
policy, that is the development of a 'Top Level' (Level I ) IDEFO diagram describing the overall 
process of programme design. Work centred on identifying the 'Constraints' (Controls), the 'Inputs' 
and 'Outputs to the process, and the 'Mechanisms' employed. 
Chapter 3 pointed the way for research. Weller and Stevens (1998) had advised that it is the whole 
process of policy design which requires investigation. Study of the literature had enabled a 'broad 
brush picture' of the process to be constructed, revealing the process to comprise the principal 
activities of 'Issue Identification', 'Programme Implementation', and 'Evaluation including 
Feedback'. The "Literature Review" also suggested that 'Issue Identification' in government 
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comprised the process of developing ROAME statements, and proposed that the work undertaken 
under each of the ROAME headings be investigated. It was also revealed that DTI's Innovation 
Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 1999a) provide useful advice in this area. It was shown that the 
guidelines contain detailed information relating to the design and administering (implementation) of 
schemes. It was suggested that close study o f the design process begin by reviewing more closely the 
'Innovation Guidelines'. In this way existing documented knowledge could be captured and used as a 
foundation for building the model. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3, discussed the systems modelling method, viewing it as a 'top-down' approach 
to analysing the design process. Government white papers were seen as an input to the process, as they 
convey to officials ministers' aspirations, in terms of the things that they wish to achieve. In drafting 
white papers, officials can receive direction from ministers as to the topics which are to be covered. 
The setting up o f the Small Business Service (SBS) (a next steps agency), is an example. The Deputy 
Head of the SBS described to the.author how ministers had developed the idea for the SBS within a 
small, private advisory group. Ministers advised officials of their wish to set up the agency, which was 
subsequently detailed in the white paper Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 18). 
Ministers may therefore be regarded as providing 'input' to the policy making process,.and in turn 
programme design. However they are not directly involved in the design process, the task of 
developing programmes that deliver policy goals being the responsibility o f officials (Cabinet Office, 
1999, p. 15). Thus ministers may be regarded as taking a top down view. 
In contrast officials engaged in the design process wil l interrelate with a number o f actors, both within 
and external to the Whitehall departments. Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 highlighted the need for research to 
examine closely the people and their activities involved in each of the identified component processes. 
It was suggested that a bottom up approach be adopted, which looks at the role of the actors within 
DTI, and those in the policy network supporting programme design, and how they relate to the design 
process. In developing the IDEFO model these requirements were kept in mind by the author. At this 
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and subsequent stages of the modelling process, the activities involved were studied. Members of the 
policy network were identified and their roles described by investigating the inputs to the design 
process. 
5.2 Constraints on the Design Process 
"C/v/7 servants are constrained by rules governing their behaviour, authority and sphere of influence" 
(Smith, 1998, p. 65). Through acting on civil servants, these rules serve in turn to constrain the process 
of designing and implementing support programmes. The purpose o f this section is to identify and 
discuss the influence of the principal constraining factors which act to limit the process. 
The over riding objective for the process o f designing support policy is the overall aim of 
achieving VFM. Chapter 2, section 2.3 referred to the objective of FMI for every department 
to achieve value in what they undertake (HMSO, 1982). FMI requires the Whitehall 
departments to put in place systems which help achieve value for money. Chapter 2, section 
2.3 continued by showing how the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b) makes clear that the 
principles of FMI apply to DTI, stating that achieving economy, efficiency, effectiveness and 
VFM is central to managing all activities within the department. Thus achieving VFM is an 
overall requirement in the design and operation of programmes, and as such represents a 
constraint on the process; i f VFM is not perceived then approval to fund activities wi l l not be 
given. 
The process of policy development is also constrained by the need to conform to European 
Commission policy on State Aids, United Kingdom (UK) Legislation, UK Government Policy, 
'Conditions set for Government Intervention', 'Ministerial Priorities', and 'Finance'. Each of these 
topics is now discussed in the following sections. This chapter also records the need for officials to 
show i f at all possible, that they are able to secure wider benefits from programme funding towards 
enhancing VFM. 
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5.2.1 European Commission State Aids Policy 
Actions of the member states are constrained by European Union (EU) policy (Price, 1990; 
Smith, 1998, p. 65; SA, 1998; DTI, 2000). Inspection of DTI's Innovation Budget Guidelines 
show them to refer to the European Commission having "considerable powers to monitor, 
control, and restrict the forms and levels of aid given by all Member States to their industries^' 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 95). 
The Competition Directorate (DGFV) within the Commission has primary responsibility for 
policing these state aids, and the Directorate's powers are summarised in DTI's guidelines as 
follows: 
(i) issuing new guidelines andframeworks to take account of the developing needs of the Single 
Market, 
(ii) requiring Member States to notify proposed aid in advance for clearance, 
(Hi) requiring member States to abolish or change aid if judged by the Commission to be 
incompatible with the Single Market, 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 95). 
Officials are informed of DGFV's role of issuing new guidelines and frameworks which set the 
bounds for the provision of State Aid. DTI (1996a, pp. 106-108, 1999a, pp. 95-97) refers to 
activities funded under the DTI's Innovation Budget are covered by the Community 
Framework for State Aids for Research and the Community Guidelines for Small and Medium 
sized Enterprises (SMEs). DTI guidance sets out a number of key points which officials must 
bear in mind in developing policy. Examples of restrictions are that aid for basic research must 
not exceed 25% of the gross project or programme costs, and that aids exceeding ECU 25 
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million must be notified for approval (DTi , 1999a, p. 95). The UK Government's Guidance on 
European Community State Aids (SA, 1998) highlights the wide range o f activities which fall 
under State Aids rules. These include grants to firms for investment, R&D, training, loans and 
guarantees, and consultancy advice. 
5.2.2 The UK Legislative Framework for Business Support 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 suggested that Acts of Parliament were an integral part of designing 
and operating schemes, and how they influence the process was an important avenue for 
research to investigate. The HM Treasury publication Government Accowiting 1989 (HMT, 
1999, chapter 2, section 2.2) shows that legal authority is required for government departments 
to spend money. In the normal case of a government department having a departmental 
minister and permanent head, for example DTI, Government Accounting 1989 refers to officials 
deriving their authority to spend from the powers o f their ministers. Ministers as agents of the 
Crown may in general exercise any powers which the Crown has power to exercise, apart from 
those that they are precluded from exercising through statute. HM Treasury states: 
''Although, as a general rule. Ministers are legally able to do anything which they are not specifically 
precludedfromdoing by statute, they will only be able to finance their activities if Parliament votes the 
money". 
(HMT, 1999, chapter 2, section 2.2, paragraph 2.2.1) 
Money wil l only be voted to the minister i f the statutory powers exist. Study of DTI's Finance 
Handbook {DTI, 1996b, ), shows the powers arise from the passing of appropriate Acts o f 
Parliament. The Acts, as well as providing the grounds by which Parliament may vote money 
to a department, also provide the legal authority by which a department can fund specific 
programme activities. The Finance Handbook {DT\, 1996b, chapter 5, annex 5.1.A) lists the 
main statutory powers (Acts) which have allowed the DTI to incur expenditure. The powers o f 
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relevance to the programme activities which are the subject of this research are the Industrial 
Development Act 1982 ( IDA) (HMSO, 1982), and the Science and Technology (S&T) Act 1965, 
(HMSO, 1965). Inspection of these Acts shows that they set out the areas where the 
govemment can intervene to help industry. In this sense * Acts' may be viewed as enablers, 
providing the legislative means for what departments wish to achieve. 
However they may be viewed as forces of constraint, because in describing what may be 
funded they also place boundaries on the range of activities which the department can 
undertake. HM Treasury (1998, chapter 2, section 2.1) and DT! (1996b, chapter 5, section 5.1, 
paragraph 5.1.8) financial guidance advises that departments wishing to fund programmes not 
covered by existing legislation wil l normally have to go to Parliament for the necessary 
authority. 
The DTI Finance Handbook {DT\, 1996b, chapter 5, annex 5.1.A) lists the consultancy 
schemes as provided for under the Industry Development Act ( IDA). Examples are the 
Business Improvement Service (BIS), Business and Technical Advisory Services (BTAS), and 
the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) consultancies. Inspection of the ROAME 
statements for the Business Link initiative, (ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 5) and the Regional 
Supply Office programme (ROAME, 1994b, paragraph 32), shows that these schemes, which 
focus on the provision o f information, are also funded under the Act. In an interview with Dr. 
Bentley, the Director of Finance and Assessment within DTI's Business Link Directorate 
(BLD), [Interview 14] he confirmed the reliance placed on the IDA to operate the consultancy 
schemes. He highlighted Part IV, Section I l . - l o f the Act which informs that: 
"The Secretary of State may make provision for the giving of advice (whether free of charge or 
otherwise) to persons carrying on or proposing to carry on a business". 
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(HMSO, 1982, p. c52). 
Dr. Bentley proposed that the above statement was also fiindamental to the operation of the 
Regional Supply Office and Business Link schemes. Although both were principally about the 
provision of information to firms, such an activity can still be regarded under the heading o f the 
giving of advice. 
The Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b, chapter 5, annex 5.1 .A) lists Section 5 o f the S&T Act, 
(HMSO, 1965) as authorising research and development in any o f the sciences, including the 
social sciences or technology. Much of the work funded under DTI's Innovation Budget drew 
its legal authority from Section 5 of the S&T Act. Study o f DTPs Innovation Budget 
Guidelines (DTI, 1992, pp. i i - i i i , 1996a, pp. 23-27, 1999a, pp. 20-25) shows programme 
activities which drew their statutory authority from the S&T ACT to include the SMART and 
SPUR (Support for Products Under Research) schemes, and the former Research and 
Technology (R & T) Initiative. The previous Support For Innovation (SFI) scheme was also 
funded under the Act. 
5.2.3 UK Government Policy 
Policy plans are normally set out in government white papers, the drafting of which falls to a 
lead department, that is, the Whitehall department which has prime responsibility in the policy 
area concerned. As described by the Dr. Kenneth Poulter, head of DTI's Management Best 
Practice Directorate in conversation with the author, white papers represent ministers 'wish 
lists' for what they want to achieve. They set out the government's policy aims, describing in 
general terms, the problems faced and the strategies to be adopted in overcoming difficulties. 
In the author's experience it is the responsibility of officials, in liaison with ministers, to then 
plan and put in place specific 'actions' to achieve policy aims (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 15). 
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Officials therefore look to white papers to understand the direction they must take in 
formulating programmes. The importance o f so doing is taken up in DTI's Finance Handbook, 
which emphasises that ^^anyone considering the introduction of a new scheme or programme of 
assistance must first set the desired objectives against the Governments stated policy on market 
failure'' (DTI, 1996b, paragraph 9.1.3). 
5.2.4 Conditions for Government Intervention 
Price (1990), states: ">4 case for government action can be made whenever an instance of 
market failure can be spotted' (Price 1990, p. 160/ However, he continues, government 
interventions are not costless, and choices have to be made. As part of policy, ministers impose 
certain conditions for the funding o f programme activities. The DTI Finance Handbook kicks 
o f f the discussion by stating: 
"///e Govenwient aims not to get involved in the workings of the private sector or marketplace, 
and only does so if there is a market failure which Justifies such intervention". 
(DTI, 1996b, paragraph 9.1.3). 
The DTI Innovation Budget Guidelines, (DTI, 1992, pp. 16-18, and annex 3, 1996a, pp. 12-13, 
35-39, 102-104, 1999a, pp. 11-12, 32-36, 91-94) describe the circumstances under which it is 
deemed to be appropriate for the government to intervene in the 'market*. DTI (1996a, 1999a) 
begin by saying that the allocation of (financial) resources for innovation and commercial 
activities should be primarily decided by market forces. However it is acknowledged that the 
government nevertheless has a role to play, and the conditions which must prevail for financial 
support to be justified are set out. Demonstration of these conditions is primary in a rationale 
for support being present. 
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In explaining the conditions which constitute rationale for intervention, the guidelines (DTI, 
1999a) uses as the starting point that Innovation, and Management of Change present firms 
with many challenges and difficulties. The attempts of firms to innovate, it is argued, 
"may be inhibited by a variety of failures both in the workings of market forces and the institutions, 
attitudes and beliefs which support the fimctioning of a market economy" (DTI, 1996a, p. 12). 
The guidelines show how failures can also encompass failures of the 'institutions' to provide 
the services required, and inappropriate attitudes and beliefs held by people on how the market 
operates. The govemment, it is stated, has a role to help firms innovate successfully under 
these conditions (DTI, 1996a, 1999a). 
Whilst not disagreeing with the line taken in the above description of'market failure', the 
author approaches the issue slightly differently, giving rise to a more understandable definition. 
For him market failure is deemed to exist when firms and other bodies face difficulties which 
they do not have the means to resolve, either because of a lack o f skilled resources within their 
organisations, or because the product or service they require is not available in the market 
place. They are inhibited by forces outside their control from taking action (Arnold, Boekholt, 
and Keen, 1999, p. 19). However, organisations simply wanting money, for example, does not 
represent grounds for support. 
In summary, a case for intervention exists when it can be established that a failure is present in 
the free operation o f market forces, that is, when demonstrable problems exist in the market 
place, which commercial and other non-governmental agencies are unable to resolve unless 
aided. This, the author observes, is the underlying principle which underpins any case for 
intervention, and is a condition which must be demonstrable in any case for support. Examples 
o f programmes which were introduced from this perspective are the A M T Planning Studies 
Consultancy Scheme, the Business Links and the Regional Supply Office initiatives. These 
programmes aimed to stimulate the development o f services aimed at addressing business 
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problems faced by SMEs, simultaneously with overcoming the barriers within firms to using 
these services. 
It should be noted that in the case of the latter two examples, ministers issued a policy directive 
to officials indicating the type of intervention required, leaving them to then research the 
requirement and draft formal cases for support (see chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.8). The 
conditions comprising market failure, together with additional factors which must be 
considered, are now discussed in greater detail. Discussion begins with market failures 
identified for R & T programmes, then those for advisory schemes. 
5.2.4.1 Market Failure in R & T Programmes 
DTI (1992, pp. 16-18, and annex 3, 1996a, pp. 35-37, 103-104, 1999a, 32-33, 91-94) list the following 
categories of market failure: 
(i) Failure to take into account the wider benefits 
(ii) Risk and Uncertainty 
(Hi) Market Access 
(iv) Information Failures 
(v) Public Goods 
(vi) Lack of competition and barriers to market entry 
Each of these are now discussed, in terms of the definitions given in DTI guidance (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 
1999a). 
(i) Externalities or Failure to take into account the Wider Benefits 
This failure describes the situation where firms are unable to appropriate all o f the economic and 
commercial benefits accruing to the economy at large from their investment in project work (Price, 
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1990, pp. 196-201; ,Ciark and Guy, 1998, p. 380; Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, p. 2), Hence they 
wil l not take account o f these benefits when deciding on the scope and timing o f project work, or at 
worst whether it should go ahead at all. Therefore projects which can provide excellent returns for the 
Nation's investment, may not proceed, or alternatively i f research work is undertaken, its scope may be 
restricted and potential benefits not fully realised. This issue is discussed in terms of 'Public Goods' in 
(v) below. 
DTI guidance (1996b, 1999a) cites examples of'externalities' as information spin-offs from applied 
research, and the cost of training staff who could subsequently be 'poached' by other firms. Instances 
of where the market failure 'failure to take into account the wider benefits' was identified is given in 
the case study example of the General Industrial Collaborative Programme (GICP), (appendix E, 
section E.2.1, p. 85). GICP was concerned with the award of grants to Research and Technology 
Organisations (RTOs), for collaborative research projects. Appendix K, section K.3.2.1 (p. 162) shows 
the 'wider benefits' to have been realised in the form of benefits arising from the projects supported, 
with these being passed on to RTO members. New revenue streams were also created. Appendix K 
also shows that in the Small Firms Merit Award for Research and Technology (SMART) and the 
Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) schemes, (these programmes provided grants to single 
companies for research and development projects), an added benefit was the encouragement of banks 
to advance loans to small companies to help finance their Research and Development (R&D) projects, 
(see sections K.3.2.2, p. 169, and K.3.2.3, p. 174, respectively). 
(ii) Risk and Uncertainty 
The problem is concerned with the degree of uncertainty attached to technical and commercial 
objectives. The distinction be^veen risk and uncertainty is drawn. Risk is defined as the case where 
firms have a reasonable idea of what project work entails, and can therefore judge the probability o f 
outcomes occurring, and hence calculate the risks involved. Examples of such instances are research 
projects involving on-going development of existing products and processes, where timescales are 
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short, that is, 'near market' research. In contrast uncertainty arises where the outcomes of activities 
cannot be anticipated, and the probability o f outcomes is difficult to ascertain. Typically such work 
wi l l involve research on novel products involving long timescales, that is, 'away from the market' 
research. 
Guidance points out that the difference bet\veen risk and uncertainty revolves round the level of 
relevant knowledge and past experience that potential participants may or may not have in the area of 
proposed work. Thus what might be an 'uncertainly' for one organisation may be regarded as a 
question o f ' r i sk ' by another. Risk, it is pointed out, is also something which is perceived differently 
by individual organisations, and its reallocation to those who can and are will ing to bear it is regarded 
as the responsibility of the financial markets to address rather than that of government. Collaboration 
is seen as one way of sharing risk. The author observes that encouraging organisations to collaborate 
in researching and developing new products is a commonly adopted strategy in the developed nations 
(Clark and Guy, 1998, pp. 382-385; Dodgson and Bessant, pp. 79-166). 
Away from the market, long term research normally represents a situation where the levels o f 
uncertainty represent high risk which prohibits firms from participating in planned work without 
support. Furthermore, sufficient information may not be available for financial institutions to 
undertake risk assessment, funding from the private sector may not be offered, thereby reinforcing the 
case .for DTI support. An exception would be a larger firm which could easily accommodate any 
potential loss. Officials, in developing the rationale, must make a judgement as to whether uncertainty 
and high risk are present. 
DTI guidelines (1992, p. 17) usefully summarises the condition of risk and uncertainty, viewing market 
failure as arising when the market does not handle risk appropriately. Risk and uncertainty is seen as 
existing when: 
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companies are reluctant to invest because the timescales associated with research are long, 
and the deliverables are therefore uncertain. Hence participants cannot be sure they wi l l 
benefit financially and are hence reluctant to invest. However the need for there to be 
^reasonable' confidence that at least some companies wil l benefit is also emphasised as a 
condition of funding. 
In the author's experience, officials have tended to take a somewhat more simplistic view, looking 
at the problem as one of market inhibition based on a lack of funds. In other words, although the 
market requires a product, the relevant SMEs, and other organisations such as HEIs and Research 
Associations, cannot exploit the market potential because of a lack o f finance to undertake the 
necessary Research and Development work. A supportive view was also expressed during an 
interview with a fellow official [Interview 9], who added that a simplistic approach has been 
engendered partly because of the lack o f *risk capital'. The author is able to confirm from his 
experience that banks, for example, have generally been reluctant to lend money for technological 
projects because they did not have the correct specialist expertise to make a risk judgement. Often 
the provision o f monies to finance R&D was conditional on DTI providing a grant (see above), the 
banks relying on DTI's expertise to evaluate the risks (see appendix K, sections K.3.2.2, p. 169, and 
K.2.2.3, p. 174, which assess performance o f the R & T initiative, including the SMART and SPUR 
schemes). 
project work, while potentially offering a high rate o f return on investment, may be o f sufficiently 
high risk and size to prejudice the commercial viability of the organisations concerned in the event 
of failure, such that, without other methods o f risk sharing (collaboration, raising money from the 
financial markets), project work wil l not go ahead. 
Difficulties stemming from problems of collaboration. Firms are suspicious o f others motives and 
abilities. 
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The case study examples contained in appendices E to H provide instances o f ' r i sk ' being identified in 
the programme rationales. For example, risk was identified as a market failure in the case o f GICP, 
(appendix E, section E.2,1, p. 85). Firms were found to be unwilling to commit funds to R&D work 
because of the long time horizons associated with pre-competiiive research. In SN4ART and SPUR the 
rationale for funding centred around the market being excessively adverse to the high risks associated 
with small firms, (see appendix E, sections E.3.1, p. 88, and E.4.1, pp. 91-92, respectively). In the 
Manufacturing, Planning, and Implementation (MPl) programme, risk was associated with the 
methodologies to be used by SMEs in strategically planning their use of new technologies, as they 
were under researched (appendix H, section H.3.1, p. 133). 
(ii i) Market Access 
The cost of overcoming problems associated with introducing new products to the market. Public 
support may be justifiable if: 
• the costs associated with entering foreign markets are prohibitive for participants, 
• If UK users of a product are, or might be, adversely affected by the lack of domestic supply, either 
from an indigenous or overseas producer. 
A clear example of'market access' having been identified as a market failure in a programme, was not 
found by the author. However, the March 1999 SMART ROAME statement (ROAME, 1999), 
addresses a similar problem. Paragraph 16 refers to the market failure of outsourcing by SMEs of 
R&D into innovative technologies. It is argued that the problem arises because neither the technology 
providers or the SMEs see the commercial case for working with each other. One means o f addressing 
the difficulty was given as supporting SMEs to embark on innovative projects in collaboration with the 
technology providers, to exploit the latter's 'technologies' for commercial purposes, (paragraph 17). 
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(iv) Information Failures 
Lack of appropriate information by participants is seen as a potential area o f market failure. Markets, it 
is stated, wil l only function correctly i f firms, individuals, and financial institutions have sufficient 
quantity of the appropriate information to perform their respective roles correctly. Information may be 
about technology or the marketability of technologies. DTI's wish to see this type o f failure addressed 
is in keeping with industrial policy of many other countries, who wish likewise to see more o f their 
technological developments exploited in the market (Clark and Guy, 1998, pp. 387-390; Guy, 1998, 
pp. 9 and 19). 
Provision of information on a commercial basis is cited as a particular problem. The desirable spread 
of information generated within programmes (e.g. research results), is inhibited by the cost o f 
collecting, structuring, and disseminating the data. User firms are also reluctant to purchase 
information until they become aware of its value to them (see also (v) below covering 'Public Goods'). 
Making firms sufficiently aware may entail the provider in giving much of its information away, such 
that there is little or nothing to sell. Thus providers may be reluctant to make information available. 
The GICP programme listed a lack of information on technical or financial potential as a market failure 
(appendix E, section E.2.1, p. 85). The author additionally observes that 'information failures' can also 
occur in the area of advisory schemes. In the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), the reluctance o f SMEs to 
use external consultants was attributed lo a lack of information on the part of small firms, of the 
benefits of so doing (see appendix F, section F.3, p. 97). In the Managing into the 90s (M90s) 
programme, (a programme promoting aimed at raising firms awareness of good practice, see appendix 
G, sub-section G.2.2.1, pp. 108-109), the lack o f information on good practice was viewed as being a 
contributory factor in firms failing to develop their management competencies. 
(v) Public Goods 
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'Public goods' are defined as ''products where consumption by one individual does not preclude 
consumption by another''{UY\, 1996a, p. 102). Klosko (1990, pp. 198-199) suggests that a 
characteristic of public goods is their being presumptively beneficial, that is, of value to the community 
for whom they are intended. The development of industry standards is given as an example of a public 
good in the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTi , 1996a, pp. 102-103). It is argued in the guidelines 
that it is appropriate for government to fund the dissemination o f research results, including 
information, when research outcomes have potential to be exploited widely in the industrial 
community, but where project participants would have difficulty in levying economic fees to cover 
their costs. Klosko proposes that where a public good represents high value to a community, such as, 
for example, the defence of a country, then members of the community are obligated to contribute its 
cost. However, as discussed in (iv) above, within DTI it is recognised that firms are often unwilling to 
pay for information, because until they receive it they do not perceive it as valuable. 
Clark and Guy (1998, p. 380) point to a further aspect o f the issue. They highlight that 'spillovers' and 
'externalities' from R&D and innovation work can not only benefit those who bear the cost but society 
more widely. Hence it is appropriate for governments to fund such work (see (i) above), (Clark and 
Guy, 1998, p. 382). 
The 1999 SMART ROAME (ROAME, 1999) provides an example o f DTI promoting a 'Public Good'. 
The ROAME refers to the support of the technology providers to encourage them to make statements 
of their capabilities via the Business Link (BL) intranet, (paragraph 23). In GICP, SMEs were able to 
benefit from project work through the RTOs' services (see appendix K, section K.3.2.1, pp. 163-164). 
(vi) Lack of Competition and Barriers to Market Entry 
New technologies can create new markets, but for those firms not up to speed with technological 
developments, new introductions can represent barriers to entering these markets. Firms may be 
reluctant to invest in what is referred to as 'best practice technologies' owing to the costs involved and 
their lack of experience of use. Thus their future commercial success may be prejudiced. Under these 
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circumstances it is regarded as appropriate to provide support. The 1999 SMART ROAME (ROAME, 
1999) provides an example o f this market failure being identified and addressed. Under the heading of 
"Technology Access Projects", the ROAME refers to major factor inhibiting the transfer of 
technologies that enable innovation to SMEs is their reluctance to pay in advance of demonstrated 
e^c//ve/?e^5" (paragraph 16, item c). 
DTI guidance (1992, pp. 25-26, 1996a, pp. 37-38, 1999a, p. 34) lists other conditions which are 
prerequisites for funding. The first of these is 'Addilionality' (Clark and Guy, 1998, p. 382; Arnold, 
Boekholt, Keen, 1999, p. 19) which must be shown to arise from any programme or project that is to 
receive approval. For example, * Additionality' exists when the mechanisms within a programme 
cause parties to address market failures which they would not have done without governmental 
intervention (DTI, 1996b, section 9.3). Another example is where the award o f grant funding 
motivates participants to collaborate in project work when they would not otherwise have done so. 
Other examples of * Additionality' are the acceleration of activity timescales and the enhancement of 
project specifications. While considering 'Additionality', officials are required to ensure that a 
proposed programme does not conflict with other existing or proposed government schemes, including 
those operated by the EC. 
Secondly a distinction is also drawn between 'demand' and 'need'. For example, industry may seek 
assistance from government to offset the costs o f purchasing new equipment. However firms may 
have sufficient funds of their own, or can raise capital easily in the financial markets to resource these 
procurements. In such cases it is inappropriate for the government to intervene. TTie author observes, 
from his experience, that the presence of 'Additionality' is a prerequisite for all cases for interventions, 
be they R & T or advisory programmes. Examples of programme additionality realised in programme 
operation, are provided in appendix K, (pp. 162, 165-168, 171, 173, 176-179). In GICP, additionality 
experienced included new technologies reaching the market more quickly, and research being more 
detailed, (see appendix K, section K.3.2.1, p. 162). In the SMART programme additionality was found 
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to be high, with many firms having proceeded with development projects that they would not have 
otherwise been able to finance (see appendix E, section K.3.3.2, p. 167), For the Managing into the 
'90s (M90s), additionality was displayed by firms receiving information that they would not have 
obtained from other sources, (see appendix K.3.4, pp. 178-179). 
5.2.4.2 M a r k e t Fai lure in Advisory Programmes 
In talking to colleagues, the author became aware that the hmovation Budget Gvidelines (DTI , 1996a, 
1999a), because of their focus on the development of ROAMEs and the subsequent administration of 
programmes, are referenced for advisory schemes as well as R & T programmes. From his experience, 
the author suggests that there are other classifications of market failure, pertaining to advisory 
schemes, which are not adequately covered by the 'Innovation Guidelines'. This, the author felt, 
represented a problem, as inspection of the DTI Finance Handbook (] 996b) and the HM Treasury 
'Green Book' (1997) showed them not to classify market failures as precisely as the 'innovation 
guidance' had done for the R & T case. This was considered unhelpful. An investigation of previous 
schemes was undertaken, and a suggested list of market failure categories for advisory schemes drawn 
up. The following market failures in advisory programmes were identified: 
(i) Lack of Awareness of need to Adopt Best Practice, 
(ii) Lack of Commitment to Adopt Best Practice, 
(i i i ) Absence of Required Skills in SMEs, 
(iv) Reluctance to Use External Expertise, 
(v) Non availability of required expertise amongst advisors 
(vi) Lack of knowledge of what are the Best Practice Methodologies 
The following provides a more detailed description of each of these market failures, and discusses how 
each of these categories was derived from the analysis o f programme development. 
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(i) Lack of Awareness of need to Adopt Best Practice 
A requirement for the adoption of good practice in management and the application of 
technology exists, but because of a lack of awareness of the benefits by chief executives in 
SMEs, they perceive no reason to take action. Both 'awareness' and 'consultancy' 
programmes have traditionally addressed this failure. Evidence of this market failure being 
cited and addressed comes from several sources. The Management Best Practice (M90s) 
ROAME for the first phase of the programme states: 
"A substantial and increasing body of evidence (not least from our competitors) indicates the 
importance of factors such as design, quality, manufacturing, management, soimdpurchasing 
policies for competitive advantage and the need for these factors to be managed in conjunction 
with each other as part of a comprehensive business strategy", 
(ROAME, 1988a, annex A, p. 1, paragraph I ) . 
The ROAME continues, "There are still too few UK firtns (particularly among SMEs) who recognise 
or act on this" (paragraph 2). Appendix G, section G.2.2 (p, 108) and sub-section G.2,2.1 (pp. 108-
109), discusses the topic further. 
The M90s' ROAME then goes on to describe the proposed actions which wi l l be taken to 
address the problem (paragraphs 8 and 9, annex A ) , (see also appendix G, sections G.2.2 to 
G.5.2, pp. 108-117). Similarly, for the previous Consultancy Initiatives, the ROAME statement 
(ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 2.1) cites difficulties in firms o f low levels o f management 
competence compared with foreign competitors, poor management education and training, with 
ability to make strategic decisions often non-existent. Again strategies for addressing the 
market failure are detailed (paragraphs 4.1 to 5.5). The Business Link ROAME also refers lo 
the need to improve the competitiveness o f firms "/« terms of their products, technology, 
management, quality, marketing, and customer focus" (ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 6). The 
ROAME then describes proposals for how Business Links wi l l , through the deployment of 
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'Private Business Advisors', help companies become aware of the business issues they face 
(paragraphs 9, 10, and 14). 
(ii) Lack of Commitment to Adopt Best Practice 
Lack of commitment to take action is indicated by SMEs continuing failure to adopt best 
practice, despite awareness of the potential benefits. Addressing o f this failure can be seen 
from inspection of the M90s Phase I ROAM E statement. The ROAME (1988a, paragraphs I , 
2 and 4) points to previous awareness campaigns having increased recognition in those firms 
participating in programme activities of 'why' they should resolve business issues, but there 
had been little 'follow up' action because insufficient advice had been given on 'how' problems 
could be tackled. How this shortcoming was tackled is detailed in appendix G, section G.5, pp. 
115-118. Firms were first sensitised to the business issues surrounding the adoption of good 
practice, then, having been rendered receptive to new messages, they were then provided with 
information on how to implement the good practice methods. 
(ii i) Absence of Required Skills in SMEs 
SMEs lack the knowledge and skills to implement best practice approaches. The Consultancy 
Initiative (CI) ROAME statement, (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 2.1), as mentioned in (i) above, 
refers to levels of management competence being low or non-existent in firms. The CI 
ROAME then describes the role of CI to help make good this internal lack o f specialist 
expertise (paragraphs 4.1 to 5.5). The ROAME statement for the Manufacturing Planning and 
Implementation (MPI) programme makes reference to, "Most SMEs are unlikely to possess the 
necessary skills to direct and co-ordinate (in this case) the implementation o/AMT....'' 
(ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 2.7). In addressing the problem of lack o f skills, the award of 
grants to encourage SMEs to hire external consultants to make good deficiencies was the 
approach adopted in both CI and MPI. The reader is referred to appendix F, sections F.3 (pp. 
96-97), and F.4 (pp. 98-99), and appendix H, sections H.2.4.4 (p. 131) and H.3 (p. 132) 
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respectively, for further discussion of the market failure and the use of external advice to help 
alleviate problems. 
(iv) Reluctance to Use External Expertise 
Their lack of skills required companies to make up deficits by hiring in external consultants. 
However, company boards are reluctant to commit to consultancy projects because they 
perceive consultancy as offering poor value, and are unaware of the benefits. The problem can 
be viewed as a particular form of an 'information failure', described in sub-section 5.2.4.1 (iv) 
above. This market failure was a principal difficulty cited in both the CI and MPI initiatives. 
The CI proposal, states ".../7 was noted that SMEs tend not to hire outside expertise to make 
good their internal lack of specialist management competence in key functions (such as 
business planning, quality, design etc)" (ROAME (1988b, paragraph 2.2), (see appendix F, 
section F.4, pp. 98-99). For MPI, referring to the high consultancy costs associated with the 
strategic planning of A M T implementation, this "15 likely to represent a major barrier to 
SMEs" (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 2.8) in committing to such projects, (see appendix H, 
section H.3.l,pp. 132-133). 
(v) Non availability of required Expertise amongst Advisors 
Services which an SME needs to become more competitive or maintain a competitive edge are 
not provided by market agencies. This was a market failure identified in drafting proposals for 
the MPI programme. The problem is described in the wording o f the ROAME, "Tlie broad 
scope of AMT planning and implementation calls on a variety of skills, and these currently 
reside in a number of unrelated bodies including HEIs, systems houses, the larger 
consultancies, and individuals" (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 2.7). In developing the rationale 
for MPI, officials highlighted the lack of expertise in the smaller consultancy organisations to 
resource project work. It was argued that by encouraging independent consultants to form 
advisor consortia and pool their knowledge, the consultancy provision for helping firms to plan 
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their strategic use of A M T would be improved, (see appendix H, section H.2.4.5, pp. 131-132, 
and section H.3.2.2, p. 133). 
(vi) Lack of knowledge of what are the Best Practice Methodologies 
Many of the methodologies and procedures for the strategic planning and implementation of 
business operations are generally unknown because the areas concerned have not been 
adequately researched. Again, the MPl programme highlighted the existence of this type of 
market problem (see appendix H, sub-section H.3.2.5, pp. 133-134, which describes how the 
lessons were captured as project experience developed). The ROAME proposal describes the 
strategic planning and implementation of A M T as: 
"A complex process involving a high level of innovation. Insufficient examples are available 
on which to base general guidance or proven procedures for implementing AMT. At present, 
problems are unique to each company situation and their solution fundamental to remaining 
viable. To find an optimum AMT solution for a company, numerous configurations of 
commercially available technologies must be investigated' 
ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 2.6). 
N.B. Market failure and the related topic o f Value for Money (VFM) is discussed further in 
chapter 6, section 6.1.1. 
5,2.4,3 Achieving W i d e r Benefits f r o m Programme F u n d i n g 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1996a, p. 102,1999a, p. 91) informs officials of the need to 
seek an increase in VFM by creating activities that allow a wider audience to benefit from programme 
work. Typically such activities disseminate the results o f research: this may form part of the R & D 
programmes themselves, or information may be disseminated through the department's awareness 
programmes. In the former case, the aim is to create a community of interested parties, with 
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information disseminated through activities such as newsleuers, workshops, and visits to 
demonstration sites [Interview I I ] . 
Instances of wider benefits being realised during programme operation are given in the case study 
examples contained in appendices D to H, and the examination of good practice in programme design 
given in appendix K, For instance the advertising campaign to promote the Enterprise Initiative (El) , 
raised the prestige of DTI such that the department experienced a higher rate of job applications than 
previously witnessed, (see appendix D, section D.5, p. 80). In the GICP programme an unexpected 
benefit was realised from funding research projects at the RTOs. This had allowed them to build new 
expertise which had enabled industry to stay ahead of the competition, (see appendix K, section 
K.3.2.1, p. 164). In M90s, the publication of a report commissioned by officials primarily to inform 
policy, had allowed a wider audience to benefit from departmental funding, (see appendix G, section 
G.6,p. 118). 
5.2.5 Ministerial Priorities 
The hmovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1996a, p. 49,1999a, p. 44) advise officials to ensure 
that programme plans match ministers' personal priorities, to enhance the likelihood of 
securing their approval. The author concurs! He has witnessed programme plans failing to 
obtain ministers' approval because aims ran counter to their views. Appendix G, sections G.2.1 
(p. 107), and G.4.1 (p. 114), record how a submission to ministers for their approval to extend 
the Towards Integration (Tl) programme was rejected. The drafi policy to continue with T l in 
isolation ran contrary to the Secretary of State (SoS), Lord Young's directive that DTl's 
programmes should be run as part of a co-ordinated approach. It was also thought by officials 
that Lord Young's rejection in part was due to him perceiving Tl as conflicting with the 
Consultancy Initiatives component o f the Enterprise Initiative (EI). The SoS regarded El as 
very much his 'baby', and as a result would not countenance something that might prejudice its 
success. 
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Officials reacted by submitting a new proposal, for the introduction of M90s, around six 
months later, which described the combining of T l with other awareness schemes operated by 
DTI. Proposals also demonstrated that M90s would be operated as an integral part o f El. 
However it was observed that M90s differed little in terms o f its operational concept from T l , 
and it is suggested that with EI having become more established, the SoS was less sensitive to 
another scheme being introduced to the initiative. The subject o f how officials have worked to 
'make the ground fertile for approval', is discussed in chapter 6, section 6.5. 
In the author's experience, officials become aware o f ministers' agendas in a variety of ways. 
Senior officials meet regularly with ministers to discuss priority areas for policy, and discuss 
progress in meeting policy objectives. During such meetings senior staff wi l l leam what is 
important to a minister, and cascade this information down the management chain. Records o f 
meetings with ministers are often circulated to staff, thus apprising them o f what a Minister 
wants to achieve. For example, section 5.2.6 of this chapter describes how following a 
presentation to ministers concerning DTI's Innovation Budget, ministers requested officials to 
provide them with information relating to the history and performance of existing programmes. 
The submission was circulated to senior officials, including the author's line manager who 
forwarded a copy to him. 
A further example lies with the Business Link initiative. Dr. Peter Bentley, a PRl 1 in DTI's 
Small Business Service (SBS), was closely involved with the development and financial 
control o f this programme. He informed the author that officials often met with the President, 
the Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, to discuss progress o f the programme. Bentley himself was 
involved in regular meetings with Mrs. Barbara Roche, the Industry Minister in the new Labour 
Government, in developing the 1997 Business Link vision statement. Ministers wishes were 
cascaded by those officials present. The author himself met with Mrs. Roche in connection 
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with the Regional Supply Office (RSO) programme for which he has responsibility. The 
purpose of the meeting was to seek the minister's views on whether funding for the programme 
should be extended beyond 31 March 1998. The minister expressed her wish to see support for 
the RSOs continue, but for a period of two years only. The period o f two years was arrived at 
based on the need to provide reasonable employment prospects for RSO staff on the one hand, 
while providing an opportunity to review the RSOs' role in the light of emergent Regional 
Development Agency policy, on the other. The author observes that officials wil l also consult 
with staff in the private offices of ministers, who, having direct contact with the minister, w i l l 
often be aware o f his or her views. 
5.2.6 Finance 
The availability o f funds inevitably constrains the process of programme design. It is useful at 
this stage to look at how budgets are set within DTI. The DTI Finance Handbook states: 
"777e D77 has financial authority delegated to it by the Treasury; this is a fitrther constraint (beyond 
the Supply Estimates voted by Parliament) on the Department's freedom to incur expenditure in 
pursuit of its policies and objectives". 
(DTI (1996b, paragraph 2.1.3). 
HM Treasury's delegated authority, it is explained, permits DTI to spend and commit 
expenditure on its policies and objectives. However, particularly for programmes, there are 
specific constraints placed on funding. This is of particular relevance to the subject o f the 
research in this thesis, and is discussed further in chapter 6, section 6.4, in relation to gaining 
approval for programmes. 
Financial management in the DTI is decentralised (DTI, 1996b, section 2.1). In common with 
other departments, responsibility to incur expenditure is delegated in the first instance to the 
Permanent Secretary as the Accounting Officer. In DTI the Accounting Officer has appointed 
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the Director General (formerly referred as the Deputy Secretary or as a Grade 2) of the 
Resources and Services Command to take overall responsibility for spend. The Director 
General carries the title of the department's Principal Establishment and Finance Officer 
(PEFO). The general responsibility for the co-ordination of spend is assigned to the Director of 
the Financial Resource Management (FRM) Directorate, which is under the PEFO's command. 
DTI (1996b) explains that there are two criteria which require to be satisfied before an official 
can commit to expenditure. They are the existence of delegated authority to commit 
expenditure and a budget allocation. Delegated authority comprises principally the authority to 
commit expenditure, approve or certify expenditure, and finally to authorise payments. For 
programmes, sub-delegations of financial authority are made by FRM to the directors (formerly 
officials at Grades 3 and 5 levels) of the individual directorates within DTI, who in turn wil l 
sub-delegate again down their management chains. The directors are referred to as the 'Budget 
Holders'. They are responsible for the financial administration of the funds allocated to them. 
The author observes that the process of allocating budgets is one of negotiation, involving 
discussions benveen the directors and FRM. 
The role of the Individual Programmes Committees (IPCs) is also discussed (DTI, 1996b, 
section 3.4). The Departmental Management Group (DMG) (see chapter 2, section 2.3) has as 
part of its responsibilities the supervision o f programme expenditure, and it is the job of the 
IPCs to support the function of DMG by monitoring spend in specific programme areas. Each 
IPC is chaired by the relevant Budget Holder, whose directorate provides the secretariat. 
Members of an IPC wil l normally include a representative from FRM, and staff having 
responsibility for programme evaluation (see also chapter 8, section 8.5). 
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The Finance Handbook DTI (1996b) describes the remit of the IPCs as to regularly review the 
cost effectiveness of programmes for which they have responsibility. The Finance Handbook 
continues: 
'"Diey examine programme ROAME statements for individual programmes and projects, consider 
evaluation findings, and, where appropriate, recommend changes to the financial provision for a 
particular scheme or changes to the allocation of resources between schemes". 
DTI (1996b, paragraph 3.4.7). 
The author observes from his own direct involvement in attending IPCs, that the above 
description does not fully describe the role of an IPC. Observation of interactions between IPC 
members shows that discussions are not restricted to talking over the financial issues. IPCs 
also place emphasis on the practicalities of proposed interventions, looking at the credibility of 
a Rationale, and the ability of proposed delivery strategies to negate market failure, for 
example. The operation of IPCs is discussed further in chapter 6, section 6.4.2. The 
Innovation Budget within DTI provides a very good example of how budgets are allocated and 
managed. The Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 43-48) describe the current 
process of allocating funds and gaining approval within the Innovation Budget. The guidelines 
begin by emphasising that funds are limited, and therefore it is necessary to ensure that spend is 
directed towards the highest priorities. The Innovation Budget Management Unit ( IBMU) has 
the responsibility of building a strategic focus into the running of the Innovation Budget. 
The task o f setting the Budget strategy begins in March of each year, with the preparing of a 
strategy paper by the Innovation Policy and Standards (IPS), Technology, Economics, 
Statistics, and Evaluation (TESE), and the Innovation Research and Technology (IRT) 
directorates, and IMBU. The paper recommends the innovation themes to be supported, and 
proposes the financial apportionment to each theme for the next but one financial year. In . 
drawing up the paper, ministerial priorities are taken into account. Early drafts of the papers 
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are discussed with the individual directorates having an interest in the Innovation Budget, and 
their comments incorporated. 
The next stage is to invite the Directors General (formerly referred to as Grade 2 or 'Deputy 
Secretaries') whose commands have within them directorates concerned with innovation 
support. Their comments included, agreed strategy papers are then submitted to the 
Departmental Steering Group (DSG) to take account o f their views. Once these have also been 
incorporated, the strategy document is submitted to ministers before Parliament's 'Summer 
Recess' for their approval. The author observes from reading copies o f minutes between 
ministers and officials, that drafts o f the paper are submitted to and discussed with ministers 
well before the recess, to *test their minds' on what is being proposed. 
Study of communications with ministers shows them to be fully involved in shaping the final 
strategy, requiring modifications to initial proposals. For example in an 8 June 1999 
submission to the Secretary of State, the Innovation Budget Holder refers to an initial 
presentation to him by officials, and responds to a request for information relating to the history 
of existing programmes and their performance. The submission then seeks agreement for a 
further presentation on the proposed way forward, once officials have investigated the options 
further. 
As a person who had been directly involved in setting budgets within the previous Business 
Link Directorate of DTI, the author asked Dr. Bentley for his insights into the allocation of 
funds to programmes. Bentley considered that programme budgets are set on the basis of 'what 
went before', the calculation of costs of running particular scheme elements, and the 
availability o f fiinds. For example, when establishing the Business Link network officials 
began on the basis that the previous TEC (Training and Enterprise Councils) enterprise budget 
had amounted to £32,000,000. The President, the Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, had indicated 
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his wish to see the introduction of specialist counsellors, that is the Innovation and Technology, 
and Design Counsellors, into the Business Link network. The additional element o f necessary 
grant, was calculated on the basis o f the salary (including overheads) o f providing one each of 
these specialist counsellors in every Business Link throughout England. 
Bentley commented that support for the specialist counsellors was provided from DTTs 
innovation budget, where the request for funds had to compete with other priorities. The 
President saw that there was sufficient need to justify funding one of each type of counsellor in 
a Business Link, but not more. Bentley also observed that a determining factor in arriving at 
the required level of funding is often the identification of the minimum level o f support 
necessary for an intervention to be effective. For example, operation o f the Regional Supply 
Offices had shown that they could provide a good level of service with a budget of around 
£4,000,000 per year. Both Bentley and the author observed that this experience led to the level 
of funding being maintained in successive extensions o f the RSO budget. 
A further example of how budgetary constraints impact on programme design can be seen in 
the development o f the MPI programme, in the setting of the objectives for the initiative 
(appendix H, section H.3.3, pp. 135-136). The budgetary authority in DTI had provisionally 
agreed a spend of £10,000,000 for MPI which, after taking out administrative costs o f 
£1,850,000, left around £8,000,000 to fund grant expenditure. Assuming consultancy fees to 
average £ 100,000 across the projects supported, and given a grant funding level of 50%, 
officials were constrained to setting a target of supporting 175 projects. 
5.2.7 Universal Application of Constraints 
The author has found from experience that officials acknowledge the need to adhere to 
government policy at all times in their work. Such adherence not only applies to ensuring that 
programmes conform in every respect to policy statements set out in white papers, but also to 
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making sure that European Commission policy is adhered to, that they are conformant with 
legislation, and also meet funding conditions including allocated budgets. 
Although not specifically stated in the 'Guidance', the DTI guidelines indicate this to be the 
case, advising project officers in preparing ROAMEs to ensure that the*department's ''policy 
provides for the support envisaged^ (DTI , 1999c, p. 29). Thus it can be concluded that the 
'policy constraints' identified for the overall process above wil l commonly apply at every, 
individual stage of that process. Thus in the chapters which follow, the topic of'Constraints' is 
not discussed separately as part of describing the component processes of the design system. 
5.3 Inputs to the Design and Administration Process 
From his experience of being involved in the development o f programmes, the author of this 
thesis is able to point to a number of sources of information which are employed in the process 
of scheme development and administration. These are now discussed. 
5.3.1 Evaluation Reports 
HMT(1997) and DTI (1996a, p. 43, 1999a, p. 42) guidelines advise that the results o f 
programme evaluation be fed back into the decision making process for future schemes. 
Examples of officials taking account of lessons leamt can be found in programme ROAME 
statements. The ROAME Statement for the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), (ROAME, 1988b, 
paragraph 2.3), in defining market failure, draws on evaluations o f previous advisory, that is 
consultancy, schemes (see appendix F, section F.3, p. 97). Similarly the Manufacturing 
Planning and Implementation studies programme (MPI) ROAME Statement (ROAME, 1990a, 
paragraph 3.4), in setting the programme objectives for the dissemination of the programme 
lessons, refers to the results of evaluating the Inside UK Enterprise Scheme which had shown 
this latter initiative as an effective technology transfer mechanism. The 1999 SMART 
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ROAME (ROAME, 1999, annex D, paragraphs 4 and 5), explains how the 1994 evaluations of 
SMART (DTI, 1994a, p. 17) and SPUR (Support for Products Under Research), (DTI, 1994b, 
p. 17), had concluded that the second phase of SMART differed little in its objectives and 
rationale from SPUR, and that the two should be combined. The ROAME continues by 
reporting that the recommendation was implemented in 1994. The topic o f evaluation reports 
providing information to the design process is discussed further in chapter 6, sub-section 
6.2.3.1. 
5.3.2 Literature 
From his experience the author is aware that officials sometimes read professional journals, reports, 
and academic papers to help gain an understanding of market problems and keep abreast o f 
developments in industrially related research. The MPI programme offers an example. The ROAME 
(!990a, paragraph 2.3), in developing the rationale for the programme, derived evidence of the need for. 
firms to use Advanced Manufacturing Technologies, by pointing to the benefits highlighted in a series 
of articles (Management Today, 1989 pp. 68-96). Appendix H, section H.2.2, (p. 129), shows how the 
articles helped seed the idea for the programme by showing how the performance o f firms can be 
improved through the correct use of technology. The author observes that it is not common practice 
for officials engaged in the design process to research the literature, a topic that is discussed further in 
chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.2 (see also Interview 13). 
5.3.3 Cabinet Office Advisory Committees 
The reports produced by Cabinet Office Advisory committees have often provided direction to 
the design of programme strategies and their content. The MPI ROAME (1990a, paragraph 
2.2), in building the rationale, refers to an internal paper drafted by the Emerging Technologies 
Sub Group of the Advisory Council On Science and Technology (ACOST), which pointed to 
the rapid advancements in manufacturing technology providing opportunities for increased 
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competitiveness at an affordable price for SMEs [Interview 6] . Encouragement of firms to 
adopt these technologies was therefore indicated. Appendix H, section H.2.4.1 (p. 130) 
discusses the point further. Section H.2.4.2 (p. 130) details how evidence contained in an 
ACOST report suggested that a firm's use of technology must be fully integrated into a 
strategic plan, for it to be applied effectively (ACOST, 1991, pp. 11-13). ACOST's 
observations helped shape the requirement in MPI for firms to adopt a holistic approach to 
planning their use of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) . The role o f advisory 
committees in informing the design process is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, sub-section 
6.3.3.1 of this thesis. 
5.3.4 Dialogue with External Bodies 
In day to day liaison with external bodies having a knowledge of industry, for example Research and 
Technology Organisations (RTOs) and Higher Education Establishments (HEIs), officials become 
aware of market problems. Outside organisations can also provide advice on how problems can be 
countered. Appendix E, section E.2.1.I (p. 85), refers to information supplied by the RTOs forming 
the basis for officials in drafting ROAME statements. In an interview with Mr Richard Amott, a Grade 
7 in DTI's Management Best Practice (MBP) Branch [Interview 11], he highlighted the importance of 
talking to external bodies including industry, in determining failures in the market. When interviewing 
Mr. Peter Munday [Interview 9] he supported Arnott's views, recording that dialogue with firms 
themselves, HEIs and RTOs, can flag problems to DTI. This has also been the author's experience. 
Mr. John Sutton, the PR 10 responsible in DTI for operating TCS (formerly referred to as the Teaching 
Company Scheme), was able to provide the author with an example of an HEI advising on programme 
delivery. A university representative advised Sutton that it was important in securing academics' 
participation in the scheme, to emphasise that TCS projects were o f the right quality to anract income 
that can be included in the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise submissions. As a result of receiving 
this advice, Sutton included in a promotional leafiet targeted at academics, a bullet point highlighting 
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the fact. Dialogue with external agencies is also discussed in chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.4 and 
6.3.3.2. 
5.3.5 Experience of Colleagues 
When employed in DTI's Manufacturing Technology Division (MTD) the author had 
responsibility as a Professional and Technology Officer, Level I , (PTOl) for designing the 
MPI Programme. During the design process the author and his manager at section head level 
(Grade 6), met with the Grade 7 in DTI's Enterprise Initiative Division (BID) who was 
responsible for the operation of the Consultancy Initiatives. The purpose of the meeting was to 
ensure that the target population o f firms to be supported by MPI did not overlap with that 
focused upon by CI. EID were able to confirm, from the monitoring of CI, that limits placed 
on the level of grants offered had rendered the schemes unattractive to larger SMEs. The 
majority o f CI applicants had been SMEs employing one hundred staff or less. Thus MPI, 
where it was planned to offer higher levels of grant funding, would be able to provide support 
attractive to the group of larger SMEs who were not currently catered for, (see appendix H, 
section H.3.2.8, pp. 134-135). A further example is given in chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.5. 
5.3.6 Personal Experience 
Officials wil l inevitably be influenced by their experience of running programmes and projects. 
For example, the use of independent programme advisory panels to steer programme delivery 
and on-going development o f programmes was introduced as a concept by the scheme 
contractor responsible for operating the MPI programme. On closure o f MPI, the advisory 
panel was considered as having made a valuable contribution to the performance o f the 
programme by the author and his colleagues. Subsequently, in 1997, the author drew on this 
good experience and introduced the concept o f advisory panels into the Regional Supply Office 
(RSO) programme, for which he had responsibility. When he was working for Dr Melvyn 
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Draper (Grade 6), the latter informed the author that he drew on his experience of running 
schemes in formulating plans for the introduction of MPI, (see chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.5). 
5.3.7 Experience of Scheme Contractors 
Organisations contracted to operate programmes gather a wealth of experience, which can often 
be usefully applied in the design process. In the author's experience, contractors can be helpful 
in two ways. Firstly, in drafting ROAME statements, they can provide valuable advice relating 
to market problems and the administrative procedures to be adopted. Secondly, contractors are 
able to call on their experience in developing strategies for the administration o f programmes 
for which they are assigned responsibility [Interview 8]. When developing the MPI 
programme, the author consulted the Production Engineering Research Association (PERA). 
From their experience of operating the Manufacturing Initiative within CI, PERA were able to 
advise on the importance of vetting consultants to help ensure the quality of their work under 
the scheme. They also advised that MPI should maintain a database o f listed consultants, to 
speed the process of matching consultancy companies to the needs of SME applicants. This 
advice was adopted in MPI, (appendix H, section H.5.2, pp. 138-139). PERA were also able to 
provide DTI with statistics for DTI's Manufacturing Initiative, which indicated that SMEs 
employing over 100 staff represented a small proportion of applicants. This helped officials 
demonstrate that in targeting the larger SMEs, MPI was meeting a market need (section 
H.3.2.8, p. 135). 
Experience of scheme contractors can also be usefully applied to positively benefit the running 
of new programmes. In setting up and operating DTI's SUPERNET initiative (a network 
designed to help specialist counsellors in the Business Links locate specialist sources of 
expertise for their clients), PERA were able to call on their experience gained in operating the 
Manufacturing Initiative. For this scheme PERA had developed and run a system for indexing 
the skills held by consultancy organisations, as part of managing the listing o f consultants (see 
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Interview 8). The system was adapted for SUPERNET to record the skills held in the centres 
of expertise such as HEIs and the RTOs. 
PERA were also able to call on their skills gained from operating previous schemes, in other 
areas. Through operating the Manufacturing Initiative PERA had gained skills in project and 
consultancy monitoring, together with knowledge of managing 'short-term' contracts 
effectively. PERA were also able to search the database which had been built under the 
Manufacturing Initiative, to help identify potential centres o f expertise to participate in the 
SUPERNET network. The organisation was also able to exploit its enquiry service, and the 
Small Firms Technical Enquiry Service which it also ran on behalf of DTI, to help SUPERNET 
users obtain the help that they required. (These observations are based on the author's 
experience of introducing SUPERNET, and discussions with Mr. Philip Sowden, the member 
of the PERA team responsible for managing the SUPERNET contract). 
5.3.8 Experience of Best Practice Practitioners 
Consultants and other organisations involved in projects related to installing best practice into 
firms can, through their 'first hand' experience, provide knowledge relating to market problems 
and advice on how strategies should be developed for the resolution o f those difficulties. A 
minute dated 5 September 1990 to the Head of the previous Manufacturing and Technology 
Directorate (MTD) states how, in drafting the rationale for MPI, officials interviewed several 
consultancy organisations. These organisations informed officials that planning the strategic 
use of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) was a complex task, and required the use 
of senior consultants, (see appendix H, section H.3.1, pp. 132-133). The high fees involved 
they advised, would be likely to deter SMEs from committing to such projects. Discussions 
also helped officials identify that the necessary expertise was limited to about six organisations, 
requiring intervention to increase the supply side (appendix H, sections H.2.4.5, p. 132, and 
H.3.3.2,p. 136). 
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5.3.9 Commissioned Research 
Officials often commission consultants and other bodies to undertake research into market 
failure and to suggest strategies for the negation of difficulties. In the interview with Amott 
[Interview 11] he provides an example of officials gaining knowledge in this way. In 
developing the Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) and Small Scale Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing (SSCIM) programmes, an external consultant ISTEL was commissioned to 
review the international status of CAE and CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing) 
technologies. Among the market failures identified by ISTEL was that the requirements o f the 
growing number of Japanese inward investors could not be met by many of the UK's sub-
contracting firms. The subject of commissioning research is discussed further in chapter 6, 
sub-section 6.3.3.3. 
5.3.10 Government White Papers 
Section 5.2.3, above, discussed the importance of schemes being conformant with government 
policy. In chapter 3, section 3.3, it was suggested that white papers are an important input to 
the process of designing schemes, and their role should be studied. White papers contain 
statements of government policy. In designing and administering schemes, officials dierefore 
consult relevant white papers to obtain the 'steers' they need in developing schemes. 
Inspection of the CI ROAME statement (ROAME, 1988b) provides an example of officials 
referring to white papers in building programme rationale. The ROAME refers to the 'DTI 
White Paper' placing great importance on the need for more effective business development, 
and how CI was supportive of government aims by seeking to improve the situation of poor 
management in SMEs (paragraph 1,1), (see also appendix F, section F.3, pp. 96-97). The role 
of white papers is further discussed in chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.9. 
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Further examples on how information is used to inform the design process is given in chapter 6, 
sections 6.2,3 and 6.3.3. Additional examples are also discussed in the case study examples 
given in appendices D to H. How use of these sources is exploited internationally by others in 
the public sector is also observed (Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, pp. 20-21). 
5.4 Mechanisms 
Ranky (1990, p. 19), and Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 172-173) describe the mechanisms as 
depicted in the IDEFO modeller, as the entities which describe how the function is accomplished. The 
HM Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997), the DTI Finance Handbook (\996b), and the DTI 
Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a) represent the principal mechanisms employed in 
programme design, (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1). They act to steer officials through the process of 
developing the rationale for funding, by informing the reader o f the steps which must be undertaken 
and the information which must be provided at each step to ensure that the criteria for interventions are 
shown to have been met. 
Reference to the above mechanisms is again commonly made by officials throughout the 
design process. As discussed in section 5.2.7 above, in relation to the universal application o f 
^constraints', the guidelines are similarly employed throughout the design and implementation 
process. This is necessary as the guidance they provide contains statements of policy, and 
hence it is 'policy' that they always be applied to the process. 
5.5 Outputs 
The introduction of programmes results in activities being supported whose aim is to reduce the 
identified market failures (DTI, 1999a). Hence delivered activities are one class of output from 
the design and implementation process. Inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI , 
1999a, pp. 41-42, 67-70) reveals that as part of * Evaluation', monitoring and evaluation reports 
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are also produced, and may thus also be classed as policy deliverables, that is, the 'outputs' 
Figure 5.1 below displays the IDEFO Level 1 diagram constructed from the above analysis. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
The first stage of mapping the process of designing and administering support programmes has 
been completed. An IDEFO top level diagram has been developed, which provides a detailed 
overview of the process (figure 5.1 above). The inputs to the process, the constraining factors, 
and the outputs in the form of delivered programmes and evaluatory reports, have been 
identified. Based on the work of the literature review recorded in chapter 3, it has been argued 
that the guidelines issued to officials in introducing schemes form the principal mechanisms 
employed in the process (section 5.4). 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, had suggested a 'producer network' of various agencies extended around DTI, 
which supported the department in carrying out its various activities. It was argued that in discovering 
the nature of the process of designing and administering support programmes, it was necessary to 
investigate how these agencies interact with the design process. Section 5.3, which looked at the 
inputs to the design system, has begun the process of identifying the actors involved, and their roles in 
informing the process o f designing support policy. Inspection o f the players identified so far reveals a 
number of different types of organisation to participate in the process. These include HEIs, 
consultants, RTOs, and companies, with which officials interact in developing and running 
programmes. Research has additionally revealed that actors in this 'programme network' have roles to 
both inform the design process, and deliver activities on behalf o f government. Studies also indicate 
that it is possible for actors to perform in both of these capacities, for instance as in the case o f the 
RTOs. 
It is observed that the structure of the programme network conforms with that described by Rhodes, in 
describing producer networks. The above analysis provides some insights into the nature o f the 
relationships between the participants and officials. Such organisations function as providers o f well 
informed advice to civil servants, as they are able to draw on their experience of delivering 
programmes, and servicing the needs of small companies more generally. Importantly, the programme 
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network has also been shown to extend internally within government, to include the nenvorking of 
officials themselves. Within the internal section of the net^vork, officials employ their personal 
experience and that of others to help them design schemes that wi l l meet the market requirements. 
Section 5.2.3 suggested that internally the programme network also involves ministers. An example 
lies in the annual setting o f budgets where officials discuss the priorities for funding with ministers 
(section 5.2.6). It would seem that a variety of literature sources are consulted in the process, including 
white papers, evaluation reports, and the reports of advisory committees. 
It has been found that officials design and operate programmes within a strict set of bounds, 
defined by a number of constraining factors (section 5.2). For example section 3.2 in chapter 3 
suggested the role of Acts of Parliament in providing for schemes should be studied, in respect 
of their role in the design and running of programmes. Their role has been shown to be vital to 
the process. Without the appropriate regulatory framework in place, ministers and officials 
cannot appropriate funds to operate schemes. Acts determine what can be done, and by 
inference, what cannot be implemented. It was further shown that two 'Acts' have been 
prominent in programme development within DTI, these being the Industrial Development Act 
J982, and the Science and Technology (S&T) Act 1965. Knowledge of the scope of these Acts 
by officials is therefore paramount in them developing new initiatives that are likely to receive 
approval. Policy has been shown to be a second and important area of constraint. EU, and UK 
Government Policy must be adhered to at all times. Forming part of policy, there is a need to 
demonstrate failures in the market that the markets themselves cannot resolve, for there to be a 
rationale for intervention. Finally, the scope of programme activities is constrained by the 
availability of finance. The next chapter, chapter 6, continues the development of the IDEFO 
model, by investigating the first of the three component processes, that is 'Issue Identification'. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ISSUE roENTIFICATION 
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6. ISSUE IDENTIFICATION 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 described the development of an IDEFO, Level 1 diagram, which provided an overall 
description of the process of designing and implementing support programmes. The factors 
constraining officials in carrying out the process, and the sources of information which they use 
to obtain evidence of market failures were detailed. It was also shown that the Innovation 
Budget Guidelines are a principal source o f reference for officials, which steer them through 
the design and administration of schemes. The main outcomes of the process are launched 
programmes and evaluation reports. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3, revealed that the overall process of programme design and administration, 
comprised the three components of'Issue Identification', 'Implementation', and 'Evaluation and 
Feedback'. This chapter continues the task o f mapping the process, by looking in detail at the 
mechanisms employed in the first of these components, Mssue Identification'. The aim is to take the 
first step in responding to the fourth research question raised in chapter 3, section 3.8.3 as follows: 
Research Question (iv): Discovering the Nature o f the Design Process - "What is the scope of the 
process describing the designing and implementing policy for introducing and operating programmes 
which support firms in becoming more competitive, what comprises that process in terms o f the 
elements which make up the whole system, and how do these elements interrelate in delivering support 
policy"? 
This chapter contributes to responding to this issue, by answering the supplementary question: 
(a) Regarding Research Question (iv): Discovering the Nature of the Design Process -
"What are the mechanisms involved in 'Issue Identification'"? 
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Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, had provided some insights into the process. The Innovation Budget 
Gtadelines, (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 1999a) revealed the identification of issues to be primarily 
concerned with the development of ROAME statements. Drafting of ROAMEs enforces a 
structured approach to the process, and it was suggested that the work undertaken in addressing 
the issues under each of the ROAME headings be studied. It was suggested that further 
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inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines would be useful in uncovering what is entailed. 
Inspection o f the 'Innovation Guidelines' shows the approval of programmes to be discussed as 
an activity which is separate from programme design. Weller and Stevens (1998) had proposed 
that the overall process be continuous in nature, running right through from 'Issue 
Identification' to 'Evaluation'. From his personal experience and observing others the author 
would concur. He has found that the ^approval' stage is an integral part of proposal 
development. When ROAMEs are first submitted for approval, those judging the case for 
support wil l often recommend changes and/or additions to improve the strength of the case. 
This process is discussed in section 6.4.2 below, where examples are also given. For this 
reason 'Approval' was treated as an integral part of 'Issue Identification'. Discussion of the 
how the approval process helps shape programme development takes place in section 6.4, 
below. 
The following sections describe the analysis of the component process of 'Issue Identification'. 
To aid the reader in following the process through. Figure 6.1 below contains a f low chart 
describing the elements comprising the process, and their sequence in the task. The flow chart 
is based on the findings of the analysis described in this chapter. 
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Figure 6.1 Flow chart of the Process of Issue Identification 
210 
6.1.1 Perception of Market Failure and Value for Money 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.4 discussed how the presence o f market failure is a condition for 
government intervention. Before embarking on a discussion of how the cases for support 
(ROAME statements) are developed, it is perhaps useful to first debate the subject o f how 
officials interpret market failure, in the context of designing and administering support 
progranimes. The author would argue that the starting point is the government's wish to 
achieve Value for Money (VFM) in the undertakings of the Whitehall departments. The white 
paper Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service (HMSO, 1982, pp. 2-3), refers to the 
government pursuing a policy to achieve good management throughout the civil service. As 
part of this management policy the white paper continues by highlighting its aim to secure 
better value for money. The DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b) takes up the theme, stating 
" Value for money in government is about ensuring that tax payer's money is used efficiently, 
economically and effectively'^ (section 4.1, paragraph 4.1.8). Conceptually, the handbook 
continues, the objective is to achieve the best outputs possible, at acceptable levels o f quality, at 
the lowest cost. That these aims apply to all DTI's activities, is emphasised. Attainment of 
VFM is thus a prime consideration for officials in designing and operating programmes. 
The Treasury 'Green Book', (HMT, 1997, pp. 59-65) sets out the principles to be applied in 
deciding when it is appropriate to intervene in private sector markets. As a rule, government 
departments should not intervene unless it can be shown that the resulting costs and outcomes 
represent an efficient use of resources. Economic efficiency, the guidance continues, ''can only 
be improved if government intervention is able to successfully correct some market failure^' (p. 
59). The conditions representing the categories of market failure were discussed in chapter 5, 
section 5.2.4. 
During the course of his investigations, a researcher in the public policy arena conveyed to the 
author that some people view market failure as a contentious subject. The author discussed 
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this comment with Dr. Peter Bentley, a PRII in DTFs Small Business Service (SBS), for his 
views. Dr. Bentley was approached as he has substantial experience in the introduction and 
evaluation of programmes (see interviews 14 and 15). Bentley did not consider the 
identification of market failure to be a contentious issue among economists and other officials 
within the department. Rather, he felt problems arise because people do not always understand 
the underlying principle governing the condition o f market failure. He suggested as an 
example, officials treating SMEs as not being able to afford advice as an instance o f market 
failure. Companies not affording advice Bentley suggested, is not an indication in itself of the 
market failing to operate correctly. Not wanting to afford something is a subjective decision, 
heavily influenced by peoples' personal views of life. Some people wil l be prepared to pay for 
certain things, while others wi l l not. 
Conversely a situation that does demonstrate the market not working properly, and therefore a 
case of market failure, is a company saying that it does not like a market offering, and hence 
wil l not test it, even though it has not tried it. Bentley argued that firms not wanting to use 
consultants at the ful l market rate because they are distrustful of their value, is an example. 
Because they have not tried using consultants small firms are unaware of their added value. In 
other words, small firms lack the necessary information about what consultants can do for 
them, that is, an information failure exists (see chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1). Interestingly, 
Bentley added that whilst ministers wi l l set policy objectives, he felt that they do not think in 
terms of market failure. The need to substantiate the rationale o f subsequent programmes in 
terms of clearly defined market failures, was essentially the domain o f officials. 
The Treasury indicates the importance of achieving V F M in designing support programmes. 
The Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997, p. 63) refers to the need for public expenditure on 
programmes or projects being cost effective in achieving policy objectives. Cost-effectiveness 
is stated in the 'Green Book' as being ratio ofpolicy outputs of a project or programme" 
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(p. 63). In analysing programme ROAME statements and evaluation reports, the author 
observed that an attempt to measure value for money in this way is not undertaken (see section 
6.3.2 - Step 4, below). Dr. Lambert (PRl 1), a senior economist in DTI (see Interview 18), 
supports the author's observations. In an E-mail to the author (dated 18 October 2000), Dr. 
Lambert related how evaluations would assess V F M in terms of their findings on the validity o f 
programme rationale, the adequacy and attainment of objectives, additionality, displacement, 
and instances of wider benefits that have been realised. Conclusions are debated and so, 
Lambert observes, "there is no monolithic calculus of VFM that derives directly from 
evalitation evidence". The author suggests that the approach adopted in DTI remains 
nonetheless generally conformant with the Treasury's policy, the Treasury stating that the 
"most basic condition for cost-effectiveness is that the activity supported should actually occur" 
(HMT, 1997, p. 63). 
In talking to Dr. Bentley, he was able to provide some reasons which contribute to the 
impracticalities of measuring VFM in absolute terms. Agreeing with Lambert, he proposed 
that assessment of VFM was not a scientific process. Perception of VFM having been 
achieved, Bentley argued, wil l depend on several factors. To begin with, the perception o f 
value wil l depend on the views of individuals, who wil l hold differing views on what VFM 
represents. Next the views on VFM change with time, as they are strongly influenced by the 
policy climate, and ministerial priorities at the time of assessment. Expanding, Bentley 
observed that different ministers have different priorities, which broadens out the policy 
climate. Ministers change positions and incoming ministers wil l oflen have different priorities 
from their predecessors. Hence the perception of what represents VFM will change in line with 
changing aspirations. 
Priorities can also change with time as a result of experience of implementing policy. He cited 
as an example the changes in emphasis in help for business start-ups and SMEs in recent years. 
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In the early 1980s there was considerable support provided for 'start-ups' under the previous 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme, which aimed to encourage unemployed people to start up their 
own businesses. People who had been made redundant and wanted to start their own 
businesses could receive an income from the government for up to one year. The scheme, 
suggested Bentley, turned out to be very expensive in terms of improving the economy, and no 
longer was politically acceptable. Hence it was not perceived as representing good value for 
money, and in consequence political emphasis was shifted in the early 1990s towards providing 
support for existing businesses, and the Enterprise Allowance Scheme was essentially dropped. 
The introduction of the Business Links was a manifestation of the shift towards support for 
existing SME businesses, this now being perceived by ministers as offering better V F M . The 
author observes that the change in policy from focusing on start-ups to placing emphasis in 
developing existing SMEs is an example o f the phenomenon referred to by Lindblom (1977, 
pp. 313-317) as 'incrementalism', (see chapter 3, section 3.5). Now, under the present Labour 
government, policy priorities have again moved back towards providing support for start-ups. 
The government has stated its aims to promote the formation of high growth start-ups, and to 
help micro businesses grow as part o f its social inclusion agenda (Stationery Office, 1998, pp. 
48-49; Cabinet Office, 1999, pp. 16, 18,26-27). These alterations in priorities, Bentley argued, 
serve to show that judgement of VFM does not arise from some elemental law, but is instead 
subject to ministerial policy. Bentley also pointed to ministers and senior officials being 
influenced by the presentational aspects of any decision to fund any programme. There is 
hence no obvious benchmark. One's only benchmark therefore is what ministers are trying to 
do, and in turn what is regarded as 'important', and hence value for money. 
In commenting, Bentley suggested that there would inevitably be differences between the 
views of the Treasury and DTI, towards what represents VFM. Bentley regarded the Treasury 
as more detached from the 'real world' than officials in DTI, who are in frequent contact with 
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business, and so consequently tends to take a 'hard line'. Bentley's observations align with 
those of Lipsey (2000, pp. 11-12). Lipsey highlights how Treasury officials frequently receive 
proposals from the spending departments to use public monies to fund various projects, which 
are often rejected. He suggests that the departments are under siege from pressure groups, 
anxious to encourage the government to embark on activities which they consider to contribute 
to the public good. 
Finally, during an interview with Dr. Lambert (Interview 18), he indicated that different 
interpretations of value for money can be placed on the findings o f evaluation reports. Lambert 
suggested that budget managers might interpret findings as implying that value for money had 
not been realised, whereas the programme manager may suggest that the programme is 
addressing a perceived need and, with modifications, can be operated to achieve V F M , The 
author is able to quote an example from his own experience, which demonstrates a similar 
conflict of opinion. The Regional Supply Office (RSO) programme operated by the Business 
Link Directorate (BLD) o f DTI, was subjected to an independent evaluation in 1997 by Pieda 
pic (Pieda, 1997). Pieda found the programme not to represent value for money, on the basis of 
the manner in which the RSOs were currently operating (p. \ \ 1), (the RSOs were essentially 
performing a purchaser/supplier matching exercise in a non-strategic way). 
The economist responsible for the evaluation in BLD, in meetings debating the future of the 
RSOs, expressed the opinion that the programme should therefore be dropped. However 
officials responsible for operating the programme felt there to be a clear need for the RSOs. 
They instead concentrated on the recommendations of the evaluation report, which suggested 
that a clear rationale would be seen as being addressed, and hence V F M achievable, i f the 
RSOs prioritised their work and became more involved in supply chain activity (pp. 117-123). 
Officials put up a submission to ministers for continued support, arguing that VFM would be 
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achieved i f the operating guidelines for the programme were modified in accordance with 
Pieda's recommendations. Ministers gave their approval. 
It was mentioned above that in the Treasury guidance (HMT, 1997, pp. 59-60), a rationale for 
intervention is dependent of there being the presence of a market failure. Guidance then continues by 
stating that it is therefore necessary for officials to demonstrate that a market failure is present, and 
further, that the means to correct it exist. How the task of satisfying these criteria is carried out by 
officials is the central theme of this chapter, and the topic is discussed in sections 6.2.3, 6.3, and 6.3.1 
to 6.4.2 below. 
6.2 Conception and Validation of Programme Ideas 
Section 6.3 below discusses the process of drafting ROAME statements. It is shown that the 
structure of the process can be deduced from study of the 'Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 
1992, 1996a, 1999a). However from his experience, the author was aware that the sequence of 
stages as suggested by the guidelines is incomplete. Witnessing the development o f initiatives 
shows there to be a preliminary sequence before embarking on the development of programme 
proposals. First ideas for schemes are bom as a result of officials considering how best they 
may help firms. These ideas are then validated before proceeding to the formal development 
process. The purpose of this section is to look at how ideas for programmes emerge and are 
then validated, before moving on to the development of cases for support, that is, the drafting 
of ROAMEs. Conceiving ideas is suggested by the author as the beginning o f the task o f 
identifying the issues. 
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6.2.1 Conception of Ideas 
An important objective for government is that UK firms are competitive in world markets, and 
government is seen as having a critical role to play in helping companies compete better 
(Stationery Office, 1998, pp. 10-11). It is the job of officials to translate the government's 
political vision into programmes which deliver outcomes (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 15). Ideas 
for new programmes thus arise out o f officials monitoring the market, looking for instances o f 
businesses performing uncompetitively, and finding ways to encourage improved performance. 
Businesses and governments alike operate in an economic environment which is becoming 
increasingly global and dynamic (PA, 1993, section A; Peppard and Rowland, 1995, pp. 25-27; 
Drucker, l995;Cliffe, 1999^ pp. 18-19). Thus officials must continually observe the market, 
and stay aware o f changing conditions which precipitate situations in which firms become 
uncompetitive. However, in thinking about how problems can be resolved, officials wil l only 
consider those which can be regarded as conditions of market failure, that is, those difficulties 
which are unresolveable without government intervention (see chapter 5, section 5.2.4). 
6.2.2 Validate Ideas 
I f a potential case for intervention is thought to exist, authorisation is then sought to build a f i i l l 
case for support, that is, develop a programme ROAME statement. The request for 
authorisation is usually presented to senior management in the form of an internal minute, 
briefly setting out the case. In his experience the author has found that senior staff prefer such 
minutes to be short and succinct, no more than two sides of A4 paper. With pressures on their 
time, senior officials constantly remind their staff that they are unable to put effort into reading 
long and complicated texts. The author observes that long detailed proposals at this stage are 
inappropriate anyway. Only an outline proposal is justifiable, since the evidence is not fully 
researched and is therefore preliminary in nature. 
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Observation of minutes setting out potential cases show them to describe the perceived market 
failures, summarising the preliminary evidence. Outline approaches for alleviating the failures 
are suggested, and a 'ball park* figure for the programme budget given. In parallel with its 
submission to line management, the outline case is circulated to all other staff having an 
interest, inviting their comments. Budgetary authorities are additionally consulted at this stage 
to check the availability of funds, and in order that proposed expenditure can be taken account 
of in planning departmental expenditure. Management normally authorises a scheme to 
proceed in a replying minute. 
The author observes that senior management judge the viability of proposals on the basis o f 
their wide range of personal experience, and in the light of the comments received from other 
staff. Their comments, added to those of others, help develop initial thinking. Outline 
proposals may be modified in the light of comments received and resubmitted. This process 
also provides the added benefit of guiding officials as they begin to write the ROAME 
statement. 
Officials have a second motive in consulting widely. Consultation provides the opportunity to 
begin making the 'ground fertile for approval', improving the chance of final endorsement for 
what they wish to undertake. The author also observes that failure to first validate ideas greatly 
increases the risk of a subsequent ROAME statement being rejected at the approval stage, and 
the effort expended thus wasted. From his experience the author is able to quote the 
Manufacturing, Planning, and Implementation (MPI) programme as an example of where the 
above process was adopted in developing ideas for a scheme (see appendix H, section H.2.3, p. 
129). Inspection of 'the files' shows the procedure to have also been adopted in developing 
the Programme for Competitive Manufacturing. Further examples of how ideas for schemes 
are developed, including the case of MPI, are provided in the case study examples given in 
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appendix D section D3, p. 78, appendix E, sections E.3.2, pp. 88-89, E.4.1.1, p. 92, appendix F, 
section F.2, p. 96, appendix G, section G.2.1, pp. 107-108, and appendix H, section H.2.2, pp. 
128-129, andH.2.3, p. 129). 
6.2.3 Inputs to the Process of Conceiving and Validating Programme Ideas 
Chapter 5, section 5.3 discussed the sources of information interrogated by officials in the 
design and administration process, and provided a few examples. This section looks again at 
these sources of evidence in the context o f how they can help prompt ideas for new 
programmes. 
6.2.3.1 Evaluation Reports 
Chapter 3, section 3.5 introduced the role of evaluation reports. Chapter 5, section 5.3.1 
summarised how they inform the overall process of designing and administering schemes. 
Importantly they can also provide information relating to the continuing nature of market 
failures, or highlight new problems which have come to light during the operation o f a scheme, 
thus feeding ideas for interventions. Examples o f officials taking account of previous 
evaluations in developing ideas can be found from inspection of programme ROAME 
statements. The ROAME proposing Phase 2 of the Managing into the 90s' (M90s) programme 
(ROAME, 1991a, paragraphs 5 and 6), refers to the evaluation study of the first phase of M90s 
as confirming the market imperfection of SMEs not being aware of good business practice, and 
how to implement it, (see appendix G? section G.2.4.2, p. 112). 
6.2.3.2 Literature 
Business related articles in the national *broad sheets', business magazines and specialist 
journals can *flag' emergent problems. Papers published by the research councils can also 
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represent rich sources of information relating to market failures. The MPI programme, which 
is discussed in appendix H, provides an example o f where literature sources were a primary 
influence in shaping ideas. Appendix H, section H.2.2, p. 128, shows how a paper prepared for 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), cited a general decline in productivity 
which had accompanied the increased use o f technology (Fleck, 1988). This observation 
indicated problems in the way firms were managing the introduction o f the new technologies, 
(see also Interview 5, pp. 391-392). An article in a business magazine Management Today 
(Management Today, pp. 68-96), had shown how the appropriate use o f technology could bring 
about significant benefits in productivity (appendix H, section H.2.2, p. 129). Along with other 
sources of evidence, these observations led officials to believe that there was a failure of firms 
to implement technology correctly, and that it was worthwhile for DTI to intervene in the 
market to help correct the problem and thus aid SMEs to improve their performance. 
However the author observes that it is unusual for officials to refer to the literature for 
information relating to evidence o f market failure. An interview with a senior economist in 
DTI [Interview 18] suggests reference to the literature to represent good practice, but there 
appears to be no systematic referencing of professional and research publications by officials. 
The author therefore suggests that insufficient use has been made o f such sources, a point 
alluded to in an interview with Mr. Frank Rott (a PRIO), [Interview 13]. Rott considered that 
programme rationales would be better founded i f greater reference to the literature was made in 
the development of ROAME statements. He himself had not called on the literature in the 
development task, and considered that most others did not also. The author consulted several 
o f his other colleagues. They were unanimous in saying that they did not consult the literature 
when developing programmes. In forming an opinion on problems reliance is almost solely 
placed on other sources of information, such as consultations with firms, Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs), and the Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs). 
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Whilst discussing the use of different information sources with other officials, the author took 
the opportunity to ask them i f they weighted the information received, dependent upon source. 
The reply received was that no such process of differentiation was undertaken, all the 
information sources used were listened to and treated as being equally o f value in providing 
evidence of market failure. During the course of his research the author was asked to consider 
whether particular officials are influenced by specific information sources. The view of 
colleagues was that those involved in the development and approval process were influenced 
by precisely the same information sources. Bentley had an interesting observation to make. He 
suggested that officials at all levels are influenced by a number o f information sources, which 
creates a 'level of noise' in debate between officials. From the 'noise' certain issues begin to 
dominate and then attract general support for considering their resolution. 
6.2.3.3 Cabinet Office Advisory Committees 
In talking to colleagues and examining his own experience, the author found little hard evidence to 
suggest that the advisory committees were actually responsible for the initiating of a programme 
idea [Interview 17]. However they represented an important influence in the design process, being 
an important activity in supporting the development of programme rationale. This is discussed 
later, in sub-section 6.3.3.1. 
6.2.3.4 Dialogue with External Bodies 
Conversations with external bodies having a knowledge o f industry is one of the ways that officials 
become aware of problems [Interview 11]. The topic was introduced in chapter 5, section 5.3.4. From 
his own experience the author observes that ofllcials work hard to achieve regular dialogue with these 
organisations, developing and maintaining strong links with their staff. During the course of these 
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conversations problems are flagged and often ideas for how issues may be addressed are discussed. 
The nurturing of links with people helps engender a sense of comradeship with officials, reducing 
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inhibitions to put suggestions forward. Regular dialogue also provides officials with plentiful 
opportunities to apprise external bodies of DTI's agenda, thereby placing their staff in a better position 
to flag issues which are relevant to the department's agenda. 
Examples of organisations with whom officials liase are the SMEs themselves, Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs), Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs), and Trade Associations. For 
example, in a discussion with Mr. Reginald Allen, a Grade 7 responsible for developing several 
programmes under LINK, he informed the author that ideas for new LINK programmes arose as result 
of discussions with the (previous) Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC), HEIs, and 
Industry. Consultancy organisations are a further source o f information about problems faced by 
SMEs (see appendix H, sections H.2.4.4, p. 131, and H.3.1, pp. 132-138). 
In the case of R&D orientated programmes, it has been the author*s experience that officials w i l l 
understandably tend to focus attention on research bodies such as HEIs, and the RTOs. For advisory 
programmes the emphasis is more on talking to consultancy based organisations and agencies 
concerned with the delivery o f best practice. However these are generalisations: Business Schools 
within HEIs can for instance, advise on the wider issues which may of interest in developing an 
advisory scheme. An example of the latter is the involvement o f Sheffield Business School in a DTi 
led, EU funded programme, to deliver business training in the Czech Republic. Sheffield are involved 
as consultants to plan and manage the delivery of training of government personnel, and staff within 
manufacturing firms. Their selection to take part in the programme was based on their expertise gained 
from running courses in business training over the years. 
Additionally, as the result of careful nurturing by officials, people who see difficulties arising often 
contact DTI as the first port of call, as they see it as the organisation best placed to help. Officials also 
extend specific invitations to external bodies to talk to them either at DTI, or at their own office. These 
meetings often produce ideas, also help build relationships with staff in the organisations concerned, 
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and encourage them to turn to DTI officials when they have a problem to discuss. Officials also 
capitalise on the fact that they may be in a position to offer financial assistance. They ensure through 
their daily contacts with organisations that people are made aware of the funding which is available. 
Thus, for example, organisations seeking funds to help ftind R&D projects they wish to undertake, are 
motivated to call officials and discuss their programme ideas. In so doing they may suggest market 
failures of which officials were unaware [Interview 9]. 
Mr. Peter Munday, a PR9 in DTl's Small Business Service, was able to provide further 
examples of dialogue with external bodies helping to seed new ideas for schemes. In the late 
1980s, the University o f Leeds through their research work had picked up ideas for developing 
a standard for data interchange between manufacturing computer systems. The university's 
research into how organisations would want to use technology in the future had shown that the 
integration of computer based systems was key. Leeds had observed that people were currently 
generating similar sets of data, but on different suppliers systems which were incompatible, and 
would therefore, not communicate with each other. It was further observed that the process o f 
transferring data between the various incompatible systems was inefficient. Data had to be re-
entered manually, and errors occurring whilst keying in data had then to be subsequently 
discovered and rectified. Leeds discussed with officials the idea of a project to develop a data 
exchange standard, which would allow information to be exchanged between systems 
independent of the supplier o f the hardware or soft;ware. 
DTI funding resulted in the setting up of the Computer Aided Data Exchange Centre 
(CADEC), and the development of the data interchange standard STEP (Standard for the 
Exchange o f Product model data). The centre also provided a test bed for suppliers o f systems, 
and additionally helped inform DTI of what businesses wanted. Munday observed that funding 
the CADEC project was sympathetic to DTI's wish to see the UK's expertise buih up in CAD 
and data exchange, and have a world voice in these areas. 
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Munday was able to identify other examples. He related how the Shoe and Allied Trades 
Research Association (SATRA) would regularly come forward with proposals for the research 
and development o f manufacturing tools, methods and processes, based on consultation with 
their members. One such proposal, and one which subsequently received funding, was for the 
development of a Computer Aided Design (CAD) system to design plastic lastes, employed in 
shoe manufacture. Traditionally wooden lastes are used in shoe making which then need to be 
stored. Storage of the lastes, and the time taken in their production, were problems identified 
by the RTO. The project aimed to have lastes made in plastic which would allow them to be 
fabricated quickly, and using digitally stored data would remove the overhead of physically 
storing the wooden tools. On another project an SME supplier of manufacturing system 
software proposed to officials the idea of a project for researching the requirements for 
manufacturing scheduling soft\vare, to improve production management processes. 
The author was approached by different SMEs to fund the research and development o f 
systems to control the cold forming of metal strips in a metal rolling process, and systems to 
control the sequencing of metal parts through the baths in the plating process. Another instance 
lies with the Electrical Research Association (ERA), who came to the author with their ideas to 
develop FIELBUS, a standard to enable electronic control data to be exchanged between 
hardware modules controlling production machinery. ERA had observed that existing control 
systems from different manufactures could not be easily interfaced with each other, thus 
preventing them being interconnected via a communications network. This was regarded by 
the RTO as a problem, as to be able to monitor and update the control parameters centrally via 
a neUvork would increase production efficiency. ERA wished to build on an existing standard 
for monitoring instrument data, and develop a standard that would allow hardware controllers 
to inter-communicate, independent of the source of the supply o f the hardware. A further 
example lies with the British Constructional Steelwork Association (a trade association), who 
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discussed their ideas for DTI to fund the development of CAD software tools, for application in 
the steel fabrication sector. In all of these examples, cases for support were developed, support 
received, and project work successfully completed. 
6.2.3.5 Personal Experience 
Ideas for novel approaches in support programmes can emerge from the schemes themselves. 
In 1990 the author began working for Dr. Melvyn Draper, then a Grade 7 in DTI, supporting 
him in the development of the MPI programme. Dr. Draper informed the author that the germ 
of the idea for MPI developed as a result o f his experience of running the previous A M T 
Planning Studies Consultancy Scheme (NEL, 1992). During the later stages o f the programme 
a few of the consultants had begun to take the wider business perspective in carrying out their 
projects. Where a more strategic approach to consultancy had been taken, it was noted that the 
client firms were experiencing greater impact from their projects. Thus Dr. Draper began 
thinking that a scheme centred round helping firms take a holistic approach to planning their 
A M T implementations would be worthwhile. 
6.2.3.6 Experience of Colleagues, Scheme Contractors, and Best Practice Practitioners 
The author suggests through observing the design process, that officials tend to draw more on the 
experience of colleagues, scheme contractors, and best practice practitioners, in the process of 
developing ROAMEs. This is discussed further in section 6.3 below. 
6.2.3.7 Commissioned Research 
Again the author observes from his own experience o f designing programmes, and from the 
experience of colleagues, commissioning o f research to determine market failure is normally 
undertaken as part of building ROAME statements (see section 6.3). However an example of 
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where such research helped spawn an idea came to light during a conversation with Mr, John 
Oakley, who heads the department's Regional and SME Management Support Unit. Oakley 
informed the author that a study commissioned by DTI into ways of developing databases on 
suppliers, whilst not leading directly to the launch of a programme as intended, did however 
help inform the design of Partnership Sourcing, a collaborative activity with the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI). 
Inspection of the report shows work to have begun in April 1990, with the market failure 
perceived as: 
"UK buyers being hampered by inadequate information (on suppliers), and little was being done to 
examine the subject andfind appropriate remedies". 
(DTI, 1991a, paragraph 2.1). 
The commissioning of research is discussed further in sub-section 6.3.3.3 below. 
6.2.3.8 Ministers 
Mr. John Cammell, Head of DTl's Manufacturing Technology Division (MTD), advised the 
author that ministers do not usually interject such as to initiate new programmes [Interview 2]. 
However there are exceptions to the norm. Examples are the introduction of the Regional 
Supply Office and Business Link programmes. In an interview, Timothy Roberts, manager of 
the Regional Supply Office (RSO) in the West Midlands [Interview 16], reported that the idea 
of setting up the RSOs was bom as a result o f a request from the Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine 
MP, when President of the Board of Trade (he preferred this title to Secretary o f State). 
In November 1993 the President attended a dinner with senior industrialists in Scotland, and was asked 
by one of the large corporates why his companies could obtain help in sourcing suppliers in Wales and 
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Scotland but not in England. As a result o f the conversation, the President asked his officials to look 
into the possibilities of setting up a sourcing service in England, something which he was keen to see. 
in the case of the Business Links programme, the President, following his appointment, asked 
officials to set up what was originally known as the 'One Stop Shops', [Interview 15]. The 
idea was originally described in the Labour Parly's 1992 election manifesto, (Labour Party, 
1992). 
A further example of a ministerial interjection arose in a second interview with Mr. John 
Cammell, held in 1991, [Interview 3]. The author was informed that the then Minister for 
Industry, the Rt, Hon. Douglas Hogg MP, had become concerned over an emergent underspend 
on DTI's R&D budget. During a meeting with Mr. Brian Murray, then Head of the Research 
and Technology Policy (RTP) Division, the Minister asked officials to investigate ideas for new 
schemes. This had paved the way for the introduction of new initiatives. According to 
Cammell, he, as Head of MTD (Manufacturing Technology Division), had previously placed 
policy proposals to the Secretary of State, Lord Young, which were resurrected as a result of 
the Industry Minister's request. 
6.2.3.9 Government White Papers 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.10, introduced the role of white papers in providing guidance regarding 
government policy towards support for businesses. The author is however not aware that while papers 
have been a principal source of new ideas. Rather they are employed as references to back programme 
rationale. For instance, as discussed previously in chapter 5, section 5.3.10, the Consultancy Initiatives 
(CI) ROAME statement refers in its introduction to the DTI While Paper (HMSO, 1988), placing 
''great importance on the need for more effective business development" (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 
1.1), (see also appendix F, section F.3, p. 97). The role of white papers is studied later in sub-section 
6.3.3.5. However the act of drafting white papers can be instrumental in promoting new ideas. The 
author along with others has on numerous occasions been asked by colleagues responsible for drafting 
227 
white papers for ideas on new initiatives. Such requests provide officials with opportunities to promote 
their ideas for addressing problems. Ideas can be put forward and, i f accepted, wil l appear in the 
published documents, and henceforth become part of accepted policy. The officials who initiated the 
ideas wil l then take forward these proposals, developing and launching new activities. 
The need for ministers to have things to announce in white papers also helps officials argue subsequent 
cases for approval. Examination of the SUPERNET programme files shows the members of the 
Innovation IPC having their attention drawn to such a need, when appraising the case for the second 
round of funding for the scheme. 
6.2.3.10 Outputs 
As discussed in the preceding section 6.2.2, the 'output' of the process o f conceiving and validating 
ideas is written approval from senior managers, in the form of a minute to their staff asking them to 
proceed with the formal development o f programmes. (Approval can sometimes be given verbally). 
6.3 Develop Programme ROAME Statements 
Chapters, section 3.3.1 identified that the task of'Issue Identification' is mainly about the 
development of ROAME statements. Section 3.3.1 showed the development of ROAMEs to be 
an 'accounting' process, in which well researched arguments for support are put forward, the 
objectives to be achieved described, and the planned expenditurejustified. ROAMEs also 
facilitate the processes o f 'Monitoring' and 'Evaluation' by defining the problems which are to 
be addressed, and the strategies proposed for their reduction. 
An interview with Dr. Melvyn Draper, a Grade 6 in DTI's former Manufacturing Technologies 
Division (MTD) [Interview 5], provided some additional background to the role of ROAME 
statements. Draper pointed to ministers not normally having technical or industrial expertise 
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(Hennessy, 1990, pp. 487-488), and their time to consider the issues surrounding cases for 
interventions being limited. These factors taken together leaves them vulnerable to criticism. 
Introduction of programmes could give rise to political criticism, through a lack of debate o f 
the issues surrounding their introduction preventing potential problems from being pre-empted. 
The ROAME approach addresses the problem by thoroughly researching the issues involved. 
The author observes that production and submission o f programme ROAME statements forms 
part of the civil servant's role to advise ministers (Hennessy, 1990, pp. 494-495; Weller and 
Stevens, 1998, p. 579). 
This section examines in detail the work within each step of building the case for support, showing 
how the evidence of problems is obtained and findings presented, such that the rationale is well 
researched and hence defensible. Drafting cases for support involves developing initial ideas, and 
building on the preliminary evidence which has been gathered to provide a substantial and credible 
argument for why proposed activities should be funded. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 revealed the function of drafting ROAMEs to be a sequential process, 
conducted in the order of discussion in the Innovation Budget Guidelines of each of the 
ROAME topics, that is, ^Rationale', 'Appraisal', 'Objectives', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation 
and Feedback'. From his experience of drafting ROAME statements, the author is able to 
confirm that, in practice, work in developing ROAMEs is carried out essentially in accordance 
with the order in which these topics are introduced in the guidelines. Examining the overall 
process revealed that research is not simply aimed at identifying the market failures but also at 
understanding the nature o f problems and how best they may be solved. The approaches 
adopted to gain such understanding were therefore also analysed. The research mechanisms 
which have been employed in R & T programmes and advisory schemes were noted, together 
with the reasons for their adoption. The information sources and methods employed in seeking 
the evidence were also investigated. 
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For the purposes of analysis, the activities involved in preparing ROAMEs may be grouped 
into three primary areas, those concerned with developing programme rationale, those 
concerned with setting objectives, and those associated with * Programme Implementation', that 
is, 'Appraisal' and 'Monitoring', and then fmally 'Evaluation including Feedback'. Again 
from his own experience and from observing colleagues, the majority o f effort is seen to be 
expended in developing the 'Rationale'. The work undertaken in developing each section o f 
ROAMEs is now discussed. 
6.3.1 Writing the Introduction 
Each ROAME must be prefaced with an introductory section, outlining the contents o f the 
document. Drafting of the "Introduction" sections of ROAMEs is relatively straight forward, 
the task limited to that of writing a summary of the ROAME contents. Guidance (DTI , 1996a, 
p. 35, 1999a, pp. 31-32) advises officials that the introduction should be o f a single page in 
length, and then lists the essential features to be contained within a ROAME. Among features 
listed are the overall objectives, what is to be undertaken and by whom, costs, start date and 
programme duration. 
6.3.2 Developing Programme Rationale 
DTI guidelines state ''the central purpose of the rationale is to argue the case for support" (DTI, 1992, 
p.16). As discussed previously in chapter I , section 1.1, DTI's remit has tended to concentrate on 
helping firms in the industrial sector to become more competitive, inspection o f ROAME statements 
shows programme rationales reflecting the government's competitiveness agenda, with delivery 
strategies pivoting around encouraging SMEs to take action to improve their competitive positions. 
For example in the LINK programme on Measurement and Instrumentation (ROAME, 1993, 
paragraphs 4-6), the rationale hinges around the identified need for the 'measurement instrument 
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industry' to develop innovative measurement equipment to meet the requirements o f users. The 
ROAME continues by highlighting the importance of the instrument industry developing "/w step with 
market requirements and maintain or improve its existing international position" (ROAME, 1993, 
paragraph 6). 
The rationale for the New SMART Scheme points to SMEs, in developing new products, investing too 
little in the innovative technology ''which will improve their competitiveness" {ROAME, 1999, 
paragraph 13). For Business Links, they are described as "part of a broader aim to improve the 
competitiveness of all firms" (ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 6), while for the network o f Regional Supply 
Offices their role is introduced as "a contribution to improving the competitiveness of industry" 
(ROAME, 1994b, paragraph 1). 
In developing 'Rationale', the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1996a, pp. 35-39, 1999a, pp. 32-36) 
'set the scene' by referring to the presumption by officials, that, in general, markets operate to produce 
the goods and services which people require. Thus intervention at public cost is only justifiable when 
defects can be identified in the operation of'market forces', which condition the running of firms. The 
guidelines advise that the 'Rationale' must therefore illustrate how the market is failing to deliver 
economic benefits by explaining what the problems are, how they arise, the consequences for 
economic performance, and why the market forces cannot be expected to resolve issues. The 
guidelines also state that officials give reasons why improvements wil l not come about without 
government intervention. However study of programme ROAMEs shows that this issue is not directly 
addressed in the statements. Instead the rationale for intervention is implied by situations of market 
forces not acting to resolve problems. The guidelines continue by advising that the 'Rationale' 
describe proposals for correcting or offsetting market failures, including how the chosen delivery 
mechanisms wil l operate to negate problems. 
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Study of DTI guidance, programme ROAME statements, and the author's experience of observing the 
development process, suggests that building of'Rationale', in both R & T and advisory programmes, 
can be described as a four step, sequential process. The steps involved are shown in Figure 6.2: 
STEP I 
BUILD EVIDENCE OF MARKET 
PROBLEMS 
STEP 2 
IDENTIFY THE FACTORS 
INHIBITING ORGANISATIONS FROM 
ADOPTING GOOD PRACTICE 
STEP 3 
DEVELOP THE DELIVERY 
STRATEGY 
STEP 4 
DEMONSTRATE THE VALUE 
OF PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS 
Figure 6.2 The Process of Developing Programme Rationale 
The work which is undertaken at each stage is now discussed. The author observes that Steps 1 and 2 
together, are concerned with determining the nature o f market failure. 
Step 1: Build Evidence of Market Problems 
This stage is concerned with collecting the evidence o f symptoms in the marketplace that suggest that 
SMEs are uncompetitive. The author observes that officials look for two groups o f evidence. The first 
is associated with trading, with a lack of competitiveness indicated by factors such as organisations 
experiencing reductions in market share, poor export performance, or a failure to bring forward new 
products which the market requires. 
232 
The second group is concerned with identifying instances of organisations not adopting good business 
practice, or exhibiting poor business characteristics such as low levels of management skills. Display 
of either of these conditions is taken to imply a stale of uncompetitiveness. The author deliberately 
refers to organisations rather than specifically companies, as problems are not confined lo the business 
sector. Examination of ROAME statements reveals that sometimes firms being uncompetitive can be 
taken in the trading sense as 'a given'. For example the Business Links statement (ROAME 1994a, 
paragraph 6) informs the reader o f the Business Links' role in improving the competitiveness o f SMEs 
"/o respond to the challenges of the 1990s", but without reference to evidence demonstrating the state 
of uncompetitiveness. 
However ROAMEs wil l often describe evidence of trading issues. The ROAME for the LINK 
programme on Measurement and Instrumentation refers to "77?^  demands of the market served by the 
instrumentation industry are simultaneously evolving and becoming stringent" (ROAME, 1993, paragraph 
5). The ROAME then continues by explaining the need for the 'measurement instrument industry' to 
develop innovative measurement equipment to meet the requirements of users who have to increase 
plant efficiencies and ensure conformance to new environmental legislation (paragraphs 5 and 6). In 
justifying the introduction of support for very small firms and inventors, the ROAME for the New 
SMART Scheme (ROAME, 1999, paragraph 18) refers to the failure of many ideas to be commercially 
exploited, as ideas are abandoned at an early stage in their development. 
For the purposes of developing a model for the design process, it would be 'neat and tidy' for it to be 
found that officials, having identified symptoms of uncompetitiveness, then work to discover the 
underlying reasons. Although from his experience the author witnessed this sequence in developing 
the rationale for MPI (see appendix H, section H.2.4, pp. 129-132), alas, analysis of practice more 
generally shows things are not quite so straight forward. As introduced above, officials also look for 
evidence of firms not adopting the good practice approaches which they should, or displaying poor 
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business characteristics, as implying evidence of uncompetitiveness. Such evidence itself often 
represents the starting point in identifying a rationale. 
For example the Business Link ROAME (ROAME, 1994a, paragraphs 9 to 11) cites 
uncompetitiveness as arising from factors such as firms not investing in training in business skills, and 
poor co-ordination of business support services which creates difficulty for firms seeking the right 
sources of information. The CI ROAME (ROAME, 1988b, paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2) writes of firms not 
having the systems to take strategic decisions, and not tending to use consultants to improve their 
management. In R & T programmes, failure to deploy good practice is often represented by 
organisations not investing sufficiently in research and development (HMSO, 1988, pp. 2, 33). Or it 
may be that bodies are failing to disseminate the outcomes o f research, including information for the 
'Public Good' (DTI, 1992, p. 16, 1996a, pp. 102-103, 1999a, pp. 91-92). 
In R & T programmes, attention has focused on a range of organisations including SMEs, HEIs, and 
RTOs (the case studies contained in appendix E provide examples). In advisory programmes, the remit 
is more restricted, with emphasis placed on the SME. However in contrast to R & T schemes, work 
hinges around presenting the evidence of firms failing to adopt best practice across the broad front of 
business operations. 
From his experience the author is able to confirm that instances o f uncompetitiveness can be detected 
as a result of interrogating the information sources detailed in chapter 5, section 5.3. For example, 
from his involvement in developing the MPI programme, the author witnessed himself and colleagues 
being made aware of poor performance in SMEs through a research paper published by the Programme 
on Information and Communication Technologies (PICT) (Fleck, 1988), (see appendix H, section H.2.4.2, 
p. 130). 
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The presence of market failure is in itself, insufficient grounds for funding. The impact of failures on 
the 'Economy' must be sufficiently great to justify public expenditure. Guidance (DTI , 1996a, pp. 12, 
35-37, 1999a, pp. 11, 32-33) advises that justification for funding is based in part on there being 
significant undesirable consequences arising from market imperfections. Examination of programme 
ROAMEs shows that officials do not attempt to describe the impact in absolute terms, for example, the 
financial cost to the 'Economy'. Instead the approach adopted is to indicate the consequences o f 
problems through detailed descriptions of the market failures. 
Finally, in identifying instances of organisations not adopting good practice, the author would suggest 
that it is essential for officials to first have an understanding o f what approaches represent worthy 
practice. Again officials consult many of the information sources listed in chapter 5, section 5.3. For 
example, in developing the M90s programme, officials called on evidence generated by the Advisory 
Committee ACOST, which showed that it was good practice for firms to integrate their business 
functions (ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 2; ROAME, 1991a, paragraph 4). 
Step 2: Identify the Factors Inhibiting Organisations from Adopting Good Practice 
Having identified evidence of firms not adopting good practice or exhibiting poor business 
characteristics, the work involved in this stage is concerned with identifying the underlying reasons for 
firms not taking the best practice actions which they should. The reasons for adopting best practice 
stem from the need to improve competitiveness to compete in worid markets, and wi l l include those 
good practice actions which are needed to address poor operational characteristics. The reasons for 
non action constitute the conditions o f market failure. The author makes the important observation at 
this point, that what Is being investigated are the factors which are acting to inhibit SMEs and other 
bodies from taking desired actions. It would therefore be more accurate to refer to these factors as 
'market inhibitors'. However to avoid confusion the author wi l l stay with 'convention', and continue 
referring to them as 'market failures'. 
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As described in chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1 it may be that for instance organisations perceive the 
risks as too high or they may lack the available finance, either o f which can inhibit them from taking 
the appropriate action. Specific examples of the types of problems which have been identified can 
again be seen from the examination of programme ROAME statements. Among the market failures 
identified in the ROAME for the New SMART Scheme (ROAME, 1999, paragraphs 13 and 14) is that 
of the difficulty faced by innovative SMEs in raising finance for funding research and development 
leading to new products. In part the problem falls in the category o f market failure Risk and 
Uncertainty' (see chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1 (ii)), risk being identified as one factor inhibiting 
financial bodies from providing funds. That the return from R&D projects tends to be 'long term' 
exacerbates the situation. 
Similarly the ROAME for the establishment o f the former Innovation Credits scheme (ROAME 1994c, 
paragraph 22) points to imperfections in the market for information, which give rise to problems in 
appraising and allocating risk. The ROAME cites only 5% of SMEs making use of technology related 
services provided by organisations such as HEIs and RTOs. Reluctance to use these facilities was put 
down to SMEs being wary of external large organisations, and their unwillingness to commit what they 
see as 'risky' expenditure on anything which cannot guarantee success (see chapter 5, sub-section 
5.2,4.1 (ii)). 
Advisory schemes provide fxirther examples of market problems. The Business Link ROAME, 
(ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 9) cites poor management as the principal cause of SMEs failing. The 
ROAME continues by suggesting difficulties could be addressed by providing better access to 
information and advice. Among the contributory problems listed for SMEs are the costs o f collecting 
and analysing business information, a lack of time and financial resources to undertake training to raise 
skill levels, and evidence of SME managers being unsure as to where they should go for help and 
advice (paragraph 10). For the Regional Supply Offices (RSOs), the market imperfection identified is 
that of the acquisition and use of commercial information by both the demand and supply sides of the 
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A variety of delivery mechanisms have and are being employed by DTI. Examples can be derived 
from the ROAMEs of the previously mentioned programmes. For instance, in the New SMART 
Scheme the 'funding gap' is addressed by providing a financial contribution towards the costs of 
undertaking the early stages of researching, designing, and developing an idea (ROAME, 1999, 
paragraph 15). The knowledge that DTI has undertaken appraisal of the technical and marketing 
aspects of projects, is cited as encouraging investment organisations to also provide funding. In the 
earlier SMART scheme, officials hoped that the evidence generated of the benefits o f funding small, 
innovative companies, would encourage more finance houses to invest in R & D projects in this type o f 
f i rm, although not successfully (see appendix K.3.2.2, p. 165). The author observes that this 
phenomenon is another example of the 'demonstrator effect', which was heavily exploited with success 
in the previous Consultancy Initiatives (see appendix F, section F.4, p. 99). 
In the case of the Innovation Credits scheme, the failure o f firms to seek outside help was addressed by 
encouraging firms to use sources of technical expertise such as HEIs and RTOs, by offering them a 
small grant, (not normally exceeding £250-00), to cover the costs of an initial consultation relating to a 
specific problem (ROAME, 1994c, paragraph 26, annex 2, paragraph 4). The offer o f these innovation 
credits was also seen as helping to develop the demand side, thereby encouraging the service providers 
to develop their service provision to suit the needs o f SMEs. This latter mechanism was also adopted 
in the MPI programme (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 2.12), (see also appendix H, section H.3.2.2, p. 
133). 
In the Business Link initiative, the problem of SME managers not knowing who they should consult 
for help was put down to the fragmentation of agencies providing business support, that is, 
organisations including the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), Enterprise Agencies, Chambers 
of Commerce, and Local Authorities (LAs) (ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 11). The solution proposed 
was the provision of funds to encourage these organisations to come together and form local 
partnerships (Business Links) to provide a 'One Stop Shop' facility able to provide an integrated, 
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business support service (paragraphs 11 to 14). For the Regional Supply Offices programme, the need 
to help SME suppliers to be introduced to the new business opportunities being provided by 
purchasers, was addressed by funding the formation of regional brokerage services (the RSOs) to 
match suppliers to these opportunities (ROAME, 1994b, paragraphs 1 to 22). 
Other examples can be seen through inspection of the case study examples contained in appendices (E) 
to(H). Appendix E, section E.2.3, p. 86, and appendix K section K.3.2.1, p. 162, show how in the 
General Industrial Collaborative Projects (GICP) programme, the resources o f the Research and 
Technology Organisations (RTOs) were employed to promote collaborative R&D, by overcoming the 
market failures o f risk, and suspicions relating to partners. Appendix E, section'E.3.4, p. 89, reveals 
how grant funding was used to encourage small firms to undertake R&D, with the offer of grants seen 
as offsetting factors such as risk and a lack of finance. In the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), grants were 
used to negate the effect of firms being suspicious of employing consultants, thereby encouraging them 
to try using consultants for the first time. The success o f the previous advisory schemes were cited in 
the ROAME statement as demonstrating the efficacy of the approach (see appendix F, section F,4, p. 
98). 
In the Managing into the '90s programme a variety of mechanisms were adopted, such as the use of 
mobile road shows, seminars, and the distribution o f informative literature. They were employed as 
means to overcome firms' lack o f awareness of the need to adopt best practice, and then encourage 
them to commit to projects for lasting change. The strategy was to first sensitise firms by explaining 
the business issues, and then provide them with increasing levels of aid to help secure their 
commitment(seeappendixG, sections G.5.1, pp. 115-118, and G.8, pp. 119-126). In the ROAME, the 
earlier Towards Integration awareness programme was referenced as providing an example o f the 
effectiveness the proposed strategy. Further examples o f delivery mechanisms employed in programme 
implementation are discussed in appendix K as part of identifying good practice. 
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Step 4: Demonstrate the Value of Proposed Interventions. 
There is little or no value in encouraging organisations to take action which results in insignificant or 
zero benefit. The author observes that officials work hard to ensure that what is proposed wi l l have 
substantial positive economic impact. However examination of ROAME statements reveals the 
'Rationale' sections to be generally silent in this area, the inference being that i f market failure is 
negated, then the undesirable effects wi l l consequently be reduced or removed, which in itself may be 
regarded as a real positive outcome. The author observes that, alternatively, demonstration o f benefits 
is often conveyed in the 'Objectives' section of ROAMEs. Here targets are given which can indicate 
economic impact, which i f met can be used as evidence o f good value for money. The setting o f 
objectives is described in greater detail in section 6.3.4 below, where examples are also given. 
6.3.3 Inputs to the Process of Developing Programme Rationale 
As discussed earlier, lack of competitiveness is often the result of failure to adopt best practice, and in 
developing the 'Rationale', officials seek to determine where best practice has not been adopted, the 
reasons for this, and the importance o f so doing. In gaining a proper understanding o f market failure 
and the nature of underlying problems, officials interrogate a number o f information sources. The 
reference sources used are largely the same as those interrogated in forming initial ideas, but by way of 
helping the reader to gain a fuller understanding of the processes involved, some further examples of 
their use are now given. 
63.3.1 Cabinet Office Advisory Committees 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.3 briefly showed how the reports o f Cabinet Office Advisory 
Committees provide useful data to inform the design process. The role of one such committee, 
ACOST, is discussed in appendix B. Their role is to investigate issues which cannot be 
addressed by a single department alone, that is, they look at the horizontal issues which 
transcend the responsibilities o f the individual Whitehall departments and recommend action to 
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be taken by government to resolve problems. The Advisory Council for Applied Research and 
Development (ACARD) and the Advisory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST) were 
two committees which influenced the development of programmes considered in this thesis 
[Interview 5] (see the case study examples for M90s in appendix G and MPI in appendix H. With 
respect to ACARD see appendix G, sections G.2.2.1, p. 109. G.2.2.2, pp. 109-110, G.2.4.2, p. 112, 
andG.5.l,p. 116. For ACOST see appendix G, sections G.2.4.2, p. 112, and G.4.2, p. 115, and 
appendix H, sections H.2.4, p. 129, H.2.4.1, p. 130, H.2.4.2, p. 130, and H.4, p. 138). 
Research involved investigation of the role of ACOST, which included an interview with Dr. John 
Leather, who sat on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Sub-Committee of ACOST 
[Interview 6]. He was able to provide useful insights into the operation of ACOST, Dr. Leather 
highlighted how ACOST placed itself in a position to give credible advice, by the Council 
consulting a 'broad church' of well informed opinion across government, academia and industry. 
Consultation was affected by ACOST's membership being drawn from leading specialists in these 
sectors. Inspection of the ACARD report New Opportwniies in Manicfacturing (Cabinet Office 
1983, inside of the front cover), suggests that the membership of the ACARD council was 
similarly structured. 
Committees such as A C O S T fulfil an important role in informing policy. Those responsible for 
policy development within government tend to be 'generalists' without specialist knowledge 
(Dunleavy, 1995, p. 62), and must therefore seek external advice on those aspects of policy 
involving technical issues. Saward (1990, pp. 588-591) refers to the process of expertise-based co-
option, whereby governments 'tap into' specialists' knowledge by co-opting them into the policy 
making process. A C O S T is one such example. Saward refers to specialists lending credibility to 
resultant policy decisions, by their being widely recognised as experts in their fields. Inspection of 
ACOST'S membership revealed the Individuals coopted to be people of high public standing, and 
regarded as authorities in their areas of specialism ( A C O S T , 1989). 
241 
During the consultation process ACOST built a wealth of evidence concerning market failures, 
and of ideas for resolving the issues identified. Information relating to problems and strategies for 
their resolution are contained in the final reports, which ofHcials can draw on in developing 
credible evidence of market failure, and designing defensible delivery strategies. Dr. Leather was 
also able to point to further mechanisms by which the work of ACOST informed officials. 
Representatives of the Whitehall departments sat on the sub-committees and became aware of the 
nature of problems through their direct involvement in discussions. Secondly in the consultation 
process, draft reports and discussion papers were circulated to government departments for 
comment, also providing officials with early information relating to the issues to be resolved (see 
also Interview 5, and appendix C, section C.4, pp. 73-74). The mechanism helped inform the 
development of the MPI programme (appendix H, section H.2.4). 
Inspection of ROAME statements shows widespread use of reports published by the Advisory 
Councils. For example the ACARD report New Opportunities in Mamtfactiiring (ACARD, 1983) 
informed the development of Phase I of M90s [Interview 5]. The Phase 2 M90s ROAME 
statement (ROAME, 1991a, paragraph 4) references the ACOST report on Advanced 
Manitfacturing Technology (ACOST, 1991) as indicating the need for inter-disciplinary work in 
planning manufacturing processes rather than the adoption of discrete technologies. The ROAME 
also cites the ACOST report 77/e Enterprise Challenge: Overcoming the Barriers To Growth To 
Small Firms (ACOST, 1990) as providing evidence that the lack of long-term management 
strategies within firms was often a major barrier to growth. 
The Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) ROAME statement (ROAME, 1990b, 
paragraph 14) refers to the 'Barriers To Growth' report, in providing evidence of the immediacy of 
market pressures which bear on firms, as indicating the need for single company funding. The 
Business Link ROAME (ROAME, 1994a, paragraph 10) again refers to the report in relation to 
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demonstration of SMEs needing to improve their management skills. Interestingly ACOST 
reported to the Prime Minister, who attended some of its meetings [Interviews 5 and 6], (appendix 
C, section C.2, p. 72). The Prime Minister sometimes requested items for placement on ACOST's 
agenda, and an example is of Mrs. Thatcher requesting environmental issues be investigated. An 
instance of Mrs. Thatcher influencing ACOST*s recommendations is of her 'hitting with her 
handbag', the idea of establishing a 'manufacturing centre of expertise' [Interview 5]. ACOST 
also provided a forum for senior ministers to meet. The chairman of ACOST hosted dinners for 
the Secretaries of State, where views on the key issues were exchanged [Interview 6]. 
6.3.3.2 Dialogue with External Bodies 
Examples of how knowledge and skills held in external bodies have been employed in programme 
design and operation, were given in chapter 5, section 5,3.4, and in sub-section 6.2.3.4 above. The 
author has found from experience that questioning the specialists and practitioners of good practice in 
organisations such as HEIs, Consultancies, RTOs, Development Agencies and firms, is usually fruitful 
in collecting evidence of market failure. Colleagues support this view [Interviews 9 and 11], Through 
their project work they develop knowledge of the best practice methods which firms should be 
adopting, and their direct contact with firms makes them aware of which best practice actions are not 
being adopted. For example, in discussing the CADEC project with Munday (see sub-section 6.2.3.4), 
he observed that the University of Leeds became aware of project needs through their earlier research 
into firms' future requirements for integrating computer based manufacturing systems. In the RTO 
example, SATRA had consulted its membership in coming forward with ideas for plastic lastes. 
Munday was also able to cite, as was the author, instances of firms coming forward with ideas for new 
schemes. 
Munday subsequently confirmed that in the examples he quoted, liaison with the parties coming 
forward continued after the initial meeting. They provided him with evidence of market failure and 
how problems should be addressed, helping him to draft the cases for support. Munday's experience 
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echoes that of the author's. The author would meet on several occasions with the lead organisation to 
obtain the information in building a robust case. The ROAME for the New SMART Scheme 
(ROAME, 1999), provides a further example of how external bodies can be valuable sources of 
evidence in building programme rationale. The ROAME refers to work at Warwick University 
suggesting that 50% of SMEs are more concerned with maintaining business stability rather than 
growth (paragraph 21). This observation was made among others to justify the introduction of 
technology reviews, and studies to help motivate firms to grow through implementing innovative ideas. 
In developing the Manufacturing, Planning, and Implementation (MPI) programme, a number of 
external agencies were contacted to secure evidence of market failure, and how problems might be 
resolved. Appendix H details the design and operation of the MPI programme. A meeting was held 
with the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) who confirmed through their experience of dealing with 
Scottish SMEs, a lack of skills in firms to implement Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
strategically. A further problem identified was that large companies who train a large proportion of 
young graduates, operate in a compartmentalised manner, and when these people leave and join an 
SME, they take this culture with them. Interviews held with several of the large consultancy 
organisations, also confirmed the presence of a lack of the necessary skills in firms, (see appendix H, 
section H.2.4.4, p. 131). 
The author also met with Professor Wamecker of the University of Stuttgart, (see appendix H, sections 
H.2.4, p. 130, and H.2.4.6, p. 132), who provided evidence of the benefits accruing to firms through 
good systems integration. In designing MPI, consultants were interviewed concerning the problems 
associated with the strategic planning of AMT by SMEs. They informed DTI that the complexity of 
strategic AMT projects would require the assignment of senior consultancy staff. From their early 
experience of working on strategic projects, they suggested that the department cater for consultancy 
costs of around £100,000 for each project to be funded (see sections H.2.4.5, p. 132, and H.3.1, pp. 
132-133). 
244 
6.3.3.3 Commissioned Research 
DTI has successfully commissioned HEIs, consultancies, and RTOs to research the problems in cases 
where insufficient evidence was available. The topic was initially discussed in chapter 5, section 5.3.9, 
where it was mentioned how officials had given a contract to consultants ISTEL, to help build 
evidence of market failure. In an interview with Mr. Richard Arnott [Interview 11], he explains how 
when developing the ROAME for the Computer Aided Engineering and Small Scale Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing programmes, officials commissioned research into market failures. Officials 
knew from the experience gained in operating previous schemes that SMEs were not investing 
sufficiently in the technologies which would allow them to compete. To help confirm the exact nature 
of this market failure, officials contracted a firm of specialist consultants, that is ISTEL, to research 
problems. ISTEL found that the investment costs and the task of integrating the new technologies 
were too great for SMEs, and recommended that a programme of 'user driven' projects to develop 
application software be supported. ISTEL's recommendations were then verified by presenting draft 
plans, based on the consultant's proposals, to an open meeting attended by a mix of HEIs, CAD 
vendors, and user companies. The author observes that the convening of the meeting represents a 
further example of officials consulting with external organisations in the ROAME development 
process. 
In developing the rationale for MPI, officials wanted to demonstrate the benefits of firms adopting an 
holistic approach in the planning their use of AMT. PERA were commissioned by the author to 
investigate a number of consultancy projects which they had undertaken on behalf of clients, to 
compare the performance of firms which had adopted a strategic approach in planning AMT, in 
contrast to those that had not. The study provided convincing evidence of the efficacy of the former 
approach, with the sample of firms exhibiting substantial increases in performance over the latter, (see 
appendix H, section H.2.4.2, p. 130). 
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In another instance consultants were asked by DTI's former Competitiveness Division (CD) to 
establish the requirement for the Regional Supply Office (RSO) programme. The project investigated 
the likely nature of demand for a proposed network of RSOs by studying the needs of national 
purchasing organisations. The consultancy report (Pin-Point, 1994) found 72% of buyers feeling the 
RSO concept to be good or very good, and it provided an analysis of market requirements to help 
officials in designing the programme. A further example was the award of a contract to the University 
of Brighton to investigate how firms learn about best practice within supply chains (supply chain 
learning), what drives the learning process, and what the barriers to learning are. The research was 
commissioned by DTI to help the department identify what future activities should be introduced to 
promote supply chain learning. 
6.3-3.4 Personal Experience 
As discussed in section 6.2.3.6 above, officials will also call on their personal knowledge in developing 
programme rationale. From his own experience and in talking to others, the author found that 
experienced officials will be aware of market failures, and will also have knowledge of what delivery 
mechanisms have been successful or otherwise in negating problems in the past. 
6.3.3.5 White Papers 
Chapter 5, sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.10 discussed the need for officials to consult relevant white papers to 
ensure that new interventions are conformant with policy. Chapter 5, section 5.2.3, recorded how the 
author asked Dr. Kenneth Poulter, a Grade 5 in DTI, for his view of the role of while papers in relation 
to programme design. He viewed white papers as ministers' 'wish lists' setting out their political 
aspirations, which officials then work to realise through the introduction and development of schemes. 
White papers thus state official policy, and list activities and objectives to be undertaken by the 
Whitehall departments. For example, in embarking on the development of the Small Business Service 
(SBS), senior officials in DTI were responding to the stated intention in the Labour Party's first 
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Competitiveness White Paper Cabinet Office (1999, p. 18), to establish such an agency. In the white 
paper Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win (HMSO, 1994a), the previous Conservative 
Govemment announced its intention to introduce the network of centres of expertise SUPERNET (p. 
79). The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-25) announced the introduction of the Consultancy 
Initiatives (CI), and slated the government's aim to initially support 1,000 projects every month, (see 
appendix F, section F.5, p. 99). 
A feature of recent white papers has been the reporting of progress towards meeting previously stated 
objectives. In the forward of the paper Forging Ahead (HMSO, 1995a, p. 3), the then Prime Minister 
John Major refers to the earlier white paper Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win, as the first 
comprehensive national survey of Britain's competitive position, as measured against our trading 
rivals. The Prime Minister continues by reminding the reader of the government's promise to ''update 
this national survey each year, as a hard-headed assessment of our competitive position" (p, 3). The 
white paper then goes on to report progress. For instance, the paper shows that total and 
manufacturing output had both risen by 4% during the year, unemployment had fallen by 300,000, and 
manufacturing productivity was up by 4% (p. 9). The establishment of SUPERNET is recorded, and 
forty-five centres had become members of the network (p. 144). 
In talking to colleagues, the author is aware that in drafting white papers, officials will consult external 
as well as internal sources of information. Information relating to market problems will be drawn from 
agencies which are in touch with the market. For example in Competitiveness: Helping Business To 
Win (HMSO, 1994a), the paper acknowledges reference to the 1994 OECD's Jobs Study, which had 
identified the problem of inflexible labour markets in Europe as a principal cause of unemployment. 
The white paper Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (The Stationery 
Office, 1998, p. 34), refers to an international benchmarking study undertaken in 1998 by Spectrum 
Strategic Consultants. The study had revealed the problem that while the UK was on a par with the 
United States (US) and Japan in business ownership of personal computers, with modems, only 12% of 
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UK SMEs exploited networking technology effectively compared with almost 20% in the US. 
Inspection of the CI ROAME statement (ROAME 1988b) suggests that officials.also call on previous 
experience of running programmes. In paragraph 2.1 the ROAME states: 
"During the preparation of the White Paper " DTI - the department for Enterprise", the rationale 
based on several points: ... TItese propositions were derivedfrom the results of the evaluation 
programme carried out on the pre-existing advisory schemes". 
Hill (1997, p. 141) proposes that study of the sequence of events in the development of policy 
would suggest the process to typically comprise: 
political manifestos, 
proposals described in the 'Queen's speech' at the beginning of a parliamentary session, 
publishing of green and white papers setting out policy objectives in general terms, 
parliamentary debates. 
Acts which give policy its legal shape. 
The introduction of an Act, Hill continues, would be followed by activities such as the 
introduction of regulations, instructions to officials, together with notes, reports and accounts of 
working practice. For the purposes of the analysis undertaken in this thesis, the author suggests 
that these latter activities are represented by the process of designing and implementing support 
programmes, (see chapter 3, section 3.3). 
The author would make two observations concerning the above sequence. Firstly, as can be 
seen from the examples of targets quoted above, white papers can contain specific as well as 
general objectives. Secondly, the sequence as laid out by Hill was not followed in the cases 
examined by the author. Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 described the role of parliamentary Acts as 
providing the legal authority which enables ministers and their departments, to finance 
programmes out of the public purse. It was shown that the two Acts under which the 
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programmes studied in this thesis were funded are the Industrial Development Act 1982 (IDA) 
(HMSO, 1982), and the Science and Technology (S&T) Act 1965, (HMSO, 1965). Both of 
these Acts pre-date the white papers announcing the government's policy to introduce these 
schemes, that is, the drafting of white papers followed the introductions of the relevant Acts. 
The importance of first having legislation in place is indicated by the observations of others. In 
an interview with the author [Interview 2], Mr. John Cammell, a Grade 3 in DTI, proposed that 
the Science and Technology Act was 'indecisive', hence allowing officials to always find 
something in its content that would allow the department, (and in turn ministers the author 
would argue), 'to do what it wanted to do'. This flexibility, the author proposes, is important in 
providing the government with a wide scope for what they commit to in introducing new 
interventions. Inspection of white papers displays a variety of schemes that have been 
announced and supported under the Science and Technology Act. The DTI White Paper 
(HMSO, I988p. 37) announced the expansion of the SMART scheme. Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 
showed that the scheme is funded under the Act. The white paper also signalled the 
govemment's policy to fund collaborative research beUveen HEIs, companies and research 
associations, under schemes such as LINK, EUREKA, and GICP, and promote technology 
transfer through initiatives such as the Regional Technology Centres (RTCs) and the Teaching 
Company Scheme (TCS), (pp. 35-36). Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win (HMSO, 
1994a, p. 79), announced the introduction SUPERNET. Consultation with colleagues 
confirmed that these schemes too were funded under the 'Science and Technology Act'. 
These examples serve to illustrate the breadth of activities which have been provided for under 
the 'Science and Technology Act'. Support for this observation, and further confirmation that 
such activities are provided for under the Act, is provided in the DTI Finance Handbook (annex 
5.1 .A). The handbook lists research and development in any of the sciences - including the 
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social sciences and technology - and the dissemination of the results of research such as to 
further their practical application, as provided for under the Act. 
The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-25) announced the introduction of the Consultancy 
Initiatives (CI), and stated the government's aim to initially support 1,000 projects every 
month, (see appendix F, section F.5, p. 99). Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 suggested that the 
operation of CI was possible because of provisions made under the Industry Development Act 
(HMSO, 1982, p. c52), (see also Interview 14). It was also proposed that the Business Link 
and Regional Supply Office initiatives were similarly provided for under the Industry Act. 
Thus, the author argues, these schemes also could be announced in white papers, since the 
necessary legislation was already in place. Intention to introduce the Business Links and the 
Regional Supply Offices was stated in Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win (HMSO, 
1994a). On page 67, the white paper refers to government having invited the training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs) to bring together local business support agencies in England, to 
establish a network of 'one-stop shops' for business information and development services, 
which were to be called Business Links. On page 68 the paper states government will 
establish a regional network (of Regional Supply Offices] which will promote best practice in 
supply chain partnerships to include buyers and suppliers in both the private and public 
sectors". 
6.3.4 Setting Objectives 
The supplementary guidance Guidance on Preparation of Evaluation Plans (DTI, 1999c), suggests that 
objectives can usefully be classified in the three levels of ultimate, intermediate, and immediate 
objectives (annex A, pp. 7-8). The ultimate objectives are usually expressed as the broad benefits 
sought by government, such as the economic benefits, e.g. to enhance the sustainable level of real, 
national income over time (p. 9), international security, and health, safety and welfare. 
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The DTI Innovation Budget Guidelines develop the discussion on objectives, stating: programme of 
work should be assembled to achieve specific goals desigfied to overcome a 'market failure (DTI 
1999, pp. 36-39). Guidance then informs that the overall objective(s) is (are) described in the 
Introduction and Rationale sections of the ROAME statement, and explain how a programme's 
outcomes will contribute to DTI's objectives and targets. In the "Objectives" sections of the ROAME 
statements, officials are required to describe the intermediate objectives, and the specific (immediate) 
objectives. The intermediate objectives describe how the overall objectives will be met, and the 
specific objectives state the success criteria for a programme's activities. Each level of objective must 
be supportive of the level above. The aim of setting objectives, is to help facilitate subsequent 
assessment of a programme's performance in reducing the identified market failures. Officials attempt 
to define the overall objectives as tightly as possible by using precise wording that is not open to 
multiple interpretation. 
The author, from his involvement in designing programmes, observed the reference to the 'Red Jelly 
Test' in one undated version of the Innovation Bitdget Guidelines (Keliher, 1997). Application of the 
'Red Jelly Test' was recommended to 'test' the objectivity of wording. Wording it was argued should 
not be so general that the objectives could be applied with equally good effect to a programme for the 
research and development of red jelly! Officials were recommended to submit their objectives to the *Red 
Jelly Test', and they always aim, where practical, to define their objectives in absolute terms. 
As introduced above, the "Objectives" section of ROAMEs is concerned with the 'lower level' targets, 
that is the intermediate and specific objectives. They will comprise targets such as the expected 
outcome of research work, or the number of seminars to be held in an 'events' programme. These 
targets must, however, be consistent with the overall programme goals, and be testable, specific and 
verifiable, and whenever possible be assigned a numerical value (HMT, 1997, pp. 5-6; DTI, 1992, pp. 
19-21, 1996a, pp. 39-41, 1996b, chapter 9, annex 9.1.B, 1999a, pp. 36-39). Targets also include 
'milestones' for the completion of specified work, or the time by which a number of events are to 
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occur. Additionally a baseline is also set against which a target can be compared, to show a 
programme's intended performance level in terms of the amount by which market failure will be 
reduced. 
The combination'of setting targets and baselines assists 'Monitoring', such that problems can be 
readily identified and corrective action taken quickly. Targets with baselines also help in assessing 
performance during programme evaluation. Setting objectives, particularly quantifiable ones, can serve 
to promote good results by providing officials with a target to aim for while running schemes. Successful 
delivery of a programme obviously depends on the participation of the target organisations. Officials 
must show that despite the perceived market failures, there is likely to be sufficient support from 
potential participants to realise a scheme's objectives. 
Examination of programme ROAMEs provides specific examples of programme objectives which 
have been set. The ROAME for the new SMART scheme (ROAME, 1999) identifies the ultimate 
objectives as to: 
a) " improve the future competitiveness of the UK economy by supporting innovative SMEs, 
which are a dynamic source of new wealth, employment, exports and innovation and by 
encouraging more SMEs to become innovative; and 
b) help contribute to a climate which encourages investment in innovative technology by 
individuals, firms and financial institutions and which stimulates a market in technological 
advice'\ 
(ROAME, 1999, paragraph 30). 
Annex (H) of the ROAME details the intermediate objectives, and lists the specific aims set for the 
programme. For instance, to provide support for R&D projects, Technology Reviews and Studies, was 
described as an intermediate objective. Specific objectives included an average sales to grant target of 
at least 10:1, 80% of SMART competition winners to be trading three years after the final grant 
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payment is made, and generating at least twenty new case studies each year illustrating the benefits of 
innovation. 
The draft ROAME for the third phase of the joint DTI/DETR Environmental Technology Best Practice 
Programme (DTI/DETR, 1999), describes the ultimate and overall objectives as to stimulate an 
effective response from firms to environmental developments, by increasing the awareness of 
environmental issues and best practice, as a means to improving industrial competitiveness (paragraphs 
2.2 and 2.9). The intermediate objectives described included encouragement of a market for 
environmental technology goods and services, and to identify through surveys in the priority areas for 
programme work, whether the specified reductions in emissions, and/or costs of waste treatment or 
disposal, had been achieved within two years of taking action. Specific objectives describe activities 
such as to develop a strategy for providing advice and information to business within six months of 
approval, and to provide free consultancy advice for SMEs on how to reduce waste and costs. The 
target for annual cost savings accruing as a result of programme activities, was quoted as £320,000,000 
by 2015. However it was pointed out that the contractor responsible for operating the programme had 
'internal' targets, which are revised at the beginning of each financial year in the light of the previous 
year's performance (paragraph 2.3). 
The MPI programme provides an example of how objectives can be set for schemes. A target of 
funding 175 projects was set in the programme (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 3.1). Appendix H, section 
H.3.3.1, pp. 135-136, describes how the figure of 175 projects was arrived at. it was estimated that 
there were about 3,500 SMEs in the market who were eligible for funding under MPI, and that officials 
could expect the scheme to attract 5% of these firms, that is 175 companies. The funding available to 
officials for die payment of grants also constrained the number of projects that could be supported. 
The money available to fund grants was approximately £8,000,000, and it was estimated that each 
consultancy would require a grant of £50, 000, assuming project costs of £100,000, funded at a level of 
50%. The funds available and the cost of each grant dictated a figure of 175 projects to be funded. 
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Further examples of objectives set in programmes are given in the programme case studies (SMART, 
appendix E, section E3.3, p. 89, SPUR, appendix E, section E.4.2, pp. 92-93, CI, appendix F, section 
F.5, pp. 99-100, M90s, appendix G, section G.3, pp. 113-114). 
6.3-5 'Appraisal', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation and Feedback' 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines require officials to set out their plans for project 'Appraisal', 
'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation including Feedback' under their respective headings in ROAME 
statements. However the author observes from his own experience and through the examination of 
ROAME statements, that in each of these areas, only outline plans are often given. Detailed planning 
tends to take place during the implementation phases of programmes. Discussion of strategies which 
have been adopted for 'Appraisal*, 'Monitoring* and 'Evaluation' is therefore left to subsequent 
chapters. Chapter 7, sections 7.2 and 7.3 cover 'Appraisal' and 'Monitoring' respectively, and chapter 
8, section 8.3, discusses evaluation planning and implementation. Section 8.4 provides some examples 
of strategies that have been adopted. 
6.3.5.1 'Appraisal' 
Appraisal in programmes usually refers to the task of ensuring that projects are selected such that they 
are coherent with programme objectives, and/or how contractors are going to be selected (DTI, 1999a, 
p. 39). Under 'Appraisal' officials are asked to: 
"(i) explain the criteria to be used in appraising projects or bids wider the programme 
(ii) show how the criteria relate to programme objectives 
(Hi) identify the person(s) responsible for doing the appraisaP\ 
DTI (1999a, p. 39). 
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Inspection of ROAME statements provides some examples of appraisal strategies which have been 
adopted in the past. In the MPI programme, a scheme contractor was appointed by competitive tender 
(see appendix H, section H.5.1, p. 138), who was responsible for appraising project applications 
against the scheme's eligibility criteria (ROAME, 1990a, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3). The ROAME 
describes the rationale for using an external contractor as to avoid placing additional burdens on the 
restricted resources of headquarters and regional staff. In the Consultancy Initiatives, project 
applications were first appraised by the Enterprise Units in DTI's regional offices, prior to a business 
review of the applicants by an Enterprise Counsellor (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 5.2), (see also 
appendix F, section F.8, p. 101). In SMART, the appraisal of applications is undertaken by regional 
staff, who vet proposals against criteria such as the quality and novelty of proposals, the need for 
support, the qualifications and experience of the project leaders and their teams, and the commercial 
viability of the applicant firms (ROAME, 1991b, paragraph 10), (see appendix E, section E.3.5, p. 90). 
6.3.5.2 'Monitoring' 
Similarly to 'Appraisal', the study of programme ROAMEs reveals that officials limit work to the 
development of outline plans for 'Monitoring'. In MPI, the ROAME refers to the scheme contractor 
being responsible for the monitoring of the projects funded, with work including the six monthly 
reporting on the on-going performance of the programme (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 5.1), (see also 
appendix H, section H,5.l, p. 138). The SMART ROAME (ROAME, 1991b, paragraph 14), stipulates 
that the participant firms in SMART being small, often new, and vulnerable, means that they are likely 
to require help and advice from the project monitoring officers. Consequently monitoring officers are 
required to visit stage I winners shortly after a project starting, and just before it ends. The last visit is 
undertaken to ensure that project work has been conducted satisfactorily before the fmal claim is 
submitted for payment. In CI, the performance monitoring of the consultants working on each of the 
component initiatives was conducted by the scheme contractor (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 5.2), (see 
appendix F, sections F.6, pp. 100-101, and F.8, pp. 102-103). 
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6.3.5.3 'Evaluation and Feedback' 
Inspection of programme ROAMEs show that in particular, officials provide only outline strategies for 
evaluating programmes when drafting ROAME statements. Detailed planning of evaluation is 
normally undertaken after ROAME approval. For example, the SMART ROAME limits itself to 
saying that an evaluation plan will be drawn up with the Evaluation and Policy Improvement 
Committee (EPIC), within three months of the ROAME being approved (ROAME, 1991b, paragraph 
16). The MPI ROAME (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 7.1) is similarly short on detail. It states that an 
evaluation plan will be submitted to EPIC within three months of programme approval, but indicates 
that interim evaluations will be undertaken at six months and one year after launch. A final evaluation 
to be carried out at the end of year three, by an external, independent body, was also proposed. 
That the practice of delaying the detailed planning of evaluating programmes is conformant with 
guidance, is indicated in the 1992 innovation guidelines. These state that in ROAMEs officials should 
confirm that they are able to submit evaluation plans within three months of programme approval, and 
that guidance is available from the EPIC Secretariat (DTI, 1992, p. 22). The 1999 Innovation Budget 
Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, p. 42), slate that officials should also indicate how the lessons learned from 
the results of'Evaluation' will be fed back into DTI's policy development process. In the ROAMEs 
inspected, the author could not locate an example of plans for the feedback of evaluation results. 
However, examples of how lessons learned from evaluations have been used to inform future 
programme policy, are given in chapter 8, section 8.4. 
6.3.6 Inputs to 'Appraisal', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation and Feedback' 
In developing strategies, ofTlcials refer to UIVs Innovation Budget Guidelines (1996a, 42-43, 
1999a, pp. 41-42), and the department's subsidiary guidance notes on 'Monitoring' (DTI, 
1999b) and 'Evaluation' (DTI, 1999c), which provide specific help in developing 'Monitoring' 
and 'Evaluation' strategies [Interview 11]. The guidelines also advise officials to talk through 
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plans for 'Monitoring' and Evaluation' with DTI's Assessment Unit. The unit's advice 
represents an 'input' to the process. 
6.3.7 Outputs 
The 'output from Mssue Identification' is draft ROAME statements for submission to the 
relevant IPC for approval. 
6.4 ROAME Approval 
In the author's experiencCj derived from being directly involved in the process of approving 
programmes^ both from submitting his own proposals for endorsement as well as appraising 
those of colleagues, the approval process often instigates change to initial drafts of ROAME 
statements. For this reason the approval process was regarded as an integral part o f the design 
process for the purposes of analysis. Examples of how the Individual Programme Committees 
(IPCs) make recommendations for changes to ROAME statements, are provided in section 
6.4.2 below. 
The Imiovation Budget Guidelines' (DTI, 1992, pp. 33-42, 1996a, pp. 48-53, 1999a, pp. 43-48) 
usefully map out the approval process. Inspection reveals the process to be essentially 
sequential, comprising several stages organised in ascending levels of budgetary authority, that 
is, the number of stages through which a proposal must pass for authorisation to be given is 
dependent on the amount of funding requested. Inspection of successive versions o f DTI's 
guidance shows that the financial thresholds change with time. The author has experienced that 
these changes can be introduced 'at short notice', often at the request o f ministers. 
Inspection of DTI guidelines (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 1999a) shows the stages of the approval 
process to be: 
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• Advisory Committee Approval 
• IPC Approval 
• Ministerial Approval 
• Treasury Notification 
• EC Approval 
From inspection of internal papers, and his own experience, the author notes that the approval 
process involves the progressive validating of proposals, with the arguments supporting a case 
being closely examined at each stage. The proposal must be endorsed at each point before 
forwarding to the next. 
6.4.1 Advisory Committee Approval 
The advisory committees are observed to wield influence. Officials are advised to submit 
ROAMEs first to the relevant advisory committee prior to seeking IPC approval (DTI, 1996a, 
p. 50). The 1999 version of the guidelines similarly advises that the directorate responsible for 
raising a proposal, first submits their ROAMEs to the "relevant Advisory Committee, where 
such exists^' (DTI, 1999a, p. 45). For the author the phrase "where such exists" serves as a 
poignant reminder of the demise of the previous AMTC (Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
Committee), which was one of the principal committees involved with technology related 
programmes. At the time of AMTC (around 1990), this type of committee was referred to as a 
'Requirements Committee'. The author participated in several o f the meetings of AMTC, and 
was able to observe first hand its important role. 
In the author's view the AMTC had significant impact on programme development, its 
membership represented a wide cross-section of sector interests, typically involving senior well 
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qualified Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) drawn from academia, industry and the consultancy 
sectors. The Committee also benefited from being jointly chaired by the former Science and 
Engineering Research Council (SERC), which allowed work funded by SERC to be co-
ordinated with the technology related work of DTI, Organisations seeking funding were 
invited before AMTC to put their cases for why proposals should receive government support. 
From their respective positions in the organisations which they represented, committee 
members were able to use their knowledge of the business and research issues to examine in 
depth, the credibility o f each case put before them. Similarly officials presented draft 
ROAMEs to AMTC, and were subjected to the same level of * in-depth' probing of the merit o f 
their case. AMTC thus provided DTI with a broad church of informed opinion about the 
relevance of planned programmes and the suitability of government policies to address market 
needs. By debating each case put before them they helped tune policy, aiding officials in 
building robust cases for support. 
Endorsement from a Requirements Committee lends officials psychological support for their 
proposals in discussions with senior officials and ministers. They help officials argue their case 
from a position of strength, as they can cite the combined support of a group of senior 
professionals for their proposals. The author notes that requirements committees provide 
another of example of co-option, as discussed in sub-section 6.3.3.1 above. Although not an 
advisory committee, the Business Link Implementation Strategy Group (ISG) similarly 
employed external expertise to help inform the on-going development of the Business Link 
initiative. 
6.4.2 Individual Programmes Committee Approval 
Guidance, (DTI, 1999a, p. 43) describes the role o f the Innovation, Individual Programmes 
Committee (IIPC) as supporting the Departmental Management Group (DMG) in its overall 
supervision of programme expenditure (DTI, 1996b, section 3.1). The specific remit o f the 
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Innovation Budget IPC is defined as reviewing the cost-effectiveness o f programmes for which 
it is responsible by examining ROAME statements, looking particularly at: 
"77ze validity of Rationale, 
WJwther there is a market failure, 
IVIiether the proposed programme will resolve the problem, 
Whether it is the best way to do it, 
Wliether the individual Objectives are appropriate, testable, and realistic, 
Whether the appraisal proposed for selecting projects will lead to the individual and 
overall objectives being met, 
Whether there is sufficient addit tonality, value for money and leverage on fimdingfrom 
elsewhere. 
WJiether the proposal is sufficiently strong to be given funding ahead of other proposals", 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 43). 
From his experience the author is able to confirm that other IPCs have similar remits. This 
observation is supported by inspection of the DTI Finance Handbook, which states that the IPC 
wi l l be chaired by the relevant budget holder. The handbook lists the IPCs operating in the 
department (four in total), and collectively describes their role as to advise the budget holder on 
ROAME statements for programmes and projects, the response to evaluation recommendations, 
and the setting of budget priorities DTI, 1996b, annex 3.4. A, appendices 1 and 2). 
How IPCs function in assessing ROAMEs is not detailed in the guidance. However the author 
has participated in numerous IPC meetings, both for the Innovation Budget and also the SME 
Budget which covers the funding of advisory activities such as the Business Link initiative. 
Experience of attending IPC meetings together with inspection of the minutes of these 
meetings, shows them to comprise of officials at PR 10 (formerly Grade 7) and above, and to be 
chaired by the relevant Budget Holder (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4). The membership of IPCs is 
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drawn from a cross section of departmental directorates, those people having an interest in 
programme proposals and the specialist expertise (for example, economists) to provide credible 
opinions. 
In many respects, an IPC meeting is similar to a PhD viva. Officials presenting ROAME 
statements are first invited to give presentations setting out their case, following which the 
chairman invites members to respond with iheir comments. Here presenters are challenged 
over their arguments and assumptions supporting the case for support. Using their knowledge 
and experience, members make Judgements on the financial and technical viability o f 
proposals. It is not unusual for ROAMEs which have been poorly constructed to be 'shredded' 
by members of a committee and have to be substantially re-written [Interview 12]. This is 
usually because the rationale has been poorly researched, or the case not argued clearly and 
concisely. 
From participating in IPCs the author observes that members can however be very supportive of cases 
placed before them where the case is well researched, clearly and concisely put, and where proposals 
are regarded by members to be of high merit. It is worth noting that officials presenting proposals are 
asked to submit their ROAMEs to the IPC Secretariat to circulate to members no later than 10 days 
before the committee is due to meet (DTI, 1999a, p. 101). This provides ample time for people to 
digest ROAME contents and form opinions on the merit of each case. Officials ignore this fact at their 
peril. The author has witnessed a number o f instances of where a ROAME has been circulated late, or 
even worse *at the meeting'. On these occasions the officials concerned receive a very 'rough ride', 
with members refusing to engage in detailed debate, requiring the case to be re-submitted at a later 
date. 
There is also the issue o f limited fiinds, which raises the issue o f priorities. Whilst developing the 
ROAM E statement for the third phase of the Regional Supply Office programme, the author consulted 
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the requirements for approval with the relevant PR 10 in DTI's Financial Resource Management (FRM) 
Directorate. The author was advised of the need to demonstrate why programmes, in this case the RSO 
programme, should receive priority over other potential candidates for funding, that is, why should 
money be spent on one programme rather than something else. 
Inspection of the minutes of IPC meetings reveals the detail of the manner in which these committees 
operate, and the exchanges between members and those officials presenting their cases. The 29 April 
1994 minutes of the Innovation and Technology Support IPC records the discussion o f the ROAME for 
the SUPERNET programme. First the branch head responsible for the scheme gave a brief outline of 
how the proposed scheme would form part of a package to improve the delivery of support for 
innovation and technology, through the Business Links. The minutes then record the subsequent 
questioning of the branch head's team by the committee members, and the advice that they provided. 
Members advised the team that they must ensure that proposals are acceptable to the Business Support 
Organisations. The Grade 6 in the team responded by saying that the principle of the network was to 
be built on goodwill, so that all participants could benefit. 
Some ambiguity was perceived by a member between DTI's role as a catalyst in establishing the 
SUPERNET services, and the possible longer-term provision of resources. The response was that 
whilst it could not be guaranteed, the intention was for the network to become *self supporting'. The 
ROAME objectives were criticised for being insufficiently tight. The paper mentioned the drafting o f 
reports, but failed to mention the level of services which were to be expected. The chairman followed 
by reiterating the importance of monitoring, and the setting of review points. The branch head replied 
that standards would be more accurately defined once some experience had been gained of network 
operation. Finally, the chairman summarised the IPC's view of the ROAME as "very favourable", and 
reports the minutes, gave his approval for £350,000 to be spent in support of the first year's operation 
of SUPERNET. 
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The minutes of 22 April 1999 meeting of the Innovation IPC provides further examples. The official 
responsible for the Biotechnology Exploitation Platforms (BEP) introduced the ROAME, and 
summarised the case for launching the ful l programme. The pilot programme had shown that many 
HEIs did not have the skills, or resources, to take advantage of the market opportunities arising from 
their research. In terms of exploiting research results, the bioscience sector was viewed as more 
complex than in the other sciences, and there was a danger of the UK having its lead eroded. The 
ROAME was criticised for not making a satisfactory case for the scheme, particularly in the area o f 
additionality. The paper, it was advised, needed to say at an early stage what the proposed programme 
set out to achieve, and why things wouldn't happen without DTI's support. How income would f low 
from commercialised intellectual property (IP) was required to be described. Here the programme was 
described as unusual, in that it sought to help organisations exploit IP, but the committee observed that 
a similar programme operated in the defence sector had failed. 
A number of other points, were raised by the committee members. These included the issue of the 
level of IP protection which might limit further research, and concerns over affordability. The sum 
sought was large, and would require consequential reductions in other areas of spend within the 
Innovation Budget. In responding, officials presenting the case emphasised that ministers were keen 
on the programme, and that the success of the pilot phase justified further support. Officials were 
advised that they should set out in greater detail the relationships of the BEP programme with the other 
schemes run by the department. The chairman added his concerns over the 'badging' of the scheme, as 
ministers were anxious to reduce the number of initiatives to avoid confusing business. A need to 
include in the ROAME the evidence from the pilot phase which would demonstrate that additional 
funding would result in a commensurate increase in benefits, was also recommended. It was noted that 
the programme rationale required strengthening. Summing up, the chairman was recorded as advising 
those present that the IPC supported the proposal, but that officials needed to consider the case against 
the broader picture of the biosciences industry, branding, and the implications for the funding of the 
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LINK programme. Officials were therefore requested to revise their ROAME in the light of the points 
raised, and resubmit the paper for a further short discussion by the IPC. 
A final example is provided by the minutes of the 30 June 1997 meeting o f the Small and Medium 
Enterprise IPC. A ROAME was submitted to the IPC by the then Management Best Practice 
directorate of DTI, which proposed the funding o f a two year programme to identify best management 
practice. Proposals centred round the directorate working with regional Business Support 
Organisations, user firms, and other national bodies, to identify, develop, and evaluate national and 
international developments in best management practice. Discussion in the IPC suggested that the 
work would help set and underpin the department's agenda to promote best practice. In commenting, 
the IPC recommended a number of amendments to the ROAME. These included that more 
information on expenditure plans should be provided, the evidence o f market failure needed to be 
strengthened in the rationale, and that thought should be given to the ways in which SMEs would 
access through intermediaries, the material to be provided. The chairman is recorded as summing up 
the discussion, and concluding that the IPC was content to fund the proposed work. He asked for the 
revised draft incorporating the committee's comments to be circulated, before submitting proposals to 
ministers. 
6.4.3 Ministerial Approval 
Where approval needs to be sought from ministers, proposals are presented to ministers in the 
form of 'Ministerial Submissions', which outline the case. In the previously mentioned 
conversation with FRM Directorate, the importance of pointing out the reasons why ministers 
should give their approval, and detailing the potential benefits which could accrue from 
expenditure, was emphasised. In making submissions to ministers, the programme ROAME 
statement is normally attached as an annex to provide ministers with further information should 
they require it. Examples o f this happening are provided in section 6.4.5 below. As 
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appropriate the case wil l detail any options and wil l recommend a particular line of action to be 
taken (Hennessy, 1990, pp. 494-495). 
To assist ministers in making a decision, officials wil l often seek a meeting with them to 
explain the case for support in more detail, and answer any questions he or she may have. For 
example, in helping to gain the Secretary o f State's approval for the MPI programme, the head 
of the Manufacturing Technologies division (Grade 3) met with him to explain the rationale for 
supporting the scheme. A brief dated 5 September 1990 was drafted for the division head, to 
help prepare him for presenting the case to ministers and answer their questions. The brief 
expanded on the argument for support presented in the ROAME, and for each point raised in 
the ROAME details o f the supporting evidence was given (see also section 6.4.5 which 
follows)." The process of advising ministers is not recorded in the current guidance. 
File papers provide insights into the process of advising ministers on support policy. For 
example in making submissions to ministers, officials structure their advice under the headings 
of'Issue', 'Recommendation', 'Timing', 'Argument', and 'Background'. In the 2 December 
1991 submission to the Secretary o f State proposing a further programme of SMART 
competitions, the branch head (Grade 5) states the 'issue' as whether to approve a further three 
years of SMART competitions at a cost of £42,000,000, over six tears. The 'recommendation' 
was that he should approve the proposed funding, and recommend support to the Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury. 'Timing' was stated as immediate, as it was hoped to launch the 
new competition on 20 January 1992, and preparations needed to be put in hand as soon as 
possible. The starting point for the 'argument' was the rationale for funding which was set out 
in the ROAME statement. This was summarised as providers of finance being unwilling to 
invest in small technology projects, where typically the sums of money required are below 
£200, 000. SMART, it was suggested, was designed to 'pump prime' such projects. Under 
'background', reference was made to the earlier pilot scheme in 1986, and the introduction of 
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the main programme in 1988. Details of the costs involved were given, and details o f the 
grants to be awarded in the new round of competitions were briefiy summarised. Confirmation 
of the availability of funds was made. 
6.4.4 Treasury Notification 
HM Treasury require departments to notify it of proposals when the level of proposed 
expenditure is equal or greater than a stated value which they determine. During 1999, the 
level for innovation programmes was £194 Million (net) (DTI, 1999a, p. 7). Examples of 
proposals being submitted to the Treasury are MPI, SPUR, and the New SMART scheme, and 
they are described in greater detail in section 6.4.5 below. 
6.4.5 EC Approval 
For programmes funded under the Innovation Budget, guidance, (DTI, 1999a, p. 48) informs 
officials that approval must be sought from the European Commission where the total project 
value (grants plus participants' contributions) exceeds 25M ECU. An exception is highlighted, 
that of work to be undertaken under EUREKA, where the threshold is raised to 30M ECU for 
participants' costs, or 4M ECU for national costs. 
Examination of file papers and the author's experience, provides further examples o f 
programmes being subjected to the various stages in the approval sequence. In a minute dated 
June 1988 to the Industry Minister, the Head of DTI's Manufacturing Technology and 
Materials division seeks ministerial approval for the proposed Computer Aided Engineering 
programme. The minute confirms that the IPC approved the programme and the budget for 
submission to ministers on 24 May 1988, and refers to the ROAME statement being attached 
for reference. 
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As the official responsible for the development and administration of MPI, he is able to confirm 
that the programme went before AMTC, the IPC, DTI ministers, the Treasury for approval, and 
finally was notified to the European Commission under the State Aids Rules, (see appendix H, 
section H.3.4, p. 137). Evidence of the approval path for the programme is also provided in the 
files. A brief in the form of a minute submitted by the author's line manager to the Head of the 
Manufacturing Technology division, dated 5 September 1990, refers to the division head's 
meeting with the Secretary o f State to discuss his approval o f the programme. A submission to 
AMTC dated 21 November 1990 records MPI having been presented to AMTC on 10 April 
1990, where the proposals received the committee's endorsement. That MPI had subsequently 
received ministerial approval is also noted. 
A letter from HM Treasury to a branch head in DTFs Research and Technology Policy (RTP) 
division dated 20 November 1990, thanks the branch head for a letter dated 30 October. The 
Treasury letter is concerned with the proposed introduction o f two schemes, MPI and SPUR, 
and refers to Treasury economists having discussed the arguments surrounding market failure 
for the proposed programmes. In respect o f MPI, the letter continues by stating that the 
Treasury accepts that there are some general arguments supporting the inability of small firms 
to perceive the approach required to achieve an optimal installation. The 'demonstration 
concept' proposed in MPI was viewed in principle "a^ an effective way of tackling and 
correcting a demand-side information failure''. A letter back to the Treasury dated 30 
November 1990 from the RTP branch head, states that it is DTI's understanding that the 
Treasury are now content with the proposals for the MPI programme. Inspection o f the files 
suggests that no further discussions took place with HM Treasury relating to the introduction of 
the scheme. Officials took the lack of further dialogue as implying that they had received 
Treasury's approval. 
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Notification of MPI to the European Commission is evidenced in a letter dated 5 October 1990, 
from the Office o f the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the European Community 
(UKREP), to the branch head in DTI's RTP division. The letter confirms that the Commission 
has been advised informally of DTi's intent to introduce MPI, and relates how preliminary 
discussions with the Commission suggest that the proposals for MPI were unlikely to cause 
difficulties. On 19 December 1990 the final draft o f the formal submission of the case for 
supporting MPI, was sent to UKREP for forwarding to the Commission. In a letter dated 31 
January 1991, the European Commission notes that MPl's support will be aimed substantially 
at firms falling within the specified Standard Industry Classification codes. This was taken to 
imply that firms in other sectors would be eligible for support, albeit at a lower level. DTI were 
requested to supply details o f the other sectors that would be eligible for support. The 
Commission also asked the department to clarify who the beneficiaries would be of the 
administrative spend (approximately £2,000,000), and whether the grants would be taxable. 
On 12 February 1991 the author forwarded a response to the Commission's questions. It was 
explained that MPI was targeted at manufacturing firms, and that the industry codes which had 
been quoted contained the main concentration o f manufacturing firms. However 
manufacturing firms occurred in sectors not normally associated with production, for example 
companies operating in the toys and goods areas. The role of the scheme contractor, SAC 
Hitec, was explained, and that the fees paid to them were in support o f their management o f the 
programme, and generating a margin of profit. It was emphasised that to keep levied charges in 
reasonable bounds, invoices would be submitted on the basis of time and materials consumed, 
and invoicing was to be subjected to financial and technical auditing by DTI. On the issue o f 
taxation, DTI advised that the grant was to be regarded as a contribution towards an applicant's 
incurred costs, and would therefore count towards profits. Approval to operate MPI was 
subsequently received from the Commission. A letter signed by Sir Leon Brittan dated 12 
April 1991, to the Secretary o f State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Right Hon. 
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Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP) states "I have the honour to inform you that the Commission has 
decided not to raise any objections to the schemes (one of which was M PI) imder Articles 
92/93 EEC\ 
Returning to SPUR, the 20 November letter from the Treasury records the useful discussion 
beuveen their economists on the market failure issues. The letter continues that the Treasury 
particularly questioned the claimed market failure in the supply o f finance to small firms for 
A M T projects, because the banks are risk adverse and lack technical resources. They argued 
that the problem centred around such projects as simply being too risky, when measured 
against the commercial test o f average returns on investment. The case demonstrating market 
failure was therefore not substantiated. However it was recognised that there was a consensus 
between Treasury and DTI ministers that some assistance for SMEs was desirable, and it was 
suggested that SPUR be treated as an experiment, with an early appraisal of performance to be 
undertaken. In the 30 November response (see above in relation to MPI), the RTP branch head 
agrees with Treasury's proposals, and confirms that an early evaluation wil l be undertaken. 
HM Treasury welcomed DTl's agreement on 19 December 1990. 
Appendix G, sections G.4.1, p. 114, G.4.2, p. I I 5 , and sub-section G.4.1.1, p. 115, shows the 
M90s programme to have passed through AMTC, IPC, and then ministers. Dated 4 March 
1999 a submission to the Industry Minister and the Secretary of State seeks their approval for 
the New SMART Scheme. The submission refers to the IPC having approved the ROAME 
statement, and the ROAME being attached. The submission also draws ministers' attention to 
the need for the department to notify the Treasury, and the European Union under State Aids 
Rules, since the total spend wil l exceed £15,000,000. 
269 
6.4.6 Approval Weighting 
Looking at the approval process the author proposes that it is the stage o f IPC approval that 
carries the most weight. Advisory committees, as their title suggests, are there to advise 
officials and have no approval authority. In contrast, the individual programme committees 
have ful l authority vested in them for the approval to fund programme work. The DTI Finance 
Handbook (DTI, 1996) states that the ''IPC should advise the budget holder on his management 
of the budget" (annex 3.4.A , appendix I) . The budget holder should, guidance continues, 
nomially seek the committee's advice on ROAME statements for programmes and projects, 
responses to evaluation recommendations, and the setting of budget priorities. Although the 
emphasis in the guidelines is placed on the advising role of the IPC, in reality the author 
observes that officials normally refer to the process of submitting ROAMEs to an IPC as that of 
obtaining IPC approval. 
The author would argue that the perception of the IPCs having an approval rather than simply 
an advisory function, stems from the committees being chaired by the budget holders (see 
chapter 5, section 5.2.6), who have within their delegated limits the authority to commit 
expenditure. In participating in IPC meetings the author has observed that i f members and the 
chair person are satisfied with the cases presented to them, the chair person wil l make 
recommendations for the commitment of funds (or a recommendation to commit expenditure to 
a higher authority) during the IPC meeting itself (see also section 6.4.2 above). The decision is 
usually recorded in the minutes of the IPC which are circulated to members and other interested 
parties within the department. 
IPCs having an approval remit, rather than being limited to an advisory role, suggests the 
former have greater powers than the latter, thus indicating that IPCs carry the greater weight. 
However, as can be seen through inspection of sections 6.4.3 to 6.4.5 above, the successive 
stages of approval carry with them an increase in the level of funds which may be authorised. 
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But it is argued that it is the role of the IPCs which remains critical in the approval sequence, 
and therefore, they can be assigned the highest level of weighting. This conclusion is derived 
from several considerations. Firstly, in an interview with Dr. Draper, a Grade 6 in DTI's 
Manufacturing and Technology Management Division [Interview 5], it was explained to the 
author how the concept of ROAME statements was introduced to help protect ministers from 
subsequent criticism following the introduction of a programme. Ministers on the whole are 
not specialists, neither do they have the time to study cases for support in detail. By going 
through the ROAME process officials offer up proposals that are well researched, reducing the 
likelihood of fiiture political embarrassment. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3, argued that submitting ROAMEs to ministers formed part o f officials' 
role of advising ministers. ROAMEs submitted to ministers form the basis of advice regarding 
the funding of schemes. Thus the ministerial role in the approval process is essentially 
restricted to ensuring proposals for support are conformant with his or her priorities, and those 
of the government. The author observes that given this scenario, the final responsibility to 
ensure the quality of the advice presented lies essentially with the IPC, rather than ministers. 
As recorded in section 6.4.2 above, the case for support contained in a ROAME is rigorously 
tested for its credibility through the challenging of officials' evidence by the IPC members. 
Thus, it is argued, the critical testing of cases by an IPC is paramount in ensuring the credibility 
o f cases for support, and therefore the IPCs should be assigned a higher weighting than 
ministers. 
The matter o f weighting the successive stages o f approval was also discussed with Dr. Peter 
Bentley (PRl 1), (a former Director, Finance and Assessment, in DTI's Business Link 
Directorate). He supported the author's views. In more recent times ROAMEs were often 
developed in response to ministers' wishes to introduce a programme, for example the Business 
Link initiative. Therefore conformance to political priorities was not an issue for ministers to 
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worry about. Bentley took the view that the weighting on ministerial approval was 
consequently close to zero. Looking further up the approval chain, he added that in most cases 
it is not necessary for schemes to go on from ministers to the Treasury, and the European 
Commission. Where cases had to be forwarded, the Treasury, he felt, were always concerned 
to look closely at new cases for expenditure, but usually limited their discussions to 
recommending modifications or additions to ROAMEs, as against responding with a total 
rejection. Bentley was not aware of any case where the Treasury had refused to sanction a DTI 
ROAME. The European Commission was principally concerned with ensuring that 
programmes operated by member states did not distort competition in the European Union, as 
against majoring on the strength of their rationale. Summarising, Bentley observed that it is the 
IPCs that are the big influence on the shaping of schemes, and should therefore be assigned the 
highest weighting. 
6.5 Making the Ground Fertile for Approval 
The author observes that officials take steps in advance o f requesting formal approval for 
programmes to ensure that *the ground is made fertile' for such approval. The steps taken are 
described below. 
6.5.1 Influencing the Decision Makers within the Department 
DTI guidance advises project officers "/o discuss their outline proposals with the approving 
authority to ensure a smoother course in the approvals process and avoid nugatory effort" DTI 
(1999a, p.45). Examination of the author's experience shows this to be in reality only one part 
o f a more involved process. Throughout the development activity, officials circulate details of 
draft proposals to colleagues with an interest in the proposed scheme. In particular, drafts are 
circulated to those directly involved in the approval process such as line management, and 
members o f the relevant IPC (DTI, 1996b, p, 50). The latter are especially important as, 
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without the support of IPC, proposals cannot be taken forward. Here officials, in the drafting 
of ROAME statements, aim to obtain the views of committee members on the nature of market 
failures, and the strategies being proposed for their negation. In each instance the comments 
received are incorporated in successive drafts, helping to build robust cases for support. 
Appendix H, section H.4, p. 138, shows how draft copies of the MP! ROAME statement 
(ROAME, 1990a) were circulated to IPC members, and their comments incorporated in the 
final draft. 
Support o f the decision makers is engendered. The decision makers are conditioned to be 
favourably disposed towards proposals through early awareness (there are no surprises when 
they are presented in IPC). Furthermore inviting and incorporating their comments on 
proposals generates a sense of ownership which renders them supportive of new introductions. 
Incorporating their comments also makes it hard for them not to lend their support, as they 
would seem to argue against themselves. It is considered by the author as very important, and 
best practice, to consult IPC menibers during the drafting of ROAME statements. TTiis is a 
view shared by others, and expressed during an interview of a colleague, Mr. Frank Rott Grade 
7 [Interview 12]. For him, by inviting IPC members to comment on drafts, and through asking 
them to advise on issues such as objective setting and delivery strategies, they become 
champions of what he or she wishes to achieve and supportive of his or her approach. Like the 
author, the value of involvement was clearly demonstrated through observing the passage of 
proposals whilst attending Innovation IPC meetings. The interviewee had always consulted 
during the development process, and contrasted his own experiences with those of others who 
had not. In his case he met with no serious problems and approval was received quickly. In 
contrast, cases where project officers had not previously consulted members, the proposals 
were taken apart and rejected, that is, the rationale was challenged and found deficient. 
273 
In developing ROAMEs, Rott also highlighted the value of one to one meetings with people 
having a high level of influence within IPC. For example, the interviewee had recognised that 
the director of the then Economics Statistics Evaluation Technology Standards Directorate, an 
economist, and well respected for his knowledge of the issues surrounding programme 
viability, held sway in the Innovation IPC. Ease of approval was partly attributed to working 
with one of his Grade 7s in drafting a ROAME statement. The Grade 7 subsequently advised 
his director of the efficacy o f what was being proposed, engendering his support. The author 
concurs, having similarly consulted in determining the content of ROAME statements. 
Examples of where best practice had been applied were reported by Rott. They were in gaining 
approval for the Innovation and Technology Counsellors programme (Second Phase), and the 
Innovation Credits Scheme (Phase 2). An example of a case initially failing to obtain approval 
in IPC through insufficient consultation, was the Focus Technical programme. 
Appendix H, section H.4, p. 138, illustrates other ways in which the decision makers are 
influenced. Again in MPI a digest o f a research paper was produced which was passed to an 
economist who was a prominent member o f the IPC. The points raised in the digest helped 
convince him of the need for the MPI programme [Interviews]. 
6.5.2 Influencing the Opinions of Ministers 
It is Ihe job of civil servants to provide their ministers with advice (Hennessy, 1990, pp. 494-
495; Weller and Stevens, 1998, p. 579), and the author observes several methods by which this 
remit has been exploited to help form their opinions such that they are sympathetic to 
proposals. One approach, adopted in developing MPI, has been arranging for ministers to visit 
manufacturing SMEs. Senior officials informed the author that a programme of visits to SMEs , 
was arranged for the Industry Minister, which helped him to gain knowledge first hand of the 
problems that firms were facing. The visits were viewed by officials as important in helping 
prepare the ground for the introduction of MPI. His improved understanding encouraged him 
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to support proposals to address the problems which he had seen (see appendix H, section H.4, 
p. 138). 
6.5.3 Maintaining Ministerial Interest in Programmes 
Another mechanism witnessed by the author to obtain a sympathetic stance for the continuation 
of existing schemes is where ministers are invited to participate in programme events. It is the 
usual practice for officials to provide written briefings for ministers when they attend such 
events. The requirement to provide a ministerial brief provides officials with the opportunity to 
advise the minister about the status o f market failures, and how well schemes are addressing 
them. (The observation was expressed to the author by his line manager, Dr. Draper, a Grade 
6, and subsequently reaffirmed by a colleague, Mr. Peter Munday, a PR9). This ensures that 
ministers understand the rationale for their continued support [Interview 5]. Appendix G, 
section G.4.2, p. 115, provides examples. In the M90s programme, ministers were invited to 
and attended the Management Action Briefing seminars, and the Under Secretary of State for 
Industry (Mr. Hogg) also launched the first version of the PA Report (PA, 1989), (see also 
Interview 5). 
6.5.4 Orchestrating Mandates 
Sub section 6.3.3.1 discussed the role of Cabinet Office Advisory Committees. Such 
committees were exploited by departments to obtain political mandates to carry out what they 
wished to do (Interview 6]. For example, ability to use ACOST as a mechanism to help set 
mandates arose from the CounciPs influence on policy making. Although assigned advisory 
status, ACOST wielded considerable power to shape policy. Its ability to influence policy was 
derived from its high status in Whitehall. High status was in turn derived from the Council 
being 'owned' by the 'Cabinet Office*, which is the ultimate policy co-ordinating body within 
government (Smith, Marsh, and Richards, 1993, p. 586; Brady and Catterall, 1997, p. 510). 
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Status was also derived from ACOST reporting directly to the Prime Minister. The setting o f 
mandates was achieved by departments influencing the thinking within ACOST. Members o f 
the Whitehall departments sat on ACOST where they were able raise issues which they had 
identified, and push for them to be discussed by the Council. In debate, departmental 
representatives were also able to recommend strategies for the resolution o f problems, which 
were often adopted in the final reports. 
As discussed above, the outcome from the consultation process was the publication of final 
reports. These made recommendations for what action government departments should take to 
resolve issues which have been identified. The high status assigned to ACOST required the 
Whitehall departments to publish written, official responses to the ACOST reports, setting out how 
they would respond to the recommendations which had been made. Usually the department 
having lead responsibility for the subject area of an Advisory Committee report would take 
responsibility for drafting the 'official response'. Official responses were usually published 
under the signature of a department's Secretary o f State. They described how the lead 
department (in collaboration with others) would respond to the committee's recommendations. 
In so doing the Secretary of State committed his or her officials to specified courses o f action 
(the mandates). As just described, officials were often successful in the consultation process, in 
getting issues and their ideas for resolving difficulties to be the subject o f recommendations in 
the final reports. The associated official responses woiild contain mandates for responding to 
recommendations, and thus officials were able to use ACOST to achieve mandates for those 
things they wished to do [Interview 6]. 
From his direct experience of drafting official responses, the author observes that officials worked 
to show that government thinking was ahead of the advisory councils by pointing to initiatives 
which were already in place, or planned. Officials were helped by having early warning of the 
content of final reports. They were able to monitor the development of ACOST thinking through 
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their membership of ACOST committees, and by ACOST circulating draft reports to interested 
parties [Interviews 5 and 6]. Examples of official published responses are the Advanced 
mamtfacttinng Technology; Government Response To The ACARD Report - New Opportunities 
in mmntfactttring: Tfie Management Of Technology {Jiy\\, 1984) and Advanced Maniifdcturing 
Technology - Government Response to the Report by the Advisory Council on Science and 
Technology (DTI, 1991c). Examples of activities in which ideas were moulded by Advisory 
Council Findings were the MPI programme (see appendix H, section H.2.4.1, p. 130), and the 
introduction within DTI of the Innovation Advisory Board, [Interview 17]. 
6.5.5 Ministerial Timing 
Approval for programmes is more likely to be given when proposals seem to solve problems 
which are high on ministers' agendas. Therefore officials choose the best times to submit 
proposals by monitoring ministerial priorities through dialogue with the ministers' private 
offices [Interview 5]. They then submit proposals when ministers are most likely to be 
interested, and thus more likely to be sympathetic to officials' proposals. Chapter 5, section 
5.2.5 provided an example. It was explained how officials considered that approval o f the first 
phase of the M90s programme, was in part due to submitting proposals to the Secretary of State 
at a time when his 'brain child', the Enterprise Initiative, had become established. He was 
consequently more receptive to new schemes being added to the umbrella initiative. 
6.6 Inputs 
Draft ROAME statements are submitted by directorate staff to the relevant IPC secretary. The 
DTI Finance Handbook refers to an IPC's role as being to examine ROAME statements for 
individual programmes or projects (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4, paragraph 3.4.6). The Innovation 
Budget Guidelines inform officials that the final versions of ROAMEs should be submitted to 
the Innovation Budget Management Unit secretariat, (not later than 10 working days before the 
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date of the IPC meeting), (DTI, 1999a, annex 8, p. 101). IPC members wi l l draw on their 
personal experience and that of colleagues in appraising cases for support. Examples of 
officials calling on their experience and knowledge in appraising ROAMEs in an IPC are given 
in section 6.4.2 above. 
6.7 Outputs 
DTI (1992, pp. 11-28, 33-34, 1996a, pp. 32-43, 49-50, 112, 1996b, 1999a, pp. 27-42, 43, 101) 
shows the output of the process to be an approved ROAME statement, that is, approval of the 
case of support to proceed with proposals. Attending IPC meetings and inspection o f IPC 
papers shows that approval is normally given by the IPC chairman during a meeting, with his 
or her approval conveyed as a record in the minutes of the meeting. Where final approval rests 
with a higher authority, that is, ministers or HM Treasury, confirmation of approval is in each, 
case normally given in a minute or letter to the project officer. In the case o f EC approval, 
agreement wil l be relayed in an Official Letter from the European Commission. 
6.8 IDEFO Level 2 and 3 Diagrams for 'Identification of Issues' 
The above analysis suggested the following IDEFO Level 2 and 3 diagrams, figures 6.3 and 6.4 
respectively. Figure 6.3, the level 2 diagram, describes the component process of'Issue 
Identification'. Figure 6.4, the level 3 diagram, details the process elements comprising Mssue 
Identification'. 
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6.9 Conclusions 
The first component of the overall process of designing and administering schemes has been mapped, 
and an IDEFO Level 2 diagram produced which describes the component process o f Mssue 
Identification' (figures 6.2 and 6.3). Thus the first step in answering the fourth research question put in 
chapter 3, section 3.8.3 has been taken by responding to the supplementary query: 
(a) "What are the mechanisms involved in 'Issue Identification'"? 
Analysis has shown this component process to comprise three process elements, these being 
'Conception and Validation of Ideas', 'Development of ROAME statements', and 'ROAME 
Approval'. The former represents a significant observation, in that the Innovation Budget 
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Guidelines does not recognise the existence of this important function. It is concluded that 
reference to this stage should be included in guidance, as it is the means by which officials 
'track the market' and introduce timely responses to changing support requirements. This is 
discussed further in chapter 10, sub-section 10.4.3.1. 
Research has shown that responsibility for the development of programmes lies predominately 
with officials. Whilst ministers are involved in the process, their role is essentially that of 
setting political priorities, and approving programme spend above a pre-specified limit, 
(sections 6.1.1,6.4.3, and 6.4.6). Attainment of value for money in designing and operating 
programmes is observed to be o f primary concern for officials, at every stage o f the design and 
administration process. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, revealed how programme rationale comprises the twin components of 
the presence of market failure, and demonstration o f the means to address problems, and that 
the satisfaction of these two criteria is key to achieving VFM. However, it is observed that the 
measurement of VFM, and the related task of setting priorities for addressing market failures, is 
not an 'exact science'. Rather the perception of V F M is somewhat subjective, being influenced 
by ministerial priorities, peoples' personal views, and their position within their respective 
departments (section 6.1.1). Nevertheless, certain ground rules exist in ensuring that V F M is 
likely to be, or has been, achieved. These rules provide a source of reference in determining 
value for money. Officials must be able to demonstrate a clear rationale, and in this task they 
are assisted by there being well defined areas of market failure, in which historically it has been 
accepted that it is appropriate for government to intervene (see chapter 5, section 5.2.4). By 
defming objectives for how a programme wi l l impact on market failure, it is possible in 
subsequent evaluation to assess an intervention's performance, by measuring how well aims 
have been met in the field (section 6.3.4). It can thus be concluded that despite the imprecise 
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nature of the evaluatory process, officials are nonetheless able to provide assessments of V F M 
with acceptable levels of credibility. 
Inspection of the process of developing ROAME statements suggests that the achievement o f 
VFM is aided by the rigour which the process displays. Essentially a sequential task, ROAME 
development comprises a series of stages in which the rationale for intervention is increasingly 
built, first through detailed and comprehensive research o f the market problems, and second via 
the close examination of draft proposals by informed opinion to assess their viability. In this 
way the nature of market failures become well understood, and confidence in the ability of draft 
strategies to successfully reduce these failures, and thereby secure good value, is built (sections 
6.2, 6.3, and 6.4). In the hierarchy of successive vetting o f proposals, it is the Individual 
Programmes Committees that most infiuence the shape o f programme design (section 6.4.6). 
Importantly, it is noted that in developing a programme rationale, officials focus on addressing 
the underlying causes of market failure, rather than majoring on reducing the symptoms of 
problems. 
It is also concluded that the steps taken by officials to make the ground fertile for approval 
actually serve to improve the efficiency of the design process, by helping to ensure that good 
programmes are brought forward. The process of influencing the 'decision makers' involves 
making them aware of the important issues, and thus they are better informed of problems and 
how they might be solved. The people concerned therefore become more receptive to giving 
their approval for new proposals, because they have been imparted with sufficient knowledge 
to make decisions. 
Understanding of the scope and operation of the programme network has been furthered. 
Within government the network transcends departmental boundaries, with examples of the 
Treasury and the European Commission participating in the approval path. Inspection of the 
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approval process reveals interaction between ministers and their officials, and between officials 
themselves. Sub-section 6.2.3.8 also illustrated how ministers participate in the network by 
indicating their priorities. This observation accords with that made in chapter 5, section 5.2.6, 
concerning the profiling of budget spend, where ministers indicate to officials their priority 
areas for action. Thus it is concluded that these observations provide further evidence 
supporting the decision to adopt a top-down strategy in the analysis of the programme design 
process (chapter 3, section 3.3). 
Evidence of the Cabinet Office having a role in informing programme policy is provided by the 
operation of the former advisory councils, (sub-section 6.3.3.1). Through consulting widely 
recognised experts in their fields, the councils were able to determine with confidence, the 
issues in science and technology which gave cause for national concern. Consultation of 
recognised experts lent integrity to their recommendations for addressing the issues identified. 
In particular, the high status within govemmenl of ACOST, derived from it being owned by the 
Cabinet Office and reporting to the Prime Minister, gave rise to the council having been a 
primary source o f influence on scheme design. The reporting of findings to the top o f 
government obliged the Whitehall departments to respond to the recommendations it made. 
Consultation of a broad church of opinion rendered the advisory councils a major node in the 
programme network, acting as an important mechanism in informing officials engaged in the 
design process. Within the ACARD and ACOST structures, officials were brought into contact 
with their government colleagues, representatives of academia and industry, and on occasions, 
the Prime Minister herself. The views of the Whitehall departments were taken into account 
through the dinners held for the Secretaries o f Slate. Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3 have provided 
further examples of how officials interact with external bodies in the design process. Officials 
interrogate the knowledge held in organisations such as the HEIs, the RTOs, and consultancy 
firms, to identify market failures and in developing delivery strategies for their negation. Such 
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organisations are also engaged in the capacity o f contractors, to undertake market research 
towards gaining a better understanding of market failure. 
It is suggested that no single information source predominates in the overall design process, 
rather each contributes to the level of 'noise' surrounding the discussion of problems, from 
which dominant issues emerge to be resolved (section 6.1.1). The author proposes that these 
observations provide the substantive evidence which demonstrates the extent o f the 
consultation process in designing support policy. As a final observation, the process is seen as 
involving a breadth of knowledge sources, which are investigated in depth. The substantive 
research that is undertaken serves to provide a high level of confidence that resulting proposals 
wil l achieve good value for money, i f implemented. Importantly, it is also concluded that such 
high levels of research, coupled with the role of'approval' in challenging proposed rationales 
for intervention, helps prevent ministers and their departments from being embarrassed due to 
unforeseen circumstances arising (section 6.4.6). 
As described above, chapter 5, section 5.2.6, illustrated how ministers are fully involved in shaping the 
final strategy for support, by discussing with officials the areas upon which innovation budget spend is 
to be focused. Nevertheless this observation is not seen as conflicting with the observations made in 
section 6.4.6 above, where it was argued that it is the IPCs which are the most influential in the 
approval process. In the case of the former, ministers discussing with officials the strategy for 
allocating funds within the Innovation Budget, can be regarded as a further mechanism by which they 
inform people o f their priorities. This may be contrasted with the role o f the IPC, which is concerned 
with the design and approval of individual programmes, and hence it is proposed that the committees 
wield the most influence. 
Two areas for improvement to current guidance have been identified. Guidance does not recognise the 
important process of conceiving ideas (section 6.2), and the easing of the approval path by making the 
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ground fertile for authorisation (section 6.5). These issues are discussed further in chapter 10, section 
10.4. Finally, the author argues that study o f the process of'Issue Identification' has revealed it to be 
complex and, he suggests, to contain a significant proportion o f policy making. These findings provide 
support for the views o f other researchers, who have argued that much policy making continues after 
the publication of white papers (chapter 3, section 3.3, and chapter 6, section 6.4.6). 
For further examples of how the mechanisms described in this chapter have been deployed in practice, 
the reader is referred to the case study examples described in appendix D, sections D.3 and D.4, pp. 78-
T 
79, appendix E, sections E.2.2 and E.2.3, pp. 85-86, sections E.3.1-E.3.3, pp. 87-89, and sections E.4.1 
and E.4.2, pp. 91-93, appendix F, section F.3, pp. 96-98, section F.5, pp. 99-100, and section F.7, p. 
101, appendix G, sections G.2.1-G.2.4, pp. 107-113, sections G.3.1 andG.3.2, pp. 113-114, and section 
G.4.I-G.4.2, pp. 114-115, and appendix H, sections H.2.1-H.2.4, pp. 128-132, sections H.3.3-H.3.4, 
pp. 135-137, and section H.4, pp. 137-138. Chapter 7 now discusses the next component process of 
'Programme Implementation'. 
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7. PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 described the development of an IDEFO Level 1 diagram, which provided an overall 
description of the process of designing and implementing support programmes. Chapter 3, 
section 3.3, revealed that the overall process of programme design and administration 
comprises the three components of Mssue Identification', 'Programme Implementation', and 
'Evaluation and Feedback'. Chapter 6 then followed and mapped the component process o f 
'Issue Identification'. It was found that the component itself comprised the three elemental 
processes o f conceiving and validating ideas, developing programme ROAME statements, and 
then finally, obtaining approval to introduce an activity. 
This chapter takes the mapping stage one step further by investigating the next process 
component, 'Programme Implementation'. In so doing, a response is provided to the second 
supplementary question (b) of the fourth research question proposed in chapter 3, section 3.8.3 
thus: 
Research Question (iv); Discovering the Nature of the Design Process -
(b) "What are the mechanisms involved in the task of'Programme Implementation'"? 
The author observes that whilst implementation plans are described in ROAMEs, it is often the 
case that implementation strategies are fully developed only after approval has been received. 
This is particularly so in the case of advisory schemes. The purpose of this chapter is thus to 
analyse the approaches which have been adopted in the running o f programmes, in order that 
this component of the process model could be developed. 
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It is shown that 'Programme Implementation' is made up of three principal administrative 
activities, these being 'Appraisal' 'Monitoring' and 'General Administration' (The first nvo of 
these activities were introduced in chapter 6, sub-sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.6, when discussing the 
development of ROAME statements). Comparison of arrangements in R & T and advisory 
programmes shows differences in the way schemes are implemented, and these are also 
analysed and discussed. 
7.2 Appraisal 
A clear distinction is made between the appraisal o f programmes, and the appraisal o f projects 
contained within programmes DTI (1992, pp. 21, 1996a, pp. 41-42, 1999a, pp. 39-40). Appraisal of 
programmes is represented by the process o f approving ROAME statements. ROAME approval was 
dealt with in chapter 6 section 6.4. For the latter, 'Appraisal' refers to the appraisal o f individual 
projects within a programme, and is the focus for discussion in guidance. The DTI Finance Handbook 
(DTI, 1996b, annex 9.1.B) describes the task of'Appraisal ' as being concerned with the selection of 
projects within a programme. The Innovation Budget Guidelines provide more detail on the role of 
'Appraisal'. 'Appraisal' comprises the process o f selecting projects such that their objectives are 
coherent, with the overall aims of the programme of which they form part (DTI, 1992, 1996a, 1999a). 
Guidance lists a number of other conditions which projects in R & T schemes, particularly those for 
which R&D is the principal activity, must meet to qualify for financial support. These can be divided 
under the headings of the Technological and Financial Criteria (DTI, 1992, pp. 7-9, 29-30, and annex 
1). For example in the former, organisations applying for the funding o f projects must be able show 
that proposals are innovative, that research is likely to lead to outcomes for which there are markets, 
and that the necessary technological resources in terms o f skilled staff and equipment are available. 
Appraising project applications against the financial criteria, includes assessment o f the financial 
viability of applicants, and the level o f grant asked for expressed as a percentage of the total eligible 
costs, e.g. salary costs, overheads, and equipment costs (DTI, 1992, p. 2, and annex 4, 1996a, pp. 130-
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131, 1999a, pp. 118-119). For all cases, officials are advised that project work must be supportive of 
overall programme goals. Importantly it is noted that project proposals must also display additionality. 
In discussing the appraisal of applications for financial support, the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 
1996b, section 9.3) states: 
''Additionality is another criterion that must be met before financial assistance is approved, the aim of 
which is to establish that assistance is necessary for the programme or project to go ahead in the form 
proposed". 
(For an explanation of what 'additionality' entails, see chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1 (vi)). 
It is interesting to note the differences in approach to appraisal benveen programmes for which R&D is the 
principal focus, and those which are geared to providing firms with advice. For the former, appraisal is 
undertaken by officials. In the latter case, responsibility for appraisal usually falls to others employed 
outside the civil service. The author discussed the differences in approach to appraisal (and also 
monitoring in projects - see section 7.3.2 below) with his colleagues. In investigating the underlying 
reasons, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Treasury allocates money to departments under the 
three headings of "Programme Spend", "Capital Expenditure", and "Running Costs". Beginning in the 
Thatcher Years', the Treasury placed tight constraints on departments' running cost budgets, which in 
turn constrained the numbers of civil servants that could be employed. Thus to avoid officials being 
over burdened with work, there grew as a result the tendency, wherever possible, to 'contract out' for 
the services of specialist staff. Such contract spend is found out o f programme funds, providing senior 
officials with greater fiexibility in how they resource tasks; for example staff are hired only as and 
when required. An example lies with the MPI programme. As recorded earlier in chapter 6, sub-
section 6.3.5.1, the MPI ROAME statement describes the approach of employing a scheme contractor 
as to "avoidplacing any additional burden on the restricted resources in the Regional Offices, and 
headquarters division" (ROAME, 1990a, paragraph 4.1), (see also appendix H, section H.5.1, p. 138). 
In CI, the scheme contractors looked af^er the listing of consultants, and the matching of these firms 
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with the applicants' needs. The Enterprise Counsellors were responsible for project appraisal and 
monitoring (appendix F, section F.8, pp. 101-103). 
However, in R&D programmes, difficulties arise in contracting the appraisal function to external 
personnel. The policy criteria are considered complex, making it very difficult to judge the eligibility of 
cases [Interview 9]. For example, in appraising R&D project applications, ofTicials must ensure that 
project objectives will help address each of the perceived market failures, of which there may be several. 
Judgements on project additionality must be made, and an assessment of whether proposed project work 
falls within DTI's remit must also be undertaken. It would not be correct for DT! to fund an industry 
sector that fell to the responsibility of another department. DETR for instance is the lead Whitehall 
department for the construction industry, MAFF for the food sector. In addition, R&D projects exhibit 
diversity in their project goals and content, adding to the complexity of the task. The complexity of the 
appraisal task dictates that assessment of applications be undertaken by people who are fully conversant 
with policy [Interview 9]. For example in the SMART and SPUR schemes, appraisal o f applications was 
undertaken by civil servants employed in DTTs Regional Offices (latterly merged into the Government 
Offices), (see appendix E, sections E.3.5 (p. 90), and E.4.4 (p. 94) respectively). In GICP, project 
appraisal was the responsibility of DTI headquarters staff, (see appendix E, section E.2.4, p. 86). 
In advisory programmes, the policy criteria are more straight forward. Many of the criteria which 
constrain the eligibility of research and development proposals do not apply in consultancy projects. Thus 
people have a simpler task in interpreting policy. For example, appraisal in consultancy projects is not 
concerned with making judgements on the presence of market failures such as 'risk and uncertainty'. In 
advisory schemes the market failure argument often hinges around firms lacking the necessary information 
(see chapter 6, section 6.1.1), and that this problem applies to small finns as a whole. For example in the 
Consultancy Initiatives (CI), the lack of information on consultancy services and a perception by firms that 
consultants represented poor value, were cited among factors inhibiting SMEs generally from hiring 
external help (see appendix F, section F.3, p. 97). Thus the eligibility of project proposals can be judged 
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effectively by lesser skilled staff (in policy) who are not civil servants, for example those employed by a 
scheme contractor. 
This strategy was employed in running the Consultancy Initiatives, where the applications for consultancy 
grants from SMEs were appraised by the Enterprise Counselors. An Enterprise Counselor would visit an 
applicant firm and undertake a business review, to determine the nature of the consultancy required. The 
counsellors were not civil servants, but people recruited from commerce and retained for their business 
skills. The author observes that in this case there was an additional consideration in not employing civil 
servants. In general, civil servants do not have in-depth business experience, and would, therefore, not 
have been suitably qualified to undertake the review task. (Further information on the processing of 
project applications in CI is contained in appendix F, section F.8, pp. 101-102). 
As described above, in the MPI programme the scheme contractor had responsibility for the appraisal of 
project applications. Applications were forwarded by the applicant firms to the contractor, whose staff 
then appraised each proposal against the scheme's eligibility criteria (see appendix H, section H.5.1, p. 
138). It may be of course that 'Appraisal' is simply not involved, as is normally the case in awareness or 
technology access programmes, where the act of participation by firms is itself not the subject o f grant 
funding. An example is the Managing into the 90s (M90s) programme (see appendix G, sections G.5.1, p. 
116, G.5.2, p. 117, and G.5.4, p. 117), where programme funding paid for events aimed at promoting best 
practice, rather than providing firms directly with financial support. 
Another factor which allows delegation of appraisal to scheme contractors on consultancy programmes is 
the larger degree of consistency between projects. For example projects funded under CI were related by 
the common themes of marketing, design, and manufacturing etcetera. Consistency renders 'testing' of 
applications for conformance with policy to be a routine exercise, with contractors' staff supplied with 
scheme guidelines which detail the conditions to be met. An example lies with the MPI programme (see 
appendix H, section H.5.3.2, p. 139). 
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7.3 Monitoring in Programmes 
Programme monitoring can be defined as the continuous tracking of performance to check that a 
programme is meeting its objectives, and introducing any necessary changes, whether to programme 
delivery or to programme objectives, in the event o f problems being identified, (Guy 1998, pp. 15-23). 
The author takes the view that monitoring is, in reality, programme evaluation in Veal time'! Monitoring 
is undertaken at two levels, the monitoring of the performance of an overall programme, and the tracking 
of the individual projects included within that programme. The former is mainly the responsibility o f 
officials to undertake, but project monitoring can be undertaken by both officials and the staff 
employed by contractors. 
7.3.1 Programme Monitoring 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines set out the arrangements for programme monitoring. They are 
listed as: 
'^(i) facilitate the effective management of activities and, 
(ii) give early warning of any technical or financial problems which may arise, 
(Hi) ensure that funds will be usedfor intended purposes, 
(iv) ensure that contractors are carrying out their fimctions correctly and effectively and to the 
required timetable, 
v) ensure that claims are made and paid on time", 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 41). 
The author takes the view that only ( i i ) , "g/v^ early warning of any technical or financial problems 
which may arise", fits with the generally accepted definition of programme monitoring (Guy, 1998, pp. 
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15-23). The remainder, it is argued, can be more appropriately placed under the category o f 'General 
Administration', and this topic is discussed in section 7.4 below. 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, pp. 21-22, 1996a, pp. 42-43, 1999a, pp. 41-42) state the 
importance of regularly checking the progress of programmes against scheme objectives, and the 
author observes the policy is widely adopted elsewhere in advisory programmes. Wider adoption is 
indicated by the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b, section 9.1, annex 9.1 .B). The 'Handbook', in 
discussing programmes in general, refers to the need for monitoring in which progress is routinely 
checked against detailed milestones and objectives. Officials are advised in the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines to also undertake mid-term reviews o f progress, which are quoted as normally being carried 
out by line management. In the author's experience, they are carried out by an independent evaluation 
team within the directorate which has responsibility for running the programme (see chapter 8, section 
8.5). 
Talking to colleagues, the timing of the reviews is a balance between allowing sufficient time to have 
elapsed for credible conclusions on performance to be drawn, while still leaving enough time for any 
recommended changes in programme delivery to bring about acceptable levels of improvement within 
the life of a programme. The 1999 edition of the Innovation Budget Guidelines agrees with this view. 
stating: 
"77?e timing of monitoring activities may depend on the amount of monitoring effort deemed 
appropriate but ideally should be from the outset as well as throughout the project/programme. This 
may be at agreed intervals but should be comprehensive enough for problems to be spotted before they 
happen and in time to take corrective action". 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 68). 
For example in the Regional Supply Office (RSO) programme, a mid term review o f the initiative was 
undertaken in 1999 by the performance and evaluation team within the Business Link directorate o f 
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DTI, the directorate also being responsible for the operation of the RSOs. The RSO programme was 
not due for a second evaluation until the financial year 2000/2001. The aim of the review was to see 
how well the RSOs were adjusting to their revised remit, which placed emphasis on the development 
of strategic supply chains, in accordance with the recommendations of an earlier evaluation. In 1994, 
shortly af\er being launched, the Business Links were subjected to a 'process review' which looked at 
the early implementation of the net\vork, to see what initial lessons could be leamt. 
The 1999 version of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, p. 41) refers the reader to 
supplementary guidance on monitoring prepared by DTI's Assessment Unit (AU), and called the 
Continuous Monitoring Guidelines (DTI, 1999b). These are accessible to all staff being placed on the 
department's intranet T E A M FORUM', latterly superseded by DTI's Mandrin intranet. The role of 
monitoring is explained as providing a more regular supply of information on the progress of DTI 
programmes for the programme manager and the Assessment Unit. The need to have an up to date 
view of programme performance in terms o f the meeting o f milestones and objectives is highlighted as 
the means by which programmes may be enhanced. The Continuous Monitoring Guide (DTI, 1999b) 
advises as to what should be included in a monitoring report. Reports should record any developments 
which have occurred since the programme was initially approved, such as the market not developing as 
expected, and any policy changes. 
Officials are also advised that monitoring reports (including mid-term reviews) shall also record 
performance against targets. Programme objectives, it is pointed out, wil l vary according to the nature 
of the programme. For example, in programmes involving dissemination activities, target figures may 
be set for the number of events and attendees at these events. Officials are advised to show progress 
against these targets, highlighting any delays and remedial action which is required. I f remedial action 
has already been taken, this is to be recorded in the monitoring report. To help in the assessment of 
performance in terms of V F M , programme expenditure against forecast spend should also be recorded. 
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A number of'monitoring' case study examples are given, by way of helping officials understand what 
is required. Looking through these provides examples of the use of monitoring mechanisms. Principal 
mechanisms quoted are the use of post-fair questionnaires, as in the Trade Fairs Support Scheme, 
which recorded the value of export orders received and contracts made. A further example quoted is 
the use of surveys conducted at the beginning and end of a programme (the Biotechnology Means 
Business Programme), which looked at the percentage increase in firms awareness o f the scheme. 
Finally numerous examples are given of the use of simple monitoring, for instance, tracking the 
progress of projects, and the numbers of events held. 
The author considers the guidance provided is 'generic' to both R & T and advisory schemes, and has been 
demonstrated by the deployment of 'continuous monitoring' in the latter type of programme. For 
example, in the Business Link initiative, officials implemented the 'Mystery Caller' assessment, in which 
Business Links were contacted with bogus enquiries to measure how well they handled and answered 
client questions. Regular reports are prepared of the results of these surveys. In the former Enterprise 
Initiative, the performance of the Initiative's advertising campaign was assessed by regularly measuring 
the levels of awareness of the Initiative in SMEs (see appendix D, section D.5, pp. 79-80). 
An example of a strategy adopted for 'Monitoring' can be seen from examination o f the M90s 
programme. Contractors employed on the programme were asked to give attendees o f awareness events 
exit questionnaires. These asked people to indicate i f they valued seminarial content, and whether they 
would take any resultant action. Through analysis of such data, officials were able to work with 
contractors in the tuning of programme content (see appendix G, section G.5.5, p. 118). 
In the technology access programme SUPERNET, the University o f Brighton was commissioned by the 
scheme contractor, PERA Intemational, to track the operation of the initiative and evaluate its 
performance. Responsibility for the evaluation project was assigned to Professor John Bessant, at the 
University (Bessant, 1999). Following Bessant's confirmation to DTI of the independent status of his 
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work, officials reached an agreement with the University for evaluatory findings to be used directly by 
DTI. The first evaluation report (Bessant, 1995pp. 2-11) which reviewed the first and pilot year of 
operation, made several recommendations for improving the programme. Inspection o f file papers reveals 
evidence of follow up action being taken. Bessant discussed his findings with the Grade 7 in DTPs 
Technology and Innovation Policy (Tl) Division, who was responsible for DTI*s internal evaluation of 
SUPERNET. Because of the independent status assigned to the Universit>' of Brighton's work, the DTI 
evaluators were able to incorporate Bessant's findings into their own report of the 'pilot' without further 
verification. 
Following the drafting of TI's evaluation paper, officials responsible for SUPERNET went to the 
Innovation IPC for approval to fiind the main phase of the programme. The case discussed modifications 
to the operation of SUPERNET, in response to the conclusions of TI's evaluation. One of TPs 
recommendations was that of Bessant (Bessant, 1995, p. 3), that the communication process between users 
and members of SUPERNET be improved. The case for the second phase proposed the introduction of a 
flow chart to help explain the communication chain. Inspection of the files also shows officials held 
regular meetings with the Contractor to discuss progress of the programme. PERA also submitted written 
annual progress reports to DTI. 
Tlie Consultancy Initiatives (CI) provides another example of arrangements made in programme 
monitoring. The second part of the CI ROAIVIE statement (ROAME 1988c, paragraph 3.1) 
describes the monitoring strategy for CI, and shows it to include the preparation of several regular 
and ad hoc reports. These comprised quarterly reports covering progress on the uptake of the 
initiatives, including details on the efficiency of the delivery process and progress against the 
specified quarterly targets. The requirement to outline trends and highlight policy issues was 
stated. Reporting also included monthly reports to the EI managers, which were to fonn the basis 
of monthly submissions to ministers. An armual report to the European Commission was also 
required as well as ad hoc reports and briefings on the Enterprise Initiative as a whole and analysis 
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for preparing answers to Pariiamentary Questions. In conversations with Mr. Philip Sowden, who 
was responsible for operating the Manufacturing and Quality Initiatives at PERA International, he 
informed the author that he met regularly with DTI officials to discuss progress reporting (see 
appendix F, section F. 6, p. 101). 
In the MPl programme quarterly reports recording progress were similarly prepared, and regular 
meetings held with the MPI scheme contractor to discuss the performance of the scheme (see 
appendix H, sections H.5.1, p. 138, and H.5.3.1, p. 139). In MPI, an independent Review Board 
also met regularly to discuss the performance of the initiative. The 'independent' status of the 
board allowed officials to defend themselves i f criticised over actions taken to modify the design 
of the scheme. The board was viewed as effective in helping DTI and the scheme contractor in 
administering the programme. An example of the Review Board influencing the delivery of MPI 
was in removing the requirement for applicants to hire their consultants through competitive 
tendering, as they had insufficient skills to manage the process (see appendix H, section H.5.3.3, p. 
139). 
7.3.2 Monitoring of Projects 
Who carries out the role of project monitoring largely depends on whether R&D is the subject of 
programme work, or alternatively whether the scheme is essentially advisory. The complexity of the 
policy issues associated with R&D programmes dictates that officials normally carry out project 
monitoring in this type of scheme [Interview 9]. However in advisory schemes, interpreting policy is 
relatively straight forward, and monitoring may be devolved to an external agency. Such agencies are 
the Enterprise Counsellors who were employed in operating the Consultancy Initiatives. As discussed 
with colleagues, the issues and arguments involved are similar to those for *AppraisaP as discussed in 
section 7.2 above. 
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7.3.2.1 Project Monitoring in R&D Programmes 
For R&D programmes it is worth expanding on what project monitoring entails. There is of course an 
element of 'p la in ' administration, for example, ensuring work is being kept within timescales. The 
purely administrative ftjnctions are discussed in section 7.4 below. Emphasis in the current context 
refers to the technical tracking o f project work, to investigate problems which have been experienced. 
Officials discuss with participants strategies to overcome difficulties, including the revision of project 
and programme objectives in the light of research (DTI, 19921996a, 1999a) [Interview 9]. An example 
lies with the GICP projects. Officials provided flexibility in the interpretation of the original objectives 
to enable new areas of research that came to light after project work had started, to be exploited (see 
appendix E, section E.2.4, p. 86). 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 and chapter 6, sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.6, showed how officials are required to 
state clearly the monitoring strategies in ROAME statements. In observing the process for R&D 
programmes, monitoring involves regular meetings with project participants to make sure that they are 
fulfilling their obligations, to check on the progress of work against targets, and to agree any changes in 
work specifications that are required in the light of research [Interview 9]. From his own experience of 
monitoring progress under the former Support For Innovation (SFI) scheme, the author suggests that 
progress meetings are normally held *on site', where project work is being undertaken. Site visits help 
officials confirm progress through witnessing first hand what has been achieved. Under SFI he undertook 
monitoring visits on projects to develop Computer Aided Design (CAD) and production management 
systems. A further example lies with the British Constructional Steelwork Association (a trade 
association) who received funding to develop on behalf of their members, CAD software tools for 
application in the steel fabrication sector. In these examples, the majority o f meetings to discuss progress 
were held on the applicants' sites, where the author was provided with direct evidence o f how work was 
progressing. 
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Appendix E provides further examples of project monitoring. As indicated above, in GICP officials were 
responsible for monitoring the progress of projects hosted by the RTOs, (see appendix E, section E.2.4, p. 
86). In SMART, DTI's regional office staff were responsible for monitoring project progress, (in the New 
Smart Scheme the work is currently undertaken by officials in the regional Government Offices). In this 
task they also undertook site visits, meeting the firms who had been awarded grants under the scheme, (see 
appendix E, section E.3.5, p. 90). The Innovation Budget Guidelines continue, informing officials that it 
is necessary for the Project Officer to record on file all contact with the applicant company/consortium, 
that is telephone calls, and visits to, and meetings with, the applicant. Guidance emphasises the 
requirement for an audit trail to justify the making of payments (DTI, 1999a, p. 67). 
Finally, the author has observed from experience that in collaborative R&D projects, participants are 
required to elect a lead organisation, which is responsible for the overall management o f project work and 
reporting to DTI. Within the lead body, a team leader will be appointed who is ultimately responsible for 
the project, and who acts as the department's first point of contact. Apart from it being good practice to 
have a single party looking after management responsibilities, for officials it saves time and effort as they . 
can interact with projects through one rather than a number of participant organisations [Interview 9]. 
Guidance (DTI, 1999a, p. 247) reflects the heed to appoint a lead body, referring to the collaboration 
framework involving a participant as the lead organisation, that ''coordinates the applications and is the 
sole recipient of the Consortium grant from the Department". 
7.3.2.2 Project Monitoring in Advisory Programmes 
In advisory schemes, project monitoring is normally assigned to non civil servants. As discussed in 
sections 7.2 and 7.3.2 above, people engaged in administering consultancy projects are less concerned with 
interpreting policy. In making decisions relating to the eligibility o f a project proposal for funding, they do 
not normally have to base their conclusions on how elements of a project relate to the specific market 
failures underpinning a programme's rationale. Similar arguments apply in project monitoring within 
consultancy schemes. People tasked with the role do not have to review progress in terms of meeting the 
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'higher level' programme objectives, which are concerned with measuring reductions in the perceived 
market failures. Rather monitoring of consultancy projects is simply concerned with ensuring that 
progress is on track to meet the project targets which were agreed at the time of awarding the grants. For 
example, in the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), the Enterprise Counsellors visited firms on the completion of 
their consultancy projects, in part to monitor the consultants' performance, but also that of CI overall (see 
chapter 6, sub-section 6,3.5.1, appendix F, section F,8, p. 103). In the MPI programme, project monitoring 
was assigned to the scheme contractor, Ricardo Hitec, whose personnel visited applicant firms to 
determine progress (appendix H, section H.5.1, p. 138). 
7.4 General Administration 
The DTI Finance Handbook {DT\, 1996b, annex 9.I.B) advises officials managing programmes, that 
monitoring of work is required to ensure that money is being spent for the purposes intended. Section 
7.3.1, proposed that four monitoring activities described in guidance be more appropriately be 
classified under the heading of "General Administration" as follows: 
"(i) facilitate the effective management of activities and, 
(ii) ensure that funds will he used for intended purposes, 
(Hi) ensure that contractors are carrying out their functions correctly and effectively and to the 
required timetable, 
(iv) ensure that claims are made widpaid on time", 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 41). 
The tasks are self explanatory, and the author is able to confirm, from observing programme 
management within DTI, that these functions are undertaken as part o f the monitoring process for both 
R & T and advisory programmes. However when analysed in detail, the author observes certain 
differences in approach between programmes involving R & D projects, and those for which the funding 
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of consultancy work is the principal subject. For example task (iv), associated with the payment of 
claims, is the responsibility of officials within R&D programmes, but is normally undertaken by the 
scheme contractors in consultancy programmes. Tasks (i) to ( i i i ) form part o f the management process 
in both R & T and advisory schemes, and, as suggested, are self explanatory. However for task (i), the 
title "facilitate effective management", whilst being a good 'catch-all', does not in the author's opinion 
relay what the process entails. Work undertaken in the management of programmes is now discussed. 
Based on his observation of the administration process, the author observes that in R & D programmes, 
officials seek to ensure that participants are doing their best to progress work to the agreed limescales 
and costs (DTI, 1999a, p. 67). This, guidance argues, also allows the Project Officer to quickly 
become aware of problems so that remedial action can be taken, and, it is added, is further necessary to 
ensure public accountability. Officials wi l l also make certain that, in collaborative projects, the lead 
organisation co-ordinates project work, liaises well with others, and submits grant claims within 'due 
dates'. Checks wil l additionally be made to ensure that participants keep accurate records of project 
progress and expenditure. With the latter, officials ensure that spend is kept within budget, and that 
funds have not been misappropriated. Guidance states that as a minimum, monitoring wil l involve the 
thorough checking of the claims for payment and related documentation (p. 67). Claims for payment 
must be accompanied by an independent accountant's certification, confirming that monies have been 
spent in accordance with the conditions o f the grant offer (DTI, 1999a, p. 52). Much of the 
administrative tracking is undertaken as part o f the monitoring process, in meetings with the parties 
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concerned. Providing they are satisfied with overall progress of projects, officials then make payments 
against submitted grant claims in the case o f R&D programmes. Sub-section 7.3.2.1 above provided 
some examples of monitoring in R&D projects. 
In advisory schemes responsibility for project monitoring and payment o f grants is normally devolved to 
contractors. Programme administration thus centres around overseeing the work of contractors, assessing 
their performance in fijlfil l ing their contractual commitments. Again, officials will be seeking to ensure 
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spend remains within budget, and that programme targets are being met. Where administrative issues 
arise, officials will discuss with the contractor strategies for the resolution of problems. These issues are 
usually discussed during the regular monitoring visits to contractors, as discussed in section 7.3 above. 
For example, inspection of documents held on file shows that for MPI (see appendix H, sections H,5.3 p. 
139, and H.5.4, pp. 140-141) and SUPERNET, meetings with the respective contractors covered topics 
such as expenditure, the design and registration of programme logos, the design of programme literature, 
organisation of seminars, and the tracking of programme spend against forecast spend. The files also show 
how contractors are also required to prepare and submit to officials, reports recording progress and 
financial spend on the schemes which they manage. The Consultancy Initiatives ROAME statement 
(second part), (ROAME, 1988c), states as an objective for 'Monitoring', "/o assist the conduct of effective 
budget management and financialforecasting ... including actual andforecast expenditure and reference 
to regional indicative budgets''' (paragraph 1). The ROAME continues by specifying that monitoring will 
include " 'reporting' in the form of half yearly financial reports to the Budget Committee and ministers, 
accompanied with the relevant physical data and analysis" (paragraph 3.1). Similarly in MPI, the scheme 
contractor provided the department with quarterly reports containing details of expenditure, and spend 
projections. As the official responsible, the author held regular progress meetings with the contractor, 
where these figures were also discussed, (see appendix H, sub-section H.5.3.1, p. 139). From his 
involvement in awareness programmes, that is M90s, the author observes the management procedures 
adopted to be essentially the same as those for consultancy schemes, (see appendix G, section G.5.3, p. 
117). 
7.5 Scheme Guidelines 
In consultancy programmes, where contracts are awarded for the administration of projects, the scheme 
contractors become 'Agents o f the Crown', that is, they act on behalf o f the Secretary of State. 
Officials must therefore ensure that in administering programme activities, scheme contractors act in 
accordance with policy. The author observes that officials secure conformity to policy by issuing 
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contractors with 'Scheme Guidelines', which inform contractors of their responsibilities and how they 
must act in the administering role. Examples are the guidelines issued to the scheme contractors in the 
Consultancy Initiatives, and the MPI programme. Further instances are the issuing of guidelines to the 
Business Links, and to the organisations hosting a Regional Supply Office, to help ensure that the delivery 
of the Business Link and Regional Supply Office services are conformant with policy. 
Inspection of guidelines drafted for consultancy schemes (and for example the Business Links), shows 
them to contain a series of policy statements advising people on how to act in given situations. The 
guidelines typically contain details o f the project eligibility criteria (checklists), programme objectives, 
the range o f work to be included in projects, listing and de-listing of advisors, the procedures for 
paying grants and the monitoring of grant expenditure. 
7.6 Appointment of Programme Contractors 
Being seen to be fair beyond question is paramount in appointing contractors. The DTI Innovation Budget 
Guidelines state: 
"a prime tenet of Government policy (and which is enshrined in Government Accounting) is that goods 
and services should be acquired by competition unless there are convincing reasons to the contrary. 
Competition avoids any suggestion offavoritism and the encouragement of monopoly", 
(DTI 1999a, p.6l). 
The guidelines continue by informing officials that under normal circumstances they must adopt 
competitive tendering procedures for the procurement of goods and services. The hiring of scheme 
contractors and consultants to carry out research falls into the latter category. Guidance also advises that 
VFM should be the primaiy aim in assessing bids to supply government. 
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7,6.1 Competitive Tendering 
The author has participated in competitive tendering on numerous occasions, and has observed the process 
to function by 'testing the market'. Testing the market involves inviting costed proposals from several 
suppliers of services. Officials compare and select from the submissions received, that bid which 
represents best value for money. The features which have been built into the competitive process are now 
examined. In studying the tendering process, the author in particular drew on his experience of being 
directly involved in the competitive tendering for the appointment of the scheme contractor for MPI 
(appendix H, section H.5.1, p. 138), the agency to operate the SUPERNET programme, and the 
communications company to run the Management Action Briefing seminars in the M90s programme 
(appendix G, section G.5.3, p. 117). 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines DTI (1996a, pp. 76-79, 1999a, pp. 61-66) describe the process of 
Competitive Tendering, which comprises several stages. The first involves the drafting of an Invitation To 
Tender (ITT) specification, which describes the scope of the work to be undertaken, giving detailed, clear 
and specific objectives. Topics presented in ITTs include a full description of the work to be undertaken, 
required timescales, and the reporting procedures. 
The award of a contract often makes the successful organisation a representative of the department. Often, 
the successful bidder's proposal becomes the main source of reference in the contract documentation. 
Care is therefore taken in drafting the ITT, to give clear directives as to how contractors must behave to 
avoid 'embarrassing' the Secretary of State. Tender specifications usually quote the ROAME objectives 
and programme eligibility criteria, as a first step in ensuring work is undertaken in accordance with policy. 
The author observes that officials write non-prescriptive ITT specifications which do not assume a 
preconceived approach. This forces bidders to analyse project requirements for themselves, ensuring that 
they have to gain a good understanding of the requirement. Those who fail to analyse what is involved 
usually present sketchy proposals which can be rejected in shortlisting. Being non-prescriptive allows 
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bidders the freedom to be innovative in their proposals, and usually leads to a variety of approaches being 
suggested. VFM is therefore enhanced by having a greater range of options from which to choose. 
Typically six organisations are invited to submit written proposals for how ihey would tackle the tasks 
specified in an ITT. Proposals submitted by tenderers are usually submitted to two stages of evaluation, 
'shortlisting' and *award of contract'. 
Following the mailing out of the ITT, officials identify a tender evaluation panel. Membership of the 
panels comprises those staff who will have direct responsibility for management o f the contract when 
awarded, together with officials drawn from other parts of the department who have specialist knowledge 
relevant to the project work. Panels are selected such that the combined knowledge of members fully 
qualifies them to appreciate the content of the proposals, and the fitness of bidders to meet requirements. 
In evaluating bids, guidance advises officials to make judgements in areas such as tenderers' 
understanding of the requirement, aptness and originality, previous relevant experience, capability in terms 
of resources, caliber of staff in terms of their qualifications to resource project work, management ability, 
and costs. 
The guidelines (DTI, 1996a,, pp. 76-79, 1999a, pp. 61-65) advises officials to seek effective relationships 
with contractors and to conduct tender evaluations to maximise VFM. Discussions with potential 
contractors both before and after opening tender documents is advised. In the first instance the author 
agrees. He has held many meetings with potential contractors prior to the tender submission date. These 
meetings, always at the request of the bidders themselves, provide their project staff with the opportunity 
to question officials about the department's requirements, thereby gaining a better understanding of *the 
need', which in tum leads to the submission of better proposals. With the latter, that is holding discussions 
with bidders following the opening of the tender documents, the author completely disagrees. He and 
those he has observed have never conducted discussions with bidders once the tender deadline has passed. 
To do so, in his opinion, might give firms providing information after the deadline an unfair advantage 
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over their competitors. On occasions the author has, however, observed that it is sometimes necessary to 
contact a tenderer, where an ambiguity in their proposal needs clarification. 
On receipt of the lenders, panel members are called to a shortlisting meeting where the proposals received 
are initially evaluated. A collective decision is reached as to which candidates wi l l be invited to a lender 
evaluation interview. Problems with the shortlisted bids are discussed, and agreement reached about 
exactly which parts of each proposal will require clarification when the bidder is questioned. Shortlisting 
makes the tender review process more efficient by weeding out the non-starters at early stage, preventing 
further waste of their time, and allowing officials to concentrate on examining the better proposals. 
Shortlisted candidates are invited for interview by the tender evaluation panel. The aim of the tender 
evaluation,interviews is to subject each shortlisted proposal to close examination. Panel members pose 
specific questions (some will be the questions from the shortlisting meeting) about the proposals, asking 
tenderers to clarify points which they have made or provide missing information. They also probe the 
knowledge of the team members fielded to check it is sufficiently wide and deep to resource the project 
work. The interviews also provide tenderers with the opportunity to expand on their written proposals. 
Officials always insist that tenderers present for interview, those members o f their project teams who have 
been assigned direct responsibilities for the day-to-day management of contract work. This prevents the 
tenderer fielding top people who create a good impression at interview, but using less experienced staff in 
the project team after the contract is awarded, thus prejudicing the project's success. After the interviews, 
panel members discuss the performance of the tenderers, and reach a collective decision about which 
organisation should be awarded the contract. The author observes that frequently the views on what 
represents the best bid will change following an interview. He suggests that the importance o f 
interviewing cannot be over stressed. The successful bidder is then awarded the contract and told that he 
may start work. 
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Through the tender evaluation process, officials aim to select an organisation which represents an optimum 
proposition in terms of their ability to deliver project objectives at minimum cost. However, it must be 
clearly stated that the department does not subscribe to a 'cheapest is best' policy in the selection process. 
Indeed in the author's experience, the cheapest bid seldom wins. Emphasis is always placed on the 
likelihood of meeting departmental objectives. The main points on which selection is based include the 
number of man-days offered, the amount of relevant experience held by the proposed members of the 
project team, price, and the credibility o f the approaches to be employed in project work in terms of the 
probability of them securing successful outcomes. In the author's experience, officials wil l also 
investigate how far up the learning curve bidders are, in terms of their ability to make progress quickly. 
Tenderers who have researched the project issues well, and have made initial suggestions as to how they 
should be tackled in putting their proposals together, are more likely to 'hit the ground running' and 
represent better VFM than those who have not. 
Finally it is interesting to note that officials cannot agree as to whether an indication o f the budget 
available for contract spend should be given at the time of going out to tender. Some officials say that 
to give an indicatory price stifles innovation on the part of tenderers, with bids tending to come in at 
close to the budget figure. The author observes that this does indeed happen, but where an indication 
of budgets is not given, proposals are often received which are 'way over the top' in terms of what is 
affordable. Based on his experience, the author holds the view that it is better to give a 'ball park 
figure' for the financial size of a project, and then make judgements on the basis of who offers the best 
value. Again in his experience where ball park figures have been given, whilst the spread of quoted 
costs is more restricted, great variations are still experienced in the content of the proposals received, 
indicating that innovativeness is not prejudiced. 
7.6.2 Grants versus Contracts 
Guidance DTI (1996a, pp. 64-70, 1999a, pp. 53-60) draws a clear distinction beUveen 'Offers o f 
Grants' and 'Contracts'. The difference between grants and contracts hinges around the type o f 
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relationship which should exist between the department and the organisation which is going to 
undertake the work. Grants are used where an organisation or organisations "undertake work for the 
benefit of the bodies concerned, and which in turn will be seen to the benefit of UK industry as a 
whole'' (DTI, 1996a, p. 64). Grants may be regarded as DTI contributions, that is gifts, to the funding 
of approved activities (DTI, 1999a, p. 54). Guidance (DTI , 1999a, p. 53) refers to DTI traditionally 
funding science and technology projects through offers o f grant, for example in collaborative R & D 
projects. However, meeting the criterion that work shall benefit industry as a whole is in the author's 
opinion not readily applied in consultancy projects. In these cases, the wider benefits are realised as 
benefits to the UK economy as a whole, through the improved competitiveness of firms. 
Offers of grants are made in the form of 'Offer Letters', which are issued to the lead organisation. 
Guidance (DTI, 1992, p. 43, 1996a, p. 64), reminds officials that in issuing offer letters, they are acting 
on behalf of the Secretary o f State and not industry. Thus grant offers are always discretionary, 
allowing the department to withdraw funding in the event of applicants not carrying out work to the 
best of their abilities. Examples given in guidance o f grant situations are in Technology Access 
programmes where a contractor wi l l run seminars to disseminate technical knowledge on behalf of DTI 
(DTI, 1999a, p. 54). Other examples of grants being awarded to organisations and firms to fund 
technology related projects lie with the GICP programme (see appendix E, section E.2, pp. 84-85), 
SN4ART (see appendix E, section E.3.4, p. 89), and SPUR (see appendix E, section E.4.3, p. 93). The 
author is also able to confirm from his experience, that the SFl projects described in sub-section 7.3.2.1 
above, were similarly grant funded. Trade associations are also supported to help promote good 
practice. The Society o f Motor Manufacturers and Traders Limited (SMMT) are supported by DTI to 
administer the SMMT Industry Forum, which aims to enhance the competitiveness o f the UK 
components industry (see websites www.smmt.co.uk and www.autoindustry.co.uk). 
In contrast to the offer o f grants, contracts are where DTI enters legal relationships with organisations 
which carry out work for the department (DTI, 1999a, p. 53). As indicated in sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 
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above, contracts are let for the running of consultancy programmes. For instance in the Consultancy 
Initiatives, PERA (an RTO) operated the Manufacturing and Quality initiatives, responsibility for the 
latter being shared with Salford University. The Charted Institute o f Marketing administered the 
Marketing Initiative, 3i Enterprise Support Limited the Business Planning and Financial Information 
components, and the Design Council the Design Initiative (see appendix F, section F.8, p. 101). 
Consultants have also been commissioned to undertake research to establish market failures, and to 
help inform the design o f delivery strategies. A consultancy ISTEL were commissioned to review the 
international status of the development of manufacturing technologies, and those that could be adopted 
by UK SMEs [Interviewl I ] . In the M90s programme, PA Consulting were awarded a contract to 
identify best practice in developing a company's business strategy in the context of the market drivers " 
(seeappendixG, sections G.2.3.1, p. 110, and G.2.4.2, pp. 112-113). In MPI, PERA were 
commissioned to provide a report comparing the performance o f firms that had adopted a strategic 
approach to the implementation of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, compared with those who 
had not (appendix H, section H.2.4.2, p. 130). External organisations including consultants are also 
employed to undertake programme evaluation, and monitoring. Pieda were employed to undertake the 
evaluation of the Regional Supply Offices (Pieda, 1997), and Segal Quince Wicksteed (SQW) Limited 
for the evaluation of Ci (SQW, 1992), (appendix F, section F.I I , p. 104-105). St. John's Innovation 
Centre (St. John's, 1992) undertook monitoring of programme performance in M90s (see appendix G, 
section G.5.5, p. 118). 
Inspection of file papers provides an example of professional institutions being involved in the process 
of developing programmes. The former Institution of Production Engineers received a grant to 
conduct a feasibility study into the needs for an initiative to assist manufacturing SMEs, through 
continuing education and training, and awareness activities. 
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7,7 Promote Programme 
. The observations described below are based on the author's involvement in the launch of MPI, 
SUPERNET, and obtaining ministerial attendance at the M90s Management Action Briefing 
seminars. Good publicity at the time of programme launch helps secure high participation by 
firms in a scheme. In the author's experience the issuing of 'press notices' (sometimes referred 
to as press releases) is the 'bulk standard' means o f informing the 'media' o f the launch of 
activities, and is used for both routine as well as high profile announcements. In a project 
meeting with a colleague (Andy Towers) in DTI's former Press Office, the author was advised 
that press notices are 'faxed ore-mailed' to editors in the National Press, professional journals. 
Radio and Television. Inspection of press releases shows that they are kept short in order that 
they may be read quickly, containing sufficient detail on which to base a short but interesting 
article. Staff writing press notices work very closely with officials responsible for launching 
new schemes, to ensure that the salient points relating to the operation and aims of a 
programme are conveyed in the 'notices'. 
For more important initiatives, launch events involving ministers are mounted to secure high 
levels o f publicity. The DTI Finance Handbook suggests people consider an official launch o f 
programmes, for example at receptions involving the appropriate minister (DTI, 1996b, section 
9.1). The author observes that greater exposure in the media arises from several factors. To 
begin with, holding an event provides an opportunity to invite journalists to attend and witness 
'the launch', thereby raising the probability of editorial coverage. File papers show that a press 
launch was mounted in the case of the MPI programme, and was successful in securing wide 
editorial coverage (see appendix H, section H.5.4, p. 140). Before inviting the media, officials 
liaise with their colleagues in the ministers' private offices to secure the agreement o f a 
minister to open the launch event. Requests to ministers to attend events are set out in formal 
ministerial submissions. In attempting to secure ministerial involvement, officials w i l l usually 
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first try and obtain agreement from the minister having direct responsibility for the programme 
in question. 
Whether the Secretary of State or a junior minister is first approached wi l l depend on the 
relative importance, in political terms, of the scheme. Ministers have heavy commitments 
arising fi-om their ministerial duties, and sometimes suitable diary dates for a minister to attend 
cannot be found. In these circumstances other ministers responsible for related areas wil l be 
approached. Ministerial attendance at a programme launch is very important, as it conveys the 
higli profile nature of a scheme. A high profile attracts attendance, thereby greatly increasing 
representation by the media and their willingness to report on a scheme's launch and its aims. 
The author further observes that ministers normally launch programmes in a forma] speech at the 
launch event. The speech explains why the scheme is being introduced, and sets out the government's 
aims and how these wil l be achieved. Following the presentation, an opportunity is given for the 
Minister to be interviewed by journalists. Working through staff in the ministers' private offices, 
officials prepare briefing notes for ministers, including questions and answers briefs, and normally 
draft his or her speech, the text of which is given to the media at the event. In this process officials 
ensure that the media receives the desired messages relating to the programme. For example in SPUR, 
a submission dated.29 January 1991 to the SoS from a section head in DTI's RTP Division, 
recommends that he launch the programme at a 'press launch', and agrees the accompanying draft 
press notice. Also attached are the draft 'opening remarks', and a question and answer briefing. 
A submission to the Secretary of State (SoS) (Peter Lilley) dated 18 February 1991, refers to the SoS 
agreeing to a formal launch of MPl. Attached to the covering minute o f the submission were the draft 
press notice, the main points for his opening remarks, and a 'question and answer' briefing. The SoS is 
asked i f he is 'content' with these. The press release gave the reasons for introducing the programme 
and outlined the operational details. Numerous articles appeared in trade journals (copies held on the 
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MPI Launch File), which served to help promote the programme (see appendix H, section H.5.4, p. 
140). 
A new scheme to help industry always provides ministers with a good news story to relate. 
However inspection o f file papers for the SUPERNET programme shows how a launch event 
also provides ministers with opportunities to discuss successes elsewhere, and in so doing 
promote other programmes. At the SUPERNET launch, the Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine took 
the opportunity to update those present with progress on developing the network of Business 
Links, and remind people of the initiative and why Business Links were important. 
From his experience in launching the MPI programme, SUPERNET, and the Management 
Action Briefing seminars within the M90s' programme, the author concludes that securing 
'press' attendance and ministerial involvement at launch events is a 'chicken and egg' scenario. 
The press is less likely to attend i f there is no minister present. Conversely, ministers are 
attracted by photo opportunities, and are more likely to agree to launch a scheme i f media 
coverage wil l be good. Officials attempt to break the circle by convincing the minister of the 
importance of the scheme in benefiting the Economy. 
The author observes that the process is eased i f ministers are made aware of the benefits at an 
early stage, as part of seeking their approval for funding. Once convinced, the Minister is 
likely to become enthusiastic and agree to attend the launch event. Agreement obtained, the 
Press is told of the Minister's intentions, motivating them to attend. The word 'intentions' is 
employed because ministers can be summoned at short notice to attend urgent debates in 'The 
House'. Where the participation of bodies such as trade and research associations is germane 
to the running of schemes, their representatives at CEO level are invited to launch events. This 
was the case with SUPERNET. 
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For R&D programmes, participation in scheme work may be enhanced by holding programme 
seminars. Potential participants are invited to the seminars where the operation and objectives 
of programmes are set out, the benefits to the community explained, and an opportunity for 
officials to be questioned about programme details provided [Interview 11]. A high public 
profile helps secure success for a programme. This has been achieved through mounting 
national advertising campaigns, as was the case for the Enterprise Initiative (see appendix D, 
section D.4, p. 79) and for the Business Link Initiative. In the MPI programme, the scheme 
contractor was responsible for promoting the scheme. The contractor mailed out to target 
companies with a brochure explaining the role o f MPI and describing the grants available. 
Consultants were also informed of the programme's details. Exposure for MPI was also 
obtained through articles written in trade journals, and promotional seminars were run in 
collaboration with DTI's Regional Offices. Consultancy organisations participating in the 
programme also helped to promote MPI, motivated by the market opportunities which the 
programme created for them (see appendix H, section H.5.4, p. 141), Appendix G, section . 
G.5.3, p. 117, shows how contractors were responsible for promoting M90s activities, 
including the running of seminars and the preparation o f brochures. 
7.8 Close Programme 
Programmes have a finite life, and ultimately wi l l be closed. As an official responsible for 
operating programmes, the author has been made aware by senior staff that there is often a 
legal requirement for a public announcement of their closure. Giving notice of closure is 
particularly important for grant based programmes. I f a firm applies for funding under a 
suspended scheme, and the public has not been formally notified, the company can argue in 
Court that the programme is still officially open, and its application should be considered. 
Complaints over non-disclosure may be submitted to Members of Parliament (MPs), and 
ministers: complaints may seriously embarrass ministers and departmental staff, and cost 
considerable official effort drafting suitable responses. 
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When asked to affect closure of the MPI programme, the author sought advice from DTI's 
solicitors. He was advised that notice of programme closure can be formally announced at the 
public launch of a programme and, i f appropriate, contained in the promotional literature. The 
limit may be presented in the form of a specific date of closure, or as a target number o f grants 
to be awarded after which no further applications wil l be considered. 
However as was the case with MPI, it is not always convenient to announce when a programme 
will close at its launch. Market failures may be protracted, and it can be desirable to leave open 
the option to introduce follow-on phases of the programme. In such cases the author was 
advised that an 'arranged' or 'planted' 'Written Parliamentary Question' be used as the 
mechanism to give public notice of closure. An MP 'friendly' towards the government of the 
day is asked to put down a Written Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons. The 
Minister then responds in writing to the MP, giving the date of closure. The Minister's answer, 
when published in Hansard, constitutes the public notice o f closure. This approach was 
adopted for announcing the closure of MPI, (Hansard, Session 1992-93, 29 March-16 April 
1993, pp. 51 -52) and, the author was told by a colleague, also in the case of the Consultancy 
Initiatives. 
Interestingly, in the case of MPI, the author's branch head had received similar advice to that of 
the author. In a minute dated 8 March 1993, the branch head writes to the head of DTI's 
former Research and Technology Policy (RTP) division, referring to a previous conversation 
with him in which the division head had agreed that closure o f MPI should be officially notified 
through a 'planted' Parliamentary Question (PQ) and a written answer. Attached to the minute 
were drafts of the PQ and answer. The author observes that the 'arranged question' should not 
seek information relating to closure directly; it should avoid drawing attention to scheme 
withdrawal as that could provoke criticism. The question should seek general information 
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about the programme, allowing the notice o f closure to be given as a 'throw away line' at the 
end. For example in MPI the question placed was along the lines of "How many applications 
have been received on the scheme to date"? The written answer, drafted by officials, gave the 
number o f applications received, and added that no further applications would be processed 
beyond a specified date. 
7.9 Inputs 
The primary input to the 'Implementation' process is the approved programme ROAME 
statement, and is the fundamental source of reference for the administration of schemes (DTI, 
1996a, p. 32, 1996b, section 9.1, and annex 9.1,8, 1999a, p. 27). The ROAME, which details 
how a programme wil l operate and the objectives set, is used as the basis in the drafting of 
Invitations to Tender, scheme guidelines, publicity material, and other similar material. 
Other documents which represent inputs to the administration function are proposals submitted 
by applicants seeking grant funding of project work, and those tendered by contractors in 
response to ITTs. Progress reports received from grant recipients and contractors also input 
information to the administrative process. 
7.10 Outputs 
A principal output is launched programmes. However as can be seen through examination of 
the tasks undertaken in operating schemes, the process overall generates a variety o f outputs. 
For example in R&D programmes, the outputs could be research reports, pre-production 
prototypes or product development specifications. In programmes for which supported 
consultancy is the principal objective, outputs are represented by consultants reports containing 
plans for the implementation of change. Other important outcomes are progress and 
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monitoring reports which form 'inputs' to 'Evaluation' (DTI, 1999a, p. 41), and contracts 
issued as a result o f competitive tendering. 
Further detail on the approaches adopted in 'Programme Implementation' can be obtained through 
reading the case study examples detailed in appendix D, sections D.4, p. 79 and D5, pp. 79-80, 
appendix E, sections E.2.3, p. 86, E.2.4, p. 86, E.3.4, p. 89, E.3.5, p. 90, E.4.3, p. 93, E.4.4, p. 94), 
appendix F, sections F.4, pp. 98-99, F.6, pp. 100-101, F.8, pp. 101-103, F.9, pp. 103-104, and FIO, 
p. 104, appendix G, sections G.5, pp. 115-118, G6, p. 118, and G8, 119-126, and appendix H sections 
H.3,p. 132, and H.5, pp. 138-141. 
Figure 7.1 below shows the IDEF Level 2 diagram, describing the component process of 'Programme 
Implementation'. 
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7.11 Conclusions 
The component process of'Programme Implementation' has been mapped and an IDEFO Level 2 
diagram developed, which graphically describes the process. It is therefore concluded that the second 
part of the fourth research question has been responded to. The question may be put as: 
b) "What are the mechanisms involved in the task of'Programme Implementation"^ 
Analysis has revealed that the implementation of programmes comprises the following elements: 
o Appraisal o f projects; 
o Monitoring of programmes and projects within programmes; 
o General Administration; 
• Promoting Programmes including their launch; 
o Scheme Closure. 
In analysing these roles it was observed that there are significant differences in approach between R & 
T and advisory programmes, particularly in the areas of appraising projects, monitoring of project 
work, and in programme administration. It is observed that in advisory programmes, particularly those 
for which consultancy is the primary focus of funding, project appraisal and monitoring is undertaken by 
external agencies. In contrast, with R & T programmes, and for which R&D is the principal activity, 
project appraisal and monitoring is undertaken by officials. It is proposed that these differences stem in 
the first instance from the drive to place work outside the civil service, to help reduce the drain on the 
running costs budget. In operating advisory programmes, it is proposed that it is the absence of a need 
to interpret the complex issues surrounding market failure, which enables officials to contract external 
organisations to administer these schemes. However in R&D programmes, the policy criteria are 
considered too complex to allow the task to be devolved to external bodies. It is also observed that the 
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issuing of legal contracts and guidelines to external agencies, provides the basis by which officials can 
ensure that they behave in a manner which is acceptable to the SoS. 
Study of project appraisal, monitoring, and administration, has provided further examples o f the 
organisations involved in DTFs programme network, and their roles in the process o f designing and 
operating schemes. Research has revealed the involvement of trade associations and the professional 
institutions, serving to further demonstrate the wide range of organisations that form part o f the 
programme network. Importantly it is noted that programme design continues into the stage of 
programme implementation. Section 7,6.1 showed how by being non prescriptive in writing ITT 
specifications, officials could choose from a number of innovative proposals. Thus, in developing their 
tender proposals, contractors help shape the final design of schemes. 
Section 7.3.1 illustrates how programme designs can be 'tuned' during their operation, through the 
process of scheme monitoring. Finally, examination of the mechanisms employed in programme 
implementation, shows that officials continue to work towards maximising V F M . Project appraisal, 
programme and project monitoring, and the tendering processes, each work to help ensure value is 
maximised. The next chapter, chapter 8, analyses the process component of'Evaluation and 
Feedback', and also brings together the results of the research conducted in this and earlier chapters, to 
construct an IDEFO diagram describing the overall structure of the design and administration process. 
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8. E V A L U A T I O N AND F E E D B A C K 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the completion of the exercise of mapping the process of designing and 
administering support programmes. Chapter 5 began the task of mapping with the development of a 
top level IDEFO diagram, providing a description of the overall support process. Chapter 3, section 
3.3, had revealed the overall process to comprise the process components 'Issue Identification'^ 
'Implementation', and 'Evaluation and Feedback'. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively mapped the 
mechanisms involved in the first two of these components, and this chapter concludes the mapping 
exercise by investigating the procedures adopted in the fmal component of 'Evaluation and Feedback'. 
It is important to look at evaluation more closely. Chapter 3, section 3.5 highlighted the strategic 
nature of'Evaluation and Feedback' in designing support policy. Therefore it is necessary to 
investigate the mechanics of the process as part of obtaining a complete, detailed description o f the 
total design system. It is important to study 'Evaluation' as the function adds value to the learning 
process, by feeding back the lessons learnt in programme delivery into future decision making. 
Section 3.3 found 'Evaluation' to be a routine practice amongst governments in the developed world. 
From his knowledge of the design process the author is aware that DTi is no exception. Indeed 
evidence shows how the government was acknowledging the importance of evaluating programmes in 
terms of their final effectiveness in 1981 (HMSO, 1981). As indicated in chapter 1, section 1.2, large 
numbers of programme evaluations have been undertaken by DTI. In reading the literature the author 
also became aware of the substantial debate which has taken place amongst researchers on the subject 
of 'Evaluation'. The author felt that investigation of the structures installed in DTI might also be of 
interest to researchers generally. 
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Thus, chapter 3, section 3.8.3, in support of completing a response to the fourth research 
question which was aimed at obtaining a complete description of the design process, posed the 
final supplementary problem of: 
(c) '"Evaluation including Feedback', what are the procedures adopted in evaluating programmes and 
feeding back evaluation results to the design process"? 
8.2 The Need for Evaluation and Feedback 
The HM Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997) sets out the requirement for the Whitehall departments 
to evaluate their interventions, and feed back the findings into the process of policy design. The 
'Green Book' describes 'Evaluation' as examining the 'outturn' of a project, programme or policy. 
Evaluation is seen as adding value by providing "lessons from experience to help future project 
management or development of a specific policy''' (HMT, 1997, p. 12). The Innovation Budget 
Guidelines (DTI, 1999a), in discussing 'Evaluation', refers officials to detailed advice provided in the 
supplementary guidelines. Guidance on the Preparation of Evaluation Plans (DTI, 1999c). These 
guidelines are designed to help evaluators and programme managers in preparing evaluation plans, 
with access to all staff provided by the guidelines being placed on the DTI 'Mandarin Intranet'. 
The evaluation guidelines again set out why evaluation of programmes is necessary. The guidelines 
acknowledge that there are several reasons for evaluation, but suggests "they all boil down to ensuring 
that programmes remain relevant, and that they provide a cost effective way of meeting their 
prescribed objectives'' (DTI, 1999a, p. 1). The guidelines continue that whilst ''Evaluation is 
essentially a backward looking process, its purpose is to inform fiiture decisions and hence help policy 
makers achieve their aims" (p. 1). This latter observation of 'Evaluation' as being part of a learning 
process, chimes in with the views of others as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.5. For example, Weiss 
(1972, p. 4), and Guy (1998, p. I) highlight the purpose o f evaluation as being to measure the effects of 
programmes against their objectives, as a way of contributing to subsequent decision making relating 
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to current and future programmes. ICnoxand McAlister(1995, p. 413) point to policy evaluation as 
integral part of the public policy process, and refer to 'Evaluation' as a core managerial activity. 
Femandez-Ballesteros (1992, p. 205) considers 'Evaluation' as being pivotal in the design process, as 
the feedback of results provides a system of self correction and improvement o f policy. 
8.3 Evaluation Planning and Implementation 
The Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997, pp. 12-14) advises that the activity to be evaluated must be 
clearly specified. Evaluation must be directly related to the policy, management, and objectives of the 
department (or agency). The need for the original documents proposing activities (programme 
ROAMEs) to describe clearly the programme rationale, aims, and objectives is emphasised. This then, 
is the starting point in evaluation planning. 
Treasury guidance also advises that any changes in goals be recorded (p. 12). The need in drafting 
cases for support, for objectives to be precisely defined and quantified is highlighted, as is the need to 
take account of monitoring information. The author observes that this advice on evaluation planning is 
conveyed in the Imwvation Budget Guidelines (see chapter 6, section 6.3.4). The DTI Finance 
Handbook (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4) develops the Treasury's theme, stating that 'Evaluation' involves 
testing the validity of programme rationale, assessing how far programme objectives have been met, 
estimating the economic benefits both direct and indirect (the wider benefits), and establishing the 
efiHciency and effectiveness of an intervention. The Evaluation Plan Guidelines (DTI , 1999c, pp. 1-4) 
continue, advising programme managers that they must draw up evaluation plans, and setting out the 
issues which should be covered in a plan. These are described as follows: 
• Testing the Validity of the Rationale: guidance states that the evaluation plan should set out the 
rationale issues to be addressed by evaluation research in the form of hypotheses to be tested, and 
specify the testing methodology to be adopted. The aims include confirming the evidence of 
market failure, establishing the extent to which interventions have influenced target organisations, 
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analysis of how the market is developing and, i f market failure is still present whether the delivery 
strategy remains valid. 
• Measurement of Benefits: analysis of the benefits which have arisen through the introduction of a 
programme. The plan must detail the principal benefits to be assessed and the key performance 
indicators. Officials are required to detail the strategy for collecting the evidence of benefits. 
• Cost Effectiveness: Officials are advised that they must consider whether the programme is 
providing VFM, by comparing programme costs with the benefits accruing. 
• Appropriateness of Institutional Arrangements: officials are advised that evaluation plans should 
' describe how the various agencies which might be involved in programme delivery, enhance the 
effectiveness of programmes in which they participate. 
• Programme Specific Issues: officials are advised that there are always programme specific issues 
which need to be considered in drawing up evaluation plans. For example there can be uncertainty 
over the impact on beneficiaries of a programme, or those external to a scheme. Uncertainty may 
arise from the design of a programme and review of the delivery strategy should be considered. Or 
for example how a scheme relates to other interventions in the same market sector may require 
investigation, to ensure that the separate interventions are mutually supportive. 
Choice of evaluation methodology is discussed (DTI, 1999c, pp. 4-5). Officials are advised that 
development of research strategies hinges around asking who is best placed to answer the evaluation 
questions. The balance between the use of'in-house' and external consultancy must also be decided. 
Choice of research methods must also be considered, and the following examples are given as the usual 
methods employed: 
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• Literature search: survey of current academic and empirical literature provides insights into how a 
market works, and can be useful in providing evidence supporting continued rationale for 
intervention (see chapter 5, section 5.3.2 and chapter 6, sub-section 6.2.3.2), 
• Survey of beneficiaries: use of detailed questionnaires in postal or telephone surveys to investigate 
evaluation issues. Officials are advised that whilst this work may be undertaken ' in house', larger 
surveys wil l normally be conducted by external, professional survey organisations. 
• Interviews with scheme participants: These include the interviewing of programme beneficiaries 
and organisations responsible for scheme delivery. Officials are advised that such interviews wil l 
normally be conducted 'face to face'. 
Officials are additionally advised that in drawing up evaluation strategies, account should be taken of 
relevant experience in other countries. 
Finally the Evaluation Plan Guidelines (DTI, 1999c, pp. 5-6) provide advice on how approval to 
conduct an evaluation is obtained, and the drawing up of evaluation timetables is discussed. Under the 
heading of "Outputs and Timing" officials are advised that the ''evaluation plan must clearly state what 
the deliverables are'''' (p. 5). These, guidance advises, wil l usually consist of an evaluation report, and a 
payment schedule for any contractor's costs. A project timetable is also required for the evaluation, 
showing the procurement, research and final reporting stages. Allowance must also be given for the 
attainment of ministerial approval for any external consultancy exceeding £ 10,000. The Secretary o f 
State's approval is required for consultancy spend over £40,000, and approval from the appropriate 
minister for contracts of between £10,000 and £39,999. The requirement for draft plans to go before 
the IPC and EMG must also be taken into account in planning. 
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Once an evaluation plan has been agreed, a research specification is then drawn up as the basis for 
going out to tender. The specification wil l build on the evaluation plan and include any additional 
detail required by a contractor, but omitting information contained in the plan for internal purposes. In 
talking to colleagues concerned with evaluation, the author was advised that the timing of an evaluation 
study is set by the need for findings to inform the policy development process, but sufficient time must be 
allowed to elapse for the results to be meaningfijl. The author observes that other researchers support this 
view (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981). The author has found that schemes are usually evaluated about half 
way through a programme and on completion. 
Importantly the Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997, p. 13) informs officials that in assessing the 
impact of programmes, it is not sufficient to use as the 'benchmark' the market conditions just prior to 
an intervention. These initial conditions may have changed without intervention. It is therefore 
necessary to examine what might have happened in the absence of a programme, assessing how market 
conditions and policies would have developed, and to then assess the programme's performance in 
terms of how it has addressed problems over and above what would have naturally occurred. 
8.4 Evaluation Reports 
Study of programme evaluation reports confirms the deployment of the above approaches in practice. 
Evaluations such as those undertaken for the Consultancy Initiatives (DTI, 1992), SUPERNET 
(Bessant, 1997), SMART (DTI, 199lb,l994a), MPI (DTI, 1997a), M90s' (DTI, 1995) and MAFF's 
Group Marketing Grant and Marketing Development Schemes (SAC, 1998), shows that in assessing 
scheme performance, evaluators work to confirm or otherwise the validity of programme rationale, 
levels of additionality experienced, the appropriateness of delivery strategies to negate market failures, 
the credibility of objectives and how well they have been achieved, and an assessment of V F M . 
Reports give views on the continuation o f market failures, and make recommendations for the 
continuation of initiatives and, where necessary, for changes in the delivery strategy. 
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In assessing performance, work focuses on identifying the impact on programme participants, be they 
the recipients of grants, or those who have received support in the form of, for example, attending an 
awareness seminar. In all of the cases examined, firms are contacted on a sample basis, using a variety 
of techniques. In the examples quoted above, the 1994 SMART evaluation involved postal surveys 
(postal questionnaires), (DTI, 1994a, p. 18). The remainder adopted a mixture of techniques including 
face to face interviews with grantees, telephone interviews, and postal surveys. Additionally 
interviews with the officials and external agencies having responsibility for administering schemes 
were also conducted. Further information on the evaluation methodologies adopted is given in the case 
study examples (see appendix E, sections E.2.5, pp. 86-87, E.3.6, p. 91, E.4.5, p. 94, appendix F, 
section F.I I , pp. 104-105, appendix G, section G.7, pp. 118-119, and appendix H, section H.6, p. 141). 
Study of the evaluations of SUPERNET (Bessant, 1995), (see chapter 7, section 7.3.1), M90s' (DTI , 
1995, p. 7), and MPI (DTI, 1997a, p. 4) programmes shows how reports prepared in 'Monitoring' were 
fed into 'Evaluation'. 
The author notes problems experienced by colleagues in evaluating schemes, particularly in awareness 
programmes. They have reported difficulty in assessing the impact of activities. Firms receive stimuli 
for change from a variety of sources, and as a result it can be difficult to conclude with certainty that an 
awareness activity was the prime motivator for change. 
Guidance requires officials to describe how lessons learnt wi l l be fed back into the policy development 
process. Examples of evaluation findings causing policy changes can again be seen through 
examination of programme evaluation reports. In the case of the Managing into the 90s (M90s) 
programme, the evaluation report for the second phase of the scheme (DTI, 1995, pp. 11-12) 
recommended that officials consider greater use of electronic means of delivering material, such as 
videos and computer discs. Phase three o f the M90s saw the introduction of Connect for Better 
Business, which was an interactive video package for use on personal computers (PCs), with the 
programme material stored on Compact Disc Read Only Memories (CD ROMs). 
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In the Regional Supply Office (RSO) Programme, the independent evaluators Pieda p!c in assessing 
the initial (three year) phase of the initiative, found the RSOs to be not providing value for money 
(Pieda, 1997, pp. 92-123). They concluded that the RSOs were unfocused, operating an 'all-comers' 
policy accepting any request for help, irrespective of whether client purchasers needed that help or not. 
Pieda recommended that the RSOs adopt a more strategic approach, focusing on larger projects, 
targeting those sectors which are economically important to their regions, becoming more involved in 
supply chain development, and helping land inward investment into the Country. Examination o f the 
ROAME statement (ROAME, 1998) and the programme guidelines (RSOGL, 1998) for the second 
phase of the programme, shows the description o f RSO operation was modified in exact accordance 
with these recommendations. 
8.5 Corporate Organisation of Evaluation in the DTI 
An interview with Dr. Ray Lambert (Deputy Director and Economic Advisor: Technology and 
Innovation Policy, in DTI's Innovation Policy and Standards Directorate) [Interview 18], was 
conducted to discover the detail of how 'Evaluation' is structured within the department. DTI's 
Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4) was also studied. It was revealed that evaluation is 
mainly undertaken by economists located in the individual directorates and commands of the 
department, together with those employed in DTI's Assessment Unit (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4), (see 
also appendix J, section J.2, pp. 155-156). However some work is contracted out to consultants (see 
section 8.3 above regarding the discussion on evaluation plans). Examples of external contractors 
being employed to evaluate programmes are Pieda evaluating the RSO programme (section 8.4), and 
Segal Quince Wicksteed Limited, the Consultancy Initiatives (see appendix F, section F.8, p. 101). 
Evaluation work is overseen by DTI's Evaluation and Policy Improvement Committee (EPIC), with 
the consideration of plans for the evaluation of individual programmes falling to the Evaluation 
Methodology Group (EMG) (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4). 
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EPIC is chaired by the Director of DTI's Financial Resource Management (FRM) directorate, with its 
membership comprising the Chief Economic Advisor, the Chairman of EMG, all directors o f 
directorates having responsibility for evaluation, representatives from the Central Policy Unit (CPU) 
and commands having an interest, together with Budget Holders or their representatives (DTI, 1996b, 
section 3.4). EPIC's function is concerned with evaluating programme strategies in terms o f their 
ability to meet the department's policy objectives. EPIC was set up in the early 1980s', as a follow on 
from FMI, and has the role of ensuring evaluations are 'up to scratch', and then to draw the broad 
lessons [Interview 18]. DTI (1996b, section 3.4) shows how EPIC also draws up an overall evaluation 
plan each year, which details the programme areas that are to be evaluated. EPIC first decides on the 
priority areas for evaluation and then agrees the plan with ministers. 
EMG is chaired by the Director, Economics, and its core membership is again drawn from Directors 
(or their representatives) having responsibility for 'Evaluation', and the Director, Programme Finance 
or a representative. Programme evaluators often attend. Programme managers attend both meetings of 
EPIC and EMG when their programmes are the subject o f discussion. EMG's responsibility is to 
approve the evaluation plans, which are drawn up by the evaluators in the individual directorates. 
EMG subsequently considers drafted evaluation reports, and when satisfied that work has been 
completed satisfactorily passes copies of the reports to the 'budget holders' and EPIC, for possible 
further action (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4). 
From his experience of the evaluation process, the author observes that responsibility for administering 
an evaluation exercise normally falls to EPIC, where a programme is the subject o f an agreed 
evaluation plan. Otherwise responsibility falls to the evaluators in the directorates. In the author's 
experience, evaluations are always carried out by a party operating independently from the section 
operating the programme to be evaluated. As indicated in the DTI Finance Handbook { DTI, 1996b, 
section 3.4), 'Evaluation' can be undertaken by specialist teams within the department, or by external 
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consultants. Evaluation of 'h igh cost' programmes such as the Business Link initiative, w i l l usually be 
undertaken by an external party. 
Section 8.2 showed that a primary role for evaluating programmes was to add value, by feeding back 
the lessons learned into future policy making. However close study of the evaluation process reveals 
there to be a number of issues involved. Chapter 6, section 6.1.1, discussed several o f these. 
Determining value for money is not an 'exact science', with no 'hard and fast' baseline being available 
against which to make absolute judgements o f performance, and hence value. Furthermore, what 
represented value was partly dependent on individuals' perceptions of what represented the priority 
market failures to tackle. However, it was proposed that assessment of performance was still possible. 
Officials in demonstrating programme rationale concentrate on identifying market failures in areas 
where historically governments have a record of intervention. By setting well defined objectives for 
the degree by which problems are to be reduced, it is possible to reach conclusions relating to 
programme performance (chapter 6, section 6.9). 
There are, however, several other problems associated with the current evaluation process, and these 
are discussed in detail in appendix J, pp. 155-156. There are difficulties in drawing the best practice 
lessons by looking across programme evaluations. First it has to be shown that past lessons reihain 
relevant, as circumstances change and new priorities emerge (the author observes that this view is in 
step with the observations made in chapter 6, section 6.1.1, regarding changing priorities causing 
alterations in perceptions of value for money). Furthermore, comparing the findings of evaluation 
reports is made difficult by the lack of coherence in reporting, due to policy changes. It is also 
suggested that placing the evaluators within the individual directorates fosters a 'silo' mentality, 
leaving people to do things in their own individual ways. In addition, it is proposed that the focus on 
delegating responsibility for the administration of budgets, causes evaluation reporting to be weighted 
towards informing budget management. This, it is suggested, can give rise to tensions through 
different interpretations being placed on evaluatory findings, between the budget holders and the 
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officials having day to day responsibilities for programme operation. This issue was again discussed in 
chapter 6, section 6.1.1. For some further insights into the operation of the evaluation process in DTI, 
the reader is referred to appendix J. 
8.6 Inputs to Evaluation and Feedback 
The above observations suggest the important 'inputs' to 'Evaluation' are the programme ROAME 
statements, and programme progress and monitoring reports. As discussed above, other inputs are 
represented by data collected during site visits by the evaluators to programme participants, 
contractors, and in meetings with officials responsible for programme operation. 
8.7 Outputs from Evaluation 
Treasury guidance (HMT, 1997, p. v), and DTI guidelines (DTI, 1999a, p. 42, 1999c, p. 1) state that 
programmes must be subjected to evaluation, with the subsequent evaluation reports widely circulated. 
Evaluation reports are hence an output of the development and administration process, and with wide 
circulation providing the feedback mechanism. Finally, based on the observations made in this 
chapter, Figure 8.1 below contains the IDEFO Level 2 diagram describing the process component of 
'Evaluation'. 
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8.8 Completion of the Mapping Task 
The above analysis of the component process of * Evaluation and Feedback' completes the last stage in 
mapping the process of the design and administration of support programmes. It is therefore now 
possible through inspection of the analyses undertaken in chapters 5 to 8, to construct an IDEFO Level 
2 diagram showing the overall structure of the design and administration process. Analysis has 
shown the structure of the process to be broadly sequential, and to comprise the following components 
and elements: 
(i) Issue Identification (chapter 6) 
Conception and Validation of Programme Ideas (chapter 6, section 6.2) 
Develop the Programme R O A M E statement (chapter 6, section 6.3): 
Step I : Build Evidence of Market Problems 
Step 2: Identify the Factors Inhibiting Organisations From Adopting Good Practice 
Step 3: Develop the Delivery Strategy 
Step 4: Demonstrate the Value of Proposed Interventions 
R O A M E Approval (chapter 6, section 6.4 and 6.5) 
(li) Programme Implementation (chapter 7) 
(ii i) Evaluation and Feedback (chapter 8, sections 8.2-8.7). 
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From these observations an IDEFO Level 2 diagram describing the process components o f the overall design 
process was constructed, as shown in Figure 8.2 below: 
Constraints 
B 
Issue 
Identification 
Mechanisms 
INPUTS 
Evaluation Reports 
Literature 
Advisory Committees 
Dialogue with External 
Bodies 
Experience of Colleagues 
Personal Experience 
Contractors' Experience 
Experience of Best 
Practice Practitioners 
Commissioned Research 
Govemment White Papers 
Constraints 
Approve 
ROAME 
statement 
Constraints 
Programme 
Implementation 
Monitoring 
Reports 
Personal Experience 
Experience of 
Colleagues 
Evaluation 
And Feedback 
Mechanisms 
Mechanisms 
CONSTRAINTS 
E C Slate Aids Policy 
Acts of Pariiament 
U K Govemment 
Policy 
(ntenrention 
Conditions 
Ministerial Priorities 
Finance 
Evaluation 
Reports 
O 
c 
Jo 
Figure 8.2 IDEFO Level 2 Diagram: The Component Processes of Programme Design and Operation 
Inspection of the findings of chapters 5 to 8 inclusive suggests the following flow chart (Figure 8.3) as 
describing the principal steps comprising the design and administration process; 
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8.9 Conclusions 
The process component of'Evaluation and Feedback' has been mapped and a detailed description of 
structure of the process and the mechanisms involved has been obtained. An IDEFO Level 2 diagram 
describing the component process has also been drafted. The supplementary question concerning 
^Evaluation' posed in chapter 3, section 3.8.3 has thus been answered. The question was: 
(c) "Evaluation including Feedback, what are the procedures adopted in evaluating programmes 
and feeding back evaluation results to the design process"? 
Chapter 3, sections 3.3 and 3.5, introduced and discussed the topic of 'incrementalism'. Here it was 
suggested that policy design is the subject of continual improvement, with designs making a series of 
advances towards solving problems, as against attempting to implement truly optimised solutions from 
the beginning. It was further proposed that policy evaluation, where the lessons learned from operating 
programmes are fed back into, and thereby inform the policy making process, represents a form of 
'incrementalism'. Analysis recorded in section 8.4 above has shown that, as might be anticipated, 
'incrementalisation' manifests itself in programme design. Examples have been provided o f 
'incrementalism' occurring in practice, with the recommendations made in programme evaluation 
reports being adopted in future scheme designs. 
Detailed study of the evaluation process has revealed several imperfections. Section 8.5 referred to 
there being no absolute measure for measuring value for money. Much of the problem lies with that of 
priorities which inevitably change with time. However, as suggested in chapter 6, section 6.9, the 
current arrangements which combine rigour in programme design with the setting o f unambiguous 
targets for the reductions in market failure, provide a sufficiently robust means of assessing value and 
from a practical standpoint, can be regarded as adequate for purpose. Given the continually changing 
nature of priorities, and that the existing arrangements have demonstrated their ability to result in 
credible evaluations, it is concluded that seeking a means o f introducing a baseline from which 
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absolute evaluation of programme performance could be calculated, would be difficult to achieve. 
Hence it is regarded as something which should not be attempted within the scope o f this research. 
Section 8.5 also showed that a number of other factors function to inhibit the process o f learning from 
evaluation. These can be summarised as people challenging the relevance o f old schemes to meet new 
priorities, and evaluators focusing more on the budgetary rather than the operational issues. These 
issues, it is felt, are addressable, and worthy of investigation to discover ways o f introducing 
improvement, a maner which is investigated in chapter 10, section 10.5.12. 
Importantly the process of designing and administering programmes has been mapped. The 
process components and elements which comprise the overall process, and their 
interrelationships have been investigated and described. A set of IDEFO diagrams have been 
constructed which provide a static model o f the design and administration process. Thus it is 
considered that the fourth research question presented in chapter 3, section 3.8.2: Discovering 
the Nature of the Design Process - "What is the scope of the process describing the designing 
and implementing policy for introducing and operating programmes which support firms in 
becoming more competitive, what comprises that process in terms of the elements which make 
up the whole system, and how do these elements interrelate in delivering support policy?", has 
been answered. 
In constructing the model of the design process, a detailed description o f the mechanisms in each of the 
above components and stages has further been obtained. From inspection of the literature and 
observation of documentation within government, the author is not aware that such a complete 
description of the process exists elsewhere. It is therefore proposed that in describing the design 
system, the author has been able to make a contribution to knowledge. Thus the first objective o f the 
research, as described in chapter 1, section 1.2, has been achieved. The objective was: 
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a) To contribute to knowledge in the area of policy by obtaining a descnption of the process of 
designing and administering programmes which help firms become more competitive, through 
detailed research of that process. 
The next stage of the research aimed to answer the f if th research question, which concerned how the 
design process can be improved. Chapter I , section 1.2, in setting out the second research objective 
(b), suggested that research findings be helpful in identifying improvement strategies. In developing 
the model, much of what takes place in practice in programme design has been recorded. This 
knowledge can therefore be employed as a source of reference in developing proposals for 
improvement. However it was thought first necessary to test the validity o f the process model before 
employing its description of the design system to inform investigation o f improvement strategies. 
Testing of the model is discussed in chapter 9 which follows. 
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9. T E S T I N G T H E M O D E L 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 recorded the analysis of the process of designing and administering 
programmeSj and from the findings of investigations developed a series o f IDEFO diagrams describing 
the design process. Chapter 5 provided a *top-lever diagram for the process as a whole. Chapter 6 
described and developed an IDEF Level 2 diagram illustrating the component process o f 'Issue 
Identification'. Chapter 7 looked at 'Programme Implementation*, and finally Chapter 8 provided a 
description of the 'Evaluation and Feedback' activity. 
In order to test the efficacy of the system model to describe the overall structure o f the design process, 
five programmes were taken as case study examples and investigated in-depth to reveal the detail o f 
how they were designed and implemented. It was then possible through inspection o f the procedures 
employed, to see how well they conformed in structure with those predicted by the model. The case 
study examples selected were: 
• The Enterprise Initiative (EI); 
• The Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative; 
• The Consultancy Initiatives (CI); 
• Managing into the 90s (M90s) programme; 
• The Manufacturing, Planning, and Implementation (MPI) programme. 
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The case study examples were selected on the basis that they were regarded as high profile activities, 
by officials (see chapter 1, section 1.1). 
The following section describes in more detail the approach adopted in gauging the efficacy of the 
design process model. For each process component described in chapters 5 to 8, that is, Mssue 
Identification', 'Programme Implementation*, and 'Evaluation including Feedback', the five case 
studies were each examined in detail, to determine wheilier the procedures involved in their 
development and administration fitted the structures as defined by the process model. Conformance 
with the IDEFO model was taken to be indicated by the ability to categorise the procedures identified, 
under the headings as defined by the model for each of the process components. 
In researching the case studies, a number o f research techniques were employed to gain the necessary 
insights to the procedures which had been used. These were as follows: 
• Study of file papers including examination of programme ROAME statements and evaluation 
reports; 
• Interviews with people directly concerned with the design and delivery o f the case study 
programmes, which included officials and staff in organisations contracted to undertake work for 
the department; 
• Ad-hoc discussions with the above personnel carried out as part o f day to day interactions in 
support of the author carrying out his work; 
• Examination o f the author*s personal experience. 
Appendices D to H describe the detailed analysis of the case studies. Appendix D investigates the 
Enterprise Initiative, appendix E the Research and Technology Initiative, appendix F the Consultancy 
Initiatives, appendix G Managing into the 90s programme, and finally appendix H the Manufacturing, 
Planning, and Implementation programme. 
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It was also considered to be necessary to demonstrate that the structure and content o f the model, 
represents a set of good practice mechanisms and approaches in programme design and administration. 
I f the model could be shown to be representative of good practice, then confidence in its wider use 
would be enhanced. Appendix K. analyses good practice in programme operation, with the 
examination of scheme performance focusing on the case study examples. In its analysis, appendix K 
draws heavily on the findings of programme evaluations. Hence conclusions relating to good, or bad 
practice, are lent credibility through them being based on a wide range o f expert opinion. The findings 
of appendix K were therefore simultaneously studied, to confirm the status o f the mechanisms adopted 
in the case study programmes in terms of them being representative of good practice. Confirmation of 
the approaches as being examples of good practice, together with their descriptions also being seen as 
conformant with those predicted by the IDEFO model, was taken to indicate the qualification o f the 
model itself to be classified as good practice. 
To help the reader confirm for his or herself, the validity o f the model, the next section contains a brief 
summary of the validation process. For each of the process components and elements detailed by the 
IDEFO model, examples from the case studies are briefly described. From these descriptions it is 
possible to identify the structures of the procedures adopted, and confirm that they conform with that 
predicted. In each instance cross referencing to the appendices containing the analysis of the case 
study examples is given, in order that people may study the validity of the model in greater detail. 
9.2 Testing the Validity of the Model 
9.2.1 The Enterprise Initiative (El) 
The Enterprise Initiative is discussed in appendix D. El was a promotional campaign designed to raise 
the levels of awareness o f OTPs services to help firms become more competitive (sections D . l and 
D.2, p. 78). 
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Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
The SoS felt people were unaware o f DTI's help for firms, (see appendix D, section D.3, p. 
78). 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
Not applicable: EI was a promotional campaign rather than a support programme (see 
appendix D, section D.3, p.78). 
Programme Implementation 
Implementation comprised collecting DTI's schemes under a single umbrella, El, then promoting EI 
and its constituent programmes in a national advertising campaign, (see sections D.3, p. 78, and D.4, p. 
79). 
Evaluation including Feedback 
The performance of the EI advertising campaign was assessed by regular monitoring of peoples' 
awareness of EI, (see section D.5, pp. 79-80). The results of monitoring were employed to focus the 
campaign on to areas where awareness of El was low. The promotional campaign appears to have 
been successful, with 52% of firms aware o f EI within six months of the launch of the campaign, (see 
section D.5, p. 80). 
9.2.2 The Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative 
The R & T initiative is discussed in appendix E. The objective of the programmes operated under the 
initiative was to raise levels of competitiveness in SMEs, by encouraging them to undertake more 
research and development (R&D). 
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Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
The R&T initiative was launched as part o f El, and brought together under a single title to help 
people identify the support for research that was available from DTI , (see appendix E, section 
E. l .pp. 82-83). 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
Not applicable. The R & T Initiative was not a support programme, rather, as discussed above, 
this initiative represented a banner under which to promote the constituent support activities, 
(see section E . I , pp. 82-83). 
Programme Implementation 
Not applicable, see above. 
Evaluation including Feedback 
Not applicable, see above. 
9.2.2.1 General Industrial Collaborative Projects (GICP) 
GICP was an umbrella programme (see section E.2, pp. 84-85) that supported a number of project 
programmes at Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs). 
Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
The idea for GICP was rooted in the government wishing to maintain sectoral research 
facilities, (see appendix E, section E.2, p. 84). 
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R O A M E Development and Approval 
Market failures included the unwillingness o f SMEs to share information, and inability to 
shoulder risk. Individual ROAMEs were prepared for each specific programme, with 
problems identified by talking to RTOs, (see section E.2.1.1, p. 85). Objectives were set as to 
promote co-operative and collaborative research, (see section E.2.2, p. 86). The RTOs 
represented the principal delivery mechanism. RTOs undertook research on behalf of member 
firms, and as part of their membership services they disseminated the results to members, (see 
section E.2. p. 84, section E.2.3, p. 86). 
Programme Implementation 
GICP: Programme administration was the responsibility of officials, (see section E.2.4, 
p. 86). 
Evaluation including Feedback 
Evaluation of GICP programmes was undertaken in 1996, (see section E.2.5, pp. 86-87). The 
evaluation method included face to face interviews with senior management and people in the 
Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs), and the study o f project progress reports held on file. 
Appendix K, section K.3.2.1, pp. 162-164, discusses the performance of GICP. The GICP evaluation 
report found the programme's rationale to have been valid (DTI, 1996c, p. 10), and that DTl's support 
had been effective in overcoming the barriers to collaborative research, with the objectives 
substantially met (pp. 9-12). Concluding, the evaluation report found GICP to have been a valuable 
and successful initiative, and its closure to have been unfortunate, (DTI, 1996c, p. 24). Feedback o f 
results into future policy was not applicable due to the cessation of GICP funding. 
9.2.2.2 Small Firms Merit Award for Research and Technology (SMART) 
SMART aims to promote R&D by firms by offering grants to innovative SMEs. 
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Issue Identirication 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
The idea for SMART was conceived as a result of officials studying US policy for helping 
small firms, (see appendix E, section E.3.2, pp. 88-89). 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
The development o f SMART was undertaken prior to the introduction of the ROAME 
approach. Therefore it was not possible to study an initial ROAME, and this coupled with the 
inability to access the people responsible for the programme's introduction, meant that it was 
not possible to determine from these sources how the original rationale was built, (see section 
E.3.1, p. 88). However the programme evaluation report (DTI, 1991b, p. 3) refers to the 
development of the rationale being the subject of several approaches, (see section E.3.1, pp. 
87-88). The rationale centred round the market failure of small firms facing difficulty in 
raising finance to fund research. Objectives were set for SMART, such as to stimulate the 
development o f new products, (see section E.3.3, p. 89). The principal delivery mechanism 
was the award of grant funding to reduce the level of risk such as to encourage small firms to 
undertake R&D, (see section E.3.4, p. 89). Section 8.3.4 (p. 90) reveals the approval sequence 
for the 1991 ROAME (ROAME, 1991b) to have been IPC and then ministers. 
Programme Implementation 
Head Quarters DTI stafl'have overall responsibility for the running of SMART, with officials in the 
regional offices of government responsible for the appraisal o f applications, and the award and 
administration of grants, (see section E.3.5, p. 90). Administration of the grants included both 
financial and project monitoring. The series of'competitions' in SMART helped promote the 
programme, (see appendix K, section K.3.2.2, p. 169). SMART was still a current programme at the 
time of completing this thesis. 
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Evaluation including Feedback 
Appendix E, section E.3.6, (p. 91), describes the two evaluations of SMART (DTI, 1991, 1994a), 
which was based on postal questionnaires. Appendix K, section K.3.2.2, (pp. 165-166) reviews the 
performance of SMART. A high level of additionality was recorded in the SMART evaluation report 
(DTI, 1991b, p. 4), while the 1994 evaluation (DTI, 1994a, pp. 3-4) confirmed the core rationale for 
the programme, that is to overcome the problem of small firms being starved of finance. Objectives 
were found to have been substantially met, (section K,3.2.2, pp. 166-168). Concluding, the report 
found SMART to have been valuable and recommended its continuation. Section K.3.2.2 (pp. 169-
170) provides an example of the evaluatory results being fed back into policy development. The 
SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 14-15) recommended the continuous assessment of project 
proposals. The principle was subsequently adopted in the administration of the programme. 
9.2.2.3 Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) 
SPUR had similar objectives to the SMART initiative, but aimed at supporting the Marger' SME. 
Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
The idea for SPUR arose as a result of DTI experiencing a drop in applications for funding, 
following the decision to substantially reduce the level of single company support in 1988. A 
new programme was seen as necessary to plug the gap in DTPs grant provision, (see section 
E.4.1.l,p.92). 
ROAME Development and Approval 
Similarly to SMART, the rationale for SPUR revolved round the difficulty o f small firms 
experiencing difficulty in identifying finance to resource research (see section E.4.1, pp. 9 1 -
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92) . However, as indicated above, a gap existed in the DTI's grant provision, but whilst 
SMART catered for the very small firm, no provision was made for the larger SME. A scheme 
aimed at the latter type of firm was therefore seen as required, (see section E.4.1.1, p. 92). 
Objectives were set for SPUR. These included the setting of targets for the number o f 
supported projects, and to stimulate additional levels of R&D in firms, (section E.4.2, pp. 92-
93) . As with SMART, the principal delivery mechanism was to employ grant funding to 
reduce risk and thereby encourage firms to invest in higher levels of research, (section E.4.3, p. 
93). Section E.4.3 (p. 93) also shows the SPUR ROAME (ROAME, 1990b) to have been 
presented to the IPC. Chapter 6, section 6.4.5 indicates SPUR to have additionally been 
presented to ministers, and Treasury. 
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Programme Implementation 
Delivery of SPUR was through the DTl's Regional Offices, which were responsible for the 
identification of projects (including the appraisal of applications - see appendix K, section K.3.2.3, pp. 
174-175), and the administration of the grants awarded, (see section E.4.4, p. 94). Appendix K, section 
K.3 .2.3, records how DTFs Regional Offices ran workshops to apprise firms o f how to draft 
applications for SPUR funding (pp. 174-175). Inspection of an internal note summarising the history 
of SMART showed that SPUR was subsumed into the former in 1997, (see appendix E, section E.4.5, 
p. 94). 
Evaluation including Feedback 
Section E.4.5, (p. 94) discusses the evaluation of SPUR as detailed in the programme evaluation report 
(DTI, 1994b), which included the use of postal questionnaires and face to face interviews. The 
evaluation found SPUR to have had a positive effect on promoting R&D in SMEs, and the 
programme's objectives generally met, (see appendix K, section K.3.2.3, pp. 171-175). Continuation 
of the scheme was recommended. Additionality was found to be high (p. 171). Section E.4.4 (p. 94) 
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describes how the 1994 evaluation of SPUR (DTI, 1994b, p. 17), prompted the integration of SPUR 
with SMART Stage 2. 
9.2.3 The Consultancy Initiatives (CI) 
CI is described in appendix F. The aim of CI was to encourage SMEs to hire consultants to help them 
improve their management capabilities. 
Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
Officials observed continuing management deficiencies in SMEs, which indicated the need for 
continued support in the form of subsidised consultancy. The SoS also wanted better co-
ordination of DTFs programmes, which acted as the trigger for bringing together the 
department's previous advisory schemes, (see appendix F, section F.2, p. 96). 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
Section F.3, (pp. 96-98), sets out the steps that were taken in drafting the rationale for CI. The 
DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-25) was cited as providing evidence of problems 
experienced by SMEs, and the need to improve their management skills. The results of 
previous evaluation reports provided further evidence of market failure, (see section F. 3, p. 
97). The award of cash grants to overcome firms' suspicions of consultants and thereby 
encourage SMEs to hire them, was the principal delivery mechanism employed in CI (section 
F.4, p. 98). Objectives for CI included initially completing 1,000 consultancies per month 
towards obtaining a market penetration of around 3% for CI . The use o f the V A T Register to 
estimate the number o f target firms was observed, (see section F.5, p. 99). The approval 
sequence of the CI ROAME (ROAME, 1988b) was first presentation to the IPC, then to 
ministers. Treasury, and finally the European Commission, (see section F.7, p. 101). 
349 
Programme Implementation 
Initial appraisal o f applications was undertaken by DTPs regional office staff, with headquarters 
personnel having overall responsibility for the administration of the initiatives. Day to day financial 
monitoring, and the listing of consultants, was undertaken by the scheme contractors elected to operate 
each of the component 'initiatives', (see section F.8, pp. 101-103). CI was promoted as part of the 
Enterprise Initiative (EI) promotional campaign (see section F.9, p. 103), and the last application for a 
grant was received in September 1994 (section F.IO, p. 104). Closure was formerly announced using 
the mechanism of a 'planted' Parliamentary Question (PQ), (see section F.IO, p. 104). Monitoring o f 
CI to track its performance was undertaken. Programme monitoring comprised such activities as 
providing data on the firms receiving support, and qualitative reporting on consultancy projects, (see 
section F.6, pp. 100-101). 
Evaluation including Feedback 
CI was subjected to evaluation, (see section F.I 1, pp. 104-105). Evaluation was based on surveys 
employing face to face interviews. Appendix K, section K.3.3 (p. 175-176) describes how inspection 
of the CI evaluation report (SQW, 1992), and a report by Ernst and Young (Ernst and Young, 1990, p. 
6), demonstrated the rationale for CI to have been valid. The scheme was found to have been 
successful overall in meeting its objectives. As discussed above (section F.3, p. 97), in defining market 
failure officials drew on the results o f evaluating the previous advisory schemes. This evidence 
represents an example of the results of evaluation being fed back into policy design. 
9.2.4 The Managing into the '90s (M90s) Programme 
Appendix G discusses the M90s 'awareness' programme. M90s aimed to raise the levels o f 
competitiveness in firms by making them more aware of the good practice they should adopt in their 
operation. 
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Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
M90s comprised three phases of which the first two were the subject o f research. Section 
G.2.1 (pp. 107-108) looks at how the idea for M90s was conceived in the first phase. Officials 
initially wanted to extend a previous awareness scheme, the Towards Integration (Tl) 
programme. However the SoS rejected the idea of continuing with TI as a 'stand alone' 
activity, as it was contrary to his wish to see the co-ordination o f DTI programmes. In 
response, officials met and agreed to the idea o f bringing DTl 's awareness activities together 
under a single umbrella programme, that is M90s. 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
Section G.2.2 (p. 108) records how officials had identified the importance o f factors such as 
design, quality and management, and the need for these to be managed as part of a corporate 
strategy, in obtaining competitive advantage. However it had been observed that too few firms 
recognised these facts, and then acted upon them. Section G.2.2.1 (pp. 108-109) records how 
this market failure was identified. The DTI White Paper (HMSG, 1988, pp. 24-25) provided 
evidence of poor management in SMEs. An advisory council report (ACARD, 1983, pp. 46-
48) provided evidence of firms failing to plans the application o f new technologies as part o f 
developing their overall business strategies. These findings were confirmed by an internal DTI 
study ( M A M , 1988). Much of M90s development occurred after the approval of the ROAME 
statement. Section G,2.3.1 (p. 110) discusses how a report commissioned from PA 
Consultants (PA, 1989), determined the delivery structure of M90s. Activities were tailored 
such that chief executives in firms would recognise and thus be receptive to the messages 
being delivered. Officials also drew on their experiences of operating previous awareness 
programmes in developing M90s, (see section G.2.3.2, p. 111). 
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Section G.2.4 (pp. 111) records developing the rationale for the continuation of M90s into a 
second phase. For phase 2, the delivery approach was substantially unchanged, (see section 
G.2.4.1, p. 111). Evidence of a continuing market failure was drawn from a number of 
sources, including the Advisory Council on Science and Technology report on A M T (ACOST, 
1991), a consultancy report (Ingersoll Engineers, 1991), and the House of Lords Select 
Committee report on Science and Technology (HMSO, 1991), (see section G.2.4.2, pp. 111-
113). 
The delivery strategies for phases I and 2 included activities such as road shows, workshops , 
demonstration firms, and literature, (see sections G.5.1 and G.5.2, pp. 115-117). Objectives set 
for phases 1 and 2 included the numbers of events to be held, and the total numbers of firms 
attending, (see sections G.3.1 p. 113, and G.3,2, pp. 113-114). The M90s ROAME statements 
(ROAME, 1988a; ROAME, 1991a) were subjected to a Requirements Committee (AMTC), an 
IPC, then ministers, in the approval sequence, (see section G.4.1.1, p. 115). 
Programme Implementation 
M90s was administered by DTI officials. External contractors were appointed through competitive 
tendering to run events, including their promotion, (see section G.5.3, p. 117). Formal appraisal was 
not applicable as M90s did not involve the grant funding of firms (section G.5.4, p. 117). Officials did, 
however, appraise individual activities and instigate performance monitoring o f the programme. 
Section G.5.5, p. 118, discusses programme monitoring, and shows it to have included the 
measurement of the distribution of literature, and an assessment of firms taking action as a result o f 
participating in M90s. 
Evaluation including Feedback 
Section G.7 (pp. 118-119) investigates the evaluation o f M90s. The evaluation method described in 
the evaluation report (DTI, 1995) was based on examination of monitoring returns, and interviews with 
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'experts' to confirm the validity o f the programme rationale. Section K.3.4 (pp. 178-181) o f appendix 
K (pp. 178-179), reveals the M90s evaluation report to have found the rationale for M90s to be valid 
(DTI, 1995, p. 2), and that the programme had achieved its objective o f raising the competitiveness o f 
firms (p. 11), (section K.3.4, pp. 179-180). An example of the M90s evaluation informing future 
policy is provided in chapter 8, section 8.4, where the report (DTI, 1995, pp. 11-12) recommended 
greater use of electronic media in delivering the M90s messages. The recommendation was adopted in 
phase 3 of the programme, which employed the use o f CD ROMs. 
9.2.5 The Manufacturing Planning and Studies (MPI) Programme 
The MPI programme is discussed in appendix H. MPI aimed to encourage SMEs to install good 
practice into their operations by employing consultants to help them plan their use o f new technologies 
holistically, that is in accordance with the needs specified in their business plans. 
Issue Identification 
Conception and Validation of Ideas 
Appendix H, section H.2.2 (pp. 128-129) describes the conception of the idea for MPI. The 
idea grew out of a perception that SMEs needed to adopt a strategic approach to planning their 
business operations, and that many were failing to do so. Evidence of market problems were 
derived from many sources such as a research paper (Fleck, 1988), a programme evaluation 
report, and ajoumal report (Management Today, 1989, pp. 68-96). Section H.2.3 (p. 129) 
shows how initial ideas for MPI were submitted to senior staff for approval, which was 
subsequently received. 
R O A M E Development and Approval 
Following the 'go ahead' to develop a ROAME statement for MPI, officials worked to 
substantiate the rationale for the scheme, (see section H.2.4, pp. 129-132). Further evidence of 
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market failure was drawn from consultancy reports, interviews with other officials, 
consultants, and a leading academic. Steps were taken to analyse the good practice actions 
which firms should take. Officials derived evidence of good practice from sources such as an 
ACOST report (ACOST, 1991, pp. 11-13), and consultancy papers (A T Kearney (1989a, 
1989b). A report was commissioned from the Production Engineering Research Association 
(PERA), which investigated two groups of projects, the first where technology had been 
implemented holistically, and secondly piecemeal. Comparison o f the approaches 
demonstrated the efficacy of adopting the former approach. 
Interviews with consultants showed the complexity o f holistic planning to be such that senior 
consultants would be required to help SMEs in the holistic planning o f business operations, 
and thus the costs involved likely to be a deterrent in firms hiring external expertise. The 
award of grants was employed to overcome inhibitions and encourage firms to embark on 
consultancy led projects, (see section H.3.1, pp. 132-133). Section H.3.3, (pp. 135-136) 
describes the setting of MPI objectives. Experience of operating the previous A M T Studies 
programme was employed to assess likely take up of MPI grants, whilst the VAT register was 
interrogated to estimate the size of the market for MPI. Objectives set included a target of 175 
projects, and the formation of 30 advisor consortia to increase the level of the UK's 
consultancy provision. The MPI ROAME (ROAME, 1990a) was subjected to a Requirements 
Committee (AMTC) for endorsement, then for IPC, ministerial, and Treasury approval. MPI 
was also notified to the European Commission under the State Aids Rules, (see section H.3.4, 
p. 137). 
As an MPI like scheme was not continued, the results o f its evaluation were not employed in 
the development of future policy. However an example of previous lessons being employed in 
the development of MPI, is given by the deployment of experience o f operating the previous 
A M T Studies programme in setting the scheme's objectives, (see section H.3.3.1, p. 135) 
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Programme Implementation 
DTI ofTlcials had overall responsibility for MPI, which included fmancial monitoring and the tracking 
of programme progress, (see section H.5.3.1, p. 139). A scheme contractor was appointed through 
competitive tendering lo manage the day to day administration o f MPl, (see sub- section H.5.1, p. 138). 
The contractor was responsible for tasks such as the monitoring and management o f programme spend, 
the appraisal of project applications, and the listing o f advisors. The programme was launched by 
ministers and promoted by the scheme contractor who prepared a brochure explaining the role of MPl , 
(see section H.5.4, pp. 140-141). Closure o f the scheme was affected through the use of a planted PQ, 
(see section H.5.5, p. 141). 
Evaluation including Feedback 
Section H.6 (p. 141) sets out the evaluation strategy for MPl, which was based on face to face 
interviews with MPl participants, and postal questionnaires. Appendix K, section K.3.5 (pp. 181-187) 
shows the MPl evaluation report (DTI, 1997a, p. 23) as fmding the rationale for MPl to have been 
valid (section K.3.5, p. 181), and that this type of scheme is useful in spreading the message of 
encouraging firms to adopt good practice (p. 181). Participant firms had benefited from their 
consultancies, and the programme was valued by both firms and the consultants (p. 182). Analysis has 
not revealed any of the lessons learned from operating the scheme to have been used to inform the 
design o f future programme policy. 
9.3 Generalisabilty of Research Findings for Wider Application 
A significant part of the rationale for undertaking the research described in this thesis, lies in the ability 
to apply the research findings in other government situations, such that a wider audience than DTI can 
benefit. Thus the final question posed in chapter 1, section 1.9 was: 
(vi) "What scope is there for exploiting the results of research beyond DTI"? 
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The research strategy adopted for investigating the design process was based on the case study method. 
Chapter 4, section 4.8.1 argued that findings of research developed from case studies are generalisable 
to similar situations. 
It is suggested that the process o f programme design, administration, and evaluation, as implemented 
by DTI, is mirrored elsewhere in government. Thus there are good grounds for supposing that the 
design model developed in chapters 5 to 8 may be applied by officials across the Whitehall 
departments. The basis for this proposition rests partly on evidence contained in the Treasury's *Green 
Book'. The 'Green Book' requires all government departments to adopt the ROAME approach in 
developing cases for support, and hence enforces a uniform structure to programme development. 
Inspection of the 'Book' also shows it to require all departments to install arrangements for scheme 
monitoring and evaluation (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1). 
Other considerations lent weight to the hypothesis of generalisability. Inspection o f the evaluation 
report of MAFF's Group Marketing Grant and the Marketing Development Scheme (SAC, 1998), (the 
report is confidential and has not been published) revealed many similarities in programme design with 
the processes employed by DTI, (p. I ) . The evaluators, the Scottish Agricultural College (SAC), begin 
by setting the background to the introduction of the scheme. SAC report the Group Marketing Grant 
(GMG) being introduced in 1992, in response to a study conducted by the Agriculture Minister which 
had identified a UK Food Trade Gap deficit of £6 Billion. The report found that a principal problem 
arose from the major retailers requiring produce from their suppliers which met increasingly stringent 
requirements, in terms of consistent quality, service, volume, and price. The major retailers were also 
found unable to deal with small and poorly managed businesses. U K producers, it was observed, were 
failing to respond to the market opportunities offered them. A number o f factors are given as 
contributing to the problem, including poor communication o f the buyers' requirements and a lack o f 
collaboration. 
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The author makes two observations at this point. Firstly is the use o f the mechanism o f contracting 
research of the market to identify problems. This is an approach widely used in DTI to help in 
determining market failure, as discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2.4. Secondly, the first two steps 
identified in chapter 6, section 6.3.2 in developing rationale for DTI programmes, can be seen to be 
present in this example. Step 1, which is concerned with identifying market problems in terms of firms 
being uncompetitive is, in the MAFF example, exhibited by the failure of the producers to meet the 
purchasing requirements of the retailers. Step 2, which is concerned with determining the good 
practice actions which firms should take, and understanding the reasons why they are not, is also 
evident, for example by the producers failing to collaborate. 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.2, showed step 3 to be concerned with identifying a delivery strategy to negate 
market failures. The SAC report shows this step to be have been undertaken, revealing that the 
strategy adopted in GMG to overcome problems as being: "to encourage the development of 
commercially-managed marketing groups for agricultural and horticultin-al produce'''' (SAC, 1998, p. 
ix). Encouragement for firms to lake the appropriate action was provided in the form of financial 
grants, again a mechanism widely adopted by DTI. 
The GMG scheme was replaced in 1994 with the Marketing Development Scheme (MDS), (SAC, 
1998, p. 2). SAC refer to MDS building on the experience of operating CMG, an approach again often 
taken within DTI. The evaluation report (SAC, 1998) displays other features which indicate similarity 
with DTI. The report comments on the validity of the programme rationale, continuing market failure 
(pp. 11-32), impact of grants on individual firms, 'additionality', and national benefits in terms o f 
exports and import substitution (pp. 33-100). Arrangements for scheme administration are also 
discussed. From these observations the author concluded the process o f designing and implementing 
programmes in MAFF is close to the procedures adopted within DTI, lending credibility to the claim of 
the generalisability of research results. 
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Potential to apply the model beyond the UK Government was also seen. The Technopolis report Good 
Ideas in Programme Management (Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, pp. 8-14) describes at a general 
level, the procedures adopted by governments world wide, but particularly across Europe, in the 
administration of Research and Technology Development programmes. Inspection o f these procedures 
suggests a similar structure to that employed in the UK, with the stages of the ROAMEF process 
clearly identifiable. It is therefore concluded that there exists good potential to exploit the design 
model described in this thesis more widely, the design model also adding value by describing the 
whole process of design through implementation to evaluation, in detail. The findings of this thesis 
should also add value in a further way. The Technopolis report refers to a later version of the report 
containing good practice examples o f programme implementations. The author proposes that the good 
practice identified in the present research would provide a valuable adjunct to Technoplis's work. 
9.4 Conclusions 
The draft IDEFO model as developed in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, had suggested the stages of programme 
design and operation to be: 
(i) Issue Identification (chapter 6) 
Conception and Validation o f Programme Ideas (chapter 6, section 6.2) 
Develop Programme ROAME statements (chapter 6, section 6.3) 
ROAME Approval (chapter 6, sections 6.4 and 6.5) 
(ii) Programme Implementation (chapter 7) 
(i i i ) Evaluation and Feedback (chapter 8, sections 8.2-8.8). 
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The analysis of the case study examples undertaken in section 9.2, reveals that the processes involved 
in their design and subsequent implementation to conform closely in terms of their structure, with that 
predicted by the process model. Each of the components and elements defined by the model have been 
shown to be substantially identifiable in the examples above, indicating the credibility o f the model to 
describe the process of designing and administering programmes. Further confidence in the model's 
ability to describe the overall process may be gained from inspection of appendices D to H, where the 
approaches adopted in the case study examples are described in detail. Importantly, the process model 
appears to be generic, being valid for Research and Technology, consultancy based, and awareness 
programmes, each of these areas being represented in the case study examples. These observations 
suggest that the model can be widely adopted for analysing the design process. 
It is proposed that the process model is an example of good practice. The results of evaluation have 
shown that the procedures which were adopted in the development and administration of the case study 
programmes, resulted in the successful implementation of these schemes. It is therefore argued that the 
processes involved represent examples of good practice, and thus in turn the model which they 
comprise may be similarly described. In addition, the research recorded in section 9.3 above suggests 
that the design process, as implemented elsewhere in government, is similar in structure to that 
employed in DTI. Hence it is proposed that the process model is also fit to describe the process o f 
designing and administering programmes as undertaken more widely in government. It is further 
observed that evidence of similarities in the design process as carried out in DTI, with the procedures 
adopted elsewhere in the public sector, lends further credibility to the model being described as a tool 
for general application. 
Having gained confidence in the validity o f the process model, which had provided a detailed 
description of the design process, the next stage o f the research was to identify ways in which the 
process could be made better. This work was necessary to achieve the second research objective (b), 
described in chapter I , section 1.2. The approach taken was to look at the mechanisms involved in 
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each component and element of the design system, and to investigate where and how improvement 
measures could be introduced. The following chapter, chapter 10, describes this phase of the research 
work. Chapter 1, section 1.2 also described the third research objective (c), which was concerned with 
developing proposals for a set o f good practice guidelines to be made available to officials engaged in 
the design process. This topic is discussed in chapter 10, sections 10.4.2 and 10.4.3. 
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IMPROVING T H E P R O C E S S 
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10. IMPROVING T H E PROCESS 
10.1 Introduction 
10.1.1 Background 
Chapter 8 described the function of'Evaluation and Feedback', and completed the exercise o f mapping 
the design process. A comprehensive description of the complete process had been obtained. Thus the 
fourth research question which was concerned with understanding the support process, was seen as 
having been answered. It was concluded that in describing the process, a contribution to knowledge 
had been made and the first research objective (a) thus achieved (see chapter 1, section 1.2). 
Chapter 9 discussed the testing of the process model using the five case study examples, which are 
described in appendices D to H. Chapter 9 concluded that the structure o f the design process, as 
defined by the model, fitted that described in the case studies thereby suggesting the model to be 
credible. Having developed a plausible model, the purpose o f this chapter is to satisfy the second 
research objective as described in chapter 1, section 1.2, which was stated as follows: 
b) To exploit the findings of research to identify ways in which the design process can be improved to 
become more efficient and effective, such that value for money is increased. 
Chapter I , section 1.2 also proposed a third research objective (c), which was staled thus: 
c) As part of achieving objective (b) to develop proposals for a set of good practice guidance for 
inclusion in a future Handbookfor Programme Design and Operation, 
Chapter 1, section 1.2 described the symptoms of possible problems. These centred around the 
observation that DTI and the remainder of government were not making best use o f the corporate 
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knowledge base in programme design. Difficulties, it was suggested, lay in accessing corporate 
knowledge, which resides principally in peoples' heads, and in a plethora of programme evaluation 
reports. It was therefore difficult for people to learn from each other's experiences. 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.3 helped confirm the existence of problems. Studying the literature had revealed 
policy mistakes to have been observed. It was proposed that problems were attributable to the 
structural changes within the Civil Service which have taken place in recent times. These have 
contributed to making access to expertise difficult, as staff are moved out o f their former policy making 
roles, or lost altogether through reductions in staffing. The ability of policy makers to create effective 
policies was in consequence considered to be restricted. The evidence o f problems lends value to 
achieving the research objectives (b) and (c), as they are concerned with identifying strategies for 
improvement. Thus the fifth research question proposed in chapter I , section 1.6 in pursuit of realising 
these objectives, was seen as a sensible question to ask. The question was stated as: 
(v) "In what areas may improvements be introduced and what should those improvements comprise"? 
Chapter 3, section 3.8.3 identified several, specific questions to be answered as part o f responding to 
the fifth research question. They were: 
(a) "how should departments exploit Knowledge Management to become learning organisations, 
and to help this happen, and specifically how to: 
(b) employ knowledge management such that officials can tap into each others experiences in 
designing support policy, 
(c) present evaluatory findings to the design process. 
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(d) use benchmarking techniques to import good practice employed elsewhere, 
(e) identify solutions for resolving the specific problems identified with DTI's File Management 
System, that is, the potential loss of files with lime, and difficulties surrounding file access"? 
The aim of this chapter is to provide answers to the fiflh research question, responding to the specific 
points (a) to (e) above. Two approaches were adopted. The first was to examine the detail of 
programme design as recorded in the mapping process (that is what happens in practice) and to then 
investigate how well current guidance provided to officials supports them in each element of the task. 
A number of problems were found and proposals for their resolution developed. The second was to 
look at other areas of inefficiency, and see what additional arrangements could be introduced to further 
improve performance. 
10.1.2 Identifying the Problems and Finding the Solutions 
Review of the literature was helpful in determining how the author should conduct the task of 
discovering the nature of problems, and how issues identified could be resolved. 
Chapter 3, section 3.4.1 proposed Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) as an appropriate approach 
for identifying the problem areas, and for finding ways in which to introduce changes for 
improvement. In section 3.4.2 it was proposed that problems could also be helped by DTI and other 
government departments becoming learning organisations through effective knowledge management. 
It was therefore suggested that ways of introducing Knowledge Management to raise the efficiency o f 
the design and administration process, also be investigated. 
Section 10.2 below begins the task of building proposals for improvement by first looking at the need 
for change. Section 10.3 develops the detailed strategy for identifying areas for betterment based on 
BPR. Developing proposals for change is discussed in section 10.4. Section 10.4,1 explains the 
reasoning behind focusing on the use of the Innovation Budget Guidelines as the principal source of 
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reference, and section 10.4.2 argues the rationale for a new set of guidance, the Handbook for 
Programme Design and Operation. Sections 10.4.1 to 10.4.3 examine the content o f current guidance, 
against what is undertaken in practice. A number o f gaps are identified, and suggestions made for how 
they can be addressed. 
Section 10.5 studies the potential to employ Knowledge Management to raise the efficiency of the 
design process. As a pre-cursor to discussing the issues involved, section 10.5.1 first highlights the 
strategic importance of knowledge to organisations. Sections 10.5.2 and 10.5.3 then follow by 
explaining the differences between data, information, and knowledge, and within 'knowledge' the need 
to differentiate between its tacit and explicit forms. Section 10,5.4 then looks at how knowledge is 
created, with sections 10.5.5 and 6 explaining the roles of'externalising' and 'internalising' 
knowledge. The difficulties associated with accessing tacit knowledge are highlighted. 
The scene set, how knowledge management can be deployed in DTI and other government departments 
is discussed in section 10.5.7. How the proposed 'Design Handbook' w i l l act as a vehicle for 
knowledge transfer is argued, and the efficacy o f the approach discussed. Section 10.5.8 looks at other 
means of transferring knowledge, while section 10.5.9 describes the use of a knowledge database to 
improve access to corporate experience. 
The need to up-date the knowledge base is highlighted in section 10.5.10, and the deployment o f 
benchmarking to l if t best practice from external organisations is described in section 10.5.11. Finally 
section 10.5.12 identifies problems with the present organisation of'Evaluation and Feedback' within 
DTI, and makes recommendations for improvement. 
10.2 The Need for Change 
The rationale to consider change in the process of designing policy for industry support programmes in 
DTI, arises in the first instance from the now widely held belief that in today's rapidly changing 
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business environment, the majority o f organisations, both private and public, must continually review 
their operations to maintain the UK's competitive position (Drucker, 1993, pp. 52-53; 1995, pp. 270-
271; Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 25-38). The publication Matnifacturing into the Late 1990s, a 
document prepared for DTI by the PA Consulting Group (PA, 1993, p. 6), refers to 'change' now being 
the key word for businesses. For PA, the need for change derives from firms having to respond to the 
market drivers, such as the global economy, technological developments, competitors, and 
demographic lifestyles and trends, (Peppard and Rowland, 1995, pp. 25-38). The market place is 
highly dynamic and competitive (Butler Group, 1995, p. I I ) , and ''achieving a consistently successjul 
performance in such changing times is an enormous challenge'' (PA , 1993, p. 6). 
A DTI internal report written for the department's Knowledge Management Unit (KMU), 
acknowledges that DTI operates in a different sector to commercial organisations, but argues that 
nevertheless, the challenges which it now faces, it has much in common'^ DTI (1999, p. 4). 
Traditional organisations, o f which government departments are an example, have built their structures 
around functions and hierarchy (Obolensky, 1994, pp. 7-8; Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p, 5-6). While 
serving organisations well in the past, they have proved slow in responding to the changing needs o f 
today's volatile, business environment. Drucker (1993, p. 142) highlights the urgent need to make 
government effective. Peppard and Rowland (1995) refer to "///e notion of 'market forces' is no longer 
a stranger to most public sector organizations in the developed world" (p. 31). 
The need for change to meet the challenge presented by the modem business environment is well 
recognised within Whitehall. The government white paper. Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 
1999), in its "Forward by The Prime Minister", the Rt. Hon. Tony ' Blair, states "77;^ Government has 
a mission to modernise - renewing our country for the new millennium" (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 4). 
The white paper continues "We all want to deliver policies, programmes and services that will make t4S 
more healthy, secure and better equipped to tackle the challenges we face'' (p. 9). To achieve the 
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government's goals, the Paper emphasises the importance o f modernising the way government works, 
including the way in which policies and programmes are devised. 
Better policy making to ensure implementation o f policies which deliver the outcomes which 
businesses seek is a primary objective for modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 7, 9, 13, 
18). The remit to help firms is echoed in the government's 'Competitiveness White paper', Oi(r 
Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (Stationery Office, 1998, p. 6), which 
refers to the government having a key i-ole as a catalyst to strengthen the supply side of the economy. 
The design and introduction of support programmes forms part o f the overall process of policy making. 
Harrington (1991) suggests the biggest opportunity for an organisation to improve its 'bottom line' 
comes from improving its business processes. Thus there exists the rationale to examine the design 
process, to identify potential areas where change could bring about policies which are more efficient, 
and more effective in raising the competitiveness o f firms. Searching for ways to improve current 
arrangements is also consistent with 'policy' of long standing. Officials have a clear mandate to make 
best use of their resources, including the maximisation o f VFM (HMSO(1982); RIPA, 1988). 
Introducing greater efficiency into the process is seen as benefiting government, through resultant cost 
savings brought by better use of resources (CCTA, 1994, pp. 1, 3-4). 
10.3 Selecting the Strategy for Identifying and Solving Problems 
Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 3-21) commend Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) for 
challenging many of the traditional assumptions on which organisations have been founded. For them, 
BPR is about seeking ways in which to introduce change into organisations so that they are better 
responsive to the changing needs of society. Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 18-21) view BPR a 
useful tool to examine current processes, and for bringing about step improvements in performance 
through subsequent redesign of those processes. BPR, they suggest, is synonymous with creativity and 
innovation (p. 163). For the government innovation is pivotal to improvement. The ^Competitiveness' 
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white paper states "TT/e Government must improve its performance by becoming more innovative^' 
(Stationery Office, 1998, p. 8). 
Others support Peppard and Rowland's views. Davis (1996) refers to BPR as being: 
''most help/til for improving the performance of recurring business procedures and activities^' (Davis, 
1996, p. 69). The Butler Group (1995) view BPR as a response to demands for business change arising 
from today's "highly volatile and competitive markets'' (p. 11). Braganza and Myers (1995, pp. I -2) 
identify BPR as a key change initiative for achieving improvements in the running o f both public and 
private sector bodies. CCTA (1994) considers BPR as being "particularly appropriate for government 
organisations'* (p. 3). Braganza and Myers (1995, p; I) highlight the pursuit of better VFM as the 
primary objective for both groups of organisations in undertaking such initiatives. 
Peppard and Rowland (1995) usefully define BPR as follows: 
"BPR as an improvement philosophy. It aims to achieve step improvements in performance by 
redesigning the processes through which an organization operates, maximizing their value-added 
content and minimising everything else. This approach can be applied at an individual process level 
or to the whole organisation" (p. 20). 
The Butler Group (1995) concur, stating "Business Process Re-engineering is primarily concerned 
with the need to investigate business processes and find out whether they can be improved" (p. 11). 
They additionally point to it being possible to undertake BPR at different levels within an organisation. 
BPR projects can extend throughout an enterprise or focus on resolving issues in a specific, problem 
area. The process of designing programmes is an example of the latter, being one o f a number of 
functional areas within DTI. The advantage of BPR is seen as stemming from its holistic nature, which 
emphasises the role of'processes' within the context of the organisation. Thus BPR, it is argued, is 
able to draw on the body of knowledge which has developed from applying the previous approaches, 
such as Total Quality Management (TQM), (Obolensky, 1994, p. 7; Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 
13). 
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Braganza and Myers (1995, pp. 8) cite cost reduction in 'the process' and the shortening of cycle times 
as principal reasons for organisations committing to BPR projects. They point to organisations 
experiencing significant benefits from implementing BPR, with some achieving 150% improvement in 
'on-time' deliveries, and processing limes down from typically 25 days to one half o f a day. These 
improvements are significant, and are similar in nature to those sought by policy designers. As needs 
change ministers and senior staff can set tight deadlines for the delivery of new policies, seeking early 
introductions of new initiatives. Government also seeks VFM in every aspect o f the policy process 
(HMSO, 1982), including that o f developing programmes. The potential to achieve significant benefits 
from applying BPR as demonstrated by the above examples, and the suitability of the approach for use 
in public sector applications (CCTA, 1994, p. 3; Braganza and Myers, 1995, p. 1) suggested that 
application of BPR would be a viable strategy for discovering ways in which the current design process 
could be improved. 
However Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 155-161) highlight the need to consider the role which 
existing processes should play in BPR. This, they argue, is a central area of contention for many. 
Hence Peppard and Rowland suggest certain points require consideration in developing BPR strategies. 
Should existing processes form the basis for the new redesigned actions, or, in embarking on BPR, 
should organisations start with a completely 'clean sheet'? They classify these two broad strategies for 
BPR into the categories of 'Systematic Redesign' and the 'Clean Sheet Approach'. The former 
generally involves incremental modification of existing processes. The latter is normally associated 
with radical change resulting from the implementation of new processes, whose design is not derived 
from the 'old ' . 
Many favour the radical approach (Braganza and Myers, 1995, p. 2). For example Hammer (1990, pp. 
104-105) argues that re-engineering cannot be planned and accomplished in small cautious steps. He 
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proposes that BPR is all-or-nothingpropositiori'^ (Hammer, 1990 p. 105) to radically redesign 
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in their performances. He continues: 
"fl/ the heart of re-engineering, is the notion of discontinuous thinking - of recognizing and breaking 
away from the outdated rules andfundamental assumptions that underlie operations. Unless we 
change these rules, we are merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic", 
(Hammer, 1990 p. 107). 
However others take a different line. Peppard and Rowland (1995, p. 157) records that whilst 
historically clean sheet strategies have been the preferred approach for many 'Western' companies, the 
failure rate of these radical projects has been high. The Butler Group (1995, p. 11) points to various 
surveys of BPR projects, which show that over 60% of radical projects fai l . Peppard and Rowland 
(1995, p. 157) suggest the failure rate could be as higli as 70%, whilst Obolensky (1994, p. 7) reports 
others considering the figure to be closer to 80%. Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 157-160) contrast 
these poor results with the success of strategies involving incremental change, where firms, particularly 
Japanese enterprises, have realised significant gains in performance. The greater risk associated with 
clean sheet projects, which take little or no account of previous experience, is proposed as a primary 
cause. 
In deciding whether an incremental or radical change approach should be adopted in developing 
proposals for improving the policy design process. Sir Robert Armstrong, former Secretary of the 
Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service, provides some useful advice. When giving a 
presentation at a seminar on the "Future Shape of Reform in Whitehall" (RlPA, 1988), he informed 
delegates (including members of the Civil Service, politicians, and people from other parts of the 
public sector, including academia) of the need, when reviewing change in the Civil Service, to bear in 
mind the following: 
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"thai change has to be accommodated withhi the continumg bitsmess of Government which will not 
wait. 772/5 (the Civil Service) is not a car which you can take off the road while you change the wheels 
or fit a new distributor. TJie people being asked to deliver management changes are the same people 
who are also and at the same time tasked to deliver a day-to-day provision of services to the publid\ 
(RlPA, 1988, p. 12). 
Sir Robert continued, advising that the nature of the Civil Service dictates that the process of 
management change in the public service must be inevitably gradual. 
However other considerations also suggest an incremental approach is more appropriate. The process 
of programme development in DTI has evolved over many years, with many of the current schemes 
having their origins in programmes launched in the 'Mid-seventies (DTI, 1983, paragraph 1.1, 1985, 
paragraph 1.14). Examination o f DTl's evaluation reports of programmes operated in the Eighties and 
Nineties shows that whilst schemes have not universally attained high levels o f success, they have 
nonetheless been generally regarded as representing reasonable V F M . While for the reasons discussed 
earlier, potential for improvement is seen, current levels o f performance are in the author's opinion 
sufficient lo render radical change unnecessary. Peppard and Rowland argue from another 'stand 
point'. They contend that" ignoring existing processes is high risk, not least because it fails to build 
on existing knowledge and experience which has been built up over time and risks repeating the 
mistakes of the past'' (Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 156).* 
Few companies, they argue, succeed in introducing entirely new processes into existing operations. 
New procedures often bear little relation to the actual tasks undertaken, making it difficult for people to 
relate to the new designs, with the consequence that change projects 'grind to a halt'. 
The Butler Group (1995, pp. 11, 13) reinforces this view. They suggest radical change 'big-bang' 
projects should not be contemplated, strongly recommending instead that firms adopt an evolutionary, 
step by step approach to BPR. Human beings they argue, are poor at handling complexity (see also 
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chapter 3, section 3.5). 'Bigrbang' projects, they continue, typically create 'thousands' of variables, 
giving the project manager no chance of success, because he or she wil l lose. For the Butler Group 
(1995, p. 13), many serious errors o f judgement in the past could have been avoided i f the business 
managers concerned had better understood the implications of complexity. 
In contrast, evolutionary BPR projects plan out best, because things are taken a step at a time (Butler 
Group, 1995, pp. 13-14). However, the Butler Group is quick to point out that systematic redesign 
while a more cautious approach, does not prevent goals for success being set high. The author further 
observes that the rationale for adopting an incremental approach displays similarities with 
Mncremenlalism' in programme development, where the complexity o f the issues involved prevents 
resolution o f all the policy issues in one go, (see chapter 3, section 3.5). Taking all o f the above 
considerations into account, systematic redesign of the development process involving incremental 
change appeared the most befitting strategy for analysis. 
The decision taken to adopt a systematic approach to re-engineering the design process, the next step 
was to identify a structure for research work. Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 45-46) suggested the 
way forward. They propose organisations are built on the three main pillars of the processes, people, 
and technology. In designing new processes these elements must be considered in turn, in the light of 
'business' requirements. The following text (section 10.4) concentrates on 'process', and records the 
examination of the current design system, identifying problems and developing proposals for their 
resolution. These proposals centre around improving current guidance available to officials. Section 
10.5 investigates the introduction of 'Knowledge Management', which is about people (Brooking, 
1999, p. 139), and 'Technology' to increase efficiency in the design process. 
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10,4 Re-engineering of the Process of Designing Policy for Support 
Programmes 
'Systematic re-design* involves identifying and understanding the existing processes, then analysing 
them systematically to create new processes (Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 156). As the first step in 
BPR, the Butler Group (1995, pp. 18-20) emphasise the importance of gaining a thorough 
understanding of the current process. For them this is not only important in providing a sound basis 
upon which to develop proposals for change, but also to allow original processes to be re-installed in 
the event of mistakes. In helping to understand and record the current process, Peppard and Rowland 
agree, recommending that a process map be constructed. For mapping purposes they report that "the 
IDEFQ mapping standard is frequently usedfor BPR initiatives" (Peppard and Rowland, 1995, p. 172). 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis described the use of IDEF to analyse and map the current design 
process, and documented the results o f this work. 
10.4.1 Examination of Current Guidance 
The current process having been analysed and mapped, the next step was to identify those areas in need 
of improvement. The observations of the Butler Group (1995) usefully suggested a starting point. 
They propose that in most organisations the current processes wil l have been built up over a period of 
time, and are unlikely to be documented. BPR, they suggest, often provides the first opportunity to 
analyse and formally record the extent of existing systems. As observed above, the situation in DTI is 
atypical, the design process having developed over many years and, as far as the author is aware, not 
the subject of a previous BPR exercise. The observations of the Butler Group suggested that the author 
begin by examining current documentation used in the design process, to discover how well procedures 
are described. Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 showed that there are three principal sources of reference which 
provide guidance to officials in the design and introduction of support programmes. They are the 
Treasury 'Green Book' (HMT, 1997), the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b), and the successive 
v^X^zsQS of iht Innovation Budget Guidelines {UY\, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1996a, 1999a). 
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From the viewpoint of scheme development and operation, the DTI Finance Handbook is the first (top-
level) source of reference for officials. However the author's own experience, coupled with findings 
derived from conversations with colleagues, showed the Innovation Budget Guidelines to be the most 
widely consulted source of reference. Study of the design process revealed several reasons 
contributing to their greater use. Firstly, copies of the guidelines are issued to ever>' official who is 
concerned with developing programmes to be funded out o f the Innovation Budget. In contrast, access 
to the Treasury guidelines and DTI's Finance Handbook is more restricted, with circulation of copies 
mainly limited to the departmental 'Finance Officers'. These officials work in the management units 
of each directorate, and oversee programme and other spend. Thus other officials wishing to reference 
the Treasury guidance and the Finance Handbook must make a specific request to the holders in order 
to read them. In talking to colleagues, the author found instances o f officials not even being aware o f 
the existence of either the 'Green Book' or the DTI Finance Handbook] Lack of awareness o f these 
documents is, in the author's view, due largely to limited distribution. 
Secondly, that portion of the guidance which is directly relevant to preparing ROAME Statements in 
the 'Green Book' and the Finance Handbook is not as comprehensive as that presented in the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines. The 'Innovation Guidelines' is dedicated to supporting officials in the 
design process, and provides a higher level of detail and explanation in those aspects directly 
connected with programme development. As one very experienced official engaged in developing 
programmes under the Innovation Budget remarked to the author, " / would not look in the 'Green 
Book' or the 'Finance Handbook 'for guidance in building a case for support". Another colleague 
reported that while he was aware of the Finance Handbook, he regarded it as an 'accountancy 
document', and therefore had not referred to it in scheme design. For him the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines, with their content directed at informing project officers (those officials engaged in 
programme design and operation), represented his primary source o f reference [Interview 11]). 
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The Imwvation Budget Guidelines were found to be the only example of their type, being specific to 
the Innovation Budget. In their present form they have evolved over a period of some thirteen years. 
During this time numerous suggestions for improvement have been received from 'users', and 
incorporated into the guidance (DTI , 1992, p. i) . The author has found the document to be *well 
thought of by officials'. Conversation with a colleague (Dr. Bentley, a PRl 1 in DTI's SBS) revealed 
the guidelines to be employed as a 'best practice' source of reference in designing schemes funded 
from within other budget areas. This seems a reasonable practice. Much of the guidance is generic to 
both R & T and advisory programmes, for example the need to demonstrate market failure, the 
presence of'constraints' such as EC State Aids, government policy, and the approval and 
administration procedures. Given the more detailed nature and widespread acceptance of the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines as the primary source of reference in the design process, it seemed 
sensible that in improving guidance the author should build on the content o f these guidelines. In 
looking at existing documentation, study began by focusing on deficiencies in this specific set of 
guidance. 
10.4.2 Proposals for a Handbook for Programme Design and Operation 
Poor access to the Treasury's 'Green Book' and the DTI Finance Handbook constitutes a problem, as 
these guidelines provide important information on the wider issues surrounding scheme design. For 
example they detail what may be 'legally' funded, by explaining the role o f Acts o f Parliament. DTI's 
guidance provides administrative advice on how officials should deal with such situations as company 
insolvency. As an initial step, it is proposed that a summary o f the roles of the HM Treasury guidance 
and the Finance Handbook be added to the Innovation Budget Guidelines, explaining their contents 
and why and when officials need to refer to them. Cross referencing between documents should also 
be provided to ensure ease of access to required sections in each set o f guidance. 
To reflect the wider content of the resultant guidance, and to differentiate it from the circulation of 
previous documentation, it is proposed that this revised advice receive a new title, Tlie Handbook for 
375 
Programme Design and Operation. The title, it is hoped, would help officials recognise the new 
guidance as a 'definitive' document on the subject of scheme design, providing ready access to advice 
on the broad range of issues surrounding the design process. Chapter 1, section 1.2, introduced the 
idea of the 'Design Handbook' and suggested it include examples of good practice in programme 
design. The third research objective (c) was hence set to develop proposals for a set o f good practice 
guidance for inclusion in the manual. 
The observations made in section 10.4.1 above suggest that the content of the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines is representative o f good practice. They have a proven track record in the field, having 
been employed over a number o f years and with their on-going development based on 'user feedback'. 
Similarly it can also be argued that the financial procedures presented in the Finance Handbook also 
represent good practice in the administration of public funds. It is therefore suggested that in adding a 
summary of the Finance Handbook to the 'Innovation Guidelines', the first step has been taken 
towards meeting objective (c). The following sections take the process of developing proposals for a 
comprehensive set of good practice guidance a stage further, by examining the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines against 'practice in the field', to identify and address gaps in its provision. 
10.4.3 Examination of Deficiencies in the Innovation Budget Guidelines 
The approach taken was to critically examine how well the guidelines supported the design task, for 
both R & T and advisory schemes. For each stage o f the design process as identified in chapters 5, 6, 
7, and 8, the descriptions provided in the Innovation Budget Guidelines of the tasks to be conducted 
was compared with the actual work undertaken in practice. A number of gaps in the guidance were 
identified. It is proposed that in each instance gaps in the 'Innovation' guidance can be filled by 
providing in the proposed 'Design Handbook', descriptions of what officials do in practice, as 
identified in building the process model. Based on inspection o f DTl 's Functional Directory (DTI, 
I999d), attendance of government meetings, and discussion with colleagues, the target audience for the 
new handbook is estimated as being approximately 400 people. 
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The process of programme design and administration has itself developed over many years, and many 
evaluations of schemes conducted (see appendix A, pp. 2-7). While many of these reports make 
recommendations for improvement, none, as far as the author is aware, have regarded any intervention 
to have failed through poor design (for some examples see appendix K, pp. 158-187, which discusses 
good and poor practice in terms of the findings made in programme evaluation reports). These 
observations provide a level of confidence that the mechanisms adopted in design and administration 
represent examples of good practice. 
However to help ensure that such confidence was not misplaced, and thus the design model 
representative of good practice, the case study examples contained in appendices D to H were 
evaluated in terms of their overall performance. On balance these schemes achieved a good set of 
outcomes. Good results, it is argued, serve to demonstrate the efficacy of the mechanisms adoptedjn 
their design and implementation. Since they are representative of the overall design process (see 
chapter 1, section 1.1), it is further suggested that the approaches described in the design model 
(research of the model focusing on the case study examples) are by implication representative of good 
practice generally. The evaluation of the case examples is described in appendix K, pp. 161-187, 
which calls on a number of DTI evaluation reports in reaching conclusions. By f i l l ing gaps in the 
current guidance with practice derived from the design model, it is proposed that the new 'Design 
Handbook' would contain a comprehensive set of good practice guidance to officials, and thus satisfy 
the third research objective (c). 
Chapter 8, section 8.8 found the main stages of the process and their component parts to be as follows: 
(i) Issue IdentiflcatioD (chapter 6) 
Conception and Validation of Programme Ideas (chapter 6, section 6.2) 
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Develop Programme ROAME statements (chapter 6, section 6.3) 
ROAME Approval (chapter 6, section 6.4 and 6.5) 
(ii) Programme Implementation (chapter 7) 
(i i i ) Evaluation and Feedback (chapter 8, sections 8.2-8.8) 
Chapter 9 described the testing of the above model. Study o f the development and administration o f 
the case study examples showed the structure o f the overall process to conform with that predicted by 
the model. By way of demonstrating the integrity of the model, chapter 9 provided instances of action 
being taken in each of the component stages, (see section 9.2.1 the Enterprise Initiative (El), sub-
section 9.2.2.1, the General Industrial Collaborative Projects (GICP) programme, sub-section 9.2.2.2, 
the Small Firms Merit Award for Research and Technology (SMART) scheme, sub-section 9.2.2.2, the 
Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) initiative, section 9.2.3, the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), 
section 9.2.4, the Managing into the '90s programme (M90s), and section 9.2.5, the Manufacturing, 
Planning and Implementation (MPI) programme). The ability of the Innovation Budget Guidelines to 
support the design process in each of these areas was examined. Appendix I , pp. 142-153, records the 
detail of the work undertaken, and the recommendations made towards achieving a comprehensive set 
of design guidelines. The principal recommendations include: 
10.4.3.1 Issue Ident i f ica t ion 
o Officials should be better apprised of the role o f Acts of Parliament, in particular how the Science 
and Technology and Industry Acts empower the Secretary of State to support businesses. Their 
relationship with what officials can and cannot fund should be explained (appendix I , section 1.2.1, 
p. 144). 
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• White papers are the primary source of reference for statements describing government policy, and 
clear advice needs to be added to guidance for officials to consult these documents, to ensure 
programmes are designed to be conformant with policy (appendix I , section 1.2.1, pp. 144-145). 
Guidance should also highlight the importance o f understanding the individual priorities o f 
ministers, in seeking to design programmes that are likely to receive their support, (appendix I , 
section 1.2.1, pp. 145-146). 
• An alternative definition of market failure, which makes explicit that the rational for government 
intervention relies on there being present in the market factors that inhibit firms from taking good . 
practice actions, is proposed (appendix 1.2.1, p. 145). Categories o f market failure pertaining to 
advisory programmes should also be provided (appendix I , section 1.2.1, p. 145). 
• It is suggested that officials' attention should be drawn to the process of conceiving and validating 
ideas, as it is fundamental to officials in making timely responses to changing support 
requirements. Drawing on the knowledge recorded in chapter 6, section 6.2, guidance should 
describe how initial thoughts are generated, and then developed into outline proposals and 
validated to test their credibility (appendix I , section 1.2.2, pp. 146-147). 
» The steps involved in developing programme rationale, as described in chapter 6, section 6.3.2, 
should be specifically identified. This would help officials in understanding the extent of the 
process. Guidance on what needs to be undertaken within each step, would be provided. In 
developing rationale, current guidance is weak in informing officials as to 'how' they identify the 
presence of market failures. Drawing on the findings of chapters 5 and 6, it is proposed that the 
sources of evidence available to officials and how they are accessed, be included In the 'Handbook 
for Programme Design' (appendix I , section 1.2.3, pp. 147-149). 
379 
• Guidance currently says little on what delivery mechanisms may be employed to negate market 
failures. It is suggested that the performance of schemes could be enhanced by providing officials 
with examples of the good practice delivery mechanisms which have successfully been employed in 
. the past. In support of fulfilling this requirement, appendix K identifies some examples where the 
opportunity is also taken to identify instances of good practice in the related area o f programme 
administration. For completeness it is proposed that examples of bad practice also be given, to help 
prevent previous mistakes being repeated (Brooking, 1999, p. 5). It is argued that such 
information, coupled with better guidance on how to determine market failure, would result in the 
introduction of programmes which, in their design, are more likely to meet the needs of firms 
(appendix I , section 1.2.3, pp. 148-149). 
• Chapter 6, section 6.5. Section 6.5 discussed some of the mechanisms by which officials can help 
'make the ground fertile' for the approval of schemes, and it is recommended that details of actions 
which officials can take to help ensure acceptance of proposals be included in guidance towards 
increasing efficiency (appendix 1, section 1.2.4, p. 149). 
10.4.3.2 Programme Implementat ion 
• Chapter 7, section 7.2, discussed 'Appraisal', and it was shown that certain checks such as the 
availability of resources, and testing the criteria which contribute to the demonstration of the 
condition of additionality, are essentially common to projects in R & T programmes and advisory 
schemes (DTI, 1996b, section 9.3). However, significant differences do exist in the administration 
of the appraisal function between the two types of programmes. For the former, appraisal is 
normally undertaken by officials, in the latter it is usually carried out by external personnel. It is 
proposed that in the new guidelines officials be reminded that the additionality criteria apply 
'across the board' when considering applications for financial support, but specific guidance on 
the how the other elements of the appraisal task are performed in each o f the two cases, be 
described, (appendix 1, section 1.3.1, pp. 149-150). 
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• Chapter 7, sections 7.3, 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, examined the monitoring function in programmes, and 
• illustrated how similarly to the administration of 'Appraisal', officials tend to be responsible for 
project monitoring in R&D projects, but in consultancy schemes the task is normally undertaken 
by non civil servants. As in the case o f appraising projects, this distinction needs to be made clear 
in guidance, and the procedures to be adopted for both classifications of programme, detailed. It 
was also considered helpful to include a section in the 'Handbook' dedicated to describing the 
mechanisms adopted in the monitoring function (see appendix 1, section 1.3.2, p. 150). 
• Chapter 7, section 7.6.1 highlighted that officials of^en quote ROAME objectives and programme 
eligibility criteria in ITT specifications to help ensure policy conformance. Furthermore, the 
proposals of successful bidders often form the basis o f contractual agreements. These practices are 
not highlighted in current guidance. Guidance should therefore be enhanced accordingly to advise 
of these needs (see appendix I , section 1.3.3, p. 151). 
• Chapter 7, section 7.6.1 also showed officials to write non-prescriptive ITT specifications, which do 
not assume a preconceived approach. This approach is not detailed in the 'Innovation Guidelines', 
and the need for tender specifications to be non prescriptive should be stated and explained in the new 
'Design Handbook' (see appendix I , section 1.3.3, p. 151). 
• The requirement to formally promote programmes, and subsequently to officially announce 
their closure, was discussed in chapter 7, sections 7.7 and 7.8. Such provisions are not 
adequately discussed in the current guidance, and it is recommended that these omissions 
be made good in the proposed handbook. Chapter 7, section 7.7 detailed a number of 
promotional activities, which have been used successfully in the past. These examples 
should be included in the new guidance, along with a discussion of the procedures for 
closure, detailed in section 7.8 (see appendix 1, section 1.3.4, p. 151). 
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10.4.3.3 Evaluation including Feed-back 
No changes were recommended. Guidance on 'Evaluation* provided in the supplementary guidelines 
Guidance on the Preparation of Evaluation Plans (DTI, 1999c), is considered as sufficiently 
comprehensive for officials to draw up effective evaluation plans for both R & T and advisory 
programmes (see appendix I , section 1.4, p. 152). 
10.4.3.4 A Process Map 
Blosch (2000, pp. 13-14) highlights the importance o f providing people with a map o f the 
process in which they are engaged, to help inform them of its make up and scope. Inspection of 
the successive versions of the Innovation Budget Guidelines, shows them not to provide such a 
map. It is therefore proposed that the flow chart described in Figure 8.3 (see chapter 8, section 
8.8) be presented in the proposed Handbook for Programme Design and Operation, with 
details of the tasks to be undertaken within each stage described. It is further suggested that the 
information required by officials at each stage of the process, also be placed in the new 
handbook, (see appendix I , section 1.5, p. 152). 
10.4.3.5 Process Drivers 
Appendix I , section 1.6, (pp. 152-153), suggests that it is important for people to understand the 
factors which drive the process of programme design. Three factors are identified, these being 
policy directives given in white papers, the priorities of individual ministers, and officials 
detecting new problems to be resolved by tracking changes in the market. These factors should 
be described in the new handbook, preferably in an introductory section. 
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10.5 The Application of Knowledge and Technology 
Section 10.3, above, proposed organisations are built on the three main pillars of the processes, 
knowledge (people), and technology. Section 10.4, immediately above, studied the current process and 
found present guidance was failing to provide adequate advice in certain areas o f programme design. 
These deficiencies were discussed, and proposals presented for how a 'Handbook for Programme 
Design and Operation' containing a more comprehensive set o f guidance should be developed. Whilst 
it is considered that recommendations for changes in guidance have the potential to significantly 
benefit the design process, it was decided to investigate other possibilities for bringing about 
improvements in the process. 
Chapter 3, section 3.4.2, introduced the concept of knowledge management (KJVl), as an avenue to 
explore in attempting to discover ways of improving the design and administration o f programmes. 
Knowledge, it was proposed, is the key resource for individuals and the overall economy, but can only 
be productive when it is integrated with a task. Hence it was suggested that the purpose and function 
of every organisation is to put knowledge to work on its processes. The importance o f knowledge, 
skills, and creativity in helping to realise high productivity and the provision o f high value in goods 
and services, is recognised by government. It was argued that in policy making, the government itself 
requires to be as innovative and creative as the private sector, and that such creativeness and innovation 
is viewed as fundamental to civil servants delivering better value from public assets. In support of 
achieving better value, government needs to make best use of peoples' talents, and to also learn from 
experience in policy making. 
Senge had developed the themes of making ful l use of peoples' capabilities, and the learning process. 
He emphasised that "The organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that 
discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization^^ 
(Senge, 1990, p. 4). Research it was suggested, should therefore investigate what features of 
knowledge management are required to help officials tap into each others experiences, by way of 
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helping departments to become learning organisations. The following sections describe proposals for 
how knowledge management might be applied to introduce a learning culture into the Whitehall 
departments. As an introduction to the topic, the knowledge theme is first developed. 
10.5.1 Knowledge is Key 
Drucker (1993, pp. 38-41; 1995, 76-77) emphasises the particular importance o f knowledge for 
society, now and in the future. He suggests that for society, it is knowledge rather than capital, natural 
resources, or labour, that represents the 'means of production', that is the basic economic resource 
(Drucker, 1993, pp. 38-39). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 7) refer lo the realisation in the Western 
Economies of the importance of knowledge, both within companies and governments. The UK 
Govemment is amongst those recognising this importance. The government's 'Competitiveness White 
Paper', Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (Stationery Office, 1998, p. 
6), cites knowledge as representing the UK's distinctive capabilities, rather than raw materials, land, or 
cheap labour. 
Knowledge is key because it provides the basis for innovation from which organisations derive their 
competitiveness (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 6). Continuing, Drucker (1993, p. 170) argues that 
increasingly the social and economic success of a country or a company is determined by the 
productivity of knowledge. He refers to knowledge being applied systematically to identify what 
knowledge is required, and what has to be done to apply knowledge effectively; that is systematic 
innovation (p. 38). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 6) describe how innovation arises from the 
utilisation of knowledge by employees. Hammer (1990, p. 107) sees innovation as pivotal to success 
in the 1990s', and innovation is seen by the UK Govemment as germane to improvement in Whitehall 
departments. The Competitiveness White Paper states: 
"77/e Government must improve its performance by becoming more innovative", 
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(Stationery Office, 1998, p. 8). 
A further consideration is the pivotal role assigned to DTI in knowledge management within 
government. The government's Competitiveness White Paper (Stationery Office, 1998, p. 61) refers to 
DTI being "a champion of innovation" and wil l play a major part in the renewal of the public service. 
It states: 
"DTI will establish a Knowledge Management Unit. Tlie new unit will pitrsite projects to the 
Department [i.e. DTI] at the forefront of knowledge management. 
(Stationery Office, 1998, p. 61). 
The work of the Knowledge Management Unit is intended to help bring about the necessary ''changes 
to the organisation, technology, management and culture of government" (p. 61). Therefore it 
followed that examining the ways in which knowledge may be applied to improve the design of 
support policy, would be a worthwhile line of investigation. Such research was seen as having the 
added benefit of being directly supportive of government policy. It was also thought that emergent 
proposals would be of relevance to the work of the Knowledge Management Unit, making a useful 
contribution to its efforts. 
10.5.2 Data, Information, and Knowledge 
It is important to recognise that not only knowledge, but also data and information are fundamental to 
the organisational processes Brooking (1999, p. 5). How all three are brought to bear on processes is 
germane to improvement, but it is important to differentiate between them as people often use these 
terms interchangeably (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8,; Marchand, 1998, p. 253; Brooking, p. 4, 
1999). For Brooking, data can be described as facts presented without a context (p. 4). Marchand 
(1998, p. 255) agrees referring to data as being 'context free', and always shareable among people 
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because recipients need not interpret them in a shared context. Examples of data are lists of numbers 
written on a page. 
In contrast information is never context free (Marchand, 1998, p. 255; Brooking, 1999, p. 4) or 'value 
neutral'. Information is data presented in context. Its transfer relies on the sharing of'context', in 
order that people may interpret the 'intelligence' they receive in the way intended by the originator. 
An example o f information would be a house number associated with the name of a road. However, 
knowledge. Brooking argues, "w information in context, together with an understanding of how to use 
it" (Brooking, 1999, p. 5). Marchand suggests "most scholars recognise knowledge as different from, 
but directly linked to information" (Marchand, 1998, p. 253). For Marchand, " 'to know' means not 
only to understand or to believe, but to apply one's knowledge" (p. 255). Brooking gives as an 
example of knowledge, information about street drainage derived from using a drawing, and 
understanding how the placement of new houses is related to water flow. Thus for Brooking, 
Knowledge — Information in Context + Understanding^ (Brooking, 1999, p. 5). 
10.5.3 Explicit and Tacit Knowledge 
Specialists in the field of knowledge management differentiate between two types o f knowledge, these 
being 'Explicit Knowledge' and 'Tacit Knowledge'. CEST (1999) usefully defines the ^vo categories 
of knowledge as follows: 
'^^Explicit Knowledge: Knowledge that can be easily expressed in words and numbers, processed by a 
computer, transmitted electronically, or stored in a database, and thereby commwucated and sliared; 
Tacit Knowledge: Knowledge which is not easily expressible, highly personal and hard to formalise, 
difficult to communicate and share". 
(CEST, 1999, p. 7). 
386 
Explicit knowledge is clearly visible and may be easily shared among individuals. Explicit knowledge 
CEST (1999, p. 6) suggests, may be regarded as 'know how' which has been 'frozen' into an artefact 
such as a document or a database. For Brooking (1999, p. 49), explicit knowledge is knowledge which 
can be inspected by another, such as explanations o f business processes which are written down in 
manuals, and other documents. Instructions showing how to assemble furniture are quoted as an 
example of recorded explicit knowledge. Knowledge documented in any form is 'explicit' (Brooking, 
1999, p. 49). More broadly tacit knowledge is regarded as an entity which is not manifested in the 
form of an artefact CEST (1999, p. 6). For Brooking, ''Tacit Knowledge is hiowledge which has not 
been made explicit" (Brooking, 1999, p. 51). 
10.5.4 Knowledge Creation 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 3-16) suggest Japanese companies have been more successful than 
their Western counterparts ''because of their skills and expertise at 'organizational knowledge 
creation "' (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 3). Organisational knowledge creation is seen as key to the 
ways in which Japanese companies innovate, which in turn has given rise to them achieving a 
competitive edge. Organisational knowledge creation is explained as the combined process of 
converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge so that others can share it, and then back into the 
tacit form by those to whom it has been passed. 
However the first stage in the process is difficult. Tacit Knowledge, Marchand (1998, p. 255) argues, 
differs from information in that it resides in the heads of individuals. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 
8-10) explain how this poses problems, owing to the difficulty o f accessing tacit knowledge directly. 
Whilst explicit knowledge is expressed by words and numbers, and therefore may be disseminated 
using conventional techniques (e.g. in books or by electronic mail), tacit knowledge is not readily 
visible to others. Tacit knowledge it is argued "is highly personal and hard to fomalize, making it 
difficult to commwiicate and share with others" (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8). They emphasise 
that it is something which is "deeply rooted in an individual's experience", and being subjective and 
387 
intuitive in nature makes tacit knowledge difficult to process and broadcast. Knowledge management 
and proposals for how it could be implemented within DTI , is discussed in this chapter, section 10.5.7 
below. However before investigating what procedures should be introduced, it is helpful to discuss the 
principles involved in transferring individuals' tacit knowledge. 
10.5.5 Externalisation of Tacit Knowledge 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 64-70), and Marchand (1998, p. 257) highlight the inevitable need for 
individuals' knowledge to be initially expressed in artefacts such as documents, in order that their 
know how can be disseminated and hence shared by all members of an organisation. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) continue, by showing how tacit knowledge can be expressed explicitly in such 
artefacts. They argue that tacit knowledge has to be first codified into the explicit form, and refer to 
this transformation process as 'extemalisation'. 
10.5.6 Internalisation of Tacit Knowledge 
Having rendered tacit knowledge explicit, its value wil l only be realised once disseminated and 
absorbed by those who have need of it (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 69). They refer to this second 
stage of knowledge transfer as the process o f Mntemalisation'. Intemalisation is the process whereby 
the recipient of explicit knowledge merges this knowledge into his own tacit knowledge, for his or her 
direct use. 
10.5.7 Application of Knowledge Management in the Process of Designing and 
Administering Support Policy 
To help determine the way in which the design and administration of programmes might be improved, 
the author thought it would be useful to identify the areas where the application of knowledge 
management could bring advantage, and simultaneously where the potential problems lie. Usefully, 
388 
the consultancy company KPMG have commissioned a survey of organisations to assess the take up of 
ICM by businesses (KPMG, 2000). The survey was conducted among chief executives, finance 
directors, marketing directors, and people with specific responsibility for K M in their companies, 
among 423 organisations having a turnover exceeding $347 million a year (p. 5). The sample was 
chosen because ''organizations of this size have the greatest need to implement KM initiatives, have 
possibly the greatest capability and resources to do so, and potentially can reap the greatest benefits" 
(p. 5). The author suggests that KPMG's observations apply to DTI, the department employing around 
7,700 permanent staff (not including the people employed in Companies House and the Patent Office), 
(Stationery Office, 2000, p. 194), and may thus be similarly classified as a larger organisation. Of the 
respondents, 64% were found to have a K M strategy (p. 7). 
Inspection of the KPMG (2000) report demonstrates the benefits in terms o f improved competitiveness, 
which can accrue to organisations through the deployment of knowledge management, and how these 
benefits arise. Interestingly their research found that 79% of the overall respondents considered K M as 
potentially having an 'extremely significant', or a 'significant' role in improving competitive 
advantage (p. 13). Respondents whose organisations had a K M programme in place were asked to 
specify the benefits that they had realised. Among the benefits described were belter decision making 
(71%), faster responses to key business issues (68%), and better customer handling (64%), (p. 15). 
'Reinventing the wheel' was found to be a common problem with the respondents, but interestingly of 
those organisations having a K M programme only 45% voiced this complaint, compared with two 
thirds in the case of those who had not (p. 11). Similarly, half of those respondents having a K M 
programme reported difficulty in capturing tacit knowledge, compared with two thirds of those 
respondents without a programme (p. 11). 
However, KPMG's research also found that respondents had experienced problems in implementing 
their K M programmes. The aim of a knowledge management programme KPMG proposes, should be 
to remove the "frustrations that employees face in gathering and accessing hwwledge. Yet only a 
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third had of all respondents had a knowledge policies - stipulating which knowledge elements to store, 
update andcuir (KPMG, 2000, p. 3). Continuing, KPMG states: 
'^Organisations that grasp the cultural implications can achieve what we define as the 'High-
Performance Employee - an individual who uses KM procedures and technologies to fulfill their own 
potential and deliver real business benefits to the organization, its customers and its stakeholders". 
(KPMG, 2000, p. 3). 
Unfortunately research had revealed organisations to be 'blind' to the employee considerations, 
reflecting their failure to consider the cultural implications of installing K M (p. 3). Evidence of 
problems is displayed in the gaps between the benefits expected by organisations, and those that they 
had actually realised. The consultancy suggests that the problem stems from respondents focusing on 
the technology issues, instead of simultaneously investing time to understand and grasp the cultural 
and organisational implications of implementing knowledge management (pp. 3, 15). 
Questioning had revealed further detail relating to problems. The introduction of measures which are 
central to achieving improvements in an organisation's operations and culture, such as rewarding 
knowledge working, creating a knowledge map - a catalogue or guide showing people what 
information is available, and measuring intellectual capital, had not been introduced by most of the 
respondents (pp. 3, 21). Among those organisations having a knowledge programme, a significant 
number had complained of information overload (65%), a lack of time to share knowledge (62%), and 
not using technology to share experiences (57%), (p. 11). Implementation issues surrounding the use 
of technology, were additionally uncovered (p. 19). Among problems reported were a lack o f user 
uptake due to insufficient communication (20%), everyday use of the technologies not integrating into 
normal working practices (19%), insufficient time given to learn how to use the system (18%), a lack 
of training (15%), and users not seeing the personal benefits (13%), (pp. 2, 19). In developing 
proposals for the introduction of K M within DTI, and more widely within government, the author felt 
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it important to address the cultural and organisational issues. Strategies for implementing effective 
knowledge management in government are now discussed. 
10.5.7.1 Codification and Transfer of Tacit Knowledge of the Process of Designing 
Support Policy 
Section 10.5.4 above discussed the difficulties faced by organisations in accessing the tacit knowledge 
residing in the heads o f individuals. KPMG had provided further evidence o f firms experiencing 
problems in accessing tacit knowledge (KPMG, 2000, p. I I ) , (see section 10.5,7). Much of DTI's 
knowledgCjis rooted in the minds o f officials, and not held on file or elsewhere. The author himself is 
aware of knowledge he holds which is not recorded. Indeed, Brooking (1999, p. 5) suggests that only 
around 20% of an organisation's available and pertinent knowledge is ever used, and this gives rise to 
potential inefficiency. Many people recognise the importance of tacit knowledge to any organisation. 
KPMG refer to the long-term value associated with 'intellectual capital growth' (KPMG, 2000, p. 2). 
Brooking agrees. For her, making knowledge explicit is strategic to an organisation as it generates 
infrastructure assets (Brooking, 1999, p. 51). Access to tacit knowledge is thus a critical issue, not 
only for commerce but for government as well (Drucker, 1993, pp. 174-176). For the author, 
introducing an effective means to achieve better use o f the knowledge held tacitly within DTI, was as 
an important issue to be resolved. 
Facilitating the process of capturing and disseminating tacit knowledge may be regarded as falling to 
the responsibility of knowledge management (KM). For example CEST suggests one of the prime 
objectives of knowledge management is "to turn elusive, invisible, imcontrollable tacit knowledge into 
visible, measurable manageable explicit knowledge" (CEST, 1999, p. 9). The management of 
knowledge is fundamental to raising the efficiencies o f organisational processes, and was hence 
considered an important area for study, in seeking ways to improve the design process. For Brooking, 
how an organisation accesses and uses data, information and knowledge is key. She argues "Hie extent 
to which the organization can be said to be efficient is the extent to which it applies available data, 
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information and knowledge to the problem at hand'^ (Brooking, 1999, p. 5). Inefficient organisations 
she points out, re-examine areas and reinvent processes time and again. The solution is to ensure that 
access to data, information, and knowledge is available to the right people, where and when they need 
it. For Brooking the process which aims to satisfy this requirement is knowledge manaeement (p. 5). 
Hansen, Nohria, and Tierney (1999, pp. 106-108) helpfully differentiate between Uvo types of 
approaches to knowledge management. They refer to these as the 'codification' and 'personalisation' 
strategies. The latter is discussed section 10.5.8 below. For the former. Brooking suggests it is 
preferable to codify tacit knowledge by getting people to analyse and write down what they know (pp. 
49, 51). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 69) agree, referring to writing things down as an act of 
transforming tacit into explicit knowledge. It is helpful they suggest i f tacit knowledge is conveyed in 
the form of words, expressed either verbally or in documents. Semi-structured interviews. Brooking 
(1999, p. 68) suggests, are also a practical means to probe individuals to elicit their internal knowledge. 
The literature provides examples of firms adopting a codification strategy. CEST records how a 
Spanish software house had faced the problem of knowledge that was essential to them serving a 
particular client's requirements, only resided with one individual analyst. The organisation was 
concerned over the risk to which it was exposed, arising from the possibility of the analyst leaving, 
retiring, or having an accident. The software company worked with the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory and the employee, to record the assumptions he made when making decisions. These were 
recorded as a set of decision rules which could then be employed widely by others (CEST, 1999, p. 9). 
CEST (1999, p. 9) provides another example of codification. Anglian Water were concerned about 
loosing invaluable experience as older people retired. To prevent this loss they held a number of 
'master classes' in which these people shared their experiences with younger employees. The sessions 
were videoed, and the messages transcribed and summarised by the knowledge management team. 
Thus knowledge had been rendered explicit and remained accessible to the company for use after the 
individuals had left. The master classes are discussed further in section 10.5.8. below. 
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Turning to the research conducted in this thesis, chapters 5 to 8 mapped the current process for the 
design of support policy. The author observes that in the mapping task, he undertook the codification 
of tacit knowledge. He analysed his own knowledge of how the process is undertaken in practice, and 
wrote his findings down. By carrying out semi-structured interviews of colleagues and others, he was 
able to externalise their personal know how. 
10.5.7.2 Dissemination of Knowledge of Programme Design and Operation 
The design process mapped, the question the author asked himself was how best to apply this explicit 
knowledge in a way which adds value to the design process? Sections 10.4.1 to 10.4.3 compared the 
content of current guidance with the knowledge of the process gained by looking at 'what happens on 
the ground'. A number of improvements to improve on current arrangements were recommended,, 
which centred around the development of a new 'Design Handbook'. 
From his experience of programme development, the author is able to confirm that the Innovation 
Budget Guidelines have traditionally been circulated in paper format. Initially it is proposed that the 
new 'Design Handbook' also be similarly circulated. This approach seems sensible. Brooking (1999, 
p. 49) refers to explicit knowledge in the form of explanations of business processes being written 
down in manuals, of which the guidelines are but one example. Hansen, and Nohria, Tiemey (1999, p. 
107-108), in looking at procedures in several industries, refer to companies using traditional means for 
sharing knowledge. They point to organisations such as Ernst & Young as employing 'apeople to 
document' codification strategy. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 69-70) share this view, highlighting 
the use of documents and manuals to facilitate the dissemination o f knowledge. Such artefacts they 
propose enable people to 'internalise' the codified knowledge, by helping them experience indirectly 
the experience of others. In this way Nonaka and Takeuchi argue, the explicit knowledge is absorbed 
by the reader and becomes part of his or her tacit knowledge base, that is, it is internalised. 
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Furthermore the use of guidance notes to convey knowledge by advising people on what they should 
(or should not) do in conducting their duties, is also a well proven approach. The Innovation Budget 
Guidelines have been in use for over twelve years, and the author suggests they would have fallen into 
disuse long before now i f they were inappropriate to the task. In talking to colleagues, they have 
informed the author that they find the 'Innovation Guidance' helpful to them in designing support 
policy. Those that use the Treasury'Green Book 'H. M . Treasury (1997) and the DTI F/wawce 
Handbook DTI (1996b), have found them equally helpful. 
There are other examples of the application guidelines. For example, DTI's Business Link Directorate 
issues guidance to Business Links, called the Business Link Service Guide (DTI, 1997d). The guide 
advises Business Link Chief Executives on matters such as the content of the information services 
which they must provide, the listing of consultants, and how they should relate to other government 
schemes. According to the official responsible for the development and maintenance of the guidelines, 
the guide has been well received by the Business Links. Chapter 7, section 7.5 pointed to the use o f 
guidelines to aid scheme contractors in managing previous DTI programmes. 
Looking across government shows the principle of issuing guidance to be common practice, which the 
author argues lends weight to the credibility of his proposals. For instance, the Treasury 'Green Book' 
lists in excess of forty sets of guidance issued across government, related to evaluation and appraisal. 
A colleague in the Department of Health believed there were some 1,000 separate pieces of guidance 
issued to organisations such as Health Trusts. Back within DTI, guidelines have been issued to 
of^cials on topics such as staff appraisal. Health and safety, and ensuring equal treatment of people o f 
ethnic origins. 
However to enhance the value of improved guidance, one further addition is required. Marchand 
(1998, p. 255) refers to several authors highlighting the importance of'understanding' to knowledge 
transfer. It is more likely that officials will adopt good practice, i f they understand the reasons for so 
394 
doing. The author therefore proposes that the expanded guidance include explanations o f why certain 
approaches should be adopted, by detailing the reasons underlying why elements o f the design and 
administration process are conducted in particular ways. Chapters 5 to 8 inclusive looked at the 
reasoning behind the approaches which have been adopted, and their findings can be incorporated into 
the 'Design Handbook'. 
The author also considered that it would be helpful for officials to be given a set of 'good practice' 
examples, illustrating mechanisms which have been successfully employed in the past in designing 
programmes. This would help reinforce the rationale for doing things in certain ways. As described 
earlier, appendix K of this thesis analyses some of the practices in scheme delivery and administration 
which have been adopted in previous schemes, and in particular the approaches used in the case study 
examples set out in appendices D to H. It is proposed that the good (and bad) practice lessons which 
are identified be detailed in an annex to the new guidelines. 
10.5.8 Personalisation Strategy for Transferring Tacit Knowledge 
Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey (1999, p. 108-109) propose that an alternative approach to adopting a 
codification strategy is sometimes required. Much tacit knowledge they suggest cannot be codified, a 
point agreed with by Brooking (1999, p. 9). Knowledge, Hansen, and Nohria, and Tiemey argue, is 
instead best transferred in brainstorming sessions and in direct 'person to person' dialogue. Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 62-64) concur, referring to the use of dialogue as a means to transfer 
knowledge. Such interactions they propose take place within teams, or in brainstorming meetings 
involving all interested parties within the organisation. Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey (1999, pp. 108-
109) refer to the dialogue based approach as the 'personalisation strategy'. United States o f America 
(USA) consultancy firms such as Bain, the Boston Consultancy Group, and McKinsey, are quoted as 
examples o f companies using a personalisation strategy. Firms like Bain invest heavily in building 
people networks in support o f making their personalisation strategies work effectively. McKinsey for 
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instance has found it helpful to transfer staff between different offices (Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey, 
1999, pp. 108-109). 
An industrial example of a company using a personalisation approach is Hewlett-Packard, (Hansen, 
Nohria, and Tiemey, 1999, p. 112). Hewlett-Packard employ their personalisation strategy to facilitate 
the transfer of technical knowledge, in support of product innovation. Transfer of technical knowledge 
is affected via 'person to person' exchanges, which result from engineers routinely visiting other 
divisions of the company, to share ideas about potential new products. 
CEST (1999, pp. 7-9) provides examples o f UK firms adopting personalisation strategies. They point 
to ICL in the UK, who when specifying the requirements of one of their buildings, 'designed in ' 
corridors which were sufficiently wide to encourage staff to hold impromptu meetings in which 
knowledge could be shared. 
Brooking (1999, pp. 9) introduces the theme of loosing access to knowledge. For her knowledge is a 
transient asset, because when employees leave or retire from an organisation they take their know how 
with them. Cliffe (1998, p. 18-19) continues, suggesting that securing and holding on to knowledge is 
more important than ever before. Cliffe highlights that the change from an industrial to a knowledge 
economy means that far more of organisations' value resides in their employees' knowledge rather 
than in tangible assets. Thus, she observes, when talented people leave firms, they take a meaningful 
part of an organisation's knowledge base with them. Cliffe (1998, p. 18) emphasises the intensity of 
present day competition, and its nature of rapid change. For her organisations must 'Uhink strategically 
at all times and at all levels" (p. 18). 
As inu-oduced in sub-section 10.5.7.1 above, CEST (1999, p. 9) provides the example of Anglian 
Water, who wished to overcome the problem of losing knowledge held by individuals when people 
retire. Many employees have worked in the water treatment industry for more than thirty years, during 
396 
which time they have built up a wealth of knowledge on and surrounding the processes involved. Most 
of this valuable knowledge is held tacitly, which is lost as people retire. To help overcome the 
problem, Anglian Water have introduced a series of 'master classes', in which retiring experts share 
their know how with others. Structured dialogue is seen as the principal mechanism enabling 
knowledge transfer. Government departments similarly face problems connected with the loss o f 
expertise and, the author observes, have not implemented strategies to address the problem. Chapter 3 
section 3.2.3 referred to a loss o f expertise within DTI due to structural changes. People had moved 
out from the department into areas where they could not easily be approached, some had been lost to 
'the system' altogether through severance and early retirement. Change is likely to continue. As 
discussed earlier, the government's white paper Modernising government (Cabinet Office, 1999) 
heralds yet further modification, and the natural retirement of personnel wil l inevitably continue. How 
best then to capture and retain the tacit knowledge o f individuals is an issue. 
One step to capturing and retaining knowledge has already been undertaken (see sub-section 10.5.7.1 
above). Using a codification strategy, the author has recorded explicitly the scope o f the policy design 
process, and the procedures adopted by officials. The use o f personalisation strategies provide other 
possible options to improve the design process. The Anglian Water case study described above 
provides one such possibility. Like that organisation, DTI should hold its version o f the 'master 
workshops', requiring staff that are leaving their areas o f work to explain to colleagues what they have 
undertaken and what they have learnt. 
Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey (1999, p. 112) usefully showed how Hewlett-Packard have exploited 
person to person interactions for transferring knowledge. Like that company, DTI operates over many 
sites, and the author observes that officials, unwittingly, do not always communicate in the design 
process as they should. Adding to the problem is that staff are kept very busy, and do not always have 
time to widely consult. For example, on 2 August 1999, the Head of Business Link Directorate (BLD), 
in addressing his PR 10s at the first Small Business Service (SBS) development (brainstorming) 
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workshop, gave an example of staff in different directorates not talking to each other. Approximately 
one year earlier, DTI's Communications and Information Industries (CU) Directorate, bid for funds 
from BLD's budget to develop IT awareness package for Business Links. Unfortunately they failed to 
inform BLD, the directorate responsible! 
Like Hewlett-Packard, the author recommends that DTI introduce a management policy which requires 
officials concerned with policy design in the various directorates to regularly meet one to one with 
colleagues in related policy areas across the department. The author further recommends that this 
policy be extended to cover officials in other govemment departments as well, by way of increasing the 
'cross fertilisation' of ideas. At the time of writing this thesis, no such policy was in place. 
Nonaka and Tackeuchi (1995, p. 63), and Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey (1999, p. 108) have argued the 
value of brainstorming of ideas in teams to create knowledge. Staff should be encouraged as a matter 
of written policy, that when developing new schemes in response to changes in the market or revised 
ministerial objectives, they should seek to test and generate new ideas by calling brainstorming 
meetings. Focusing at the team rather than the individual level, these meetings would involve 
interested parties not only within their own directorates, but also those elsewhere in DTI, and, indeed, 
those across 'Whitehall*. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 63-64) highlight the value of 'observing 
others' in transferring tacit knowledge from one individual into the personal knowledge base of 
another. Thus the author recommends that management policy should advise officials 'shadow' 
colleagues involved in the design process. Again, the author is not aware of written directives having 
been issued to officials instructing them to conduct brainstorming sessions and to shadow colleagues. 
10.5.9 A Knowledge Base 
As discussed earlier, tacit knowledge is a personal resource (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. xi ; Marchand, 1998, p. 255). Thus, for Brooking (1999), "Knowledge 
Management is about people" (p. 139). Brooking continues, "// '5 about people who are the possessors 
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of and indicators to the location of knowledge in a company" (p. 139). Leonard-Barton (1995, pp. 4-
5) develops the 'people' theme. For her, the starting point for managing knowledge is about gaining an 
understanding of the core capabilities. The development of core capabilities, she argues, is inextricably 
linked to knowledge creation, and therefore contributes directly to competitiveness. To create and 
maintain core capabilities, organisations must manage and encourage the activities which create 
knowledge and determine what is core capability. 
Drucker states: 
"Organizations are characterised by being 'specialpurpose' institutions. They are effective because 
they concentrate on one task". 
(Drucker, 1993, p.47). 
Govemment departments such as DTI are organisations fitting Drucker's characterisation. Their 
principal job, and the specialism of their personnel, is that of policy making, with the objective of 
improving life for the community as a whole (Cabinet Office, 1999, pp. 15-17). The focus on 
knowledge management should thus be on building the competencies of officials in the policy making 
process. However in implementing knowledge management, there are important issues to be resolved. 
The knowledge management function is not performed well in organisations because people are not 
omnipotent (Butler Group, 1995, pp. 13-14; Brooking, 1999), and, proposes Brooking, the goal of 
knowledge management (KM) should be to make employees 'all knowing' (p. 139). Good K M 
suggests Brooking (1999, p. 5) allows access by people to the information that they require, at the right 
time. Such access to data is important in preventing organisations from repeating mistakes and 
'reinventing wheels'. This is a problem experienced by many organisations (KPMG, 2000, p. 11), (see 
section 10.5.7 above). 
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However, as Brooking points out, the quantity o f knowledge which exists in organisations like DTI is 
large, and of a such a level that renders its documentation impractical. It is better, she argues, to create 
instead a knowledge base which shows where particular expertise resides. KPMG continue the theme 
(section 10.5.7). They highlight the importance o f creating knowledge maps, which show people what 
information is available (KPMG, 2000, p. 3). 
DTI has already taken steps towards creating a knowledge base. Inspection o f the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, annex 3, pp. 85-88) shows them to list each directorate and section within DTI 
which has an interest in the administration of the Innovation Budget (DTI, 1999a, annex 3, pp. 85-88). 
They have already been placed on the department's Mandrin Intranet (see also section 10.6 below), and 
are accessible from peoples' workstations. For each entry a brief description o f the directorate's or 
section's responsibilities is given, together with details of whom to contact. This information is 
effectively backed by the issuance to every official of the department's Functional Directory (DTI, 
1999d), which again not only gives brief summaries of the function of each directorate and section, but 
also the responsibilities of each member of staff. The directory was in the process o f being added to 
the intranet at the time of writing this thesis. 
However Brooking (1999, pp. 139-141) highlights the need to be able to locate all relevant documents 
to a task. A comprehensive list of guidance and other documents associated with the design process is 
not available. It is suggested that such a list be created and be added as part o f building a knowledge 
base. This would assist officials in ensuring that they have accessed all the relevant sources of 
knowledge in building rationale for new policy and interventions. An important entry would be the 
new 'Design Handbook' as a means o f aiding access to a fuller set o f knowledge on the design process. 
The author ftirther proposes that as part of building the knowledge base supporting programme design, 
electronic access to each of these documents, including DTI's Finance Handbook (DT\, 1996b), also 
be provided from officials' workstations. To add further value, it is additionally suggested that the 
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knowledge base use well proven database techniques, such as 'context searching' to enable officials to 
quickly identify sources of help. 
However, a well constructed knowledge base is helpful in other ways. Brooking (1999, pp. 9, 139-
141) refers to the importance of knowing where expertise resides in an organisation. It is, she suggests, 
impractical to ask people to write down everything they know. People do not have the time to record 
their knowledge, simultaneous with servicing their day to day workloads (p. 9). Therefore people 
should be regarded as the knowledge network 'gatekeepers*, who can be contacted by others in regard 
of expertise which they hold. To provide ease of access to the gatekeepers, details o f their areas o f 
specialism should be held on the knowledge base. By tracking the movement o f staff and recording 
their current location within the organisation, access to their expertise can be maintained. The author 
proposes that details of personal experience and the tracking of staff changes be held on DTI's 
knowledge base, a facility that is currently not present. 
There are other considerations which support the rationale for including details of personal expertise on 
the planned knowledge base. Brooking (1999, pp. 141-142) highlights the difficulty o f determining 
what is lost to an organisation when an employee leaves. By recording details o f peoples' personal 
experience, 'management' can quickly assess the extent of the loss by interrogating their entry on the 
knowledge base. The knowledge base can then be employed to quickly identify other members o f the 
organisation who can help 'plug the gap'. CEST(1999, pp. 7-8, 12) also supports the argument for a 
knowledge base. They suggest the most effective way of exchanging knowledge is to bring together 
people sharing a common interest. This presupposes that people who need to talk to each other are 
each aware of others existence and that they are the right people to communicate with. To help make 
the task o f locating people easier, CEST report many organisations having invested in 'know who' 
databases (p. 12). 
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A knowledge database can also be extended to act as a resource for storing and accessing explicit 
knowledge. CEST (1999, pp. 8-9) provide as a case study, Linklaters, a f irm of City of London 
solicitors. Each practice comprising the f i rm deals in a different area o f legal specialism, and records 
on a 'know how' database the significant transactions which have been undertaken. The database 
consists o f the original material and structured indices, which through sophisticated thesauri allow the 
database to be searched for data which might be relevant to a new case. CEST (1999) argue that, in the 
Linklaters example, most o f the tacit knowledge associated with the execution of each transaction, for 
example, the reasons why a particular letter was important to the resolution o f a case, is recorded in its 
explicit form. In this way they suggest, the f irm maintains a permanent record of its knowledge, which 
helps protect them from the loss of their personnel. 
The author suggests it would advisable for DTI to adapt the Linklaters system for use within the 
department. A study should be undertaken to identify the areas where the introduction of such a 
system would yield significant benefits. For the author, the recording o f documents generated as part 
of the programme approval process would be a good starting point. The majority o f documents are 
now created using neUvorked workstations, allowing them to be processed and transferred directly into 
the knowledge base. The knowledge base could thus hold copies o f documents such as minutes 
between officials discussing market failure, ROAME statements, and the minutes o f IPC meetings. 
A knowledge base should also be designed to help ease the fundamental problem of knowledge often 
not being captured explicitly, when tacit knowledge is transferred directly between people. For 
example, in one to one dialogue, codification of tacit knowledge into an explicit form may not occur. 
Or, as argued by Hansen, Nohria, and Tiemey (1999, p. 108), it may be that codification is not 
possible. In these instances although tacit knowledge is transferred, the organisation as a whole is still 
unable to gain access to it. However CEST (1999, p. 7) refer to the 'transfer o f tacit knowledge to tacit 
knowledge' process as often leaving explicit traces. These 'traces', they propose, can be used as 
indicators o f the nature and likely location o f the tacit knowledge which they derived from. They cite 
402 
as an example Buckman Laboratories. The company has an extensive system o f electronic 
newsgroups, which allow 'front line' staff dealing with customers to pose questions which are picked 
up by staff across the company. It is not unusual for an enquirer to receive several responses to each 
problem posed, and these are summarised and stored on the system for future use. 
The advantages of the system are that it enables and promotes ' l ive ' inter-disciplinary dialogue, with a 
person able to access the knowledge of another without classification, storage, archiving or retrieving. 
It has been found that the unstructured nature of the dialogue has led to unknown knowledge being 
uncovered. Thus the system has promoted the revealing and sharing o f tacit knowledge. It is 
acknowledged that much of the tacit knowledge is exchanged during Mive' dialogue, but the entries on 
the newsgroups are explicit, and can be summarised and archived for future use. Given the Buckman 
Laboratories experience, it is suggested that as part o f building the knowledge base, DTI investigate 
the use of its Mandrin intranet to allow officials to post questions on matters relating to policy 
development. Like Buckman, questions and responses could be regularly collated and summarised, 
with the summaries placed in an electronic file which officials could then search to find material of 
interest. 
Lastly chapter 3, section 3.6.1 uncovered problems with the current system o f holding documents in 
*hard copy' in physical files. These concerned the destruction of certain files with time, and the 
difficulties of accessing files held in different locations. Capitalising on the fact that most documents 
are created electronically, the introduction of a knowledge base along the lines described above is seen 
as being helpful in overcoming the problems identified, by providing 'on-line' access to documents 
and explicit knowledge transferred from people and the documents themselves. 
10.5.10 Updating the Knowledge Base 
Leonard-Barton (1995, pp. xi -xi i i , p. 1) refers to what she terms the ^wellsprings of knowledge' in 
organisations. The wellsprings are the knowledge reservoirs in an institution. Knowledge, she 
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observes, accumulates continuously with time, and is shaped and directed by the daily managerial 
decisions. Thus knowledge reservoirs are constantly replenished by 'streams' of new ideas which 
source corporate renewal. Marchand (1998, p. 253) agrees. He refers to the relationship benveen 
knowledge and information which continuously changes in organisations. For him it is the resultant, 
continuous conversion process between information and knowledge which provides on-going 
opportunities for improvement. 
The knowledge base must therefore be continually up-dated. While the various arrangements proposed 
in this chapter wi l l in many cases be self up-dating, it is proposed that a team of officials be identified 
and given the remit of regularly interviewing officials, by way of making sure that a formal system is 
in place to capture the new knowledge as it is created. The knowledge team would be required to write 
down their findings to express new tacit knowledge explicitly, which could then be placed on to the 
knowledge base. They would also be responsible for co-ordinating the other measures described, such 
as capturing and analysing the content of documents as they are created, to ensure that the knowledge 
as it is created is added to the knowledge base. 
10.5.11 Importing External Knowledge 
In organisations building their capabilities, Leonard-Barton (1995, pp. 12-13, 28) suggests they wil l 
normally have to import knowledge from external sources. Absorbing external information, she 
argues, is critical to success. 
10.5,11,1 Benchmarking 
Peppard and Rowland (1995, pp. 167-169) commend the use of benchmarking to highlight areas where 
processes can be improved. For them benchmarking is useful in broadening peoples' perspectives. 
Harrington (1991) suggests the importance of people having something to toil for. For him "every 
person, process, and organization needs goals to strive for. Without them we drift on a sea of 
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confusion. We all want to improve. No one likes to be average" (Harrington, 1991, p. 219). 
Harrington continues by referring to the past tendency o f organisations to set goals based on their 
previous performance, without reference to the performance of others. Thus, he argues, targets were 
set which could be easily met, giving a false sense of achievement and depressing the realisation of the 
true potential. Benchmarking, Harrington suggests ''is the antidote to this self imposed mediocrity" (p. 
219). 
Cox and Thompson (1998, pp. 1-6) refer to the use o f benchmarking to improve aspects of business 
performance. They define benchmarking as "the process through which 'best practices' are 
discovered and subsequently adopted in an organization, with a resultant performance improvement" 
(Cox and Thompson, 1998, p. 3). For them, benchmarking "is little more than copying what someone 
else appears to be doing better" (p. 3). Benchmarking, they suggest, has become one of the most 
popular business management tools of the 1990s' (p. I ) , and has developed as an instrument o f 
common application across all sectors of industry and commerce. Thus the author concluded that the 
use of benchmarking should be investigated, as a further avenue for obtaining new knowledge which 
may be exploited in improving the policy making process. 
Cox and Thompson (1998, pp. 4-6) suggest two levels o f benchmarking may be deployed. Internal 
benchmarking, which does not transcend the boundaries o f the organisation, relies on objective 
assessment and comparison of individual units and processes within that organisation. The concept, 
they argue, is more appropriate to situations where units have a high degree o f autonomy. In contrast, 
external benchmarking involves assessment of the activities and systems of outside, non related 
organisations, with the intent of identifying the better practice processes which may be adapted and 
implanted internally. 
Cox and Thompson (1998, p. 6) continue by describing three types of benchmarking, these being 
Competitive, Functional, and Strategic. Competitive benchmarking involves benchmarking the special 
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factors which contribute to a competitor's success, and is often difficult to achieve as competitors are 
unlikely to reveal the secrets o f their success. Strategic benchmarking involves looking at an 
organisation's core competencies which contribute to success. However Cox and Thompson argue that 
the concept is largely untested and doubts exist over its validity. Functional benchmarking relies on 
comparing systems and processes which have factors in common, rather than the structures o f 
organisations. Hence the concept is often referred to as generic benchmarking, because its application 
is not restricted to any one type of organisation, and hence its wide use to-date (Cox and Thompson, 
1998, p. 6). 
From the above arguments, it was considered that external benchmarking using the generic, functional 
approach, would be the most likely approach to bring significant benefits for DTI. It was thought that 
the discipline enforced on the design process by the constraining factors described in chapter 5, section, 
5.2.4 are such that radical differences in practices are unlikely to be found across DTI . Therefore 
internal benchmarking is not likely to be of value. It was also considered that inspection of procedures 
in Other Government Departments (OGDs) across Whitehall should not be given priority, as many of 
the 'constraints' wi l l apply equally to officials in these organisations. 
The author therefore considered that the greatest benefits from benchmarking would be realised from 
adopting an external approach. In deciding on the type o f benchmarking to adopt, the competitive and 
strategic benchmarking approaches were rejected, on the grounds of the secrecy issues of the former 
and the unproven nature of the latter. Functional benchmarking was judged to be the more appropriate 
approach, as the concept is well proven and affords comparisons independent of the business sector. 
The opportunity was seen to benchmark current DTI processes not only with public organisations 
abroad, but also private sector companies both in the UK. as well as internationally. 
Whilst the development of a detailed benchmarking strategy is viewed as lying outside the scope of 
this thesis, an outline strategy can be proposed. It is suggested that the model o f the policy design 
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process as mapped in this thesis be deployed as the initial starting point for benchmarking. It is 
suggested that for each of the stages defined in the process o f designing support programmes, the 
procedures adopted in these stages by other organisations be examined, and the process elements 
identified. Each of the process elements would then be compared with those adopted within DTI, 
looking for cases of commonality and examples of where different processes are deployed. In each 
instance the relationships between the process and performance would be investigated, with the 
objective of determining the good, and bad practice approaches. The results of such analysis would 
then be made widely available to officials within the department and government more widely. An 
important part of the benchmarking process would be to test the validity of the model for general 
application, making any necessary changes to its design. 
Benchmarking is not the panacea. Cox and Thompson (1998, pp. 11-12) warn of the dangers o f 
placing excessive emphasis on benchmarking, which runs the risks of organisations' products and 
services becoming more alike. Harrington (1991) refers to firms reaching a plateau, where they have 
improved to the extent where their processes have become the world's benchmark. 
The author recognises the danger o f DTI simply producing clones of others' programmes. However 
the author considers that DTI has been historically innovative its design of new schemes, a fact which 
is indicated by others adopting the department's designs. In a conversation with Mr. John Launchbury, 
the official responsible for the operation of the Inside UK Enterprise (lUKE) scheme, (see appendix G, 
section G.8.2.4, p. 122), he informed the author that the initiative had been adopted by the Canadian, 
German, and Austrian governments. The concept has also been adopted in the Netherlands, and in the 
Basque region of Spain. 
Mr. Philip Sowden of Technopolis was able to site further examples, based on his experience o f 
working abroad. In Egypt, as part o f the government's Industrial Modernisation Programme, sixteen 
Business Resource Centres are to be established. Funded by the Egyptian Government and the 
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European Union, the centres are modelled on DTI's Business Links. The Cypriot Government as part 
of their industrial modernisation programme are funding consultancy projects aimed at helping firms to 
develop their capabilities. Sowden advised that the Cyprus Government was anxious to ensure quality 
in the services delivered by the consultants, and modelled the programme on the UK's consultancy 
Initiatives (appendix F, pp. 95-105). It is hoped that the innovative culture within the department wi l l 
continue to flourish. Implementation of the proposals for knowledge management in policy design 
should help foster the innovation process, allowing officials to build on international experience to 
build on their record of introducing inventive schemes. 
10.5.12 Improving the Process of Evaluation and Learning 
Chapter 8 demonstrated the strategic importance of'Evaluation and Feedback' in the programme 
design process. However in analysing the process of designing support policy, the author felt that the 
best use of Evaluation (including mid-term reviews o f programmes) is not being made. In talking to 
colleagues he found a tendency for them to read only those evaluation reports which are directly 
related to programmes for which they have, or have had, responsibility. Other reports are often 
ignored, and hence he concluded that the process of 'feeding back' was not fully effective. 
As discussed in chapter 1, section 1.2, a large number of evaluation reports have been drafted, and is 
too great for officials to search through to see what lessons they may learn from past operating 
experience. The author was concerned that important knowledge relating to policy design is 
effectively being hidden. He considered that the reports could be viewed loosely as 'explicit traces'. 
Whilst a proportion of the tacit knowledge used and gained in designing policy and in the running of 
programmes would remain tacit, in undertaking the evaluation exercise much would be codified into 
the explicit form. For example chapter 8, section 8.4 referred to evaluators carrying out face to face 
interviews of those involved in programmes, with their findings being written down in the reports. 
Thus an important part o f the tacit knowledge used in introducing a programme is held explicitly in 
these reports. 
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To improve access to the knowledge contained in evaluation reports, it was thought helpful i f previous 
reports were analysed to determine the best practice lessons in programme design. These lessons could 
then be recorded and held on the proposed knowledge base. There are problems in drawing 
comparisons across evaluations, as the circumstances surrounding the introduction o f interventions can 
differ. Furthermore the distributed nature o f 'Evaluation' as currently implemented can cause 
problems over consistency in the interpretation o f results, as the evaluators work in comparative 
isolation from one another. Nevertheless it is considered that analysis across evaluations to determine 
good practice is possible, providing the analysis addresses the fundamental economic issues (see 
appendix J, section J.2, p. 155). As an additional step, it is also proposed that evaluation staff in the 
separate units be brought together into a single evaluation unit. By grouping the evaluators together 
the sharing of tacit knowledge can be facilitated through adoption of a personalisation approach, using 
mechanisms such as face to face dialogue and brainstorming sessions (see appendix J, section J.2, pp. 
156-157). 
The above proposals are considered as addressing the need to improve the manner in which evaluatory 
findings are presented to the design process, thereby answering the supplementary question (v) - b, 
(chapter 3, sections 3.5 and 3.8.3). Appendix J section J.2, pp. 155-157, describes in greater detail, the 
background leading to these recommendations. It discusses the problems existing with current 
arrangements for 'Evaluation' within DTI, and the issues which need to be considered in identifying 
ways to make improvements. 
10.5.13 Taking Account of Experience 
Section 10.5.7 suggested 'information overload' to be a problem experienced by many organisations. 
Blosch (2000, p. 12) takes up the theme. He refers to much work having been done by organisations in 
developing approaches to K M , that are principally based on providing better communications channels 
to individuals and stored information. By way of an example he refers to organisations having built 
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electronic libraries that store a company's documentation, which can be accessed via sophisticated 
search facilities over the Internet. While seemingly attractive, Blosch cites problems with the 
approach. Reinforcing KPMG's observations (KPMG, 2000, p. I I ) , he points to many personnel 
suffering information overload. Too much data, Blosch proposes, causes increases in communication 
times, which in turn accentuates the overload problem. Therefore, while access to information is 
important, access to the right information is even more so. 
KPMG (2000, p. 3) points to the frustrations experienced by employees in accessing knowledge, and 
indicates the importance of minimising the data held by specifying the knowledge elements to be 
stored, updated, and culled. For the former, Blosch (2000, pp. 13-14) provides further advice. Using 
DHL as a case study example, he refers to the need for organisations to have a framework for K M 
which provides coherence in the data provided. Knowledge elements contained in the framework 
should, Blosch suggests, comprise descriptions o f the processes, the events that drive these processes, 
the data and systems that underpin the processes, the process goals, the underlying reasons for 
undertaking a process, descriptions of the process networks, and details of the people involved. 
In support of developing the knowledge elements the role of using process maps is highlighted. Blosch 
lists several advantages of process mapping. They include the provision of diagrammatic 
representation of what actually happens, the capturing of knowledge from a broad range of individuals 
across an organisation in a consistent and coherent way, and by supporting innovation by enabling 
people to discover what is undertaken as a basis for seeking improvement. In developing a process 
map, Blosch cautions against providing a diagram which describes the whole organisation in detail. It 
is better, he suggests, to produce maps representing parts of the business process Blosch 2,000, p. 14). 
Interestingly Blosch mentions that it is possible to employ IDEF modelling to generate the process 
maps(p, 14). 
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The author contends that his proposals for a knowledge base supporting programme design, contain 
many of the desired features of the knowledge framework described by Blosch. To begin with he has 
not attempted to describe the complete business process o f DTI, but one part of that process, the design 
and administration o f support programmes. Secondly, much of what is required would be provided by 
incorporating the proposed Handbook for Programme Design and Operation, into the knowledge base 
(section 10.5.9). Proposals for drafting the new handbook were discussed in section 10.4.3. Sub-
section 10.4.3.4 suggested that a process map setting out and detailing the stages comprising the design 
process, be contained in the proposed handbook. The map would be based on the f low chart described 
in chapter 8, section 8.8 (Figure 8.3), which in turn would be derived from the application of IDEFO to 
analyse and model the design and administration process. 
Factors which drive the design process, that is the policy directives contained in white papers, the 
specific priorities of individual ministers, and changing market conditions, would be described in the 
new guidance, (see sub-section 10.4.3.5). By analysing the Mnputs' to the various parts of the design 
and administration process, the information sets which underpin each component would be recorded 
(see sub-section 10.4.3.4). Sub-section 10.5.7.2 recommended including in the revised guidelines the 
underlying reasons for certain procedures being adopted. 
Research also enables the remaining requirements to be substantially met. In mapping the overall 
design process a number of the people directly involved have been identified. (The identity of others 
can be determined through inspection of chapters 5 to 8 inclusive, which describe the functional areas. 
DTI's Functional Directory can then be employed to determine which officials are involved in each of 
these areas). As argued in sub-section 10.5.7.1 above, their tacit knowledge, including that o f the 
author, has been captured in developing the IDEFO model. The content o f the proposed handbook 
being based on the contents of the model, would hence provide officials with an explicit record 
containing a significant part of DTFs tacit knowledge relating to scheme design. It is further suggested 
that by placing on the knowledge base details o f the people engaged in designing and administering 
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programmes, including descriptions of their responsibilities, a comprehensive source of reference 
would be provided (see section 10.5.9). This, it is suggested, would enable people to quickly locate 
colleagues engaged in a particular part of the design process. 
Finally, it is proposed that details of the 'programme network' (the subject was introduced in chapter 3, 
sectionf3.3.2, and chapter 5, section 5.6) be included oh the knowledge base, providing information on 
the organisations involved and their respective functions. Analysis of the findings contained in 
chapters 5 to 8 enables the structure of the network to be determined, and the principal relationships are 
summarised below: 
Relationships within Government 
Officials network with colleagues engaged in programme design to learn from others' experience 
(chapter 5, section 5.3.5), in the setting of budgets (chapter 5, section 5.2.6), in programme approval to 
debate the rationale of cases for support (chapter 6, sections 6.4.2 and 6.5.1), and in the evaluation of 
programmes (chapter 8, section 8.5). 
Officials interact with ministers in the seeding of ideas and discussing priorities (chapter 5, sections 
5.2.5 and 5.2.6, chapter 6, sub-section 6.2,3.8), in setting overall budgets for programme work (chapter 
5, section 5.2.6), and in programme approval (chapter 6, sections 6.4.3, 6.5.2, 6.5.3 and 6.5.4). 
Officials maintain dialogues with colleagues in HM Treasury, UKREP, and the European Commission 
in the approval of schemes (chapter 6, sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). 
The views of ministers across government on the priorities to be addressed, including those o f the 
Prime Minister, have been captured by officials via the Cabinet Office Advisory Committees (chapter 
6, sub-section 6.3.3.1). 
412 
Officials in headquarters directorates work with colleagues in the regional Government Offices (GOs), 
in programme delivery (chapter 7, sections 7.2 and 7.3.1). 
Relationships with External Bodies 
Ministers and their officials network with members o f the 'press' in the launching o f programmes 
(chapter 7, section 7.7). 
RTOs act as providers o f evidence of market failure to officials (chapter 5, sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.7, 
chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.2), as consultants to undertake research into market failures 
(chapter 6, sub-section 6.3.3.3, chapter 7, section 7.6.2), and as contractors to deliver initiatives 
(chapter 7, sections 7.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 7.6.2). 
Officials network with HEIs to learn of market failures and obtain advice on programme design 
(chapter 5, section 5.3.4, chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.2). Officials also liase with HEIs in 
their role as contractors undertaking commissioned research of market problems (chapter 6, section 
6.3.3.3), in monitoring schemes (chapter 7, section 7.3.1), and in programme delivery (chapter 7, 
section 7.6.2). 
Consultancy organisations provide advice on market problems and in the development of delivery 
strategies (chapter 5, section 5.3.8, chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.2), act as contractors to 
research market problems and to deliver programmes (chapter 6, section 6.3.3.3 and chapter 7, sections 
7.3.1 and 7.6.2). Consultants are also employed by officials to undertake programme evaluations 
(chapter 7, section 7.6.2, chapter 8, section 8.5). 
Trade associations help stimulate ideas (chapter 6, section 6.2.3.4) and deliver initiatives (chapter 7, 
sub-section 7.3.2.1 and section 7.6.2). 
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Regional development agencies can provide officials with information relating to market problems 
(chapter 6, section 6.3.3.2). 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), enterprise agencies, local authorities, professional 
institutions, commercial organisations other than consultancy companies, have also been involved in 
programme delivery (chapter 7, section 7.6.2). 
Officials interact with SMEs as providers o f information relating to market failures (chapter 5, section 
6.2.3.4), and as organisations receiving support. Numerous instances of firms receiving help are 
contained in this thesis, and for some specific examples the reader is referred to appendices E to H. 
SMEs also interact with the design process through them informing the process of evaluation (chapter 
8, sections 8.3 and 8.6), 
As indicated above, it is proposed that a description o f the programme network be placed in the new 
guidelines, or alternatively as a discrete item on the knowledge base, to help officials identify sources 
of help and how they can be used. It is also suggested that the knowledge team introduced in section 
10.5.10 above, also be made responsible for 'culling' the knowledge base, removing data which is no 
longer required. This is seen as an important function to help prevent information overload, as 
discussed in section 10.5.7, (KPMG, 2000, p. 3). 
10.6 The Mandrin Intranet 
Inspection of DTI's Mandrin intranet shows it to provide officials with a range of facilities. These are 
now summarised. Via Mandrin officials can access electronically documents such as government 
white papers, DTl's spending plans, the departments Functional Directory, press releases, DTI's aims 
and objectives, ministers speeches, and records o f Parliamentary business. 'Team Forum' provides a 
facility for officials to place on an electronic notice board summaries of important events or 
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documents, such as matters relating to a Regional Development Agency's (RDA's) regional economic 
strategy, programme announcements, office notices, and information relating to the European 
Structural Funds. Details of DTI's specialist groups such as the 'Knowledge Management Unit' and 
the 'Future Unit' are also provided. Guidance on how to deal with ministers together with their 
bibliographies, and descriptions of their responsibilities, are also included. The author proposes that 
the value of the Mandrin intranet can be significantly enhanced by providing access to the proposed 
knowledge base supporting programme development, as described in sections 10.5.9, 10.5.10, and 
10.5.13 above. 
10.7 Addressing the Cultural and Organisational Issues 
Section 10.5.7 illustrated how companies were being prevented from fully realising the benefits of 
installing knowledge management programmes, due them failing to observe the cultural and 
organisational issues associated with implementation. In rolling out a knowledge management 
programme within DTI and the other government departments (OGDs), it was considered as 
fundamental to develop an implementation strategy which would address these issues, i f the problems 
experienced by others are to be avoided. 
Buckman (1999, pp. 22-25), chairman and CEO of Buckman Laboratories International Inc, is able to 
advise on sU-ategies to overcome the cultural issues, based on his experience of running the company. 
He highlights the need to identify and address the barriers to the sharing o f knowledge, that are 
inherent in an organisation. KPMG (2000, p, 19) drew attention to technology related problems, such 
as the everyday use of technologies not integrating into normal working practices. But, Buckman 
suggests, introducing the technology is the 'easy part' o f knowledge management (Buckman, 1999, p. 
22). In contrast he sites the natural reluctance of human beings to give up the advantage of hoarding 
private, individual know-how as the major inhibitor to knowledge sharing (see the example relating to 
sales staff in the following paragraph). People, Buckman proposes, perceive knowledge as power, 
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providing them with the ability to maintain personal influence (p. 22). Therefore the problem is a 
human one rather than technological (Brooking, 1999, p. 139). 
Continuing, Buckman suggests that competition between divisions drives many people to grow their 
knowledge and use it to succeed (p. 22). However, experience in Buckman Laboratories has 
demonstrated a tendency among sales personnel to resist sharing what they know. They feared giving 
away their knowledge because their salaries were related to sales volumes, which in turn were related 
to their knowledge of the market. Buckman (2000, pp. 23-24) suggests that engendering trust is 
essential in creating a culture in which knowledge is openly shared. Trust, he proposes, comes from 
ensuring that all members of a company, irrespective o f their level, has equal access to an 
organisation's knowledge base. Communication is also fundamental. KPMG (2000, p. 19) refers to a 
lack of user uptake of knowledge management systems due to insufficient communication. Nobody, 
Buckman argues, must be inhibited from communicating with someone else, no matter what their 
relative positions are within the company. 
Rewarding as a group those who contribute to an organisation by communicating their knowledge is 
seen as a strategy to overcome problems (Buckman 1999, pp. 23-24; KPMG, 2000, pp. 3, 21). It is 
important to ensure that those who contribute most to the system are easily identifiable, and are 
perceived as having their span of influence and hence power, increased. In this way the collective 
power of people grows, which is realised as improved success for the organisation (Buckman 1999, pp. 
23-24). The author observes that the strategy would address the issue raised by KPMG (2000, pp 2, 
19) of users not seeing the personal benefits. By way of motivating staff to exchange their experiences 
and contribute to the knowledge base, top contributors should also be physically rewarded (Buckman 
1999, pp. 23-24). In the Buckman Laboratories case, staff were invited to attend an event held at a 
resort. By so doing, it is suggested, others were more motivated to participate in knowledge sharing. 
At the event, participants held formal meetings and shared ideas on how to advance knowledge 
sharing, thereby adding further value. 
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It is proposed that the above approaches would be additionally helpful in overcoming the difficulty o f 
people perceiving a lack of time to share knowledge (KPMG, 2000, p. I I ) . The incentives of 
recognition and physical rewards would, the author suggests, cause staff to give knowledge sharing a 
higher priority, and thus to find the time to exchange their experiences with others. 
Returning to problems experienced in Buckman in relation to the sales staff not wishing to share their 
knowledge, it is thought that DTI could face a similar difficulty. The author observes that while 
officials in the design process are not involved in 'selling' in the normally accepted sense, their salaries 
are nevertheless linked to their performance. Officials are given annual performance reviews where 
they are awarded box markings related to their achievements against specified objectives. The size o f 
an individual's subsequent pay award is directly related to the box marking which has been awarded. 
In the interests o f encouraging officials to share their knowledge, it is proposed that the government re-
appraises its current policy, and removes the relationship bet\veen the pay o f individuals and their 
personal achievements. Instead, it is suggested, it would be better to reward officials collectively, more 
in line with the Buckman Laboratories approach. 
The author further proposes that DTI and the OGDs, similarly introduce incentives for the sharing o f 
knowledge as observed in the Buckman case. For DTI the author proposes that the knowledge team 
track the levels of knowledge sharing via the knowledge base, and via the Mandrin intranet display a 
list of the frequent contributors. Learning from Buckman Laboralories's experience it is additionally 
proposed that the department hold annual 'away days', where primary contributors can exchange ideas 
and see how best the knowledge created can be applied to help DTI and OGDs meet their objectives. 
In designing the knowledge base, care should be taken to establish equal rights of access across 
govemment. 
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KPMG in their report (KPMG, 2000, pp. 2, 19) recorded people experiencing problems over 
insufficient time to learn how to use the system, and a lack of training. DTI has an excellent history o f 
training its people. For example, as the latest Mandrin system was introduced, each member o f the 
department's staff attended a one-day training course on how to use the system, and learn of the 
facilities available. In support o f the training day each official received a comprehensive manual 
describing the system and giving instructions on how each facility should be used. However with time 
the author observes that as time passes the information accessible via the intranet changes and grows, 
and at such a pace that it is not always possible to keep up with progress. Via the intranet staff are 
regularly updated on additional facilities as they are introduced, but the author nonetheless 
recommends that DTI holds one half day refresher courses to help officials stay abreast of 
developments. Holding the refresher sessions every six months is suggested as being adequate. 
10.8 Conclusions 
The purpose of the work described in this chapter, was to respond to the flf^h research question which 
sought to identify ways in which the process of designing and administering programmes could be 
improved (see chapter 1, section 1.5). The question has been answered, with a number of improvement 
strategies proposed and their efficacy argued. Among these, proposals for the development of the 
Handbook for Programme Design and Operation^ that provides a comprehensive set of good practice 
guidance to fully support officials in the design process, has been detailed. This satisfies the third and 
final research objective (c), (chapter I , section 1.2). 
As part of re-engineering the process of developing support initiatives, chapter 3, sections 3.4.2 and 
3.8.3, posed the supplementary question o f how knowledge management could be employed to 
improve the efficiency with which the design and administration o f programmes is undertaken. 
Sections 10.5 to 10.7 record the analysis o f how knowledge management can add value to the design 
process, and a number o f steps that can be taken to introduce K M were proposed. Central to these 
proposals is the introduction o f a knowledge base to support scheme development, which 
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simultaneously wi l l promote continuous improvement by helping DTI , and i f implemented more 
widely other government departments, to move towards becoming learning organisations (see chapter 
3, sections 3.4.2 and 3.8.3). As part o f the overall K M strategy the approaches which should be 
adopted to benchmark external organisations have been identified, and thus the supplementary question 
(v) - d, which is concerned with the importing of good practice has been addressed. A response to the 
supplementary question (v) - e, which sought to overcome the problems of losing archived data with 
time, has also been provided (see chapter 3, sections 3.4.2 and 3.8.3). 
In developing the ideas for the introduction of knowledge management, the experience of commercial 
organisations in implementing their K M systems has been taken into account. Based on good case 
study examples a set o f strategies aimed at reducing the effects o f commonly experienced problems has 
been developed. Thus it is argued that the author's proposals for implementing K M to support the 
design process are pragmatic, and that the implementation o f the suggested measures should result in 
improved efficiency. Thus it is claimed that the second research objective (Objective (b)), of 
developing proposals for exploiting research findings to achieve better VFM, has also been achieved 
(chapter I , section 1.2). 
The introduction o f DTI's Mandrin intranet has provided a number of facilities which represent good . 
:xamples of knowledge management (section 10.6), but comparison with practice adopted elsewhere 
id the measures recommended by the gurus in the subject, suggests that DTI has still a way to go 
before it becomes a true learning organisation (sections 10.5 and 10.7). Implementation of the 
measures proposed in this thesis to aid the process of developing and running programmes, would be 
an important step towards realisation of the learning goal. Furthermore, it is argued that the pragmatic 
nature o f proposals gives rise to the potential to apply the K M principals described in this thesis more 
widely within the department, and across Whitehall, to support the range o f activities undertaken in 
government. Therefore, importantly, it is suggested that the proposals for knowledge management 
e 
an 
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have Ihe added potential to help the government realise its over arching aim to improve policy making 
throughout its administration (section 10.2). 
Chapter 3, section 3.5, discussed the incremental nature o f the programme design process within 
govemment, a phenomenon which Lindblom refers to as Mncrementalism' (Lindblom, 1977, pp. 313-
317). Section 10.3 above observed that the best practice strategies adopted for re-engineering 
processes in companies, are similarly incremental in their approach. The issues to be considered at the 
time of embarking on projects for change are too complex to be resolved in a single, 'big hit ' . It is 
therefore suggested that Linblom's observations apply more generally, being equally applicable to the 
development of policy within commercial organisations. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.3, also recommended that it was important to discover the structure of that part 
of the 'producer network', which supports the process of designing and administering schemes, that is 
the 'programme network'. Research has revealed this component o f the producer network to be far 
reaching, extending both within and externally o f govemment, involving people at different levels and 
comprising a broad range of organisational types. The members o f the programme network, together 
with descriptions of their relationships with the design process, have been summarised (section 
10.5.13). Apart from usefully informing officials in the design process o f who they should establish 
relationships with, details of the network participants should be of more general interest to researchers 
engaged in public policy. Chapter 11 now summarises the work undertaken in this research, drawing 
overall conclusions from the observations made. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Research Observations 
Chapter 1, section 1.2, set out three research objectives. These were to make a contribution to 
knowledge by obtaining a detailed description of the process o f designing and administering 
support programmes, to identify strategies for improving the process, and as part o f the latter to 
develop proposals for a set o f good practice guidance. Chapter 1,sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 1.6, 
and 1.9, set out the six research questions which had to be answered in support of meeting these 
objectives. Research has provided a comprehensive set o f responses to the questions, and through 
these answers it is claimed that the research objectives have been fully met. As part of meeting its 
objectives, it is further claimed that the research has provided for the first time, a detailed 
description of the process of designing and administering publicly funded support programmes for 
SMEs. In addition, a practical set o f proposals for improving the overall process has been 
developed. Furthermore it is suggested that these proposals have the potential to be widely adopted 
in the public sector, as the principal features o f the design and administration process are 
identifiable in programme development outside of DTI (chapter 4, section 4.8.1, and chapter 9, 
section 9.3). Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, revealed the high levels of govemment spend world wide on 
support initiatives for industry. It is thus suggested that i f widely employed, the proposals have the 
potential to help administrations generally to realise better value for the money, from the funds that 
they invest in support initiatives. 
Success in achieving the research aims indicates the efficacy o f the research strategy that was 
adopted for investigations. It is considered that the success o f the investigatory method is partly 
attributable to the adoption of ethnography, with the author acting in the role of participant 
observer (chapter 4, section 4.5). As a participant observer the author was able to employ his own 
knowledge of the design system, both as the foundation on which to build an understanding o f the 
design process, and at the beginning of the research project to understand where research effort 
should be directed. In the latter case, the author's direct involvement in programme design also 
allowed him to know whom he should approach for information. He knew what peoples' 
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responsibilities were, and therefore what knowledge they would be likely to have. From observing 
colleagues in the work place the author was aware of their personal characteristics, and therefore 
understood how well they analysed their own situations and therefore represented good candidates 
s 
for questioning, and how individuals should be approached to obtain information. 
Importantly, as a civil servant employed by DTI for a number of years, the author was a ful ly 
accepted, and trusted, member of the community in which he worked. This acceptance facilitated 
access to the information that people held, as he had the 'tacit permission' to approach them. The 
author never once experienced a blocking of information, or a refusal to requests for papers 
etcetera. Similarly the author experienced no difficulty in securing interviews with colleagues. As 
a member o f the community engaged in the design process, the author was also able to closely 
observe the actions of others, and benefit from their experiences through tacit to tacit knowledge 
transfer. In consulting the literature, the author observes that his decision to adopt an ethnographic 
approach is in keeping with the growing trend among researchers to use naturalistic methods to 
investigate social situations. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3, suggested that systems theory be adopted for analysing the policy process, 
and chapter 4, sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 proposed that IDEFO techniques be employed to examine 
the design and administration process. However Hi l l , (1997, pp. 128-129) pointed to some 
researchers advocating a 'bottom-up' approach to the analysis of policy as being preferable to 
adopting the 'top-down' approach which is inherent to systems theory. They propose that to 
understand the complexities of the dynamics involved, it is necessary to carry out detailed 
examination o f the activities undertaken. The author argues that the use o f successive 
decomposition in IDEFO modelling (see chapter 4, section 4.6.2) directed research to analyse at the 
'bottom lever, what takes place in the design process, and has thus enabled an in-depth 
understanding of the process to be obtained. That IDEFO was applied as an integral part o f the case 
study method served to strengthen the ability of the research strategy to examine the design process 
in fine detail (chapter 4, section 4.6). 
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Examples o f phenomena that have been revealed by such a detailed analysis include the presence 
of a four stage process in the development o f programme rationale (chapter 6, section 6.3.2), the 
role o f ROAME statements in protecting ministers' interests (chapter 6, section 6.4.6), and how 
officials have interacted with ministers to enhance the likelihood of obtaining their approval for 
new initiatives (chapter 6, section 6.5). Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, discussed Rhodes's concept o f 
'producer networks' (Rhodes, 1988, pp.327-343). Analysis of the design and administration 
process at the detailed level has allowed research to build on Rhodes's observations. Details o f the 
extent o f the programme network, that is that part o f DTI's 'producer network' supporting the 
specific tasks contained in programme development and delivery, have been provided (chapter 10, 
section 10.5.13). As predicted by Rhodes the network was found to be extensive, with a broad 
range o f actors to be involved. 
Research has enabled the structure of the network to be defined, and the roles of each of the 
network participants to be described. Chapter 4, section 4.8.1, set out the generalisablity of the 
research findings. It is suggested that the investigatory strategy as described in this thesis, could 
be usefully adopted by other researchers to analyse similar social situations within other 
organisations. However, as indicated above, the success experienced by the author in adopting the 
strategy for studying the design process within DTI was largely attributable to him being 
recognised as a fu l l and trusted member o f the community that was the subject o f examination. It 
is proposed that an external researcher would not 'enjoy' this position, taking him or her several 
years to gain the tacit permissions, and an understanding of the culture, which would be required. 
Therefore, in recommending his research strategy for wider adoption, the author would make the 
proviso that its fitness for purpose is reliant on the researcher being perceived by the target 
community as an established member of the organisation concerned. 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, referred to researchers viewing policy making as a complex process. The 
author would argue that his research has lent weight to this view. Study of the process o f 
programme design and administration has shown it to be a complex phenomenon in its own right, 
and being part of policy making therefore contributes to the complexity of the overall policy 
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system. Chapter 3, sections 3.3 and 3.5, chapter 8, sections 8.4 and 8.9, discussed the incremental 
nature of policy development, and how 'incrementalism' as described by Lindblom (1977, pp. 313-
317), extends to the level of scheme design. The findings of research further suggest that 
'incrementalism' is not restricted to the public sector, but is probably identifiable in the 
development of commercial policy within organisations lying in the private sector (chapter 10, 
sections 10.3 and 10.8). 
11.2 Strengths and the Weaknesses of the Research Work 
Beginning with the weaknesses, there are several avenues of research which the author wished to 
explore to broaden and further strengthen investigatory findings, but from which he was prevented 
from studying owing to time limitations. The author wished to interview officials and examine file 
papers in other government departments, to further test the validity of the design model for wider 
use. It would have been useful to have extended the literature review, by taking a more 'in-depth' 
look at analysis o f the role of civil servants advising their ministers. This would be backed by the 
interviewing of officials employed in the private offices of ministers, to better relate the advisory 
role of the design process, with the general responsibilities assigned to officials. 
The role of the Foresight Programme operated by DTI's Office for Science and Technology (OST), 
in informing policy decisions is a further area which the author wanted to investigate. The 
Foresight Programme aims to look into the long term future, and determine the priorities for policy 
setting. It would have been desirable, to have gained a fuller understanding of the role o f Foresight 
in contributing to the design process, by investigating the relationship between the deliverables of 
Foresight and programme development. A number of'Foresight' programmes are operated across 
Europe and elsewhere (Arnold, Boekholt, and Keen, 1999, p. 21), and these are potentially 
interesting candidates for research. 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 showed how officials make use of evidence portrayed in white papers, in 
developing programme 'Rationale'. Again to extend knowledge of the overall process of 
programme development, it would have been helpful to have studied the interrelationships bet\veen 
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officials engaged in the design process, and those tasked with drafting white papers. Research 
would also involve study of the mechanisms which inform the process, and hence in turn the design 
process. From his experience, the author knows that Select Committees can influence policy, and 
would have liked to have investigated their role in influencing programme introductions. 
However these weaknesses are considered to be more than outweighed by the strengths of the 
research which has been undertaken. Deployment o f the case study method has enabled the scope 
and the essential elements of the design process to be revealed. A rich set of insights into what is 
involved have been provided. Confidence in the resulting design model can be drawn from the 
wide range of information sources which were investigated in-depth in the reaching of conclusions. 
Testing of the model was undertaken to check on its validity, and steps were taken to confirm that 
its content represented good practice. Research has also been able to capitalise upon the 
knowledge gained in developing the design model, going on to provide a set of practical proposals 
to improve the design process and thereby VFM. The proposals are based on proven methods as 
previously adopted in commerce, and confidence in their ability to deliver better performance is 
hence held. 
11,3 Further Research 
A number of areas for further research are identifiable. Clearly the weaknesses described above in 
themselves represent candidates for further study. As part of investigating the wider role of 
officials advising their ministers, it is suggested that there is potential to examine how the design 
process differs from other forms o f policy advice. It is proposed that the advising role 
demonstrated in developing schemes is a product of officials reacting to statements of govemment 
policy. Such policy, it is suggested, is normally the subject of careful planning, sometimes whilst a 
'government' is in 'opposition'. Policy advising in the context of programme design thus relates to 
the programme strategies that wil l best deliver planned Ministerial objectives. This scenario can be 
contrasted with, for example, officials advising ministers in crisis situations, which often occur 
without warning. How then the design process should be viewed as an advisory mechanism is a 
question for research to answer. 
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A further topic, related to the first, is how should the role of producing ROAME statements in 
protecting ministers vulnerability be interpreted? Should the process o f developing ROAMEs be 
viewed as an advisory mechanism, or as a device to produce a baseline upon which impact 
performance can subsequently be evaluated? In a similar vein, how important is the issuing of 
scheme guidelines to agencies responsible for operating govemment programmes in protecting 
ministers from criticism, as against helping to ensure that the contractor delivers adequate 
performance? 
Two additional areas for research are seen. The first is to enrich the knowledge built in this thesis 
further, by analysing the schemes operated elsewhere in the world, including those funded by the 
European Commission. It is proposed that the design model be employed as the basis for mapping 
the procedures involved, which would allow domestic approaches to be compared with those 
adopted elsewhere. The work would also include benchmarking of the design process in the UK 
with the processes employed by other countries, to determine what lessons can be leamt for 
application by governments as a whole. Much is to be gained from benchmarking. The European 
Commission Green paper on innovation, in referring to industrial activities undertaken in different 
countries slates that here "there is a great wealth of experience^* (EC, 1995, p. I). 
Potential to use the design model in commercial applications is thought to be possible. Companies, 
like governments must monitor the market drivers and design and implement strategies in response 
to those drivers. Programmes to develop new products wi l l be initiated and managed, and the 
performance of new introductions to the market analysed and fed back into product design. The 
overall process, it is suggested, exhibits many of the features of designing and administering 
programmes. Again, using the design model, it is proposed that research be conducted to analyse 
the development process within commercial organisations. Depending on what is revealed, the 
design model could be adapted accordingly, and the good practice lessons identified employed to 
strengthen the design o f programmes within govemment. 
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Finally, the second area for research to investigate is the introduction o f recommendations made in 
Chapter 10, section 10.5 for improving the effectiveness of the design process. These hinged 
around the development of the new *Design Handbook', and the application of Knowledge 
Management in the process o f developing schemes. For the former, the author would have liked to 
have taken a further step towards producing the 'Handbook', by taking the 'good practice' analysis 
developed in appendix K, and building a set of matrices to: 
(a) relate research methods to classification of market failure, 
(b) relate delivery strategies to market failure. 
The examples considered in appendix K are not exhaustive; indeed the thesis as a whole, including 
information held in the interview records (appendix B), contains additional content which could be 
analysed. Further research could take in a wider analysis of programme delivery in support of 
providing a rich source of information and advice for officials. The work undertaken so far does 
however, represent a good foundation upon which to build. 
Research is also necessary to determine how proposals for introducing knowledge management can 
be effected. It is envisaged that a pilot system would be;initially introduced. Using the proposals 
laid out in this thesis, investigations would thus be concerned with identifying the research 
objectives for the project, including what the scope of the pilot should be and identifying the people 
who are to be the subject o f the pilot, together with the development o f the research and 
implementation strategies. In developing research plans, study o f procedures adopted more widely 
in commerce would be evaluated. The deliverables of the research project would be detailed 
recommendations for how Knowledge Management should be introduced more widely within 
government, and list the priority areas for implementation. Finally, an interesting area for further 
research is to measure the extent to which Linblom's observations concerning the incremental 
nature of policy making in the arena of public policy {Lindblom, 1977, pp. 313-317), are also valid 
for the development of commercial policy in the private sector. 
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11.4 Summary 
The research has been successfully completed with all research objectives fully satisfied. The 
research has thus been of value. By revealing the detail of the process of designing and operating 
programmes within DTI, a contribution to knowledge has been made and 'curiosity' satisfied. This 
knowledge has been successfully exploited in pursuit o f finding ways to improve the current 
process, with a set of pragmatic proposals drawn up for addressing problems which have been 
identified. Several worthwhile areas for further research have been suggested, which i f followed 
up should lead to yet greater understanding of the design process, and in the discovery of ways in 
which we may improve it further for the benefit o f us all. 
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APPENDIX A LIST OF EVALUATION REPORTS 
1. Metal Working Machine Tool Industry Scheme 1983 
2. Robots In British Industry 1983 
3. Interim Assessment Of The Small Business Loan Guarantee Scheme 1983 
4. Small Business Loan Guarantee Scheme 1983 
5. Study Of The First 50 Failures Under The Small Business Loan Scheme 1983 
6. Assessment Of The Instrumentation And Automation Industry Pre 1984 
7. Advanced Factory Group; Final Report Pre 1984 
8. Assistance For The Small Firms Located In Steel, Shipbuilding And Textile 
Areas 
Pre 1984 
9. Assessment OF The 600 Group Scamp Project Pre 1984 
10. BOTB Joint Venture Scheme Pre 1984 
11. Case Study In Machine Tools Pre 1984 
12. Enquiry Into The Benefits Of The Governments Advance Factory Building 
Programme 
Pre 1984 
13. Evaluation Of The Product And Process Development Scheme Pre 1984 
14. Impact Of The English Estates And The Welsh Development Agency On 
Private Sector Provision Of Industrial Property 
Pre 1984 
15. Interim Assessment Of The Quality Assurance Advisory Service Pre 1984 
16. Measuring The Effects And Costs Of Regional Incentives Pre 1984 
17. Promoting Innovation (Micro Electronic Implication Projects) Pre 1984 
18. Regional Incentives and the Investment Decision Of The Firm Pre 1984 
19. Services To Exporters Study Pre 1984 
20. Small Workshop Scheme Pre 1984 
21. Survey of the Effect of the 100% Industrial Buildings Allowance Pre 1984 
22. Evaluation of the Ferrous Foundry Industry Scheme 1985 
23. Evaluation of the non-ferrous Foundry Scheme 1985 
24. Textile Machinery Industry Scheme 1985 
25. Wool Textile Industry Scheme 1985 
26. Wool Textile Industry Scheme State II 1985 
27. Economic Assessment of the Electronic Components Industry Scheme 1985 
28. Evaluation of the Clothing Industry Scheme 1985 
29. Evaluation of the Manufacturing Advisory Service 1985 
30. EWG (85) 4 Interim Evaluation Report: The Quality Assurance 
Advisory Group 
1985 
31. EWG (85) 11 Evaluation Report: Teaching Company Scheme 1985 
Assessment 
32. EWG (85) 19 Evaluation Report: Interim Review Of West 
Midlands FMASE 
1985 
33. EWG (85) 26 Evaluation Report: Overview of Evaluation 
Findings; Support For Lni's 
1985 
34. EWG (85) 31 Evaluation Report: Scarp FMS Demonstration 
Project 
1985 
35. EWG (85) 33 Evaluation Report: Pre -Production Order Support 
Programmes 
1985 
36. EWG (85) 34 Evaluation Repon :Support For British Geological 
Survey Programmes 
1985 
37. EWG (86) 21 Evaluation Report: The Teaching Company Scheme 1986 
38. EWG (86) 15 Report: The Evaluation Of Requirements Board 
Approval Projects 
1986 
39. EWG (86) 18 Evaluation Report: PPO Support 1986 
40. EWG (86) 19 Evaluation Report : BTAS - M 1986 
41. EWG (86) 20 Evaluation Report : Support For Software Products 1986 
42. EWG (86) 24 Evaluation Report : The West Midlands Financial 
Management Advisory Service Experiment 
1986 
43. EWG (86) 26 Report: Industry's Early Reactions To RDG 2 1986 
44. EWG (87) 5 Evaluation Report : The Software Product Scheme 1987 
45. Evaluation of the Alvey Programme : Interim Report 1987 
46. EWG (87) 14 Evaluation Report : C A D T E S 1987 
47., EWG (87) 9 Evaluation Report: SEFIS 1987 
48. EWG (87) 1 Evaluation Report : The Overseas Projects Fund 1987 
49. EWG (87) 6 Evaluation Report : The Office And Services Industry 
Scheme 
1987 
50. EWG (87) 7 EVALUATION Report : Business Improvement 
Services 
1987 
51, EWG (87) 10 Evaluation Report : SFI General 1987 
52. EWG (87) 17 Evaluation Report : MISP 1 1987 
53. EWG (87) 18 L R U Evaluation Report : Support for Ferranti 1987 
54. EWG (87) 20 Evaluation Report;: Interim Review Of The Outward 
S&T Export Mission Scheme 
1987 
55. EWG (88) 19 Evaluation Report : Support For CNC Machine Tools 
In Colleges 
1988 
56. EWG (88) 22 Evaluation Report : Map Training 1988 
57. Industry's Early Reaction To The New Regional Development Grant 1988 
58. EWG (88) 1 Evaluation Report : Smiths Industries Aerospace And 
Defence Systems 
1988 
59. EWG (88) 2 Evaluation Report ; Air R&D Support On Three 
Project Studies 
1988 
60. EWG (88) 5 Evaluation Report : The BTAS Design Scheme 1988 
61. EWG (88) 9 Evaluation Report : The Private Sector Steel Scheme 1988 
62. EWG (88) 10 Evaluation Report : Support For Club Projects 1988 
63. EWG (88) 13 Evaluation Report : Overseas Trade Fairs 1988 
64. EWG (88) 17 Evaluation Report; Steel Castings Rationalisation 
Scheme 
1988 
65. EWG (88) 20 Evaluation Report: The Micros In Schools 
Programme 
1988 
66. EWG (88) 23 Evaluation Report :Smart (Phase 1) 1988 
67. EWG (88) 27 Rationalisation In The Private Sector Of The United 
Kingdom Steel Industry 
1988 
68. EWG (88) 32 Evaluation Report: Support For Quality 1988 
69. EWG (89) 2 Evaluation Report : The Handsworih Task Force 1989 
70. EWG (89) 5 Evaluation Report : DTI Support For Aircraft And 
Aero - Engine R& D 
1989 
71. EWG (89) 6 Evaluation Report : The Consultancy Initiatives : 
Phase 1 
1989 
72. EPIC (89) 7 Evaluation Report : Product Design Advice Centres 1989 
73. EPIC (89) 9 Evaluation Report : First Stage Report On Regional 
Enterprise Grants 
1989 
74. EPIC (89) 14 DTI/IDS/WOID Evaluation Report : Regional 
Selective Assistance 1980 
1989 
75. EPIC (89) 17 Evaluation Report Support For Fihns 1989 
76. EPIC (89) 18 Evaluation Report : Fibre Optics And Optoelectronics 
(FOS) Scheme 
1989 
77. EPIC (89) 19 Evaluation Report : National Physical Laboratory 
Division O f Radiation Science And Acoustics 
1989 
78. EPIC (89) 25 Evaluation : DRSA At NPL Supplementary To EIPIC 
(89) 19 
1989 
79. EPIC (89) 27 Evaluation Report On The Mineral Intelligence 
Programme At The British Geological Survey 
1989 
80. EPIC (89) 28 Evaluation Report Of The Mineral Reconnaissance 
Programme At BGS 
1989 
81. EPIC (89) 31 Evaluation Report :The Industrial Heal Recovery 
Scheme 
1989 
82. EPIC (90) 11 Evaluation Report : The Demonstration Firms 
Scheme 
1990 
83. EPIC (90) 35 Evaluation Report : The Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems Support Scheme 
1990 
84. EPIC (90) 42 Interim Evaluation Report : Managing Into The 90's 1990 
85. EPIC (90) 48 Evaluation Report: The Teaching Companies Scheme 1990 
86. EPIC (90) I Evaluation Report :Research And Technology 
Organisations 
1990 
87. EPIC (90) 32 Evaluation Report : Flow Measurement At N E L 1990 
88. EPIC (90) 34 Evaluation Report : Regional Investment And 
Regional Innovation Grants; Stage 2 
1990 
89. EPIC (90) 36 Evaluation Report :DMOM AT NPL 1990 
90. EPIC (90), 37 Evaluation Report : Support For Inward Investment In 
The United Kingdom 
1990 
91. EPIC (90) 40 Evaluation Report : SMART 1990 
92. EPIC (90) 44 Evaluation Report: Resort For Aeroengine Noise 1990 
93. EPIC (90) 46 Evaluation Report: Inner Cities Task Force 
Evaluation 
1990 
94. EPIC (91) 18 Evaluation Report: Teaching Companies'Scheme 1991 
95. EPIC (91) 23 Evaluation Report: STIP And C A E 1991 
96. EPIC (91) 19 Evaluation Report: Consultancy Initiatives; Second 
Stage 
1991 
97. EPIC (91) 9 Evaluation Report: Validity Of Analytical 
Measurement 
1991 
98. EPIC (91) 10 Evaluation Report: Single European Market Publicity 
Campaign 
1991 
99. EPIC (91) 12 Interim Evaluation Report : United Kingdom Engines 
Emissions Consortium 
1991 
100. EPIC (91) 13 Evaluation Report : Gallium Arsenide 1991 
101. EPIC (91) 14 Evaluation Report : Overseas Seminars And Outward 
Missions 
1991 
102. EPIC (91) 19 Companies Houses 1991 
103. EPIC (91) 24 Evaluation Report: Open Systems Technology 
Transfer 
1991 
104. EPIC (91) 32 Evaluation Report : Overseas Stores Promotions 
Scheme 
1991 
105. EPIC (91) 38 Evaluation Report : RSA "Small Cases" 1991 
106. EPIC (91) 39 Evaluation Report ; Regional Enterprise Grants Y 1991 
107. EPIC (91) 46 Evaluation Report : Export Marketing Research 
Scheme 
1991 
108. EPIC (91) 54 Evaluation Report : Environmental Metrology 1991 
109. EPIC (91) Evaluation Report: Consultancy Initiatives; Third Stage 1991 
no. EPIC (91) Evaluation Of The Alvey Programme; Final Report 1991 
111. EPIC (91) 60 Evaluation Report : Olympus Utilisation Programme 1991 
112. EPIC (91) 62 Evaluation Report : Basic Metrology 1991 
113. EPIC (91) 66 Summary Of 3 Evaluation Reports ; A & Ae Research 
Programmes 
1991 
114. EPIC (92) 1 Evaluation Report : Advanced Lithography Research 
Initiative 
1992 
115. EPIC (92) 4 Evaluation Work Programme 1992/93 1992 
116. EPIC (92) 6 Evaluation Report : Inward Missions 1992 
117. EPIC (92) 7 Evaluation Report : Technical Action Line 1992 
118. EPIC (92) 8 Evaluation Report : Consultancy Initiatives 
Implementation Guidance 
1992 
119. EPIC (92) 9 Strategy For the Evaluation of Research and 
Technology Organisations 
1992 
120. EPIC (92) 15 Evaluation Report : Warren Spring Laboratory 
(Limited Circulation Only) 
1992 
121. EPIC (92) 17 Evaluation Report : Technology Transfer 
Mechanisms 
1992 
122. EPIC (92) 20 Evaluation Report : Iron and Steel Employees 1992 
Readaption Benefits Scheme 
123. EPIC (92) 23 Evaluation Report: Support for Collaborative R&D 
In The Metal Processing Industry 
1992 
124. EPIC (92) 24 Evaluation Report _ High Temperature 
Superconductivity 
1992 
125. EPIC (92) 25 Evaluation Strategy : Information Technology 1992 
126. EPIC (92) 26 Evaluation Report: Consultancy Initiatives - Fourth 
Stage 
1992 
127. EPIC (92) 27 Evaluation Report: Regional Enterprise Grants (RJN) 1992 
128. EPIC (92) 28 Evaluation Report: Films 1992 
129. EPIC (92) 29 Evaluation Report: Regional Selective Assistance -
Main Report 
1992 
130. EPIC (92) 20 Evaluation Report: Exchange Risks Guarantee 
Scheme 
1992 
131. EPIC (92) 31 Evaluation Strategy : LINK 1992 
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW RECORDS 
APPENDIX B INTERVIEW RECORDS 
Interview Number: 1 Date: 3 November 1988 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr Derek Baker 
Grade 
Grade 7 
Position 
Section Head, Manufacturing Management and Technologies ( M M T ) Division 
Duration of T ime with D T I 
Over 10 years 
Purpose of Interview 
T o help place research into context by obtaining historical data on the development of DTI , and to 
help identify those aspects of government activity which should be investigated. In particular 
information was sought which would help the author identify those areas of programme 
development and operation, which should become the focus for research. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
During the course of a number of interactions with Mr Baker, the author became aware that the 
interviewee had gained substantial knowledge of DTI and its approaches to helping industry. 
Rationale for selecting Mr Baker was that he had spent some 24 years in industry, and 15 years 
working in DTI . His time within the department had been spent solely on the introduction and 
management of industrial support programmes. These included both programmes which were the 
subject of giving grants to industry, and awareness activities. Mr Baker is regarded by his 
colleagues as having excellent experience in operating both types of programmes. 
The length of time spent in the DTI and the variety of work placed him in a good position to 
provide a historical record of how policy for supporting S M E s had developed. Coupled with his 
industrial experience Mr Baker was also well qualified to comment from 'first hand' experience on 
the relative success of schemes. Mr Baker is currently responsible for the management of the 
Towards Integration (Tl ) awareness programme, a scheme in which he also had responsibility for 
developing. Mr Baker was therefore considered as being a good candidate to question about the 
design of awareness activities, which were known to be from personal knowledge to be a major 
area of DTl's activities. 
Duration of Interview 
1 hour 30 minutes 
Questions Asked 
Q l 
It would be helpful in drafting the thesis to set work in the context of the history of D T I . Would 
you please describe what you see as having been the principal stages of development? 
Response 
Things began with the formation of the Ministry of Technology (Min Tech) in 1965. Along with 
the Department of Economics Affairs ( D E A ) Min Tech was referred to as a 'super department'. 
During the late 1980s', Min Tech was merged with the Overseas Trade Board ( B O T B ) creating the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) . Present day activities in the area of industrial support 
programmes have their roots in the old Min Tech; current policy is based on that originally set by 
this previous department. 
Mr Baker recommended the interviewing of Mr John Cammell, Head of M M T Division. Mr 
Cammell had been with DTI since the formation of Min Tech, and would be able to give further 
insights on the development of DTI and its work. 
Q2 
Do ministers influence programme development? 
Response 
Mr Baker observed that the Labour Government and previous Conservative administrations were 
interventionist, whereas the present Conservative Government took a non interventionist stance. 
This had resulted in the introduction of the Enterprise Initiative which was helpful, but not 
interventionist. 
Q3 
In developing programmes, what factors in your opinion are primary sources of influence on the 
process? 
Response 
Parliamentary legislation is a major influence, in that it provides the legislative framework which 
authorises the government to use public funds in support of actions it wishes to undertake. 
Legislation is contained in Acts of Parliament. The department has been, and is, driven by two 
Acts of Parliament: 
a) The Science and Technology ( S & T ) Act, 1965, 
b) The Industry Act, 1972. 
The S & T Act was introduced by the Labour Government in the Min Tech days. It has been and 
remains, the principal vehicle by which the department has been able to fund most of its schemes. 
Acts of Parliament are divided into sections, and it is Section 8 of the S & T Act which is most 
relevant. Examples of activities supported under Section 8 are the Support For Innovation (SFI ) , 
collaborative R & D , and awareness programmes. 
Mr Baker advised that furdier reading on the history of Min Tech was available in the book by C . 
P. Snow, title Tlie Corridors of Power, 
The Industry Act allows selective assistance to be provided to firms. It is Section 7 of the Act 
which is relevant to DTI's industrial support. An example of support are the Regional Assistance 
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Schemes designed to maximise employment. Grants were restricted to designated (geographical), 
development areas. Amongst companies receiving grants were ICI, and Nissan. Grants were also 
given for Selective Assistance Projects. A number of schemes were funded which were designed 
to promote the take-up of new technology in selected industrial sectors. Examples o f schemes 
launched are Machine Tools, Textile and Printing Machines, CADCAM, Robotics, and Red 
Poultry. 
Latterly DTi programmes have also become the subject of scrutiny of the European Commission 
(EC), which acts as a further agency of influence. Member States must not distort competition 
within the Community with the introduction of their programmes. 
Q4 
How has the development of awareness programmes progressed over the years? 
Response 
The Labour Government and previous Conservative administrations have taken an interventionist 
stance, in contrast with the present Conservative Government which is operating a non 
interveritionist policy. For example greater emphasis is now placed on helping companies improve 
their management through the award of consultancy grants, under EI. 
Turning to the history o f awareness programmes specifically, 1967 saw the launch of the Low Cost 
Automation Campaign. The aim of the programme was to raise awareness amongst SMEs of the 
need to adopt new technologies. These would be regarded as Mow tech' by 1988 standards. Need 
was demonstrated by telling companies o f the benefits which could be realised, and how it may be 
used. Examples of technologies pushed were fluidics: fluid power, fluidic logic; and hydraulics. 
Another programme introduced at around the same time was the Industrial Technology 
Programme, which covered topics such as tribology, terrolechnology, corrosion, and materials 
handling. 
1971 saw the introduction of the Automatic Warehousing programme, which featured computer 
control as the enabling technology. Mr Baker reported that under the scheme he wrote a 
promotional book; an 'easy to read' text with sections listing computer systems components, giving 
descriptions of the function of each component, how computer systems work, and how such 
systems may be employed in automatic warehousing applications. For DTI the book featured 'a 
first', using colour printing. Examples o f component technologies described were punch tape 
readers, printers, and interfaces. 
To help the programme gain the attention of firms, a 'catch phrase' was employed, Not So Much A 
Warehouse, A Program. The phrase was based on that employed for the BBC TV programme Not 
So Much A Programme; a 'play on words'. 
In 1977 Numerical Control (NC) was promoted, with the formation o f the Cad Centre. 1978/86 
awareness work saw the promotion of microprocessors with the MAPCON scheme. 1983 onwards 
featured an increased emphasis on CAPM (Computer Aided Production Management). 1982/83 
saw the launch of the CADCAM awareness programme, which also included robotics. This 
coincided with the IT Year. During 1983/84 Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) was 
promoted. In 1986 CIMAP, an exhibition/seminarial event was staged to raise awareness of the 
need to adopt open systems' standards in implementing computer communications protocols; that 
is MAP (Manufacturing Applications Protocols). 
Literature on the above activities was not available for inspection. 
In discussions Mr Baker mentioned the Production Engineering Advisory Service, operated by the 
Production Engineering Research Association (PERA). Like the current Towards Integration 
11 
(awareness) programme PERA had employed the use o f a Mobile Demonstration Unit (MDU) to 
raise awareness of the advisory scheme. Mr W Brinkley was DTTs project officer for the 
programme, and he could be contacted for detailed information i f required. 
Findings: 
During the interview it was observed that Mr Baker possessed both depth and breadth in his 
knowledge of DTI and its programmes within the areas o f interest, supporting the efficacy for 
selecting him for interview. 
The ways in which DTI functions to help SMEs are rooted in the formation o f the Ministry o f 
Technology in 1965. Min Tech along with the Department of Economic Affairs were refeaed to as 
'super departments'. 
In the late 1980s Min Tech and the British Overseas Trade Board were merged to create DTI. 
Acts of Parliament are the vehicles by which government is invested with the legal authority to take 
actions. The Acts which have been introduced to provide the legal framework for the operation of 
recent and current programmes are the Science and Technology, and the Industry Acts. It is the 
S&T Act which has been the principal enabler for the funding o f past and present schemes. In 
particular it is Section 8 of the S&T Act which has provided the necessary legislation; covering for 
example the Support For Innovation and 'awareness' programmes. It was concluded that schemes 
funded under Section 8 of the S&T Act should therefore be a primary area for research. 
Ministers take a non interventionist stance, as is exemplified by greater emphasis now being placed 
on support for consultancy projects under El. 
A useful historical background to the operation of awareness activities in the area o f 
manufacturing, covering the period 1967 to-date, was given. A number o f schemes were described, 
contributing to the list of potential programmes to be examined. 
The draft report of the interview was passed to Mr Baker who approved its content but advised two 
corrections; details of the book by CP. Snow, title The Corridors of Power, wrong author quoted, 
and the reference to the Department of Economics Affairs (DBA) had 'Affairs* omitted. The 
corrections have been incorporated. 
Mr Baker also added that much of DTI's work is rooted in activities begun over 100 years ago. 
Circa 1836 a Select Committee on Manufactured Goods, recommended that we should spend more 
on training and awareness. The recommendation seeded the setting up of 42 centres to promote 
manufacturing in the textile sector. The action was in response to a push by the French to sell their 
products abroad. The centres failed because of the 'usual' problems, underfunding and lack o f 
direction. Further references to this early work could be found in Schools of Design by Quenton 
Bell, and Tlie future of Industrial Education by Stewart McDonald. 
Mr Baker observed that before inventing new schemes, we should ask what have we done in the 
past. 
Further Action: 
To seek an interview with Mr John Cammell, head of M M T Division, who joined Min Tech at its 
formation and is hence in an excellent position to place current activities in the context of history. 
Mr Cammell should also be in a position to comment and expand on observations arising out of 
this interview. 
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Comments 
A copy of the draft interview record was passed to Mr Baker for his comments who confirmed the 
accuracy of this record. 
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Interview Number: 2 Date: 22 November 1988 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr J . E. Cammell 
Grade 
Under Secretary (Grade 3) 
Position 
Head of the Manufacturing Management and Technologies ( M M T ) Division. 
Duration of Time with D T I 
24 years (includes time spent in the previous Min Tech department). 
Purpose of Interview 
To gain historical information on the development of D T I , to help set research work in context, and 
to fmd out the extent to which ministers influence programme design. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
In a previous interview [Interview I ] , Mr Baker had recommended the interviewing of Mr John 
Cammell, Head of M M T Division. Mr Cammell had been with DTI since the formation of Min 
Tech, and would be able to give further insights on the development of D T I and its work. A s a 
Grade 3 he had held a number of senior posts within the department, and is therefore well qualified 
to provide a history of the political events which have shaped the department and its industrial 
policy. As a head of a division responsible for theintroduction and operation of industry support 
programmes, he had regular contact with ministers and would be able to comment on their input to 
the process of programme development, from first hand experience. 
Duration of Interview 
I hour. 
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Questions Asked 
Q i 
Can you please relate the history o f DTI, describing the major stages which have influenced its 
policy for supporting industry? 
Response 
Things really began with the DSIR (Department of Science and Industrial Research) which was 
created in 'the War'. DSIR was staffed by civil servants but run like the Science and Engineering 
Research Council (SERC). The department assumed responsibility for university grants and 
management o f all non defence R&D establishments; the National Engineering and the National 
Physical Laboratories (NEL and NPL) for example. Agriculture was excluded. In 1964 Harold 
Wilson decided that resources would be better vested in departments which held sectoral 
responsibilities and advanced technology. The decision precipitated the formation of Min Tech led 
by Frank Cousins, in this year. Other departments formed were the Department o f the 
Environment (DOE), responsible for building, transport and water pollution, and SERC. 
Min Tech's responsibilities were focused on the development and application of new technology. 
Examples were machine tools and computers. In 1964 the Science and Technology (S&T) Act also 
came into being and provided statuary backing for Min Tech's work. 'Process' and 'product' were 
two areas covered, with the aim of securing development and improvements throughout industry. 
Two years later in 1966 the Engineering Industries Division of the British Overseas Trade Board 
(BOTB), came into Min Tech. 
Mr Cammell viewed the S&T Act as indecisive; one could always fmd something in its content 
which would allow you do what you wanted to do! With the twin introductions o f Min Tech and 
the S&T Act one now had a department with a funding instrument to carry out what 'you' wanted. 
The next major change was the decision to abolish the Ministry o f Aviation and transfer all 
responsibilities to Min Tech. The objective was to bring military and R&D together to gain from 
the mutual benefits, and the merger massively increased the size of Min Tech. Integration o f work 
was never achieved - changing culture in a defence establishment takes a long time and synergetic 
benefits were not realised; development requirements are different. 
The next change resulted with the creation of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Procurement 
Executive, into which the defence related, R&D establishments were transferred. 
'Ted' Heath created DTI out of the merger of Min Tech and the BOTB, plus the Department o f 
Consumer Affairs. At this time aviation was hived o f f to the MOD. Interventionism was played 
down, but because of the flexibility afforded by the S&T Act, activities continued much the same 
as they did under the old Min Tech. 
Then Harold Wilson split BOTB out of DTI, but they were then subsequently re-merged by Tony 
Benn. 
M r Cammell contrasted Min Tech with other government departments. A major difference was 
that Min Tech was not only an administration department, e.g. the Inland Revenue which is 
concerned with the administration o f tax collection. Min Tech was staffed and administered by 
technologists, and played an active role in industrial development. 
Q2 
What were the specific objectives o f Min Tech? 
Response 
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Specific objectives were probably not there in the beginning. The broad objective was to help UK 
industry to meet the challenge of a changing commercial environment. In the early '60s industry 
had conie through a supplier led boom; such was the demand so manufacturers did not have to 
worry about finding a market for their products. For instance you could wait 18 months for 
delivery o f a Morris Minor! In the car industry people were prepared to pay anything to screw more 
cars out o f the factory. Companies also had almost guaranteed markets in the previous 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia. Continental Europe was still in a mess and provided 
little competition, whilst UK. industry was still in tack from the War. 
But competition was hotting up, with our firms becoming uncompetitive through inefficiency 
arising from their use o f old machinery and production methods. Min Tech sought to address 
problems by raising industry's awareness of the need to adopt new techniques. For example 
emphasis begun to be placed on the need for information integration in installing systems, an issue 
also featuring in awareness programmes - the Towards Integration programme, 
Q3 
What was the success? 
Response 
Success in 1964 was not achieved as the climate for change did not exist. To install new 
technologies and adopt new methodologies requires a major change in 'shop floor' attitudes. 
People saw new introductions as an unemployment threat, and were motivated against change. 
Government tackled the technology issues ignoring the political and social consequences of 
automation. 
Q4 
Are you able to quote any examples of the early schemes, and the lessons learnt? 
Response 
One instrument was the Pre Production Order scheme, where DTI encouraged firms to develop 
new products by guaranteeing to purchase the first models, simultaneous with achieving 
technology transfer. But the programme fell into disrepute because it was difficult to administer. 
The idea was that DTI would place equipment into firms for a period up to three years, after which 
the recipient was given the option to purchase the equipment from the department. I f he liked it, he 
would and technology transfer had been affected. 
The scheme's designers thought all recipient companies would be pleased to take in the new kit, 
but it was not always so. The department then continued to have the responsibility to place 
equipment, i f a buyer could not be found. There were other problems. In one instance kit from a 
supplier (Ferranti) had been installed into a factory (Rover), which was subsequently closed. There 
was then a dispute as to who should finally pay for the equipment. The scheme was latterly used to 
pump money into export projects such as the Hong Kong Coal Fired power Station project. 
Another area was the operation of the Selective Assistance Projects, which promoted the 
development and use of technology, by providing grants to user companies to o f f set the costs of 
purchase and installation of new technologies. An example was numerically controlled (NC) 
machine tools. 
Q5 
How did early policy develop to where we are now? 
Response 
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In the early days emphasis was on the development of products and processes, with single 
companies targeted. The aim was to improve competitiveness in the market place. 
Mr Cammell criticised the early approach. General policy was to operate through 'supply industry' 
funding to vendors, and then help the transfer of new technology to users. In other words a 'top 
down' approach. For example push people to buy computers without looking at what they needed. 
In the machine tool area for example the approach became discredited. Equipment was installed 
but quickly discarded because it did not meet expectations. 
Latterly DTI had been subjected to the influence of EC policy. DTI policy was now dictated by the 
EC in many areas. 
Q6 
From your contact with ministers, are you able to say that they provide ideas for programmes 
themselves? 
Response 
No they don't. We receive little from them in terms of ideas for new activities. 
Comments: 
The interview was arranged by prior appointment; its purpose and the areas to be covered relayed 
to the interviewee prior to meeting with him. 
During the course of the interview statements of fact were echoed back to the interviewee, to 
ensure that they had been correctly recorded. 
Findings: 
As expected Mr Cammell was able to provide more, interesting detail relating to the history of DTI, 
and through delivery of this information confirmed the views o f Mr Baker, that many of the present 
industry support activities operated by DTI, are founded on previous Min Tech policy. The 
increasing role of the EC was also validated. Mr Cammell also confirmed the role of the Science 
and Technology Act in providing the legislation authorising DTI to undertake its operations. 
Worthy of note was the observation that the S&T Act had been drafted in such a way as to afford 
flexibility in its interpretation, thereby allowing officials flexibility in what they had proposed. 
In talking about eariier programmes Mr Cammell confirmed the operation o f some of those 
mentioned by Mr Baker, and added to the list the Pre Production Order scheme. He was able to 
cite as a major problem with earlier schemes the folly o f focusing activity on the development of 
the supply side, by way of promoting the use of new technology. Such an approach fails because 
the needs of the end user are not sufficiently considered in programme design; for example the 
adverse reaction to automation by workers. When designing schemes, not to research the needs of 
those who you are trying to help may therefore be confirmed as bad practice. 
The Pre Production Order scheme had demonstrated use of two, joint mechanisms. First the 
mechanism of guaranteeing to purchase pre production (prototype) kit, as an incentive to encourage 
the development of new products. The second to achieve technology transfer by offering use of the 
prototypes to users on a free trail basis, as a way of encouraging them to try out new ideas. 
However the twin approach had been shown to be subject to serious problems, as user firms could 
not always be found and the issue of ownership may not be easily resolvable when a trial sites are 
to be closed. Potentially application of the joint mechanisms represents bad practice. 
Ministers tend not to propose new ideas for programmes. 
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Interview Number: 3 Date: 28 March 1991 
Name oflnterviewee 
Mr John Cammell 
Grade 
Grade 3 
Position 
Head o f the Manufacturing Technology Division (MTD) 
Duration of Time with D T I 
27 years (includes time spent in the previous Min Tech department) 
Purpose of Interview 
Staff had been made aware by line management (in meetings and through the copying of minutes), 
that there was a need to put forward proposals for new initiatives. References had been made to a 
ministerial directive. Since the general view was that ministers have little or no involvement in 
proposing new ideas for programmes, the author was curious to see i f ministers had promoted the 
action. Investigation might also reveal a further set of influences on programme design. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
As a head of a division responsible for the introduction and operation o f industry support 
programmes, Mr Cammell was involved in top level discussions relating to policy, and would be 
able to relate how the decision to introduce new schemes had been reached. 
Duration of Interview 
5 minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Qi 
Can you throw some light on how the decision to see what new initiatives may be introduced was 
taken? 
Response 
The decision to introduce new initiatives was motivated by Douglas Hogg, the Minister for 
Industry. Mr Hogg had expressed his concern over the significant underspend on the R & D 
Budget, opportunity was being wasted. As a result Mr Cammell had met with Mr David Murray, 
Head o f Research and Technology Policy (RTF) Division, to investigate options for a response. It 
was agreed that earlier proposals for new initiatives which had been previously abandoned, should 
be resurrected. Mr Cammell had then drafted a set of policy proposals based on previous ideas, 
which he submitted to the Secretary of State, Mr David Young. 
Findings: 
The meeting confirmed ministerial involvement, but that the driver was the desire to spend money 
rather than ministerial interest in addressing specific problems. It is therefore concluded that no 
evidence of ministerial influence on specific design was present. 
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Interview Number: 4 Date: 27 March 1990 
Name of Interviewee: 
Ms Paula Freedman 
Position 
Grade? 
Section Head Enterprise Initiative Division (EID) 
Duration of Time with D T I : 
10 years 
Purpose of Interview: 
To gain an understanding of the objectives of the Enterprise Initiative (EI) advertising campaign 
and the strategies employed in meeting those objectives. 
Reason for Selection for Interview: 
Ms Freedman was the Grade 7 responsible for introducing and operating the El advertising 
campaign, and was therefore well qualified to answer questions relating to the design of the 
Campaign and its administration. The post also required Ms Freedman to have a good 
understanding of the overall strategy developed for the delivery o f El, and would thus be able to 
provide wider background surrounding the operation of the 'Initiative'. 
Duration of Interview: 
40 minutes. 
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Questions Asked and Responses 
Q i 
I am just beginning my research into how DT! through its programmes, help SMEs to become 
competitive. The Enterprise initiative (EI) is clearly the department's flagship activity, and I 
would like to begin by examining how the 'Initiative' is promoted. Would you please describe the 
background leading to the setting up of the high profile, promotional campaign? 
Response 
The need for a formal high profile campaign arose primarily from the need to meet the targets 
agreed with ministers for the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), set in the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 
1988, p. 25, paragraph 6.6), for the numbers of firms applying for funding under CI . 
Q2 
What was the principal strategy adopted in the campaign? 
Response 
The strategy adopted was to have a first tranche of advertising, aimed at raising initial awareness 
levels of El, and DTI's programmes aimed at SMEs. One cannot build schemes without the target 
audience being aware of their existence. To secure a volume response, national advertising on 
television was employed: Television advertising was backed by promotion in the press, placing 
advertisements in national and regional papers. Advertisements were also placed in technical 
journals. Advertising was aimed directly at the firms themselves. 
The impact target set for the promotional campaign was that 70% of the target audience o f firms, 
would become aware of EI. Market & Opinion Research International Limited (MORI) have been 
contracted to track the impact of the Campaign. They prepare and submit six weekly tracking 
reports to DTI. Tracking focuses on measuring the levels o f awareness in firms o f the EI booklet, 
and gauging the numbers of companies employing consultants. 
The result of the 'tracking research' are monitored and action taken accordingly. I f awareness is 
shown to be falling, then the level of advertising is increased. Advertising levels are adjusted on a 
regional by region basis. The Campaign began with advertisements on television o f 60 seconds 
duration, which was then reduced to 30 seconds. Now the time has been reduced to 10 seconds. 
'Drip and burst' techniques are employed. 
Q3 
How would you describe the quality of the responses received to date? 
Response 
A lot of'rubbish' has been received with people 'generally' requesting information. Also requests 
were received from very small companies who would not benefit from CI , and large companies 
who were not eligible for funding. 
Other Points 
Ms Freedman also made a few other points of interest. The targets were a best estimate by 
officials, which were subsequently scaled back by the Secretary o f State. Officials had 
underestimated the number of applications required to identify each CI project. Experience had 
shown that two applications were required to realise each completed project. Ms Freedman 
suggested looking at the EI marketing Plan for further information. Spend on the E! promotional 
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campaign is running at approximately £10 million per year. Plans forthe Campaign are reviewed 
every October, by the Individual Programmes Committee (IPC). 
Findings 
The need to meet targets agreed with ministers for the numbers of CI projects dictated the 
mounting of a national campaign using advertisements placed on national television, and in the 
national, regional and technical press. In developing a promotional strategy it is first necessary to 
make firms aware of the existence of schemes, before subsequently promoting the individual 
strands of support. A figure o f 70% of the target firms becoming aware of the El booklet was set 
as the impact objective. Tracking of awareness levels has been introduced to monitor the impact o f 
the advertising campaign, which is undertaken on a 6 weekly basis. This allows corrective action 
to be taken. Advertising is stepped up in the regions in response to falling levels o f awareness. 
The promotional campaign began with television advertisements o f 60 seconds duration, falling to 
30 second, then 10 seconds. 'Drip and burst' techniques were employed. 
A proportion of the responses received were from non eligible parties, and officials had also 
underestimated the number of applications required to realise completed projects. The need to 
account for attrition is observed. Two applications are found to be required, for each completed 
consultancy. Approved annually by IPC, the budget for the El Campaign was approximately £10 
million per year, a high level of spend. 
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Interview Number: 5 Date: 25 March 1991 
Name of Interviewee 
Dr Melvyn Draper 
Position: 
Grade 6: Deputy Head of Branch in the Manufacturing and Technology Management Division. 
Duration of Time with D T I 
12 years. Dr Draper Joined DTI on 8 January 1979 
Purpose of Interview 
To look at some of the specific aspects concerning the introduction o f the M90s and MP! 
Programmes. This report records two interviews, one held on 25 March 1991 and a second 
conducted around the same time. 
Reason for Selection for Interview^ 
In his time with DTI Dr Draper has had senior responsibility for the design and operation of several 
advisory and awareness programmes, including M90s. He has thus gained in-depth experience o f 
the running of programmes and was therefore well qualified to answer questions concerning the 
mechanisms adopted in scheme development, and programme administration. Furthermore Dr 
Draper sat on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Sub-committee of ACOST and from this 
position had direct experience o f how Advisory Councils influence programme design. He was 
also involved in regular dialogue with ministers regarding the introduction and implementation of 
schemes, and could thus speak from a position of first-hand experience of the interactions which 
take place between officials and ministers in the approval process. 
Total Duration of Interview Time 
I hour 30 Minutes 
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Questions asked and Responses 
Q l 
How did ideas of Managing Into the 90s arise? 
Response 
For M90s planning commenced around January 1987. Existing schemes were the starting point. In 
many ways M90s was as a result planned against the findings of the Advisory Council for Applied 
Research and Development (ACARD) report New Opportunities in Manufacturing: The 
Management of Technology. The former CADCAM and A M T schemes had been set up as a result 
o f the findings of that report, as had the T I (Towards Integration) awareness programme. 
M90s followed on from T I , building on the experience this and the CADCAM and A M T schemes. 
It built on the integration theme but recognised that technology integration was no use without 
integrated management. For this reason the latter was brought in. Also the Quality, Design, and 
Education (QDE) Division had successfully run the Quality campaign plus a couple of 'Design' 
events. Together these had shown a continuing lack o f awareness among firms of best 
management practice, across a broad cross section o f areas o f business management. 
The Grade 3 heads of the Quality, Design, and Education (QDE) Division and the Manufacturing 
Technology and Management (MTM) divisions then worked together and assembled the bones o f a 
programme, based on the previously run activities. The result was M90s, which comprised a 
number of modules covering areas such as 'Manufacturing', 'Quality' and 'Purchasing'. Also the 
design of M90s looked at a project set up by Ingersoll Engineers to set up a Manufacturing 
Technology Centre using Just In Time (JIT). DTI consulted the support information for the centre 
which gave an indication o f what was needed. In addition M T M (Manufacturing and Technology 
Management Division) commissioned a detailed report Manufacturing in the late J 9 9 0 s from PA 
Consultants, which provided a vision of what a best practice company would need to do in ten 
years time. 
Q2 
Officials in DTI take steps to ensure ministers are receptive to proposed schemes, thereby assisting 
in their approval. How was this carried out in M90s? 
Response 
Originally M T M submitted plans to ministers for extending the Towards Integration (TI) 
programme. This was undertaken just prior to the announcement of the Enterprise Initiative (El) ' . 
EI was the Secretary of State, Lord Young's 'baby', which he did not want prejudiced. Lord 
Young felt TI conflicted with the Consultancy Initiatives, which are a major component o f El. The 
request to extend TI was consequently rejected. Also TI was not seen as being an integral part o f 
EI, and hence not co-ordinated with other programmes. This was contrary to the Secretary of 
State's requirements. 
A second attempt at submitting plans was left for six months, and approval successfully obtained 
(these plans described the proposal for the introduction of M90s). The change in ministers* 
attitudes was described as attributable to two factors. Firstly EI was no longer a brand new idea. 
Hence Lord Young was not as critical in his assessment o f the potential 'conflict' with EI that the 
introduction of a new scheme might create. Secondly plans for a replacement for T I were shown 
in the programme ROAME statement to be supportive of El, and to be an integral part of the 
'initiative', by making company directors aware o f best practice before or in parallel with the El 
consultancies. 
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On the first point, Dr Draper emphasised how 'timing' of submissions to ministers is important. 
Officials must judge when it is the right, or wrong, lime to go to ministers. Subsequently the 
ground was prepared for the acceptance o f future proposals for the content and continued operation 
of M90s. Ministers were invited to (and attended ) the M90's Manufacturing Action Briefing 
Seminars (MABs). Dr Draper reported how they had been impressed by those events, and through 
their attendance they became acquainted with the MABs and the role of M90s. I f ministers are 
kept abreast and involved with scheme operation, they are more likely to be receptive to what 
officials say. The PA report (PA, 1989) was also sent to ministers and the book was publicly 
launched by the 'Industry Minister'. Copies of the report were also circulated to the department's 
deput>' secretaries, and relevant committees like ACOST (Advisory Council on Science and 
Technolog>', which effectively replaced ACARD). 
Dr Draper observed that by these measures, all points of influence in the approval process had 
become aware of M90s, and what it was achieving. They thus became receptive to new ideas. 
Regarding committees such as ACOST, Dr Draper stated that DTI officials often participate in 
their studies and they send draft reports to DTI for comment. DTI has often influenced the drafting 
of these reports, and is therefore unlikely to reject their findings. 
Dr Draper made several other observations of interest. Firstly, the government's non-interventionist 
stance meant that ministers do not directly initiate schemes in DTI. They start from the 'stand 
point' of "why should we support a particular intervention"? 
Secondly ministers do not normally have industrial or technical expertise. Ministerial resource is 
also limited for considering cases for supporting schemes. This leaves them vulnerable to policy 
mistakes. The ROAME approach was introduced in response to overcoming these difficulties. The 
development of ROAMEs contains a self auditing and checking process. Ministers must understand 
all issues in giving their approval. The ROAME process involves proper consideration o f every 
aspect of the approval issues surrounding a proposal intervention. In this way, ministers are 
protected from potential problems. 
Dr Draper referred to the six months delay which was experienced between the end of the current 
funding for TI , and approval for M90s. There was severe pressure because of the gap, to get a 
replacement scheme into the field as quickly as possible. As a result M90s was cobbled together 
quickly, with much development undertaken post initial launch of the programme. 
Q3 
Turning to MPl, how did ideas for this programme arise? 
Response 
In March 1989, the Secretar>' of State said we need some new innovative ideas. Dr Draper thought 
it would be useful to extend the A M T Consultancy Scheme. Prior to this, in 1988, an internally run 
study had been undertaken of companies to find out what they required. Also the ACOST study of 
A M T was in train. ACOST were identifying the problem of SMEs having access to information. 
However it must be remembered that the predominance o f ^academics' on ACOST, who were 
tending to move towards ideas for a centre of expertise. Not surprisingly, Mrs Thatcher 'hit the 
report with her handbag'! (The author notes that DTI had had previous bad experience with 
'centres', largely due to equipment becoming quickly out of date, and thus destroying the 
practicalit>' of demonstrations to reflect 'real life situations'). 
Also Dr Draper sat in on a meeting to discuss the ESRC PICT programme, and became aware of 
Dr Fleck's research into the reasons for technologies not providing the expected productivity gains. 
Fleck had produced a report which was used to influence the thinking of a senior economist in the 
Research and Technology Policy Division in DTI, who had a major influence on decisions relating 
to programme funding through his membership of the IPC. Therefore when the window of 
opportunity appeared, as represented by the Secreiar>' of State's wish for new ideas, Dr Draper had 
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formulated initial thoughts for what became MPI, and the initial evidence supporting a rationale for 
Its introduction. This initial rationale was based on: 
(i) Fleck's report (Fleck, 1988) had shown that A M T innovation could only be undertaken in the 
field. 
( i i ) From DTI's internal study, it was seen that firms lacked the necessary skills to implement 
A M T strategically, nor did they have the time to undertake the task properly 
(i i i ) The (first) PA report (PA, 1989, pp. 52-54) had shown the need for firms to develop an 
integrated approach, 
(iv) A need for technology transfer was identified, with poorer firms needing to learn from the 
best, as indicated by evaluation reports o f previous schemes (Flexible Manufacturing Scheme and 
the Inside UK Enterprise programme). 
In developing ideas Dr Draper also called on his experience o f operating previous schemes, in 
particular MAPCON (Micro Electronic Applications Projects Consultancy). 
Findings 
Dr Draper has provided an excellent set o f insights into the approval o f M90s, and the development 
o f programmes more generally, especially MPI. Points of particular note are, firstly officials must 
be sensitive to the timing of putting proposals to ministers, and be aware of their personal priorities. 
Next, Dr Draper has shown how officials can make the ground fertile for approval by educating 
ministers and senior officials about the role o f schemes and their success. An important way o f 
achieving this is to invite them to participate in scheme events, so that they can witness first hand 
what is being achieved. The importance of circulating material relating to scheme activities to the 
decision points in the approval process was also noted. In these ways people become educated and 
thus more receptive o f new, future ideas. 
The non-interventionist stance of the government precipitates a situation in which ministers do not 
normally come forward with ideas for programmes. The important role o f the ROAME approach 
in helping removing ministers' vulnerability to attack i f problems arise following the introduction 
of schemes, is noted. 
In developing ideas for MPI, Dr Draper has been able to provide examples o f information sources 
which can be used to inform the design process. That is research reports. Advisory Council 
reports, evaluation reports, internal studies, personal experience and the experience of others in 
running activities. 
Comments 
A copy of this interview record was passed to Dr Draper for comment. Dr Draper recommended 
some additional observations which were added, following which he agreed the content o f the 
record. 
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Interview Number: 6 Date: 19 September 1991 
Name of Interviewee 
Or John A. Leather. 
Position 
Member of the Advisory Council On Science and Technology (ACOST) Sub- committee on 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT), on secondment from Shell. 
Purpose of Interview 
To investigate the role of Cabinet advisory councils such as ACOST work to inform policy making 
in DTI and other government departments. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
As a member of an ACOST sub-committee, Dr Leather had gained inside experience of the 
workings of ACOST, and its activities related to government departments. That he sat on the A M T 
Sub-committee was seen as particularly relevant, as evidence from this committee was known by 
the author to have been employed in developing programme rationale, Dr Leather had also spent 
over a year on the Sub-committee suggesting him to well versed in how ACOST operated. 
Duration of lnterview 
I hour. 
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How would you define the role o f ACOST? 
Response 
ACOST has no executive role. Its status is purely advisory, and is there to help develop policy. 
ACOST's remit is to identify and consider the national issues in science and technology, and give 
advice as to how best these may be addressed by the Whitehall departments. 
In taking the national view, ACOST deals with those issues which transcend the individual 
responsibilities o f government departments and other bodies involved in science and technology. 
Thus ACOST normally confines its work to issues which might not be addressed by a single 
department alone. 
Q2 
ACOST appears to have a high status. Where do you see this as being derived from? 
Response 
ACOST reports to the Prime Minister and is owned by the Cabinet Office, which provides and 
houses the Secretariat. The Secretariat reports firstly to the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), who is 
responsible for providing advice on science and technology matters to the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. The CSA is the main link between ACOST and government, and plays the central role in 
planning the work of the Council. 
Q3 
How does ACOST select the topics for study? 
Response 
ACOST's advice is based on studies of a subject which it might select by itself, or at the request of 
the Prime Minister. Reports are submitted to the Prime Minister, generally with a recommendation 
to publish, but sometimes on a confidential basis. 
Q4 
How does ACOST ensure that its recommendations are well researched? 
Response 
Membership of the Council comprises senior figures drawn from Academia and Industry, who 
possess a breadth of expertise and experience within the assigned area of remit. The CSA together 
with the Chief Scientists/Scientific Advisers of the Whitehall departments also attend full meetings 
of the Council. Additionally, the Prime Minister periodically meets with ACOST. 
Much of ACOSTs work is carried out in the Sub-Committees and small Working Groups which sit 
under the Council. The groups support the work o f the Council, with its Sub-committees each 
studying specific topics falling within the more general terms o f reference of the Council. 
There are three Sub-Committees in total: the Annual Review, International Collaboration and the 
Emerging Technologies committees. Membership of the groups comprises partly o f persons drawn 
from Council and partly o f members co-opted because they could make special contributions to the 
subjects under review. 
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The councils operate on a restricted budget and are thus unable to undertake research themselves. 
The data collection method employed by a council or a working group is therefore to invite leading 
representatives to submit evidence, from bodies such as trade and research associations, learned 
societies, academia, senior executives from companies and government departments. These bodies 
have undertaken research in the area of interest, or alternatively by the nature of their work have a 
good understanding o f strategic requirements (e.g. a university participating in a number o f 
collaborative projects and leading edge developments). Evidence might be submitted orally or as 
written reports. 
Q5 
How is the work agenda set? 
Response 
The process of setting the work agenda comprises identifying and prioritising the issues. 
Collection of data to inform the process takes place at various levels and in a number of different 
ways. 
Firstly there is a large element of'self-setting' o f the agenda by ACOST itself. From their 
informed positions, members of ACOST raise issues which they consider to be of concern. 
Secondly, the Chairman of ACOST hosts dinners for the Secretaries o f State: these dinners are the 
forum for the exchange of views on the key issues. The Prime Minister has also been known to 
request particular items to be put on the agenda. For instance Mrs Thatcher asked ACOST to 
investigate issues relating to the 'Environment'. 
ACOST also maintains a dialogue with the Whitehall departments, with several levels o f contact. 
At the middle management level (Grade 6 and 7 levels), staff from relevant departments sit on the 
working group panels as assessors. An example is the A M T sub-group formed under the Emerging 
Technologies Sub Committee, to look at and report on the national A M T issues. D T I , having the 
lead in the A M T area, fields an assessor on the panel. As a member of the panel, DTI has been 
able to advise ACOST about the identification o f the issues, and on the drafting o f its 
recommendations contained in the Report on Advanced Manufacturing Technology. 
The work of ACOST also relates to the Whitehall departments through their respective 
Departmental Advisory Bodies. For DTI, the advisory body is called the Innovation Advisory 
Board, which is a section within the Research Technology and Planning Division (RTP). 
Q6 
How does ACOST influence policy development in DTI and the other Whitehall departments? 
Response 
ACOST works through two main influences. The content of the final reports, sometimes 
published, sometimes not, represents one of the sources o f advice to the Prime Minister, and might 
be employed in Cabinet decisions relating to policy. The reports contain advice presented as 
recommendations directed to government departments, which they wil l often feel the need to 
respond to in official responses. 
Working Papers are a second source of influence. Leading up to the preparation o f a final report, 
discussion documents and draft reports are widely circulated by ACOST for comment, within the 
relevant departments and elsewhere. These papers stimulate discussion within the departments 
and hence influence the formation of their thoughts. 
In addition, by departments having representation on the sub-committees they are able to influence 
ACOST's thinking, by raising the issues which they see as important. The need to address these 
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issues can subsequently appear in final reports, raising them up the political agenda. In this way 
ACOST provides departments with an opportunity to do something which they would like to do, 
but for which they had no previous remit. 
Findings 
Dr Leather was able to provide some useful insights into the operation of ACOST, and how its 
activities can work to influence policy. Of note is the researching of a broad church of well 
informed opinion in ACOST developing its recommendations, which lends them credibility. 
ACOST derives its high status in Whitehall from it reporting to the Prime Minister and its 
ownership by the Cabinet Office. Through their membership o f the sub-committees, departments 
are able to exploit ACOST's status to place higher on the political agenda issues o f concern. 
Comments 
Certain points were clarified with Dr Leather over the telephone. 
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Interview Number: 7 Date: August 1996 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr John Oakley 
Position 
Grade 7 
Duration of Time with D T I 
Greater than 15 years 
Purpose oflnterview 
To discuss the development o f the delivery strategy o f the 'Purchasing' module o f the Managing 
into the 90s (M90s) programme. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Mr Oakley was responsible for the development and delivery strategy of the 'Purchasing' module 
in M90s, and was therefore well qualified to provide insights into the design and delivery process. 
Duration of Interview 
45 minutes 
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Can you explain the purpose o f the Purchasing and Supply seminars in M90s? 
Response 
The Purchasing and Supply seminars represented the main activity in the 'Purchasing' module of 
M90s. The overall objective was to make firms aware o f the benefits o f purchasers building closer 
working relationships with their suppliers. In particular the benefits were seen as arising from: 
(i) faster and more effective product development by involving suppliers directly in 
the design process, 
( i i ) calling on the strengths of the many to overcome weaknesses in the individual 
organisations (a win-win scenario), 
( i i i ) being privy to a purchaser's vision: suppliers can work with him to realise the 
vision, to mutual benefit, 
(iv) lower costs through increased efficiency. 
Q2 
How did the idea for the seminars arise? 
Response 
The rationale for operating the Purchasing and Supply module o f M90s grew from the following 
observations: 
a: Research by Cardiff and Glasgow Business Schools together with others, the details of which are 
not on file, showed SMEs were unaware of the need to adopt best practice, because they were 
unaware of the benefits afforded. The Cardiff research was undertaken in support of publishing the 
book The Machine that Changed the World. 
b: The need to establish firms capable of working closely with Inward Investor companies, such as 
Sony. 
Q3 
What strategy was adopted to put the best practice messages across? 
Response 
Two series of seminars were held, aimed at senior purchasing staff and at other managers. 
The first series comprised 25 one-day events held at different locations around the country. These 
focused on increasing awareness of the benefits of, and hence the need to adopt, good practice in 
the purchasing of goods and services. The format comprised o f presentations by a *guru' in 
Purchasing and Supply, (Dr David Farmer), an industrialist from a nationally renowned company, 
an industrialist drawn from the local community of firms, and a Cardiff Business School academic. 
Using a well known expert and an academic from a leading university helped the messages to be 
taken seriously. The industrialist reinforced the message from his real life experience, establishing 
credibility, and thereby building commitment to change. Short formal presentations were followed 
by an interactive session, when delegates could question the experts. The question time reinforced 
the messages, helping to build a commitment to act. 
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The second series of events were half-day workshops again held at various locations across the UK. 
Again the principle o f gradually building commitment in firms was used, with attendees being 
offered successive levels of help. The format comprised a presentation on supply chain 
management by a resident expert (Mr T e d ' Linzey, ex IBM), backed by videos o f case study 
material. The workshops contrasted with the earlier series o f events, in that greater emphasis was 
placed on the *how' of implementing best practice. Again an interactive session followed, in which 
delegates could ask questions. The resident expert was also available for private one-to-one 
discussion at the close of each event. 
The facility to discuss topics one-to-one with the expert was particularly important, as it provided 
firms with an opportunity to discuss solutions to their particular problems. 
Q4 
How did you choose the sites at which to hold the seminars? 
Response 
The seminars and workshops were located in areas of the country having low levels of awareness 
of good practice. Research had shown that in certain areas o f the country (Central Scotland, 
including Fife and Deeside, the North East of England, South Wales, and Telford) suppliers were 
already working closely with purchasing organisations. Firms in these areas were influenced by, in 
particular, the large Japanese Investors, who required close working relationships with their 
suppliers (and the adoption o f best practice generally). Elsewhere, the 'partnership sourcing' 
culture was absent, so the seminars were targeted on these areas. 
Q5 
Were there any follow up activities? 
Response 
While running both series of events, ofllcials assessed the success o f their intervention through 
listening to questions asked by delegates. Initially, questioning had the common theme of "what 
are the benefits?". Later, attendees were largely aware o f the benefits, but wanted to know what to 
do to realise them. Here the success of the workshop formal in bringing firms into contact with 
experts, helped to seed the idea for the Supply Chain Network Groups, which were subsequently 
introduced. 
Findings 
Mr Oakley was able to provide details describing the background to introducing the Purchasing 
Module's Purchasing and Supply seminars. 
Comments: 
The content of this interview record was checked for accuracy and agreed widi Mr Oakley. 
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Interview Number: 8 Date: 19 September 1996 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr Philip Sowden 
Position 
Manager of Enterprise Division, PERA International 
Duration o f T i m e w i t h PERA International 
23 years. 
Purpose of Interview 
To gain insights into the administration o f the Consultancy Initiatives, and a view on the 
effectiveness of the procedures adopted, from a Scheme Contractor's perspective. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Mr Sowden had responsibility for PERA's administration of the CI Manufacturing Systems 
Initiative. He also was assigned responsibility for the Quality Initiative, a role which PERA shared 
with the University o f Salford. For the former Mr Sowden's responsibilities included the setting up 
of the administration systems, such as a consultancy database to support the management o f the 
Initiative, Mr Sowden also had responsibility for running the previous Business and Technical 
Advisory Services (BTAS), consultancy scheme at PERA. He was hence seen as having in-depth 
knowledge in the area of interest to the research. 
Duration of Interview 
1 hour 15 Minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Q l Before we discuss the mechanisms adopted in running CI, what insiglits can you provide 
concerning how ideas for CI arose. 
Response: 
It should be remembered to begin with, Lord Young thought that DTl 's services were its 'best 
kept' secret, and brigading schemes under a common umbrella, the Enterprise Initiative, was one 
step taken to improve access. CI played its part bringing together a number of the previous 
advisory schemes. Next to consider is that the previous advisory schemes were topic based, 
looking at specific areas such as Robotics and Quality. CI has kept these elements, but broadened 
them out to lake account of the wider management issues. Feedback from previous schemes and 
'input' from academia had suggested more emphasis should be placed on 'Management' and 
'Enterprise'. 
Because of developments in Japan, everybody was saying that firms needed robots. They were 
seen as the panacea in raising productivity and profitability. However, people forgot to take 
account of the management issues. For example how installing a robot in a production area 
impacts on other equipment installed on the 'shop floor'. A welding machine for instance 'expects' 
the welding piece to be offered to it in a precise place. The welding position is the subject o f tight 
tolerances. A human being has the flexibility o f movement to offer the pieces precisely where the 
welding machine requires them to be, irrespective o f relative position. However difficulties have 
been experienced in using robot arms through their control being insufficient, to position work 
pieces sufficiently precisely to satisfy the requirements o f the welding devices. Firms thus needed 
to take account of the wider management issues involved in using technologies such as robotics, to 
improve efficiency. 
Q2 
What are the precise details of the procedures which were adopted to achieve good management o f 
CI? 
Response: 
It is essential to ensure that the consultants appointed by firms are fit to undertake work under the 
scheme. Things began with consultants filling in application forms in which they provided details 
o f their track record, skills, and references who could be contacted regarding the quality o f their 
work. Consultants were always listed as businesses, even i f they were 'one man' companies. A 
minimum period of two years trading as a consultant was sought, or alternatively one year i f the 
head of the consultancy firm had a minimum of five years previous experience as a senior 
consultant elsewhere. 
Four references were sought, and additionally applicant consultants had to provide a sample of four 
project reports of work undertaken for clients. Senior partners o f applicants were interviewed 
towards assessing the capabilities o f the consultancies. Consultants deemed to be suitably qualified 
were then listed on a database, which held details o f each listed organisation and the individual 
consultants. 
Mr Sowden saw PERA's role as that of a project manager, playing a proactive role. The role 
included helping client firms find an appropriate consultant, guiding them in the choosing and 
using of consultants. The sequence of events was that first applicant firms would be telephoned 
following the visits by the Enterprise Counsellors, saying you have a project in mind. They would 
then be asked i f they had identified a consultant. I f so, then PERA would look to see i f the 
organisation was listed on the consultancy database. I f the consultancy was not listed, or the firm 
had nothing in mind, then PERA would provide firms with the names of three consultancies o f f of 
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the database, from which they could select a consultant. PERA also agreed fee rates with the 
consultants. 
Successful consultants were asked to submit draft proposals for the work which were drawn up 
against the requirements described in the Enterprise Counsellors' visit reports. PERA issued them 
with guidance on how to draft project proposals. PERA then looked at the draft proposals 
recommending any necessary changes. Once any changes had been incorporated the proposals 
were forwarded to the client firms who then sent PERA a letter of authorisation. Once received, 
PERA then raised an order on the chosen consultant, for DTI's share o f the project costs. 
During and following the completion of projects, client firms would be contacted to obtain their 
views on how their projects went. The information gathered in this way allowed track records o f 
each listed consultant to be built up. The process also allowed expertise profiles o f consultancies to 
be developed, helping in the matching of consultants to clients' needs. Having consultants details 
recorded on a computer database facilitated the matching function to be undertaken quickly. 
Matching was also based on the clients location, PERA seeking to identify consultants who were 
geographically close to the client. 
Q3 Who contracted with the consultant and.why? 
Response 
There was one contract which was the subject of DTI's share of the costs, which was made 
beUveen PERA and the consultant. There was a second, separate contract beUveen the client firm 
and the said consultant in respect o f payment o f the client's share of costs. This strategy gave 
PERA control over the consultants. Monies could be withheld in the event o f unsatisfactory 
performance. CI also represented considerable, potential business for individual consultants. 
Where consistent under performance was detected firms could be de-listed, losing them access to 
good, potential business. This provided PERA with the clout to bring offending consultancies 'into 
line', and to develop good practice for the sector in general. 
Q4 How many projects did PERA approve? 
Response: 
50,002 projects were supported in total (Manufacturing and Quality initiatives combined). 
Q5 Are there any other points you would like to have recorded? 
Response: 
The individual elements i f CI were based on the earlier advisory schemes. Hence the previous 
expertise which had been gained in the running of these schemes, was absorbed into CI which was 
a strength. Some scheme contractors employed in CI were in many cases the same as those 
employed for the operating the previous advisory schemes. New contractors were able to learn 
from this previous experience. Mr Sowden suggested that the principles adopted by PERA were 
commonly applied by the other scheme contractors. 
Mr Sowden added a couple of points. Around 30,000 companies were assisted towards receiving 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) 9000 accreditation, which provided the UK. with a lead 
in this area. Mr Sowden also added that PERA reported directly to DTI on a quarterly basis. 
Quarterly reports were prepared which were presented at the quaterly progress meetings with the 
department. 
Comments:. 
The content o f this report was verified by Mr Sowden and his comments incorporated. 
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Findings 
A successful interview. Mr Sowden was able to provide an excellent level o f detail surrounding 
the introduction of CI, and the mechanisms adopted in the day to day operation of the scheme. 
O f interest was confirmation of Lord Young's wish to see better awareness o f DTl 's services, 
which helped prompt the launch of El and the introduction o f CI. That there was a growing 
awareness of the need for firms to take account of the management issues surrounding the 
introduction o f new technologies and systems, helped shape the design of CI, and differentiated its 
elements from the previous advisory schemes. 
Important to the operation of CI was assuring the quality o f the consultants working under CI. 
Central was the rigorous checking o f consultant's credentials and the listing o f qualified 
organisations on a database. This.enabled consultants to be quickly matched to client needs. 
Service to client firms was enhanced by building experience profiles o f the listed consultants and 
records of their performances. 
Interestingly was the principle o f the scheme contractor being assigned responsibility for the 
payment of the DTI share of the consultancy costs, which provided the contractor with a degree of 
control, derived from its ability to withdraw business from poor performers. That CI was based on 
previously run schemes, allowed DTI and the scheme contractors to build on previously gained 
experience. 
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Interview Number: 9 
Interviewee 
Mr Peter Munday 
Position in D T I 
SPTO 
Time with D T I 
Greater than 10 years 
Reason for interview 
To gather some examples o f good practice in programme design, and how on-going development 
of schemes has been undertaken. 
Reason for selecting interviewee 
Mr Munday is an experienced project officer o f long standing. He has gained a breadth and depth 
of experience from working on awareness and R & T programmes, and has been involved in the 
development and implementation of both types o f scheme. The many years spent with DTI 
enables him to additionally provide historical data, relating to scheme design and operation. 
Interview note 
This interview report records the points arising in a series o f short interviews conducted on 4 
October 1996, 23 December 1996, 15 July 1999; each o f about 20 minutes in duration. 
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Q l (4 October 1996) 
[ am aware that at the beginning o f running the Managing into the 90s (M90s) programme, 
emphasis was placed on making firms aware of the need to adopt best practice methods in running 
their businesses, and to then provide them with information on 'how' to adopt good practice 
methods. What gave rise to the decision to adopt such a strategy? 
Response 
In running the former Towards Integration (Tl) awareness programme (a road show style of 
seminar based on a mobile demonstration unit), officials became aware of firms not understanding 
the benefits of adopting best practice, and a lack of knowledge o f how to implement good practice 
methods, through listening to the questions posed by participating firms. 
Also, in talking to finms in relation to them applying for grant support, they were often challenged 
regarding the strategies they wished to take. Frequently officials would point to better, alternative 
ways of approaching problems, which the SMEs should be thinking about. It was also observed 
that firms tend to be compartmentalised in their organisation, unaware o f the need for integration o f 
the business systems. 
From these observations it was concluded that their existed a general lack of awareness in small 
firms over why they should adopt best practice, and how. 
Q2 
Talking about the development of programmes generally, what constituted the primary sources of 
information relating to market failures? 
Response 
Talking to supplier firms provided a lot of information, as they were able to relate problems 
experienced by their customers. RTOs likewise with their membership. HEIs and RTOs also used 
to come forward with ideas for research leading to new products which would provide the UK. with 
a competitive edge. Firms similarly would contact DTI with their plans for innovative research. 
Officials made sure that people were aware of DTI funding, by way of encouraging organisations 
to come forward with ideas. Engendering a close relationship with external bodies also helped, as 
they would contact officials as the first port of call i f they became aware o f problems or 
opportunities for new projects. 
Q3 (23 December 1996) 
Tuming to R & T programmes, what problems did you observe in the design of earlier schemes? 
Response 
In the 'early days' (circa 1985) the generally held view was that technologies such as Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) were the panacea for making companies competitive. Introducing 
technology into companies would sort all the problems out. An example of our encouragement was 
the Robotic Scheme, where firms could receive grants towards the costs of introducing their first 
robot system. A number of installations failed because attention was not paid to the 'processes'; 
that is insufficient consideration was given to how the operation of the new, technology 
installations related in their operation to the existing systems within the companies. 
Q4 
What steps were taken to address problems? 
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Response 
In the late eighties onwards systems integration was made an essential feature in the design o f 
schemes. In drafting ROAME statements officials made encouragement of firms to adopt, say, 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), a mandator)' requirement for funding. In Research and 
Technology programmes involving grants for research and development into new products and 
tools, it was stipulated that deliverables must be aimed towards helping firms achieve better 
integration of their manufacturing systems. In awareness activities such as those employed in the 
Towards Integration programme, making firms aware of the need to adopt CIM approaches became 
the key objective. Latterly in Manufacturing in the '90s (M90s), the integration theme was 
extended to encompass all business operations. 
Q5 
Are you able to quote any other examples of changes in the delivery o f programmes, and why those 
changes were introduced? 
Response 
Experience of running collaborative programmes taught us that it is not possible to think o f 
ever>'thing when project proposals are being put together by collaborators. As a result, problems 
often arise some way into a project's life which go undetected and because corrective action is not 
taken, programme deliverables failed to meet market requirements. So re-appraisal in the light of 
initial project work was introduced, to allow work to be re-focused against a belter understanding 
of needs. Re-appraisal normally takes place about nine months into a project. 
We also actively encouraged applicants to think carefully about what needed to be undertaken 
before submitting. The wisdom of thinking about things long and hard was in the PRISM project 
funded under the System Technology Integration Programtne (STIP). The lead applicant spent 
£25,000-00 of his own money on a study of the requirements, which was used to specify project 
work in the application. This worked well, with little sorting out to do following the start o f work. 
Another thing which was obser\'ed was that companies were not generally good at putting 
proposals together. People had difficulty in setting out their ideas. Officials had to spend 
considerable time with applicants helping them write their proposals, which raises a resource issue. 
This is still the case, but to help the problem the department produced a summary o f the Project 
Officers Guidelines, in which restricted information was removed, as a guide to applicants in 
preparing proposals. The guide pointed out the conditions that successful applications needed to 
satisfy to obtain funding for what they proposed. 
Project management was also noticed to be a weakness resulting in poor administration of work, 
and in turn objectives only partially met. Although the individuals directly involved in project 
work were academically bright with considerable technical expertise, their skills in management 
were often low. To avoid the problem DTI started to insist that participants must identify an 
individual with good project management experience, to assume overall responsibility for the 
undertaking of work. The requirement was also placed into the department's 'guidelines'. 
Considerable improvements in performance were noticed as arising out of this step. 
Another problem we experienced was that of project work being prejudiced by the inability o f 
individuals forming the collaborative teams lo work together, because of personality differences. 
Officials subsequently made sure that project teams had ample opportunity lo meet well before 
project work commenced, in order that clashes could be prevented. 
SPUR was introduced in reaction to the fall in applications experienced after the withdrawal o f 
single company funding under the SFI scheme. 
Q6 (15 July 1999) 
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The Innovation and Technology Support (ITS) Budget Guidelines refer to the market failure 'Risk 
and Uncertainty', Here, as you know, officials when determining the case for support, are asked to 
make a judgement based not only on the technological risks, but also the financial uncertainties. In 
my experience, historically - back in the late 1980s and until the mid 1990s - project officers, when 
designing R&D programmes, tended to take the simple approach of asking whether firms had 
access to the necessary financial resources, either from 'within ' or from external agencies. What is 
your view? 
Response 
Mr Munday's response was to advise that it was also his experience that project officers took this 
simple approach, and indeed still tend to think this way. Reasons why a more simplistic view 
could be tolerated were cited. In the 'early days' there was a lack of venture capital, and therefore 
risk funding was difficuU to obtain. Furthermore the 'banks' were not geared up to make financial 
decisions on loaning money for innovative projects, as they did not have the technology qualified 
staff As a result they tended to rely on DTI to undertake risk assessment, providing firms with 
loans only i f DTI was prepared to award grants. At that time it must also be remembered that 
'Europe' and the 'Global Market' were only just 'rearing their heads'. There was hence less 
pressure on the financial institutions to widen their marketplace. Banks took a more parochial view 
which focused on advancing their own business agendas, whereas DTI's interests were in 
promoting'UK PLC! 
Q7 
I observe that in R & D projects, appraisal of applications is normally undertaken by officials. In 
contrast in consultancy schemes, project appraisal is often undertaken by staff of a Scheme 
Contractor, What are the reasons for the difference in approach? 
Response 
In R&D programmes the eligibility issues are complex. There is more to think about in terms of 
the eligibility criteria. For example you have to judge whether project work is away from the 
market, the skills of the applicants, as well as whether or not project proposals are conformant with 
the programme and wider departmental policy objectives. The task is made more complex by 
R&D projects being very different from each other in terms of their work content- Altogether the 
complexity of the appraisal task is such that officials are better placed to judge the suitability of 
applications for funding. 
In consultancy programmes interpretation of policy is relatively straight forward. Policy can be 
simply expressed as to provide help to SMEs generally, it being taken that most are in need of help. 
There is also a high degree of consistency in the subject matter between projects, and appraisal 
being comparatively straight forward can thus be undertaken by people employed by Scheme 
Contractors. 
Similar arguments are applied in the monitoring o f projects. Complexity of R&D projects and the 
policy issues involved requires them to be tracked by officials, whereas in the case of consultancy 
work, projects can be monitored by contractor personnel. 
Findings 
Mr Munday was able to provide a useful set o f background the on-going development o f schemes 
operated by DTI. Of particular note are: 
( i ) In developing M90s officials had become aware o f firms being unaware o f best practice and 
how to implement these methodologies, by listening to the questions asked by delegates attending 
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the T l 'road shows'. Observations led to the delivery strategy in M90s focusing on making firms 
aware of both why and how to adopt best practice. Officials also became aware o f problems 
through their day to day contact with SMEs. 
( i i ) Officials learn from the experience o f operating programmes, for example officials witnessed 
the failure of A M T impiementalions funded by DTI , because systems integration issues had not 
been addressed. As a result emphasis on integration became an essential feature o f DTI 
programmes. 
are: (i i i ) Other examples of features built into programme design as a result o f experience 
• The introduction o f project definition phases into R & T projects, 
• Recognition of the need to help applicants draft their proposals, and the issue o f application 
guidelines to help off load officials and improve the quality of proposals. 
• In appraising projects, to check that the person appointed as having overall responsibility for 
project work has good management skills, and that participants are able to work together. 
(iv) Unavailability of funding often constitutes the reason for support. 
(v) Contact with firms, HEIs, and RTOs can be successfully exploited to gain information about 
R&D opportunities and market failure. Officials made sure that people were aware of DTI funding, 
by way o f encouraging them to come forward with ideas. 
(vi) The complexity of policy issues combined with the variety of work experienced in R&D 
projects, dictates that they normally be appraised by officials. In contrast, appraisal o f consultancy 
projects does not involve interpretation o f policy, and given the higher degree of consistency 
between projects, appraisal is comparatively straight forward and can be undertaken by staff 
employed by contractors. Similar arguments apply to project monitoring, with officials normally 
responsible for monitoring o f R&D projects, and external staff in the case o f consultancy projects. 
Comments 
The content o f this interview were checked with Mr Munday who agreed that they represented an 
accurate record. 
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Interview Number: 10 Date: December 1996 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr David Ellis 
Position 
Grade 7 
Duration of Time with D T I 
Greater than 15 years 
Purpose of Interview 
To identify and discuss the delivery mechanisms employed in the delivery o f the 'Quality' 
component of the Managing into the 90s (M90s) programme. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Mr Ellis is the Grade 7 responsible for delivering the 'Quality' component o f the M90s programme. 
He has held this responsibility for several years during which time he has gained in-depth 
experience of the mechanisms involved, and a good understanding of the rationale for tlieir 
selection. 
Duration of Interview 
30 minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Q i 
Would you please describe delivery structure adopted for the Quality module of M90s? 
Response 
In Phase I of M90s the principal activity was a series of one day. Total Quality Management 
(TQM) seminars. These aimed to help firms understand the concept of total quality and show how 
it contributes to competitiveness. Each seminar started with an introductory talk explaining TQM 
and its relation to improving business performance. These deliveries were then followed by a 
series of presentations dealing with specific aspects of TQM, 
Q2 
What were the mechanisms adopted to convey the messages, and how did they function to motivate 
firms to take action? 
Response 
Four main delivery mechanisms were used in the seminars to convey the awareness messages. 
First a high profile chairman was engaged, who had good communication skills and knowledge o f 
the subject matter. The TQM seminars employed Vincent Kane OBE, a broadcaster on TV Wales. 
He had a personal commitment to quality, indicated by him having received the OBE for his part in 
establishing the Wales Quality Centre. 
The second strand was a presentation by a leading expert on quality, Professor Oakland of Bradford 
University. He assumed the role of expert presenter, which was later expanded, by his being 
available all day for consultation by delegates. In this way people could ask the specialist 
questions in private, thereby reinforcing the message content of the events. Thirdly a DTI speaker 
reinforced the best practice messages, and signposted delegates to other M90s activities and the 
Consultancy Initiatives. Finally, case studies were presented by representatives o f organisations 
which had adopted TQM. Important to the TQM events was the concept of'industry people 
talking to industry people', which helped the transfer o f messages by establishing a perception of 
relevance of programme content in people's minds. 
Q3 
How was the performance of the TQM seminars viewed? 
Response 
The approach which we had adopted was reported as well thought of by delegates. 
Q4 
How were the seminars managed and the audiences identified? 
Response 
Organisation of the quality events which included audience building, was contracted to a specialist 
company (IBIS). Of particular interest is that IBIS received no fee from DTI for this work. Under 
the terms of their agreement with DTI, they charged a delegate fee with their costs underwritten by 
the department. The seminars were so successful that DTI never had to compensate IBIS; indeed 
its staff reported that IBIS made a good profit! 
Findings 
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Mr Ellis was usefully able to provide details of how the TQM seminars in the 'Quality' module 
within M90s were delivered. Fundamental to the seminars putting their messages across was the 
use of a high profile person to chair the events. Ensuring that programme content would be 
perceived as relevant and credible was also key, which was achieved through having a chairman 
having a solid grounding in the subject ('Quality'), and presentations by a leading, academic expert 
and representatives of case study companies. The importance of having the specialist available for 
private consultation is observed, as a means of helping reinforce commitment to change. 
The value of underwriting contractors running events is observed. It provides them with the 
confidence to commit, and i f successful need involve no payment from the 'Public Purse'. 
Comments 
The accuracy of the content of this interview record was confirmed and agreed with Mr Ellis. 
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Interview Number: 11 Date: 6 December 1996 
Name of Interviewee 
Richard Arnott 
Grade 
Grade 7 
Position 
Head of Section in the Managemem Best Practice Branch (MBP) in the Manufacturing Technoloev 
and Services Division (MTS), DTI HQ 
Duration of Time with D T I HQ 
13 years. 
Purpose of Interview 
To investigate the processes which had been employed in the past to establish evidence of market 
failure and subsequent programme design. During the interview the opportunity was taken to seek 
Mr Amott's views on the differences between Advanced Technology Programmes (ATPs) and 
General Industrial Collaborative Programmes (GICPs), to confirm the author's understanding. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
From 'day one' o f joining DTI, Richard Amott has been directly involved at the *coal face' in the 
development and administration o f advanced technology R&D and Best Practice related 
programmes. He has been responsible, both as an SSO and subsequently at Grade 7 levels for 
programme development and project management, and has built up a wealth of experience in the 
day to day administration of programmes. 
Mr Amotl is a Chartered Engineer, and his understanding o f engineering related topics enables him 
to form opinions related to technical matters which have integrity. He is articulate and able to 
impart knowledge which he holds. The schemes for which he has had responsibility are viewed by 
colleagues as successful, and therefore when instances of best practice are quoted they may be 
recorded as such with a high degree of confidence. The programmes operated by Mr Amott have 
been strategic to DTI's objectives, rendering him as a good candidate for interview. 
Duration of Interview 
45 minutes. 
Questions Asked 
Q l 
You had responsibility for the introduction of the Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) and the 
Small Scale Computer Integrated Manufacturing (SSCIM) programmes. How did you set about 
establishing evidence of market failure which these schemes were designed to address? 
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Response 
Officials knew from experience of previous schemes, for example from operating the Small 
Engineering Firms Industrial Support and Robotics programmes, and the Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems scheme, that many SMEs were not understanding the impact of, or investing in, technologies 
that would allow them to compete for business. To help build a better picture of the market failure, 
specialist consultants ISTEL were contracted to review the international situation on the development 
of CAE and CIM technologies which were 'scaleable' for use in smaller engineering firms. 
The core conclusions were that UK SMEs were falling behind their foreign counterparts, and the 
requirements of the growing set of Japanese inward investors could not be met by many of the UK 
subcontracting firms. Also the main European CAE and CIM programmes where often loo difficult 
for SMEs to exploit. Specifically ISTEL found evidence of a market failure, that was that whilst many 
variants of CAE and CIM systems where available, the investment threshold and integration processes 
were simply beyond many SMEs. They recommended a range of collaborative 'user driven' projects 
be established, to develop application software for engineering and production management, with 
dissemination networks to be established to help broadcast the results. 
On the basis of ISTEL's recommendations we put together draft plans for what we wished to 
undertake to reduce the market failures we perceived. A ver>' important next step was to confirm 
ISTEL's findings and gain wider views on our proposals. An open meeting was convened lo which a 
wide ranging group of people were invited; HEIs, Computer Aided Design (CAD) vendors, user 
companies. Amongst invitees were potential programme collaborators. 
In the meeting officials presented ISTEL's findings and DTI's proposals based on the consultant's 
report, for programme activities to help reduce market problems. Those present were invited to give 
their views on the perceived market failures and DTl's plans. Participants confirmed the consultants 
views, helped officials tune their ideas and signalled their willingness to participate in planned 
activities, should DTI decide lo go ahead. 
The meeting importantly achieved other objectives. Potential collaborators were identified by 
organisations learning of DTI's plans. Networks of project participants were seeded at the event by 
people networking during lunch and afterwards. Tlie meeting also helped DTI prioritise the areas of 
work to be undertaken. 
In summary' the meeting confirmed the consultants understanding of market failure, helped DTI 'tune' 
its ideas, and identify the priorit)' areas for activities to focus upon. 
An additional measure taken lo ensure DTI schemes addressed strategic issues, was lo submit 
programme proposals and project applications for grant funding etc., to the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technologies Committee (AMTC). This Committee comprised independent members drawn from 
HEIs, consultancies, and industr>', who were experts in the Advanced Manufacturing Technolog>' 
(AMT) field. AMTC provided views on initial ideas for programmes, perceived market failures and 
the delivery strategies for reducing market problems. In this way AMTC provided advice and 
recommendations to officials conceding proposals for new work, including those areas covered by Mr 
Amotl's responsibilities. 
Q2 
Returning to the open meeting, are you aware of such practice being adopted elsewhere? 
Response: 
Yes. The above process was repeated to establish the Smaller Scale CIM (SSCIM) programme which 
was closely linked to the main CAE activit>'. Other common practices used to help identify market 
failures included consultation with fimis, and feedback from 'Expert Missions'. Such missions 
involved specialists visiting countries such as Japan and the United States, with some visits sponsored 
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by govemment and others by trade associations. Study tours were also undertaken by individual 
companies. The visits looked at the status of A M T development and application in those countries. 
Reports containing the observations of these fact finding visits were often passed to officials, who 
drew on their conclusions in developing ideas for new programmes. 
The reports were useful in highlighting the gaps in terms of competitiveness between UK industry and 
firms in other countries. 'Market intelligence' collected by our colleagues in the British Embassies and 
Consulates abroad was also used in determining the gap between the competitiveness of foreign 
industries and our own. 
Mr Amott also emphasised the value of talking to people in industry and elsewhere in determining 
market failure. 
Q3 
How would you define the terms of reference of Advanced Technology Programmes (ATPs) as 
against the role o f General Industrial Collaborative Programmes (GICPs)? 
Response 
ATPs are theme based. They are wide ranging going across many sectors. SSCIM, and Computer 
Aided Engineering (CAE) are examples. SSCIM covered the more general set of integration systems 
and software tailored for SMEs. CAE was about developing integrated 3D modelling and CADCAM 
to support concurrent engineering. 
GICPs tend to involve large projects. CIM 2000 is an example, and was major project developing 
production management sofhvare to support lean production. They were intended to be strategic and 
more sectorally orientated. Another example is the High Speed Machining Project, which was 
targeted at the Aerospace Sector and involved the development of machine tools. 
Of interest are SEFIS 1 and SEFIS 2 (Small Engineering Finns Industrial Support), which were funded 
under Section 8 of the Industry Act. The funding concentrated on encouraging engineering SMEs to 
use Computer Numeric Control (CNC) equipment. The schemes led to the need to introduce the CAE 
and SSCIM programmes, which aimed to help firms integrate CNC systems into the overall 
production management process. 
Q4 
In developing delivery strategies and making decisions on how programmes should be administered, 
what were the principal sources of reference which you used? 
Response 
The Project Officer's Manual (the SFI Guidelines) was the main source of reference. These have been 
developed in the light of introducing R&T projects and represent empirical 'best practice' advice in 
developing and administering schemes. 
Comments: 
A copy of the draft interview record was passed to Mr Amott for his comments. He was able to 
add several other, useful points. His comments included, he confirmed his acceptance o f this 
interview record. 
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Findings: 
Mr Amott was able to provide an example of using a consultancy organisation, (ISTEL) to research 
the nature of market failures. The consultant's findings in this case were employed as the basis for 
developing two programmes, CAE and SSCIM. 
Mr Amon was able to demonstrate the value of holding open events to help confirm officials 
understanding o f market failures, to tune ideas for negating these failures, and to aid in the 
prioritisation o f work areas. Such meetings also help identify potential collaborators, through 
organisations learning of DTI's plans and people networking at the event. 
Differences benveen ATPs and GICPs were described. ATPs are theme based, that is activities are 
undertaken with common themes involving organisations across a number of different sectors. GICPs 
tend to be sector specific and involve large projects. 
Other points to come out of the interview was the use o f committees such as AMTC, to help 
officials formulate ideas for programmes, to aid the process of defining the exact nature of these 
failures, and to help inform the process o f developing programme and project proposals. Mr Amott 
was also usefully able to show how one to one consultation with people employed in industry also 
helps inform the process o f programme development. Other sources o f information to the process 
include the reports of expert missions, and the network of science and technology councillors 
employed in the British Embassies and Consulates. Of note here is that officials do not simply 
concentrate on determining market failure, but first look for evidence o f likely problems by 
identifying gaps between the UK's performance and those levels being achieved elsewhere. The 
ISTEL example showed how a consultancy study of the market can be also be used to identify 
gaps. 
Finally Mr Amott also pointed to his reliance on the SFI Guidelines in developing and 
administering programmes, and how this guidance represented best practice through calling upon 
the experience of officials in its drafting. His observations served to confirm the author's view of 
the importance of this document in the development process, both in terms o f its widespread use 
and fitness of purpose. 
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Interview Number: 12 Date: 30 July 1997 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr F W Rott 
Grade 
Grade 7 
Position 
Section Head 
Duration of Time with D T I 
9 Years 
Purpose of Interview 
To confirm the efficacy of involving members o f the Individual Programmes Committees (IPC) in 
the development of ROAME statements. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
The official was selected for interview because of his substantial experience in introducing a set of 
successful programmes; weight of experience and 'success' in getting his views assigned 
credibility. 
Since joining DTI the official has been principally concerned with the development and 
administration of support programmes for SMEs. During this period the interviewee has been 
directly responsible for the introduction o f new schemes, which are regarded as successful in 
generally achieving their objectives. 
Duration of Interview 
20 Minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Q l 
Drawing from your experience, what is your view on involving members of the relevant IPC in the 
process of developing ROAME statements, in order to improve the likelihood of securing 
approval? 
Response 
It is considered very important, and best practice, to consult IPC members during the drafting o f 
ROAME statements. By inviting them to comment on drafts and by asking them to advise on 
issues such as objective setting and delivery strategies, they become champions o f what you wish 
to achieve and supportive of your approach. The value of involvement was c|early demonstrated 
through observing the passage of proposals whilst attending Innovation IPC meetings. The 
interviewee had always consulted in the development process, and contrasted his own experiences 
with those of others who had not. In his case he met with no serious problems and approval was 
received quickly. In contrast cases where project officers had not previously consulted members, 
the proposals were taken apart and rejected; i.e. the rationale was challenged and found deficient. 
Q2 
What form did their involvement take? 
Response 
Draft copies of the ROAME were circulated and discussions on how issues should be addressed 
undertaken in one to one meetings. Anention was drawn to the need to target people having a high 
level of influence within IPC. For example the interviewee had recognised that the director o f the 
Economics Statistics Evaluation Technology Standards Directorate, (John Barber), an economist, 
and well respected for his knowledge of the issues surrounding programme viability, held sway in 
the Innovation IPC. Ease of approval was partly attributed to working with one o f his Grade 7's, 
(Ray Lambert), in drafting the ROAME statements. The Grade 7 subsequently advised his director 
o f the efficacy of what was being proposed, engendering his support. 
Q3 
Can you describe any specific examples by programme? 
Response 
Examples o f where best practice had been applied by the interviewee, were in gaining approval for 
the Innovation and Technology Counsellors programme (Second Phase), and the Innovation 
Credits Scheme (Phase 2). The title of a programme exhibiting bad preparation and failing to 
obtain approval in committee, was the Focus Technical programme. 
Comments: 
Interview impromptu; held as a result of the subject arising during the course of official discussion. 
A draft of the interview was passed to the interviewee for checking on 1 August 1997. He 
approved that which was reported and concluded. The interviewee added that in some cases the 
results o f consultation had been ignored, which had led to proposals being unsuccessful. He 
considered it generally important that officials were made aware of the rationale for consultation in 
the drafting of ROAME statements and incorporating and taking into account comments received. 
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Findings: 
The interviewee supports the view that it is best practice to consult the decision makers in IPCs, in 
the drafting of programme proposals. Consultation is important in easing the path to approval. The 
credibility of consultation being labelled as best practice arises from the ability of the interviewee 
to quote from direct experience, where he was able to cite specific examples o f the positive 
contribution of doing so, as against the negative effects of not so doing. Attention was drawn to the 
particular need to target those who hold sway in committee, and/or those who are able to influence 
the opinions o f the 'mandarins'. The importance o f making officials to be aware and understand 
o f the need to consult and take account o f comment, was emphasised, an issue which the proposed 
Handbook would address. 
The process of consultation was identified as inviting decision makers to comment on draft 
ROA*4Es, and seeking their advice on how design issues should be addressed. . 
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Interview Number: 13 Date: 6 August 1997 
Name of Interviewee 
Mr. F W Rott 
Grade 
Grade 7 
Position 
Section Head 
Duration o fTime with D T I 
9 Years 
Purpose of Interview • 
To ascertain whether or not officials when developing programmes, always research *the literature' 
to.look for evidence of market failures. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
The official was selected for interview because of his substantial experience in introducing a set o f 
successful programmes, weight o f experience and 'success' in getting his views assigned 
credibility. 
Since joining DTI the official has been principally concerned with the development and 
administration o f support programmes for SMEs. During this period the interviewee has been > 
directly responsible for the introduction o f new schemes, which are regarded as successful in 
generally achieving their objectives. 
Duration of Interview 
10 Minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Q l 
Inspection of 'the literature' undertaken during the course of research, has revealed much evidence 
of the market failures which DTI has addressed in operating its programmes. This evidence often 
serves to confirm the efficacy of DTI's interventions. Whilst developing ROAME statements the 
author and his manager researched the literature, but he feels that consultation to gather evidence of 
failures is not widely practised by officials. What is the view of the interviewee? 
Response 
The interviewee certainly had not, and was of the impression that most others did not also. He 
stated that rationale would be better founded i f research of the literature was undertaken. 
Comments: 
Interview was impromptu. 
Open questioning was adopted. 
Understanding of interviewee's views was echoed back to him and confirmed as correct. 
Interviewers Report 
Findings: 
The interviewee confirmed that 'the literature' was not normally consulted, meaning that a rich 
source of information was being ignored, and thereby possibly prejudicing programme design. The 
author concludes that in the proposed Handbook officials should be signposted to 'the literature'. 
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Interview Number: 14 Date: 15 July 1999 
Name of Interviewee 
Dr. Peter Bentley 
Grade 
PR I I (Formerly Grade 6). 
Position 
Director - Finance and Assessment, Business Link Directorate 
Duration o f Time wi th D T I 
Dr Bentley began his career in the Civil Service in 1975. 
Purpose of Interview 
To discuss the role of Acts of Parliament in the delivery o f support programmes. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Dr Bentley was selected for interview because he has had direct responsibility for the development 
and management o f support programmes over the years, many of these as a senior manager In 
discussions with him and also in listening to his interjections during meetings, it was clear to the 
author that he has built up a wealth of experience, is able to analyse situations, and compare and 
contrast the various issues in debating policy. Dr Bentley is noted for his attention to detail. 
In his capacity for overseeing the financial control o f programme budget expenditure for the 
Business Link directorate, a position he has held for four years, (plus previous financial 
management responsibilities) Dr Bentley has obtained an in-depth understanding o f government 
policy relating to programme funding, including the legal basis for the provision o f that funding. 
Duration of Interview 
10 minutes. 
55 
Questions Asked 
Q i 
You have said previously that the Industry Act o f 1982 provides the legal authority for us to 
support the services provided by the Business Links (BLs) and the Regional Supply Offices 
(RSOs). In particular you pointed to Part IV of the Act, Section 11 - (1), "Advice for Business" 
which refers to the powers o f the Secretary o f State to make provisions for the giving of advice to 
firms. Would you please confirm that this forms the basis of our ability to fund the central remit of 
the BL and RSO programmes in the giving o f information. 
Response 
Providing information is a form of giving advice. I prefer to summarise what the BLs and the 
RSOs do by viewing their activities as providing an advisory service. 
Q2 
Presumably the former Consultancy Initiatives etcetera obtained their legal basis from the Industry 
Act? 
Response 
Yes, again they were about advising firms, which Section I I (1) is about. These schemes, as with 
BLs, are considered as 'advisory services', because firms are 'advised' but it is up to them as to 
whether they use the advice or not. 
Q3 
I note from the Business Link ROAME statement, that reference is also made to the Employment 
Act. What is the reason for this? 
Response 
Business Links, when determining how firms might improve, may recommend training and 
signpost a company to a Training and Enterprise Council (TEC). The TECs provide training for 
staff in firms under the provision of the Employment Act. In signposting firms to TECs for the 
training, they are acting as an extension o f the TECs' training remit, and derive their authority to do 
so also from the Employment Act. 
Comments: 
A copy o f this report in draft was given to Dr Bentley, who confirmed that he was in agreement 
with its content. 
Findings: 
A satisfactory interview which achieved its objectives. It was confirmed that the 1982 Industry Act 
provided the legal authority for the running of DTI's previous consultancy schemes, BLs and 
RSOs. Emphasis is placed on these schemes being advisory in nature, where no compulsion is 
placed on participating firms to use the advice which they receive. 
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Interview Number: 15 Date: 20 July 1999 
Name of Interviewee 
Dr. Peter Bentley 
Grade 
PRl I (Formerly Grade 6). 
Position 
Director - Finance and Assessment, Business Link Directorate 
Duration o fT ime wi th D T I 
Dr Bentley began his career in the Civil Service in 1975. 
Purpose of Interview 
To discuss how ideas for the Business Link programme arose. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Dr Bentley was selected for interview because he has had direct responsibility for the development 
and management of support programmes over the years, many of these as a senior manager. In 
discussions with him and also in listening to his interjections during meetings, it was clear to the 
author that he has built up a wealth of experience, is able to analyse situations, and compare and 
contrast the various issues in debating policy. Dr Bentley is noted for his attention to detail. 
In his capacity for overseeing the financial control of programme budget expenditure for the 
Business Link Directorate, a position he has held for four years, (plus previous financial 
management responsibilities) Dr Bentley has obtained an in-depth understanding o f government 
policy relating to programme funding, including the legal basis for the provision o f that funding. 
He has been involved with the Business Link programme since its inception. 
Duration of Interview 
10 minutes. 
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• 
Questions Asked 
Q l 
It has been reported that the idea for developing the Regional Supply Office (RSO) programme 
arose because o f an intervention by the past President o f DTI, the Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine. It 
has been said many times in Business Link Directorate, that similarly. Business Links was the 
President idea. Are you able to confirm that this was indeed the case? 
Response 
Dr Bentley reported that the Business Link example was not as straight forward as in the RSO case. 
In the early 1990s there was a 'groundswell of opinion' which said that in terms o f organisations 
delivering services to SMEs, things were getting very confusing for the customer. At the time 
organisations such as Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), Chambers of Commerce, Trade 
Associations, and Enterprise Agencies, were all delivering business support services for SMEs. 
The idea for addressing the problem by creating One Stop Shops which would provide a single 
point of access to business services, was in fact described in the 1992 Labour Party Manifesto, but 
not that o f the Conservative Party. However following the re-election o f the Conservatives, the 
President asked his officials to develop and implement the One Stop Shop programme. He 
subsequently agreed that the One Stop Shops should be branded as Business Links. The President 
was a wonderful *parent' for Business Links, taking the attitude with his staff that i f you haven't 
the money, then find it! Holding his position for a total of three years he was able to see 
developments through to the launch and subsequent running of the 'Links'. 
That he was such a champion of the programme helped see events through to the operation of a 
successful scheme. It is important to note however that he was instrumental in initiating the 
programme, rather than it being his original idea. 
Dr Bentley expressed his view that the Business Link programme probably would not have been 
initiated i f Michael Heseltine had not been appointed. 
Comments: 
A copy of this report in draft was given to Dr Bentley. Dr Bentley recommended one change 
which was incorporated, following which he was happy with the content. 
Findings: 
Dr Bentley was able to confirm that Michael Heseltine was responsible for initiating the Business 
Link initiative, but in this he was instrumental, rather than being the creator o f the idea. The 
interview also provides an example o f a scheme being developed in response to a well defined 
market failure, in this case the difficulty experience by firms in accessing help due to confusion in 
the marketplace. 
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Interview Number: 16 Date: 19 July 1999 
Name of Interviewee 
Timothy Roberts 
Position 
Manager of the Regional Supply Office, West Midlands 
Duration of Time with D T I 
I Year 
Purpose of Interview 
To identify how ministers asked for the introduction o f a supplier matching service. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Mr Timothy Roberts was seconded to DTI's previous Competitive Division as an industrialist in 
early February 1994. He was recruited in a senior management role at the Grade 6 level, and 
assumed a high level o f responsibility. He held the position for one year. 
Mr Roberts was given the task of overseeing the design of the Regional Supply Office (RSO) 
programme in its formative stages of development. His seniority together with the timing of his 
involvement in the project, places him in a strong position to be able to report on matters 
concerning the initial development phases of the RSO programme. 
Duration of Interview 
15 minutes 
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Questions and Answers 
Question 1 
You have mentioned in the past at RSO Managers meetings, that the idea for the RSO programme 
was initiated by ministers. Would you please elaborate? 
Response 
Mr Roberts reported he was not present when the actual 'event' look place, but was able to say 
with confidence what happened, as the 'story' had been reported to him by those present at the 
lime. In November 1993 the President o f the DTI, Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, whilst at a dinner 
with industrialists in Scotland, was asked by a large corporation why it was that companies in his 
group could obtain public assistance in the finding o f suppliers in Wales and Scotland, but not in 
England. The Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question, and on his return to the 
department, asked his officials to investigate, indicating his keenness to provide assistance in 
England. 
Mr Roberts continued, mentioning that officials then carried out an investigation to determine 
whether or not English companies were being disadvantaged and i f so, should a source o f supply 
service be introduced, and what delivery strategy should be adopted. To help answer these 
questions a survey was commissioned to determine likely interest, would purchasing organisations 
pay for the service, and what the user requirement was. Among findings were that firms were being 
disadvantaged, the need for a source of supply service was confirmed, but companies would be 
unlikely to pay for the service. 
Comments: 
The interview was conducted over the telephone. Mr Roberts was given a copy in draft of this 
report, and confirmed that he was happy with its content. 
Findings: 
The above example provides a clear case of a minister putting forward an initial idea for a scheme, 
which subsequently matured into a launched programme. Mr Roberts was also able to provide an 
instance of officials of commissioning surveys to help determine market failures (English firms 
disadvantaged through lack of a source o f supply service), and confirm the need for the subsidised 
sourcing service to address this failure. 
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Interview Number: 17 Date: 23 July 1999 
Interviewee 
Dr Ian Harrison 
Grade 
PR 11 (Formerly Grade 6) 
Position 
Deputy Director, Management Best Practice Directorate ^ 
Duration of Time with D T I 
13 years. Dr. Harrison joined DTI on 2 October 1986. 
Purpose of Interview 
To investigate instances of Cabinet Office Advisory Councils seeding programme ideas, and to 
confirm difficulties with tapered funding. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
Dr Harrison has been employed in DTI for a long period of time. In day to day dialogue with the 
official the author has become aware that Dr Harrison has built a substantial weight o f experience 
in programme development, and is a good communicator. The range of posts he has held enables 
him to discuss, from first hand experience, both the political and 'market failure' aspects o f scheme 
introduction. His posting in the Innovation Unit ( lU) o f the Research Policy and Technology 
(RTP) Division is particularly relevant, as here he had overall responsibility for policy 
development. Dr Harrison was therefore selected because he is able to base his comments on 
sound knowledge of the issues involved. 
Duration of Interview 
15 minutes 
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Questions Asked 
Q l 
Are you able to provide any examples o f where the Advisory Councils such as ACOST (Advisory 
Council On Science and Technolo^), have seeded ideas for programmes? 
Response 
T^l,',!!'"^ "P ^'^^ Innovation Advisory Board arose out of the work undertaken by 
ACOST, m prepanng their report The Barriers to Growth (ACOST, 1990). The decision to set up 
DTI s Innovation Unit was another decision which arose from ACOST/IAB (Innovation Advisory 
Board) work. References to the Innovation Advisory Board are likely to be found in the DTI 
Annual reports between 1980 and 1990. 
Q2 
Are you aware of any specific schemes? 
Response 
Dr Harrison mentioned the joint DTI/DES Regional Technology Centre (RTC) programme, was 
built on an existing scheme started by the then Department of Education and Science (DES) in 
1987, and subsequently developed as a jointly funded initiative. 
Q3 
In previous conversations with you, you referred to difficulties experienced with applying the 
principle of 'tapered funding'. Would you please describe the problems? 
Response 
Dr Harrison related his experience of setting up the Regional Technology Centres (RTCs). Tapered 
funding was applied over a period of three years. When the RTC initiative was being developed, 
officials were under management pressure to ensure that the department ful ly spent its financial 
allocations within the first financial year, a consequence of the Treasury's Rules on 'Annuality'. In 
consequence, grants to RTCs were front loaded, with 50% to be spent in the first year. 
Unfortunately the decision failed to take ful l account of the time and effort needed to set up and 
establish such information centres (finding accommodation, recruiting staff, building up networks 
o f clients and providers etc.). The set up activities extended well into the second year. Many of the 
RTCs were not fully operational during the first year, and could not up use their fu l l allocation of 
funds. Annuality prevented carry over o f residual funds into the following year. Remaining funds 
in year two were insufficient to support the outstanding 'set up' work. Dr Harrison believed this 
was a reason for the subsequent failure o f a number of Centres. Moreover most commercial 
payments are made in arrears, and the RTC projects tended to slip behind schedule. This 
prevented payment for work undertaken at the extreme end o f the financial year, adding to 
problems. 
Comments: 
A copy of the draft meeting record was passed to Dr Harrison for comment, and he replied that he 
was content. ^ 
Findings: 
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Dr Harrison was not able to cite examples of an Advisory Committee seeding the introduction of a 
specific programme, but was able to provide two good examples of ACOST triggering action 
within DTI. In the case of the former, Dr Harrison's response lent weight to the authors view that 
Advisory Committees help officials in providing evidence in support of programme strategies, 
rather than being primary generators of ideas. 
Dr Harrison also provided an example of officials building on existing programmes in introducing 
new schemes. He was also able most usefully, to demonstrate the dangers associated with 
application of tapered funding. 
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Interview Number: 18 Date: 22 September 1999 
Interviewee 
Dr Ray Lambert 
Grade 
PRl I 
Position 
Deputy Director and Economic Advisor: Technology and Innovations Policy, in DTFs Innovation 
Policy and Standards Directorate. 
Duration o f T i m e wi th D T I 
Greater than 15 years 
Purpose of Interview 
To investigate the mechanisms which are in place to ensure that lessons learnt in programme 
evaluations, is widely accessible. To then discuss enhancements to current arrangements which 
would improve the department's use of its knowledge of programme development and delivery. 
Reason for Selection for Interview 
A qualified economist, Dr Lambert has been involved in advising DTI directorates in the 
monitoring and evaluation of programmes over recent years. His opinions and advice are well 
respected throughout the department, and is regarded as a leading specialist in evaluation strategy 
within DTI. During his time with DTI he has built a wealth of experience in matters relating to 
programme performance, making him an excellent candidate for interview. 
Duration of Interview 
50 Minutes. 
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Questions Asked 
Q l 1 am aware of steps being taken under the guise of knowledge management, to bring together 
the knowledge of best practice in programme development and operations, so that such knowledge 
may be widely shared. What arrangements do you consider to be in place? 
Response: 
The problem of how best to collate and then analyse the findings of evaluation, so that best practice 
in programme development and delivery can be determined and disseminated, is something which 
has been thought about for a long time. There are however difficulties, some conceptual, some 
practical. For example, i f you determine what is best practice in selling apples and pears, how do 
you know that the same approaches wil l allow you to sell bananas better? A further difficulty is 
that circumstances change. New ministers bring with them new priorities, which can alter the 
strategic relevance of evaluation findings. For example an intervention which secured only 
marginal or no benefits, may nonetheless be viewed as potentially valuable in the light of revised 
departmental objectives. 
Q2 Is it practical to try and derive best practice from analysing evaluation reports? 
Response: 
A l l evaluation reports are inevitably narrow in their subject, they tend to look at single 
programmes, and you need something which is more comprehensive. This requirement was 
realised a couple of years ago, with the formation of the ES (Economic and Statistics) Directorate 
Core Unit. 
Dr Lambert advised looking at the report of the Business Support Working Group Christopher 
Moir was the economist. 
When secretary of the Evaluation Policy Improvement Committee (EPIC), Dr Lambert reported 
that a database of evaluation reports was set up. The database contained the summaries of the main 
findings of evaluation reports, which officials could look across and see quickly what had 
previously worked. In practice, this was used by evaluators but not by programme or budget 
managers. 
Q3 What happened to the database? 
Response: 
It was not continued by subsequent Secretariats. It was very much my project and when I 
subsequently moved on, it was not continued. There were other factors. To be o f use there has to 
be coherence in reporting. Performance is judged against the background of an intervention 
meeting policy objectives. One can learn by looking across schemes that have policy objectives in 
common. Coherence between successive evaluations thus relies on consistent policy. Because o f 
the abrupt changes in policy which were experienced, coherent reporting was not possible and the 
database fell out of use. The application of previous evaluation results wi l l always run into the 
question of lack of relevance to newer departmental objectives or more specifically to a new 
generation of particular programmes - current situations in markets tend to be viewed by people as 
different from the past, and old lessons hence cannot be applied. 
Q4 Can anything in reality be done? 
Response: 
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Dr Lambert disagreed with the lack of relevance. Much can be leamt from what has been done 
before, as many of the present issues when analysed have much in common with previous 
problems, if the analyst is able to step back and look at the fundamental economic issues and at the 
generic t>'pe of inier%'ention. To give one example, there is an empirical regularit>' in the time path 
diffusion of new products and new technologies. Although the elapsed lime from introduction to 
maximum take up can var>', the pattern tends to be very similar across ver>' different products and 
processes. The analyst can bring this regularity to bear in understanding and evaluating the effects 
of technology dissemination programmes. 
Q 5 Do you see other difficulties? 
Response: 
There is a further tension. Financial Resource Management ( F R M ) say there is a need for 
comprehensive, across the board evaluation, but current management philosophy is to delegate 
responsibility for administering programme budgets down the chains of command. Moving 
towards a more centralised framework for evaluation, which would enable comparisons of value 
for money or contribution towards Departmental Public Service Agreement (PSA) objectives 
seems to run counter to this philosophy, and is in effect being resisted by line managers, which 
evaluation specialists are also expressing doubts about the scope for a common methodology across 
types of programme. 
The greater delegation of management responsibility, with its focus on financial administration, has 
tended to reinforce the existing structure of evaluation where the evaluators - mostly the 
economists working on particular policy areas in line directorates, plus the Assessment Unit ( A U ) 
in the Innovation Policy and Standards Directorate (IPS) - have responsibility for evaluating the 
schemes for which its directorate is responsible. Evaluation staff are employed as team members 
of the directorates, reporting to the Director, who is normally also a budget holder. The process is 
intended to be co-ordinated by E P I C , but its touch is too light to achieve a more strategic approach 
to evaluation that emphasises central resource allocation for the department as a whole, rather than 
individual budget or programme management as the main use of evaluation results. Knowledge 
management might be one way of overcoming this 'silo mentality', although one has to bear in 
mind that knowledge management is today's fad, no doubt to be replaced by another management 
'buzz word' before too long. 
Thus at present, the way evaluation units are structured, means that evaluation is not only 
programme but importantly also budget specific. Therefore, in Dr Lambert's opinion, evaluation is 
currently weighted towards informing budget management, with feedback into 'programme'. This 
poses problems, owing to differing interpretations which can be placed on the findings by the 
various evaluation units. For example staff responsible for budget management may interpret 
evaluation findings as meaning an activity does not represent value for money. Conversely a 
programme manager might say there are a few weaknesses, but these can be overcome with 
modifications to the delivery strategy. 
Q6 What attempts have been made to overcome the problems of different evaluation agendas? 
Response: 
Clearly there is a departmental agenda, which is more concerned with evaluating programme 
strategies in terms of their ability to meet the department's policy objectives. This is why E P I C 
was set up in the early 1980s', as a follow on from FMI (the Financial Management Initiative). 
The role of E P I C was to ensure evaluations were 'up to scratch', and to then draw broad lessons. 
The broad principles intended to apply to evaluation across government departments is set out, 
inter alia, in the H.M. Treasury' Green Book . Because of the Treasur>''s intellectual histor>', the 
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evaluation sections tend to be about project rather than programme evaluation and DTI officials 
generally pay lip service to the 'Green Book' but work in their own well established tradition. 
The detailed consideration of evaluation plans for individual programmes and of each evaluation 
report has in the last few years been delegated by EPIC to and Evaluation Methodology Group 
(EMG) chaired by a Grade 5 Economist. This still has the problem that there is usually a debate . 
between evaluators, programme managers and the chairman, plus, to a limited extent, FRM, rather 
than a discussion involving a wider range of departmental interest groups. This group informs 
future policy making by feeding its conclusions on Evaluation to the relevant IPC. 
The evaluation culture is now well embedded, but there is a need to move on. We need to see i f we 
are achieving our broad policy objectives. Because of the current structure where you have a 
number of essentially independent, evaluation units you have a situation in which people want to 
do things in different ways, and determining best practice across the pitch is thus difficult to 
achieve. 
As a first step, evaluation staff in the separate units could be brought together into a single 
evaluation unit. This approach was mooted when evaluation was first formalised with the 
establishment of EPIC's predecessor the Evaluation Working Group (EWG) in 1984, and rejected 
because of the importance attached (as it still is by some) to evaluators being knowledgeable about 
the policy areas they evaluate. The problem of real or apparent regulatory capture was to be dealt 
with through the EWG (now EPIC). 
The conclusion that evaluation should be "... strengthened and moved nearer the centre of the 
department..." has now been adopted by the Departmental Steering Group (DSG), but details of 
how are yet to emerge. An option is for a centralised unit to be housed in FRM, to use the clout o f 
the finance managers. 
The single evaluation unit could look across past schemes and draw out the best practice lessons. 
However there is a danger of becoming too backward looking. There is a need in a modem 
government department to undertake forward policy reviews - a theme in discussions of a more 
strategic approach to evaluation is that it should be seen together with research into markets and 
industries as informing departmental objectives and how to achieve them, focused on what 
activities are likely to bring about economic benefit in terms of raising Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) or the difficult area of wider economic benefits, rather than confining attention to U-aditions, 
for example post evaluations. This is no doubt an over ambitious agenda. 
During the interview the author referred to the requirement in the HM Treasury 'Green Book', for 
officials to draw on the lessons learned across Whitehall. Dr Lambert was asked i f DTI officials 
read the evaluation reports of the Other Government Departments (OGDs). It was Dr Lambert's 
view that they tended not to. He expressed the view that they tended to work in their own 
established tradition, tending to ignore what is undertaken elsewhere in government. 
Comments: 
The interview was informative, and filled in a number of gaps in the author's knowledge of the 
evaluation process within DTI, and how the process helps to inform policy making. The issues 
surrounding evaluation were described, the problems with the current system discussed, and some 
useful ideas identified for improving the process. 
The draft note of the meeting was passed to Dr Lambert for comment. His comments were 
included and he confirmed the accuracy of this interview record. 
Findings: 
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Problems exist in attempting to draw best practice lessons in programme operation, by looking 
across evaluations. In part the problem is conceptual. It has to be shown that what has been learnt 
in the past is relevant to addressing 'present day' issues. 
Circumstances change and new priorities emerge, which can alter the strategic relevance of 
evaluation findings. This situation is not helped by all evaluation reports being narrowly focused, 
being the subject of single programmes, and steps need to be taken to provide something which is 
more comprehensive. 
Steps have been taken to address problems. A database of evaluation reports was previously set up 
containing the summaries of the main findings of evaluation reports which officials could look 
across to see what had previously worked. In practice, this was used by evaluators rather than 
programme or budget managers, the people directly concerned with the development of delivery 
policy. [Restricted access to the latter by officials was possibly the primary cause] 
There is a further problem in drawing conclusions on best practice, by comparing evaluations. 
Difficulty arises from a lack of coherence in reporting, which in turn results from continual changes 
in policy that in the strategic sense (meeting DTI's objectives) makes comparing like for like more 
difficult. There are also practical difficulties. People wi l l instinctively argue the relevance of 
previous evaluations to current, market situations. 
The lack of relevance argument is not credible, as much can be learnt from what has been done 
before. The proviso is that analysis is conducted from the perspective of identifying and addressing 
the fundamental economic issues, and to then look at how, generically, mechanisms function to 
address these issues. This approach allows interventions to be compared independent o f policy 
change, and regularities between programmes to be discovered and best practice conclusions to be 
drawn. 
There are factors which mitigate against across the board comparisons at present. Delegation o f 
responsibility for administering budgets down the chains of command, has resulted in a structure in 
which the evaluation is 'distributed'. The evaluaiors are mostly working in particular policy areas 
within the line directorates, (plus the Assessment Unit (AU) in IPS). They thus have responsibility 
for evaluating the schemes in their particular area, and operate largely independently of each other. 
It is first observed that, overall, the current structure leaves the evaluation process largely 
uncoordinated, leaving people to do things in different ways. 
Secondly, the focus in delegated responsibility on the administration of budgets, causes the 
evaluation process to be weighted towards informing budget management. This creates tensions 
between programme and budget managers, over differences in interpretation of evaluation findings. 
Budget holders will focus on the value for money related findings of evaluation. On the other hand 
programme managers wi l l look more closely at the operational findings. In summar>', determining 
best practice across DTI is difficult to achieve. 
There are arguments for placing the evaluaiors within the individual directorates. They become 
more knowledgeable about the policy areas of the directorates, and arc thus better qualified to make 
credible judgements on the effects of policy, than staff placed centrally. 
Some procedures are in place to help determine and disseminate best practice in evaluation work. 
EPIC was set up in the early 1980s' in response to FMl, to ensure evaluations were credible, and to 
then draw the broad lessons. The detailed consideration of evaluation plans for individual 
programmes and the subsequent evaluation reports has been delegated by EPIC to and Evaluation 
Methodology Group (EMG). This however is largely still failing to involve the wider range of 
interest groups, necessar>' to inform future policy making. 
The requirement to draw lessons from the experiences of Other Government Departments (OGDs) 
is set out among other things in the H. M . Treasury 'Green Book'. In relation to the wider picture 
however, DTI officials tend to work in their own well established tradition, tending to ignore what 
goes on elsewhere. 
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There is a requirement to evaluate programme strategies in terms of their ability to meet 
departmental, policy objectives. Dr Lambert was able to propose some ways forward in resolving 
the evaluatory issues. 
Moving towards a more centralised framework for evaluation would enable comparisons o f 
programme performance across DTI, in terms of value for money or contribution towards 
departmental PSA objectives. 
Knowledge management is seen as a potential way of overconiing this 'silo mentality'. 
As a first step, evaluation staff in the separate units could be brought together into a single 
evaluation unit. An option is for the unit to be housed in FRM, to use the status o f this directorate 
as DTVs ultimate controller o f finance, to add clout to evaluation findings and recommendations. 
The Departmental Strategy Group (DSG) are thinking along these lines, but no plans are available 
at the time of the interview. 
The single evaluation unit could look across past schemes and draw out the best practice lessons. 
But in this process there is a need to look forward as well as the past. As part of Evaluation's role 
in informing policy, it is also necessary to research markets and industries to help inform the 
setting of policy objectives, and then how to meet those objectives. 
General observations: 
It is observed that the content of the evaluation sections of the Green Book tends to be about 
project rather than programme evaluation, and its value is therefore restricted. It is also observed 
that officials in DTI tend stay with their own established traditions, tending to ignore what goes on 
elsewhere. 
Subsequent Dialogue: 
In a subsequent exchange of E-mails (beUveen 17 October 2000 and 19 October 2000) Dr Lambert 
subsequently added that "on the point about looking at OGDs evaluations - it is rare for 
administrators here (at DTI) to look at DTI evaluations - one reason being that they are orientated 
towards the effects, possible future and scope for improvement of individual programmes. Lessons 
do not readily generalise, especially as folk tend to see their own schemes as sui generis, while 
evaluations also tend to seem to be about yesterday's saltations to yesterday's problems. Another 
reason is that they can be pretty boring (mea culpa on that onef\ 
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APPENDIX C THE ROLE OF ADVISORY COUNCILS - ACOST 
C.1 Introduction 
Experience gained by the author from his work in the development of programmes, coupled with 
discussions with fellow officials and an interview with Dr. John Leather [Interview 6] a member of 
the ACOST A M T Sub-group, has shown that a major influence on the development of policy has 
been the government's 'Advisory Councils'. Advisory Councils advise government in the 
development o f its policy in areas which are of national and strategic importance. The Councils 
identify the issues relating to policy arid report to government, making recommendations. ACOST, 
the subject of this review, was disbanded in 1993. 
The author first became aware of the influence of the Councils on DTI policy when working on the 
development of the ROAME statement for the Manufacturing Planning and Implementation (MPI) 
programme (see appendix H). In developing the ROAME, the rationale statement was reinforced 
by referring to problems which had been identified by one of the Councils. Discussion with 
colleagues indicated that the Advisory Councils have affected DTI policy on many occasions. 
Consequently it is necessary to investigate the role of these Councils, to assess the nature and 
extent of their influence. 
C.2 The Role of ACOST 
Of the Advisory Councils, it is those having an industrial remit which most influenced DTI policy. 
Two councils have been the main sources of influence: 
• The Advisory Council for Applied Research and Development (ACARD). 
• Advisory Council On Science and Technology (ACOST). 
Announced in a memorandum to the House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, ACARD was established in 1976 to consider matters related to UK Manufacturing 
Industry. The formation of ACOST was announced by the government on 20 July 1987, and 
represented one of several steps taken to strengthen UK Research and Development in response the 
recommendations of the First Report o f the House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology: 1987-88 Session. ACOST absorbed the work o f ACARD and was given an extended 
set of terms of reference to cover all aspects o f science and technology. 
Study o f the Advisory Councils has concentrated on the role o f ACOST, which was the . 
influence during the period studied. (The operation o f ACARD was similar to ACOST). mam 
Information on the operation of ACOST was collected in the following ways: 
• Study of the internal government information pack, summarising the aims, and operation o f 
ACOST (ACOST, 1989, pp. 5-6). This details the Council structure and membership of the 
component committees, 
• Interview of the Secretary of the ACOST Sub-Group on A M T [Interview 8], 
• Discussion with officials regarding their experiences. 
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• Personal experience gained in drafting the government response (DTI, 1991c) to the ACOST 
report on Advanced Manufacturing Technology (ACOST, 1991), 
• Examination of documents held on department files, 
• Reading of reports published by HMSO of reviews conducted by ACARD (ACARD, 1983) 
and the ACOST report on AMT (ACOST, 1991). 
Initial analysis of the data showed the fundamental role played by ACOST in policy development 
within DTI, and allowed a *broad brush' picture to be painted describing the nature of influence of 
the Council. The main features are detailed in the following. 
ACOST had no executive role. It was purely advisory, there to help develop policy. ACOSPs 
remit was to identify and consider the national issues in science and technology, and give their 
advice as to how best these may be addressed by the Whitehall departments. Contained within 
their final reports, their advice was presented as recommendations directed to government 
departments. In taking the national view, ACOST dealt with those issues which transcend the 
individual responsibilities of government departments, and other bodies involved in science and 
technology. Thus ACOST normally confmed its work to issues which might not be addressed by a 
single department alone. 
ACOST reported to the Prime Minister and was owned by the Cabinet Office, which provided and 
housed the Secretariat. The Secretariat reported firstly to the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), who 
was responsible for providing advice on science and technology matters to the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet. The CSA was the main link between ACOST and government, and played the central 
role in planning the work of the Council. ACOST's advice was based on studies o f a subject which 
it might select by itself, or at the request of the Prime Minister. Reports were submitted to the 
Prime Minister, generally with a recommendation to publish, but sometimes on a confidential basis. 
Membership of the Council comprised senior figures drawn from Academia and Industry, who 
possessed a breadth o f expertise and experience within the assigned area of remit. The CSA 
together with the Chief Scientists/Scientific Advisers of the Whitehall departments (normally 
people at Grade 2 Level), also attended ful l meetings of the Council. Additionally, the Prime 
Minister periodically met ACOST. Much of ACOST's work was carried out in the Sub-
Committees and small Working Groups which sit under the Council. The groups supported the 
work of the Council: its Sub-committees each studied specific topics falling within the more 
general terms o f reference o f the Council. 
There were three Sub-Committees in total: the Annual Review, International Collaboration and the 
Emerging Technologies committees. It was the last which was the main focus o f attention. 
Membership o f the groups comprised partly of persons drawn from Council and partly of members 
co-opted because they could make special contributions to the subjects under review. 
The councils operated on a restricted budget and were unable to undertake research themselves. 
The data collection method employed by a council or a working group was therefore to invite 
leading representatives to submit evidence, from bodies such as trade and research associations, 
learned societies, Academia, senior executives from companies and government departments. 
These bodies would have undertaken research in the area of interest, or alternatively by the nature 
of their work had a good understanding of strategic requirements (e.g. a university participating in 
a number of collaborative projects and leading edge developments). Evidence might be submitted 
orally or as written reports. 
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C.3 Setting the Work Agenda 
The process of setting the work agenda comprised identifying and prioritising the issues. 
Collection of data to inform the process took place at various levels and in a number of different 
ways. Firstly there was a large element o f 'self-setting' of the agenda by ACOST itself From their 
informed positions, members of ACOST raised issues which they considered to be o f concern. 
Secondly, the Chairman of ACOST hosted dinners for the Secretaries of State: these dinners were 
the forum for the exchange of views on the key issues. The Prime Minister has also been known to 
request particular items to be put on the agenda. For instance Mrs. Thatcher asked ACOST to 
investigate issues relating to the 'Environment'. 
ACOST also maintained a dialogue with the Whitehall departments, with several levels of contact. 
At the middle management level (Grade 6 and 7 levels), staff from relevant departments sat on the 
working group panels as assessors. An example was the A M T sub-group formed under the 
Emerging Technologies Sub Committee to look at and report on the national A M T issues. DTI , 
having the lead in the A M T area, fielded an assessor on the panel [Interview 5]. As a member of 
the panel, DTI was able to advise ACOST about the identification of the issues, and about the 
drafting of the recommendations contained in the resultant Report on Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (ACOST, 1991). 
The work of ACOST also related to the Whitehall departments through their respective 
Departmental Advisory Bodies. For DTI, the Advisory Body was called the Innovation Advisory 
Board, which was a section within the former Research Technology and Planning Division (RTP). 
Investigations have not revealed any evidence that development of programmes was precipitated 
through this interface with the Council. 
C.4 The Mechanisms of ACOST influence 
ACOST appears to have worked through two main influences: 
Final Reports: The content of the reports represented one of the sources o f advice to the Prime 
Minister, and might be employed in Cabinet decisions relating to policy. Clearly^ potential for 
ACOST to affect DTI policy by influencing Cabinet decisions existed, but the research undertaken 
has not identified any examples of scheme development being effected directly in this way. 
However, ACOST's ability to wield direct and profound influence over policy in the Whitehall 
departments was clearly evident. 
ACOST had a high political status, because the Council was chaired by the Prime Minister and 
owned by the Cabinet Office. The high status required the government to respond formally to the 
recommendations in the final reports. Responsibility for drafting the 'official response' fell to the 
Whitehall departments that were the subject of the recommendations. Because ACOST's studies 
transcended the boundaries of activity o f the individual departments, more than one department 
would normally be involved. The protocol employed was that the department seen as having the 
principal lead in the topic covered by a report, accepted responsibility for drafting the response on 
behalf of itself and the other Ministries targeted for action. 
Officials in the lead department drafted the text o f the official response, which was submitted to the 
Secretary o f State for approval for publication. The text of the submission aimed to address the 
concerns of ACOST in terms of the initiatives already in place and those planned. It is the case of 
the planned initiatives which is of particular interest. It is important to note that by approving the 
draft response, the Secretary of State publicly committed his department to implementing the 
planned activities. 
Working Papers: Leading up to the preparation of a final report, discussion documents and draft 
reports were widely circulated by ACOST within the relevant departments and elsewhere. These 
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papers stimulated discussion within the departments and hence influenced the formation o f their 
thougltts. 
Investigation of the interplay between*ACOST and DTI has revealed Uvo mechanisms of particular 
interest, which were brought into play in the development of new programmes. By having an 
assessor on the Emerging Technology's A M T panel, DTI was apprised of ACOSPs views about 
what needed to be undertaken in the field of A M T [Interviews 5 and 6]. Using this knowledge, 
DTI could design and launch the MPI programme such as to address a number of ACOSPs 
concerns ahead of the publication of the final report. Thus the department was placed in a strong 
position when drafting the government response to the report. 
The second mechanism again arises from the department having an assessor on a working group. 
In the period 1989/1990 DTI became concerned about the lack of co-ordination between the A M T 
related activities supported in the UK. The department considered the solution to the problem to be 
the provision of a centrally administered, UK network to disseminate information about best 
practice in the application of AMT. DTI wished to undertake a feasibility study to consider the 
viability of its proposals, but needed to have the problem identified as a priority for DTI to address. 
Through the Assessor appointed from DTI, the department was able to raise awareness o f the 
problem within the ACOST and suggest the introduction of the Network as a solution. The DTI 
input to the discussions resulted in ACOST formally recommending that the DTI should consider 
establishing an information network along the lines proposed. 
As it was a formal recommendation, DTI was obliged to respond and drafted an Official Response 
proposing a feasibility study as a precursor for setting up a UK network meeting ACOST's 
concerns. The draft text was approved by the Secretary of Slate, so committing the department to 
consider the networking issues. By this sequence of events officials engineered the grant of a remit 
for something they wished to do. 
Discussions with a sub group member [Interview 6] led the author to believe that ACOST was 
often used to help officials get issues placed higher on the political agenda. In this respect, ACOST 
is seen as having given departments an opportunity to do something which they would like to do, 
but for which they had no remit. 
C.5 Summary 
ACOST not only informed and influenced programme development, but was also used as a tool by 
government departments to help them secure approval for policy. The principal mechanisms are 
summarised below: 
a) Exploitation of the position of an agency which, operating at the national level, was able 
through its research activities to identify the issues of national importance and make 
recommendations concerning their resolution. Operating at the national level facilitated the 
interrogation of a broad cross section of well informed opinion enabling the drafting of 
recommendations which were well balanced and hence credible. 
b) The presentation of recommendations in formal reports to the policy makers within DTI, 
thereby informing the process of policy relating to programme development. The 
recommendations helped officials build programme rationale, by providing the evidence o f the 
presence of failures within the market, together with the argument to support the proposed lines 
of corrective action. 
c) The chairing of ACOST by the Prime Minister together with the committee being responsible to 
the Cabinet Office (the agency responsible for helping the government to develop its policies), 
motivated the department to take action as the Committee's recommendations were recognised 
as being the directive aims of government. 
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d) Having ACOST undertake its research at the next level up from that where ministries 
specifically operate, helped ensure that strategic issues were addressed. These issues might 
otherwise be missed, because they fell outside the remits of individual departments. 
e) Issues to be examined were identified in the guise o f setting an agenda which scoped the 
investigatory work to be undertaken. 
issues: 0 The setting of the agenda involved the initial identification and prioritisation o f potential 
• ACOST adopted a multi-sourcing approach in capturing data to inform the process of 
priority setting: 
• as membership comprised prominent, well informed individuals representing a broad church 
of opinion in the community, ACOST was collectively able to flag potential problems; 
• informal dinners were used to provide a forum in which important issues might be discussed 
with Secretaries of State; 
• ACOST additionally received intelligence about national priorities from the Whitehall 
departments, through the lines of communication which existed between the CSA, and the 
officials at the Chief Scientist level within DTI, etc. The CSA is located in the Cabinet 
Office and was a member o f the ACOST committee. The Chief Scientists hold senior 
positions within the departments (usually at Grade 2 level), and are hence able to take an 
overview of problems notified by staff within individual branches and sections. 
• the Prime Minister is in a position representing the complete overview of national issues. 
His or her position brings him/her into contact with a wide variety of senior individuals. His 
or her chairmanship allowed him to raise and discuss relevant issues. 
h) Credible recommendations were produced by ACOST because of the thorough investigation of 
the identified issues. This involved establishing the exact nature of the problems involved, and 
taking an informed opinion about the approaches which might be adopted in their resolution. 
i) The mechanisms described in h) were enabled by accessing the data within agencies 
representing national sources o f informed opinion. The principal contributors were: 
• members of ACOST themselves; 
• organisations representing a broad cross section of the A M T community; 
• seconded members of individual departments acting in the role of assessors within sub 
committees who were thereby able to use their knowledge to help ACOST determine and 
prioritise problems. 
J) Credibility in reporting was enhanced through the circulation of draft conclusions (working 
papers), to government departments and other interested parties, redrafting findings in the light 
of comments received, 
k) Circulation o f working papers provided DTI and other departments with early confirmation of 
the issues. Their circulation hence provided an important source of evidence, which might be 
drawn upon in the development of programme rationale statements. 
I) ACOST provided a means by which departments were able to secure ministerial approval for 
policy which they wished to implement towards addressing market failures. Tlie mechanisms 
involved were: 
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o use of the assessor role to place issues on ACOSPs agenda and steer the development of 
associated recommendations; 
o The requirement to respond to ACOSTs recommendations in the form of an Official 
Government Response. 
That the departmental responses were assigned the status of 'off icial ' means that they were 
statements of government policy. As it is in turn the responsibility o f the departments to initiate 
action to administer policy on behalf of ministers, the recommendations of an advisory council 
provided the mandate for officials to develop programmes of appropriate activities. 
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APPENDIX D THE ENTERPRISE INITIATIVE 
D.1 Introduction 
This appendix describes the Enterprise Initiative (EI) which featured a large promotional campaign 
aimed at improving access to DTl's services, by making firms more aware of what the department 
had to offer. 
D.2 Description of the Enterprise Initiative 
Chapter I , section 1.1, introduced the Enterprise Initiative (El). Announced in the DTI 
White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24, 41). EI was launched on 13 January 1988. The white 
paper explains the role of EI as bringing together the services operated by DTI for 
industry and commerce. Through EI the government was seen as providing a 
comprehensive packiage of'self-help* for firms. Themes emphasised were promoting 
innovation through support for R&D, and helping firms become competitive through 
transferring best practice, and helping firms to use expert, private sector advice. 
EI was a 'flagship activity', and acted as the primary influence in co-ordinating DTI's 
programmes. It is for this reason that it was studied in more detail as a case study. In 
itself. El did not provide direct help to firms, rather it acted in the role of a co-ordinator, 
bringing together many of DTI's existing schemes and promoting them as a single ' 
'product line'. 
The Enterprise Initiative was dropped as the department's flagship in 1994. 
D.3 Issue Identification 
The author is able to provide some of the background leading up to the introduction of EI. Along 
with his colleagues he was informed that in 1987, Lord Young, then Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, sought to rationalise the 100 or so schemes he inherited on his appointment. He 
believed the sheer number and the absence of their co-ordination, were contributing to confusion 
and a general lack of awareness among SMEs about DTI's support programmes. He was reported 
by senior officials to have said that he felt DTI's services for firms were its 'best kept' secret! Lord 
Young asked officials to address the problem of confusion. The need for a co-ordinated approach to 
address the problems was reflected in the DTI White Paper. 
EI hence provided a national focus for DTI's programmes, and generated synergy by structuring 
schemes behind a common goal; that is to promote 'enterprise' among firms. In this way access 
was seen as improved by removing some of the confusion. 
Programmes brigaded together and operated under EI included the case study examples of the 
Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative, the Consultancy Initiatives (CI), Managing into the 
90s (M90s), and the Manufacturing, Planning and Implementation (MPI) programmes (EI, 1989). 
EI also included activities to increase awareness of international standards, to help firms cope with 
the introduction of the Single European Market. In a discussion with Mr John Oakley, a PR 10 in 
DTI and who had knowledge surrounding the development of EI, he informed the author that a 
separate ROAME was not prepared for the EI promotional campaign. 
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D.4 Implementation: Promotion of the Enterprise Initiative 
The DTI White Paper refers to DTFs services to be strongly promoted. Concerned that the business 
community was largely unaware o f the DTI services available, the DTI engaged an external 
marketing agency to develop and run a promotional campaign towards increasing participation in 
its schemes. The author observes the aim of promotion was to raise levels o f awareness among 
firms of the schemes operating under EI. In this way one of the barriers to participation was 
removed, by helping businesses understand how DTI's programmes could help them. 
An interview was held with Ms Paula Freedman who had responsibility as a Grade 7 in DTI's 
Enterprise Division for the promotion of El [Interview 4]. Ms Freedman was able to provide useful 
information concerning the campaign. The need for a high profile campaign arose from the targets 
set in the DTI White Paper, for the numbers o f SMEs to undertake consultancy projects under the 
Consultancy Initiatives. To ensure these targets were achieved, a high level o f promotion was 
required. (The Consultancy Initiatives are discussed in appendix F). 
A high profile was secured by heavy advertising in the national media, including television, and at 
regional and local levels through the provincial press. The advertising campaign made people aware 
of the existence of DTI programmes, and how they offered a service to help companies overcome 
problems. It was the largest promotional campaign to have been mounted by DTI to date, with a 
budget of around £10 Million a year. 
To keep El in the forefront of peoples' minds and to reinforce messages, the campaign was run 
substantially over the life of the initiative. Annual blocks o f funding were agreed by the IPC and 
ministers. An external agency was appointed to design and mount the campaign. 
The strategy adopted for the campaign was to first build awareness of El, to develop interest in DTPs 
schemes. Advertising on national Television was the primary medium employed for this purpose, with 
the objective of obtaining a volume response. Advertisements were at first o f 60 seconds duration 
which was subsequently reduced to 30 seconds and then finally to 10 seconds. Television advertising 
was backed by advertising in the national, regional, and technical 'Press'. 
The advertising campaign was supported with the introduction of a set of promotional literature. 
The literature had a hierarchical structure, with the booklet Introducing the Enterprise Initiative 
(El, 1989) serving as the 'top level' brochure. This provided an overview of the schemes operated 
by DTI to help business, and signposted the reader to lower level literature which described 
individual programmes in more detail. Signposting between schemes was achieved by cross-
references between the EI promotional brochure and the literature o f the individual schemes: this 
increased awareness of the full range o f help available from the department. 
The author was informed by colleagues o f how the advertising campaign generated a high enquiry 
rate, which DTI was unable to service. Many of the responses generated were also reported by Ms 
Freedman to be 'rubbish'. The department surmounted these problems by letting a contract for the 
manning of an enquiry help line, and the distribution o f introductory literature. 
D.5 Monitoring: Assessment of Impact 
The goal set for the advertising campaign was to achieve an awareness of 70% among the target 
audience of SMEs. In talking to the author, colleagues reported that typically only a few percent of 
firms are usually expected to be aware of DTI schemes. Market &. Opinion Research International 
Limited (MORI) were commissioned to track and measure the impact of the campaign, producing 
tracking reports at six weekly intervals. Among factors measured were the levels o f awareness of the 
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EI Booklet. Drip and burst techniques were employed in advertising, the levels of advertising 
increased on a regional basis, when falls in the response rates were detected. 
MORI reported that around 52% of firms were aware of El six months after advertising began (MORI, 
1998). The figure indicates the success of the campaign, as demonstrated by the substantially higher 
level of awareness of El, compared with that normally expected for other schemes. The author would 
note however, that most of DTI's programmes had not previously been the subject of a concerted 
advertising campaign. 
Central to the El advertising campaign was the use of a corporate logo, the now famous 'Whoosh 
Arrow. Use of the 'Arrow' taught officials of the value of corporate badging to promote a corporate 
identity, and the policy was continued with the introduction of the Business Links initiative. An 
unexpected benefit of the promotional campaign was the raising of DTI's status in the eyes of the 
general public. Colleagues reported to the author a much higher rate of external applicants for posts 
within DTI as a result of the campaign. 
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APPENDIX E THE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 
E.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2, section 2.5 discussed the move away in 1988 from near market R&D. Far less emphasis 
was also to be placed on single company funding with greater stress to be put on technology 
transfer. These changes in policy were set out in the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, p. 3). The 
white paper refers to DTI's support for R&D to become part of the department's services to be 
provided under El. 
As discussed inchapter 2, section 2.5.3, the DTI White Paper provides the background to 
establishing the R & T Initiative. The white paper slates that "77;^ overall aim of DTI's innovation 
policy is to encourage a net addition to innovation by industry without creating distortions in the 
economy (HMSO, 1988, p. 33). 
The paper refers to innovation as being essential to sustain competitive edge (p. 33), and that 
successful businesses are those which innovate. The white paper continues by arguing that the 
ability and willingness of businesses to innovate had strengthened through an improved economic 
climate, but UK funded R&D remained a lower proportion of GDP than that experienced in other, 
industrial nations. 
The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, p. 33) then refers to a review by DTI o f its role in 
encouraging innovation. Based on the findings of the review, three changes in policy towards the 
funding of R&D were proposed. Firstly greater emphasis was to be given in collaborative 
programmes on longer term research involving companies, simultaneous with the encouragement 
in these programmes of more collaboration between higher education institutions (HEls) and firms. 
Secondly more stress was to be placed on promoting the many different aspects o f technology 
transfer, and tliirdly to end the SFI Scheme and other specialist activities aimed at promoting the 
take up of specific technologies, such as the Microelectronics Industry Support Programme. 
Against the backdrop of the new policy, the white paper then highlighted the responsibility on 
firms to finance R&D and those circumstances under which it is appropriate for government to 
help. The Paper states: 
Firms themselves are best able to assess their own markets and to balance the commercial risks 
and rewards of financing R&D and innovation. Tlie Government shoitld not take on the 
responsibilities which are primarily those of industry. The closer to the market place that 
innovation is taking place, the more fundamental this should be as a guiding principle ofpolicy. In 
particular, firms have the best access to information about the prospects of R&D projects they 
alone undertake and are best placed to reap the benefits from them ". 
But the Government recognise that reliance on the decisions of firms may produce a level of 
innovation and use of technology which fails to provide maximum benefits for the economy as a 
whole. The Government's view is that DTI's innovation policy should be focused primarily on the 
circimistances where research is necessary before commercial applications can be developed, or 
where the benefits of research are likely to be widespread, and on technology transfer. There may 
also be exceptional circumstances where technological uncertainties of research dissuade firms 
from projects which would have benefit to the whole economy'', 
(HMSO, 1988, p. 33). 
The DTI White Paper identifies four principal areas of activity to be supported in collaborative 
research: 
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LINK - current at the time of writing this thesis, LINK encourages companies to participate in 
joint research with HEIs. The Innovation Budget Guidelines inform that LINK is an 'across 
Whitehall' initiative, involving DTI and other government departments (DTI, 1992, p. ii) . 
EUREKA - also current at the time of writing this thesis, the scheme focuses upon 
collaboration between firms and other organisations across national borders in Europe (DTI, 
1992, p . i i ) . 
National collaborative research programmes - encourage longer-term industrially led 
collaborative projects between firms, in new, advanced technologies. In the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines these were referred to as Advanced Technology Programmes (ATPs), (DTI, 1992, 
p. i i i , annex 6, p. V I - i i i ) . ATP programmes were introduced in response to policy wishing to 
see support of National collaborative research programmes (HMSO, 1988, p. 35) which looked 
to encourage longer-term collaborative projects between firms, in new, advanced technologies. 
ATPs were theme based, and concerned with the development o f strategic generic 
technologies, such as robotics and Information Technology (IT), which had potential 
application across a range of sectors [Interview I I ] . 
General Industrial Collaborative Projects (GICPs) - encouragement o f collaborative research 
through a number of types of project (DTI, 1992, p. i i i , annex 8, p. V I I I - i). GICP projects 
were aimed at motivating firms to collaborate in industrially orientated research. They tended 
to be focused on a specific sector, such as the High Speed Machining Programme which 
brought together users of *high technology' cutting machinery and the machine tool industry 
[lnter\Mew 11]. 
Following shortly after the publication o f the white paper, the DTI's Research and Technology 
(R & T) Initiative was launched in 1988 as an integral part of EI (EI, 1989). The R & T Initiative 
housed the above schemes, which also contained elements to promote technology transfer and 
innovation more generally. The Innovation Budget Guidelines were revised and a new version of 
the Guidelines issued (DTI, 1988). Revisions reflected the policy changes introduced in the DTI 
White Paper, and the brigading together of the R & T schemes under the R & T Initiative. 
For the purposes of this research it was decided to concentrate on those programme areas where 
DTI has sole responsibility. It was thought that significant, additional research would be required to 
investigate fully the LINK and Eureka activities, and the author wished to keep the research within 
acceptable bounds. 
Although not'listed in the early version o f the Innovation Guidelines (DTI, 1988), SMART 
continued to be funded (DTI, 1991b, p. I ) . In 1988, this represented a principal ^exception to the 
rule' of funding policy, being the only significant programme at the time still offering single 
company support. In 1991 a new initiative. Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) was 
introduced (DTI, 1994b, p. 1). SPUR also offered single company funding, but unlike SMART, 
which was aimed at the small firm, SPUR targeted the medium size o f company (DTI , 1994b, pp. 
9,13). 
Inspection of the 1992 issue of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, p. i i i ) shows both 
SMART and SPUR to have been brought together into the R & T Initiative. Reading the guidance 
also reveals increased stress on achieving innovation and technology transfer in project work. The 
following text examines in more detail the features of some of the programme activities supported 
under the R & T Initiative. 
For this case study example, investigations have focused on GICP, SMART, and SPUR, on the 
basis that these schemes are broadly respected within DTI for their performance. 
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E.2 GICP and Club Projects 
The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988) in relation to GICP projects, talks about such work as 
encouraging collaboration through a variety of projects'' (p. 35). The paper continues that some 
ofthese projects ser\'ice the requirements of fragmented industries, where normally small firms do 
not have the resources for advanced technological projects (pp. 35-36). Research Associations were 
seen as examples of organisations which could pool their resources to meet the needs of these 
The 1992 edhion of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, p. i i i , annex 8, p. VIII - i) 
develops the theme. The guidelines refer to support for R<S:D undertaken at a 'host site', which is 
referred to as a centre of excellence, with the host orchestrating research on behalf of specific 
groups of industrial organisations. Guidance (DTI, 1992, p. ii i) slates that normally hosts wil l be 
Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs). Examples of an RTO are the Production 
Engineering Research Association (PERA) and RAPRA, the Rubber And Plastics Research 
Association. The guidelines refer to RTO led projects as 'Club Projects'. 
The evaluation report Evaluation Of DTI Funded Research Projects At Research And Technology 
Organisations (DTI, 1996c), (the report comprises 45 pages and was prepared by DTI's 
Assessment Unit) provides further information on DTI support for RTO led R&D. In introducing 
the subject, the report refers to the GICP programme being announced in 1988 with the aim of 
encouraging collaborative research projects that would be of particular benefit to SMEs (p. i , 
paragraph 1.2). A total of 913 projects were funded with grant payments totalling £127 Mill ion. 
The RTO Report (DTI, 1996c, p. 12) draws a distinction between two categories o f projects 
supported under GICP. These are co-operative and collaborative projects respectively, although the 
author observes that these titles are sometimes used interchangeably. Co-operative projects are 
those where membership funds are used to provide the industr>' contribution, usually around 50% 
of the project costs. Co-operative projects are thus undertaken on behalf of the whole membership 
of an RTO. Collaborative projects are those where the industry contribution is provided by 
individual companies, with funding provided with cash or in kind (by both members and non-
members). 
Co-operative projects were often found to be speculative, being well away from the market, and to 
benefit the members at large and were broadly based. Collaborative projects fell into two types. 
The first, and the majority, were those projects where the RTO undertook the research work itself, 
with participant firms providing funding in kind such as staff time, raw materials, and samples. 
Generally companies involved in these projects had an interest in exploiting the results, but who 
were either unable to fund the research component of project work, or support the facilities to do 
so. A small proportion of the projects were found to be truly collaborative, with industrial partners 
taking an active part in research. 
The RTO evaluation report (DTI, 1996c, pp. 2-4, 7) provides a useful summary on the history o f 
funding RTOs. The report refers to government support for RTOs prior to 1970, focusing on 
maintaining an RTO as a viable research facility for a particular sector. Support was in the fomi of 
block grants which were not assigned to specific activities. Subsequently policy changed to that of 
funding particular programmes of work at RTOs. From 1988 onwards programme ROAME 
statements were prepared for each RTO programme to be supported. 
The 1988 evaluation report (AU, 1988), (tlie report contains 42 pages), provides further background 
(pp. 1-3)10 DTl's support to the RTOs and other organisations, such as the department's Industrial 
Research Establishments, prior to 1988. R&D clubs operating in a range of research areas were formed 
by the research organisations, with R&D carried out on behalf of club members. Dissemination of 
technical information and the provision of technical ser\'ices were also important functions for the 
clubs (AU, 1988, pp. 2-3, 7-14). The evaluation report discusses how DTI (and other departments) had 
provided financial assistance for 'clubs' run by die research organisations. TIte RTOs' traditional role 
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of providing a wide range of general co-operative research and other services on behalf of their 
membership as a whole, is highlighted. However, attention is drawn to many RTOs having undertaken 
group sponsored projects for sections of their membership, which may be classified as club projects. In 
concluding, the evaluation report confirms the rationale for club support and recommends that funding 
continue (AU,1988, pp. iv, 41). The author observes that the role o f the RTOs closely aligns with the 
post 1988 function described above, and therefore suggests that the good experience o f the RTO model 
played an important part in developing GICP. 
The introduction of support for club projects being before the introduction of the requirement to 
prepare programme ROAME statements, and hence no such cases were likely to have been prepared 
for each project supported. No reference is made in the 1996 evaluation (DTI, 1996c) to a previous 
ROAME statement for GICP, and the author suggests that a ROAME was not prepared. ROAMEs 
were, however, produced for the individual projects supported under GICP, (see section E.2.1.1 
below). 
E.2.1 Issue Identification: Rationale 
The RTO Evaluation Report (DTI, 1996c, p. 7) discusses the rationale for GICP. Several market 
failures are described. Many firms, both large and small, were wary o f sharing research information 
with others. Firms often have insufficient resources or lack the necessary expertise to undertake 
research work. Many were described as simply unwilling or unable to commit funds to R&D work, 
because of the long lime horizons associated with pre-competitive research. Costs are significant in 
setting up R&D projects and ensuring that work wil l be attractive to other participants. 
Other market failures, which represented problems for RTOs and firms alike, were reported as 
being set out in the programme rationale- They were as follows: 
• inability to shoulder technological andfinancial risks, 
• the lack of information on technical or financial potential. 
• disregardfor the wider benefits", 
(DTI, 1996c, p. 9). 
The author observes that the market failures identified above reflect the eligibility conditions for 
funding which are set out in the Innovation Budget Guidelines 
(DTI, 1992, pp. 16-18, 1996a, pp. 102-104, 1999a, pp. 91-94), as discussed in chapter 5, sub-
section 5.2.4.1 of this thesis. 
E.2.1.1 Identification ofMarket Failures 
In GICP it is the author's experience that it is the RTOs which flag problems to officials. Inspection of 
evaluation reports supports this view. The RTO report refers to the preparation of ROAMEs 
"accompanying RTO proposals" (DTI, 1996c, p. 7). The evaluation report looking at DTI support for 
collaborative R&D at RTOs in the metals processing industry is more specific, stating "ROAME 
statements were written by officials in the Department based on information supplied by the RTOs" 
(AU, 1992, p. 3); (the report comprises 24 pages and was prepared by DTFs Assessment Unit). 
E.2.2 Objectives 
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The RTO Evaluation Report (DTI, 1996c, p. 8) gives the programme objectives as being to 
promote co-operative and collaborative, pre-competitive research involving industrial SMEs and 
encourage technology transfer into that sector, particularly into small firms. 
E.2.3 Delivery Strategy 
The principal mechanism deployed in the programme was to use the resources available to RTOs, 
to help promote R & D in these firms (DTI, 1996c, pp. 9-10, 16, 24). The 1992 edition of the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI , 1992), shows how the RTOs were grant funded to lead and 
undertake project work (p. i i i , annex 8, p. V I I - i to i i ) . 
The RTO Report (DTI, 1996c) argues the case for majoring on RTOs as host organisations. 
Compared with alternative organisations, RTO membership normally comprises a high proportion 
of SMEs (p. 8), the focus o f government policy (HMSO, 1988, p. 25, 35-36), and hence RTOs tend 
to be more aware of SME needs. Through their day to day activities RTOs have built up substantial 
knowledge o f their specialist sectors, and are thus able to guide R&D such that it meets industrial 
requirements (p. 9). RTOs have also been found more willing to share information than large 
companies. Through their membership services, RTOs are normally better able to communicate the 
information they wish to share (pp. 2, 9-10). Therefore RTOs provided DTI with access to the 
target companies through a well established and well informed infrastructure. 
E.2.4 Programme Implementation 
Programme administration was the responsibility o f officials employed in DTI, which included 
project appraisal and monitoring. The RTO evaluation report refers to the administration of the 
projects being the responsibility of project officers in five divisions within DTI. The report shows 
that administrative duties included the appraisal o f applications and objectives to check their 
conformity with the aims set out in the ROAME statements, and project monitoring. Some RTOs 
were reported as holding the view that in setting strict objectives, they were prevented from ful ly 
exploiting areas of potential research, that were not envisaged at the beginning o f projects. That the 
DTI project officers had been flexible in their approach, in those cases where problems were 
significant, was highlighted (DTI, 1996c, pp. 20-21). 
E.2.5 Evaluation 
The RTO Report (DTI, 1996c) records the evaluation of GICP projects managed by Research and 
Technology Organisations (RTOs). The aim of the evaluation was to identify the benefits accruing to 
the RTOs and industrial participants from their GICP projects, and the achievement o f programme and 
project objectives. Evaluation also looked at the effectiveness of monitoring and project management, 
additionality, the levels of innovation and technology transfer and finally, the wider benefits. 
The evaluation report (DTI, 1996c, pp. 4-7) in setting out the evaluation strategy, states that 
between 1992 and 1995, 300 GICP projects were scheduled for completion. The sample for 
evaluation was generated by using the criteria of projects receiving a grant o f greater than £50,000, 
and due for completion between December 1992 and December 1994. This gave a sample size o f 
89 projects covering 17 RTOs. The sample size was considered large and therefore statistically 
significant, allowing conclusions relating the total universe of projects to be drawn with reasonable 
credibility. Progress reports held on DTI project files were also inspected. 
Face to face interviews were conducted with senior management and project managers at 15 out o f 
the total 17 RTOs. A structured questionnaire was used in each interview. The questionnaire aimed 
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to Identify the benefits which had accrued to both the RTOs and industry members as a resuh of 
participating in the supported projects. Interviews aimed also to assess the achievement o f 
programme and project objectives, and determine the effectiveness o f project monitoring and 
management, and measure the levels of additionality, innovation, technology transfer and the 
wider benefits experienced. 
E.3 The SMART Scheme 
The DTI Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, p. i i i ) describe the Small Firms Merit Award 
for Research and Technology (SMART) scheme as an open competition, focusing oh single 
companies. The 1991 Evaluation Report o f the SMART Scheme (DTI, 199 lb) ; (the report contains 
39 pages and was drafted by DTI's Assessment Unit) usefully provides the background to the 
introduction of SMART (pp. I -2). The Report informs that the Scheme was launched in 1986 to 
stimulate innovative projects in start-ups and small firms. The idea for the scheme arose out of 
officials looking at the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme in the USA, a point 
which the author is able to confirm from information he picked up in the course o f his duties at 
DTI. However SMART was seen in differing from SBIR in several respects, particularly in respect 
o f the latter involving 11 US government departments and agencies whilst SMART was a purely 
DTI initiative. 
SMART is described as a 'competition' consisting of two competitive stages, which were referred 
to as Stage I and Stage II in the report. The term 'competition' was adopted as the scheme aimed to 
attract more applications than grants awarded. Entry into Stage II is limited to the winners of the 
first stage. The scheme was launched with a pilot competition involving 20 Stage I awards, with 
companies employing less than 200 staff being eligible for funding. In 1988 the scheme was 
expanded with a total o f 140 Stage I awards. The original target had been 100, but so many quality 
proposals had been received that the number was increased to the higher figure. Costs were 
reported as being around £9 Million (DTI, 199lb, pp. 1-2). 
The 1991 Evaluation Report shows a further three year programme costing £29 Mill ion was 
approved for the years 1989-91, with a target of 150 Stage I awards set for each year. To maximise 
the value of the scheme, the decision was taken to restrict eligibility for support to SMEs 
employing 49 or less staff. In 1990 officials felt the number of high quality applications had again 
increased, and the number of Stage I awards was raised from 150 to 180. Funding o f Stage I 
projects was at a level of 75% of project costs up to a level of £37,500, and for Stage II work 50% 
support was provided to a maximum of £50,000. These percentages and figures were maintained 
throughout the period covered by the Report (DTI, 1991b, pp. 1-2). Approximately 50% of Stage I 
winners received Stage 11 funding. 
The later 1994 version of the SMART evaluation (DTI, 1994a) (this report comprises 29 pages and 
again prepared by the department's Assessment Unit) provides further details pertaining to the 
development, operation, and the performance history o f the Scheme. A further round of funding 
was agreed for the three year period 1992-94. Funding levels continued at 75% and 50% for Stages 
I and I I respectively, but the limits were increased to a maximum grant o f £45,000 for Stage I 
awards, £60,000 for Stage I I . The target level o f Stage I awards, set at 180 in 1990, was maintained 
for the 1992-1994 period (DTI, 1994a). By the end of 1994, SMART had attracted 7356 
applications, and had made awards totalling £64.5 Million (pp. 1-2). 
E.3.1 Issue Identification: Rationale 
The 1991 SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1991b, p. 3) refers to the earlier SMART competitions 
being launched at a time of rapidly changing DTI policy (HMSO, 1988). The evaluation report 
comments that the development of rationale for SMART was subjected to several different 
87 
approaches during the 1988-89 period, but that the various versions do not vary greatly. The 
rationale for SMART was observed to be built round addressing the following market failures: 
"fl^ Smallfirms have particular difficulty raising finance because the stuns involved, while too 
large to raise against the security of personal assets, are smaller than those of interest to 
venture capital organisations. TJie latter rarely consider atiything wider about £200k. 
b) The capital market shows too little interest in high technology projects which are costly to 
assess, and of which they have little imderstanding. 
c) TJie market is excessively averse to the high risks attached to small, often start-up, firms 
putting forward innovative, back-from-the-market projects. However such firms and 
projects, when successful, are particularly profitable and beneficial to the economy. 
d) The market under-values the benefits likely to accrue to potential customers for SMART 
stimulated products. There will also be benefits from stimulation to both competitors and 
sub-contractors", 
(DTI, 1991b, p. 3) 
The 1991 ROAME statement highlights small firms facing problems in raising finance for 
innovative technological projects, (ROAME, 1991b, section B, paragraph 4), and for evidence o f 
these problems references the findings o f the evaluation report. The ROAME continues by 
repeating the evaluation findings (a) to (d) above. 
The report (DTI, 1991b) refers to the above rationale resting on the belief that small, high 
technology firms face disproportionate difficulty in raising finance. Rationale for SMART was 
seen as predicating that the scheme would be able to avoid the problem for some firms, and 
contribute removing it for all, by helping the providers of venture capital to appreciate the potential 
and be more willing to advance funds for small, high technology firms, (DTI, 1991b, p. 3). 
The 1994 SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1994a) lakes up the discussion. It proposes that 
evalualory work confirmed the credibility of the elements (a), (b), and (c) of the above rationale, 
(element (d) was not commented upon) but that "with hindsight for rationale for changing the 
climate for investment was probably unrealistic", (DTI, 1994a, p. 3). The report argues that for 
SMART to have changed the financial climate, the scheme would have had to demonstrate that 
financiers were missing good investment opportunities and therefore it would pay them to change 
their attitudes to all firms, not just the winners. This it did not do and the evaluation report 
concludes that there was no evidence of SMART successes having significantly changed the 
attitude of financiers towards investing in small, high technology firms (pp. 3-4, 16-17). 
The author wanted to establish the approaches adopted in establishing SMART^s original rationale. 
However he met with difficulty. The evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 1-2) refers to SMART 
having been launched during 1986. This, the author is able to state, was at a time prior to the 
introduction of ROAME statements, and he was therefore unable to inspect a ROAME to extract 
the required information. Secondly, with the passage of time, it was not possible to locate 
colleagues associated with the introduction o f the scheme. 
E.3.2 Issue Identification: Conceiving the Idea for SMART 
The author was however fortunate enough to be pointed by Mr. John Hobday (Director in DTI's 
Small Business Service) who had previous responsibility for SMART, in the direction o f Mr. Roy 
Evans. Evans, a PR9 and a member of the team currently responsible for the delivery of SMART, 
was able to report that while not involved at the beginning o f SMART, he had worked on the 
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scheme at a sufficiently early stage to be working with those officials involved with its launch He 
had learnt of the circumstances surrounding the introduction o f SMART from them. 
Evans reported that officials had visited the United States in the mid 1980s, to look at US policy on 
helping small firms. They were particularly taken by the operation of the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) programme. At this time the department was operating SFI, which 
tended to focus on the medium sized firms and the larger companies. SBIR in contrast, was aimed 
at smaller firms. The value of helping the smaller firms in terms of job and wealth creation had also 
been noted at the time, and in turn the benefits accruing from SBIR which was aimed at this sector. 
On this basis SMART was introduced to f i l l the perceived gap in DTI's programme provision. 
E.3.3 Aims and Objectives 
The following aims and objectives were set out for SMART in the ROAME statement:-
Aims: 
• "To contribute to a climate which encourages investment in highly innovative technology by 
individuals, firms andfinancial institutions". 
• " To encourage and facilitate the formation of viable and durable, science and technology-
based businesses". 
• "7b stimulate small firms to develop and market new science and technology-based products". 
(ROAME, 1991b, section C, paragraph 9) 
Objectives: 
• " To stimulate at least 25% more wortliwhile ideas per year meriting a Stage I award than there 
are awards available". 
• "^By the end of each Stage I f , to have caused at least 10% of Stage I winners in that competition 
to be viable small firms established or registered after winning". 
• "To stimulate at least one-third of Stage I winners to market a SMART derived- product within 
three years of getting the award". 
• "7b achieve ratings for 'value for money' and 'innovation' at least equal to those achieved in 
the J990 evaluation and on the same basis". 
(ROAME, 1991b, section C, paragraph 9). 
The ROAME (paragraph 5) highlighted the findings of the evaluation report (DTI , 1991b, pp. 11-
13) which had indicated the previous good, value for money realised in SMART, by the 
attributable profits exceeding the amount o f DTI assistance, (see also appendix K, section K.3.2.2). 
E.3.4 Delivery Mechanisms 
Pivotal to the operation of SMART was the use of grant funding to encourage firms to undertake 
R&D, the grants helping to offset factors such as risk and lack of finance, thereby helping to reduce 
the identified market failures (ROAME, 1991b, section A, paragraphs 1-3). 
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N.B. Indication that the 1991 ROAME was submitted to the IPC is provided in a minute 
dated 3 December 1991 from DTI to the Territorial SMART managers, which refers to 
proposals having been discussed by the IPC. A further minute dated 2 December 1991, 
from the head o f the Research and Technology Planning Directorate 3, requests approval 
from the Secretary o f State (SoS), for a further programme of SMART competitions. 
E.3.5 Programme Implementation 
Study o f the evaluation report (DTI, 1991b, pp. 2-3, 13-22, 1994a, pp. 2, 14-15) shows that Head 
Quarters DTI has overall responsibility for the management o f the SMART scheme and deals with 
policy matters. The former DTI Regional Offices (ROs), and currently the Government Offices 
(GOs), together with the former Scottish and Welsh Offices, and the Department o f Economic 
Development in Northern Ireland, are responsible for the administration of the scheme in their 
respective regions. The administration task involved overseeing the Stage I competitions inviting 
proposals and appointing winners, awarding and monitoring of grants - project progress and 
fmancial monitoring for both Stages I and 11. The 1991 evaluation report records most firms having 
reported that they had received at least two monitoring visits during their Stage i projects, from 
officials in the Regional Offices (1991b, p. 22). 
Initially the allocation of awards to each region was made on the basis o f population, but the need 
to respond to the needs of policy on regional assistance was also taken into account (DTI, 1994a, p. 
14). However latterly DTI awarded 20% of the grants based on quality factors. 
Mr. John Papworth (PR 10) of DTPs SME and Technology (SMET) Directorate, who has 
responsibility for administering SMART, was able to explain the process involved. DTI wished to 
monitor the quality o f assessment work carried out by the ROs. Each 'region' was asked to forward 
to departmental officials, two sets of case papers for successful applications, together with all those 
o f applicants put on the reserved list. Both sets of case papers are checked to ensure that assessment 
has been fair. 
In particular, the reserve list cases would be checked to see i f ROs had applied the acceptance 
criteria too tightly. Where DTI officials found instances o f applications which in their opinion 
should have been awarded a grant, the relevant RO would be told to reconsider its list o f reserve 
proposals. Simultaneously the RO would be allocated an additional 20% of funds to cover 
additional projects. 
The report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 14-15) refers to regional staff calling upon ofRcials in the various 
divisions and agencies within DTI, Research Establishments and other departments, to obtain 
specialist advice relating to technologies and markets in assessing proposals. However reference is 
made to staff in the regions "'finding it increasingly difficult to identify individuals within DTI to 
provide technical expertise in particular technology areas", (DTI, 1994a, p. 14). This observation 
is in line with those of others such as Dunleavy (1995, pp. 61-63), who highlighted the loss of 
access to expertise through successive reorganisations within government, (see chapter 3, section 
3.2.3 o f this thesis). 
The evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, p. 14) refers to calls for proposals being announced in January 
o f each year, which are closed in April. Awards are then made in the following September. The 
evaluators observe that inevitably delays in making awards can typically be up to one year, from 
the time of an applicant submitting a proposal. Interviews with scheme participants revealed that 
65% of respondents had experienced little or no difficulty with the delay, but that a substantial 
minority (35%) were presented with some serious problems. 
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E.3.6 Evaluation Method 
The evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 2-3) describes the evaluation method. The review was 
undertaken by the DTI Research and Technology Policy Assessment Unit, with the review strategy 
based on postal questionnaires sent to Stage I and I ! winners. A total o f 412 firms were contacted 
as a random sample out of a population o f 830. The sample comprised of three groups of firms; 
Stage I (1988 to 1992) and II winners, those involved in an earlier evaluation, and unsuccessful 
applicants. A response rate of 66% was achieved. 
In order to test the validity of the survey sample, that is that the information contained in the postal 
responses constituted a representative sample, the ROs were asked to provide information on 
projects which had displayed outstanding success. Face to face interviews were also conducted 
with Regional Office staff, and four with financiers. In addition the Review took into account the 
views expressed by people at presentations at financial fora, and at Regional Office SMART 
meetings. 
E.4 Support for Products Under Research Scheme 
The Support for Products Under Research (SPUR) scheme was introduced in 1991 with three years 
of funding. The budget was £32 Million (DTI , 1994b, p. I ) . An evaluation of the scheme was 
conducted in 1994 and the evaluation report (DTI, 1994b), (the Assessment Unit's SPUR report 
contains 17 pages) provides useful background to its operation. 
The overriding objective of SPUR was to encourage established SMEs to undertake more R&D. 
Like SMART, SPUR provided single company support to firms, but was targeted at funding 
projects which were the subject of significant technological advance. The selection criteria also 
required proposals to demonstrate a clear route to the market, to enhance the probability o f 
exploitation. Grant funding was provided at the fixed level of 30% of the total, eligible project 
costs to a maximum of £150,000. Projects were required to be of between 6 months and 3 years in 
duration. Unusually a minimum limit was set for the total projects costs. The limit was £50,000. 
This minimum limit helped differentiate SPUR from the SMART scheme, the intention with the 
former to target somewhat larger projects. Another aspect differentiating SPUR from SMART was 
the emphasis on established SMEs, rather than start-ups. 
E.4.1 Issue Identification: Rationale 
The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. 3-4) details the three principal elements o f the 
programme rationale. They were; 
Innovation - the particular importance o f the SME Sector's role in innovation was cited, which 
materially depends on them undertaking R&D. 
Finance - SMEs face greater difficulty in obtaining finance to fund R&D and the problems which 
they experience are larger than those experienced by larger firms. In consequence promising work 
is not undertaken, delayed, or is restricted in scale. Thus it was concluded that i f left to market 
forces alone, R&D undertaken in SMEs would be less than optimum. 
Risk - several components of risk were identified. SMEs it was considered, lack the range and 
scale of business activities which would enable losses on one project or business area to be offset 
by profits generated elsewhere. Financiers may be deterred from investing in R & D projects 
because they lack the necessary information and expertise to satisfactorily evaluate the risks 
involved. Participation in collaborative projects was seen as difficult for SMEs, because of their 
sensitivity to failure, and their inhibition to share knowledge. The higher costs associated with 
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collaborative R&D " W heavily upon them" (DTI, 1994b, p. 4). In summarising these market 
failures, the view was taken that lef\ to the decision processes of SMEs, R&D and in turn 
innovation would be inadequate to the detriment o f the economy as a whole. 
E.4.1.1 Identifying Market Failure 
The author again approached Mr. John Papworth who also had responsibility latterly for the 
running of SPUR in DTJ's SME and Technology (SMET) Directorate. Mr. Papworth was asked 
what lay behind the rationale for the programme. The author was informed that the reason for 
introducing SPUR was to 'plug the gap' lef^ by the withdrawal of the former SFI scheme. Mr, 
Papworth continued by explaining that SMART catered for the smaller SME, but not the medium 
sized company. 
A discussion with Mr. Peter Munday of D T r s Management Best Practice Directorate (MBP) 
provided some further insights. The launch o f SPUR was in reaction to a marked drop in project 
applications, following the decision to substantially withdraw from single company funding in 
1988 (HMSO, 1988, pp. 35-37). Following the decision officials experienced a significant fall in the 
numbers of project applications. Despite the offer of funding, many SMEs were found reluctant to join 
collaborative projects. Discussion with firms revealed that the inducement of grant funding was 
insufficient to overcome their suspicion of potential partners. This market problem demonstrated the 
need for single company support, to encourage SMEs to embark on R&D projects, and was cited as 
key to the rationale for introducing SPUR. Mr. Papworth concurred. 
The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b) supports the preceding observations. It makes reference 
to the changes in R&D support which were introduced in the late 1980s (HMSO, 1988, pp. 35-37). 
These it argued, ''had an unforeseen and disproportionate effect on SMEs", (DTI, 1994b, p. 4). 
Reference is made to the previous Support for Innovation (SFI) scheme, which had shown that 
significant benefits arose from supporting smaller firms. Additionality was considered more easily 
identifiable and higher with the SME projects, than in those supporting larger companies. 
E.4.2 Objectives 
As introduced above, the overall objective of SPUR was to encourage more small firms to 
undertake greater levels of R&D to develop new products and processes to benefit the UK 
economy (DTI, 1994b, pp. 9-14). Six specific objectives were quoted for SPUR. These are 
discussed below along what was achieved in practice. 
"Objective I: to support at least 60 projects in the first full year of the scheme and 150 projects 
annually by the third year which lead to significant advance", (DTI, 1994b, p. 9). 
111 projects were supported in the first year, which was well in excess of the target figure, with 
136 in year two. Sixty eight projects had been supported up to August 1993, and the evaluation 
report concluded that the target of 150 projects funded by year three end, was likely to have been 
achieved. 
"Objective 2: to stimulate at least £25 Mper year additional investment in R&D, which could not 
otherwise have occurred, by SMEs by the third year", (DTI, 1994b, p. 10). 
The evaluators reported that it was too early in the life of SPUR to assess performance against this 
objective. But at the time of the evaluation it was found that 63% of firms had increased their spend 
and R & D capability, as a result o f SPUR funding. 
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''Objective 3: at least 80 new products to be marketed successfully by firms (grant holders and 
other firms) within two years of the end of the initial three year scheme", 
(DTI, 1994b, p. 10). 
The object was likely to be met. Of the 199 firms which had responded to the questionnaire, 94 
stated their intention to have their products on the market by the end o f 1993. A further 72 expected 
their developments to be on the market by the end o f the following year. Of the 22 firms visited, 14 
already were marketing their products with six planning to launch theirs within a year. The 
evaluators commented on the effect which SPUR was having on speeding the release of products 
and processes into the market. 
"Objective 4: to generate additional profits in the companies supported, which when aggregated 
over the four years following the end of the project, amount to three times the granf\ (DTI, 1994b, 
p. 10). 
The assessment team suggested that it was too early to measure this objective. Companies, it was 
observed, tend not to identify profits generated from specific products. Nonetheless applicants were 
asked to provide estimates of increased turnover created as a result o f sales from the SPUR 
supported products, and the evaluators in turn estimated that profits were approximately twice that 
o f the grant values. On this basis progress was concluded to be reasonable. 
"Objective 5: 70% of projects should achieve most or all of their specified technical objectives", 
(DTI 1994b, p. 12). 
This objective was likely to be achieved. It was found that objectives were changed during the life 
o f the projects, often resulting in a better product. Only 22 of the 24 completed projects were 
visited, but all of these firms had achieved 75% of the objectives set. It was found that objectives 
were changed during the life of the projects, often resulting in a better product. That it is probable 
that the other firms would achieve a similar performance is indicated in the "Conclusions" of die 
SPUR report, where it is stated that SPUR would be likely to meet its specific objectives. 
"Objective 6: to streamline administrative procedures so that at least 75% of offers are made 
within 4 months of the date of the initial application", (DTI, 1994b, p. 12). 
Overall this objective was also met, and a tightening of the target from four to three months was 
recommended. 
In helping to ensure that the SPUR scheme was in practice addressing the needs o f the larger 
SMEs, and thus differentiating from SMART, the evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, p. 13) records 
that an additional objective was introduced by officials that 50% o f successful applicants be SMEs 
employing between 50 and 500 people. The postal responses suggested the meeting of this 
objective, with 53% of firms employing more than 50 staff. 
E.4.3 Delivery Mechanisms 
Similariy to the SMART scheme grant funding was pivotal to encouraging firms by reducing 
inhibiting factors, thus enabling them to commit to undertaking R & D and helping to negate the 
perceived market failures, (ROAME, 1990b, paragraph I ) . 
N.B. Evidence of the ROAME (1990b) being submitted to the IPC for approval is provided by the 
document being referenced as an IPC paper, that is IPC (90) 31. 
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E.4.4 Programme Implementation 
In England SPUR was delivered through DTI's Regional Offices whose function was to appraise 
applications against the eligibility criteria and award and pay grants on behalf of the department. In 
Scotland and Wales the Scottish Office Industry Department and the Welsh Office Industry 
departments did not have devolved authority to award grants, with appraisal papers passed with 
their recommendations to DTI HQ for authorisation (DTI , 1994b, p. I ) . A note giving a brief 
history of SMART, was handed to the author by a colleague (see also section E.4.5 below). The 
note recorded that during 1995, SMART Stage 2 was subsumed into SPUR. The author notes that 
the decision to integrate SPUR with SMART was in reaction to the recommendation of the SPUR 
evaluation (DTI, 1994b, p. 17), which suggested officials needed to consider the relationship 
between the two initiatives. (The 19.94 SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, p. 17), in its 
recommendations, suggested merging Stage I I o f SMART with SPUR). 
E.4.5 Evaluation Method 
The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. 2-3) sets out the evaluation strategy which was 
adopted. At 29 April 1993, 497 applications had been received o f which 292 had been approved, 
142 failed, and 63 still being processed. Twenty four had been completed. Because only a relatively 
small number of completed projects questionnaires were sent to the 232 cases which had received 
approval by 31 December 1992. The evaluation report argues that these projects had been 
underway sufficiently long for meaningful conclusions to be drawn (DTI, 1994b, p. 3). 
A similar questionnaire was posted to the 115 firms whose applications had been failed by the 31 
December date. Again it was thought sufficient time would have elapsed for these firms to have 
made decisions relating to the future for their original proposals, and thus able to answer the 
evaluators* questions. The results of the postal questionnaires was regarded as very good, the 
response rate for successful and unsuccessful applicants being 86% and 62% respectively. 
Twenty two of the 24 completed projects were 'visited' and face to face interviews conducted with 
company personnel. Programme managers in the ROs were also visited to obtain information 
relating to the administration of the scheme, to capture their experiences and gather their views on 
performance. 
During the evaluation the evaluators examined the levels of R & D funding and examples of where 
SPUR had stimulated additional R&D activity. The evaluation also looked at SMEs* funding 
arrangements to support R&D, and whether they had experienced difficulties in raising the required 
funds. 
Appendix K discusses good (and bad) practice in the developing and running of programmes. 
Section IC.2 looks at some general examples including experiences o f operating R & T 
programmes. Section K.3 focuses on the case study examples; sub-section K.3.2.1 analyses good 
practice in GICP programmes, K.3.2.2 good practice in running SMART, and sub-section K.3.23 
those in SPUR. An undated paper (based on the contents drafted around October 2000), 
summarising the history of SMART, which was passed to the author by a colleague (Mr Roy 
Evans), states that SMART Stage 2 was subsumed into SPUR, and the programme renamed SPUR 
Plus. In 1997, the new Smart scheme was introduced which incorporated the earlier SMART and 
SPUR initiatives. 
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APPENDIX F THE CONSULTANCY INITIATIVES 
F.1 introduction 
Introduced in 1988 the Consultancy Initiatives (CI) provided support to SMEs for consultancy 
projects. CI programme replaced, but was based on, several previous advisory schemes covering 
technology and business practice (Ernst & Young, 1990, p. I ) . The overriding aim of CI was to 
improve the quality o f management in small firms, and the support provided represented a major 
component of the government's strategy to improve the competitiveness of businesses. CI 
comprised of six discrete 'initiatives' which were collectively referred to as The Initiatives' by 
officials and those directly connected with the administration of the set of schemes. 
Six individual initiatives were supported under CI, these being the Business Planning Initiative 
(BP), Design Initiative (DES), Financial and Information Systems Initiative (FIS), Manufacturing 
Systems Initiative (MFR), Marketing Initiative (MKT) , and the Quality Initiative (QUA). Under CI 
independent firms or groups employing less than 500 people were eligible for grants for hiring 
consultants in specified, target areas of management (El, 1989, pp. 4-17). 
Chapter I , section I . I introduced CI, which was announced in the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, 
pp. 24-27). The white paper in referring to the immanent launch of the Enterprise Initiative, set out 
the governments intention to include a set of initiatives in El to support private sector consultancy 
projects, across a broad range of management functions. The white paper stated that £50 Mill ion 
was to be made available during the financial year I988/I989 to support these business 
development initiatives.'A target of supporting 1,000 projects per month was set for the financial 
year. The programme was closed on 15 September 1994 with the award of the last grant. 
F.2 Conceive and Test Validity of the Idea 
The author observed from conversations with colleagues, that the idea for the Consultancy 
Initiatives grew from two stimuli. Firstly, evaluation of previous advisory schemes had shown that 
deficiencies in SME management were continuing (see section F.3 below), suggesting that 
intervention should continue along similar lines. Secondly as discussed in appendix D, section D.3, 
the Secretary o f Slate Lord Young wanted DTI's programmes to be better co-ordinated in their 
delivery. This provided the impetus to bring the previously separate consultancy schemes together 
under one banner, the Consultancy Initiatives (CI). As activities to be included in CI were based on 
existing schemes, it was unnecessary to confirm the validity o f an idea. 
F.3 Development of Rationale 
The DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, pp. 24-25) provides the background to the rationale for 
introducing CI. The white paper refers to high quality management being essential to the 
competitiveness of businesses, who alone create a prosperous economy. Immediate action was seen 
as being needed to improve management skills. The white paper (HMSO, 1988) acknowledged that 
management skills can be improved by training, and referred to the wide range o f facilities 
available in organisations such as business schools and colleges. 
However it was pointed out that many SMEs face particular difficulty in using these facilities. 
Small firms normally cannot afford to let managers spend time away from the work place, and a 
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wide range of management skills is required to reside in a small number of individuals. SMEs it 
was argued, do not have the resources to undertake proper analysis and planned development of 
their businesses. The use of external, professional expertise to supplement existing management 
resources was seen as an immediate way of helping to overcome the problem (HMSO, 1988). 
The programme ROAME statement for CI (ROAME, 1988b) takes up the theme. It refers firstly to 
the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988) placing great importance on the need for effective business 
development (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph I . l ) . The ROAME suggests the following market 
failures being present, based on previous evaluations: 
"a) The levels of management competence in many firms is low compared to overseas competitors: 
h) levels of management education and training are low: and 
c) systems to take strategic decisions within firms are often non-existent", 
(DTI, 1988b, paragraphs 2.1-2.3). 
The author proposes that the above elements of market imperfection may be summarised as staff in 
SMEs, lacking the necessar>' management skills to manage business operations effectively, such that 
they are competitive in the market place, (see chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.2). 
The CI ROAME statement continued by noting that in addition SMEs tend not to hire in external 
expertise to help make good their lack o f management expertise. The ROAME also highlighted that 
while expert ser\'ices existed in the market place, market imperfections existed which prevented 
their use by small firms. Firstly there was a general lack o f information about the availability of the 
services. Secondly SMEs perceived consultants as being expensive and their ser\'ices of limited 
relevance to them. In short, they represented poor value for money in the eyes of many small 
companies. 
The CI ROAME (DTI, 1988b, paragraphs 2.1-2.3) describes how the market failures were 
identified. In the case of CI this was, as mentioned above, substantially one o f demonstrating the 
continuation of previously identified problems. The ROAME refers to the above propositions being 
derived from the results of a previous evaluation of earlier advisory schemes operated by DTI. In 
particular operation of the previous Business Improvement Services (BIS), Business and Technical 
Advisor)' Ser\'ices (BTAS), the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) and Micro-
electronics Awareness Programme (MAP) were cited. The evaluations had demonstrated that few 
firms were aware of the net gain which could be obtained through the use of consultants, but those 
who had experienced their use had found consultants help to have been valuable. A good degree o f 
additionality had also been demonstrated, and the schemes had exhibited considerable benefits to 
both applicant firms and the economy. 
An inter\'ie\v was conducted by the author with Mr. Philip Sowden [lnter\'iew 8] o f PERA 
International, who was responsible for managing the previous BTAS scheme, and under CI the 
Manufacturing and Quality initiatives. He was able to provide some interesting insights 
surrounding the development of CI. Mr. Sowden referred to Lord Young's observations that DTI's 
schemes had been its 'best kept secret'! He then described the background leading to the design o f 
CI. Formation of CI was substantially a process of absorbing the previous advisory schemes. These 
schemes had been *topic' orientated, focusing on a particular, manufacturing business discipline. 
They had been developed at a lime when officials were concerned with mounting a response to the 
success of Japanese industr>', which was seen as arising from their use of Advanced Manufacturing 
TechnoIog>' (AMT) such as robotics. 
As lime progressed, the need to take account o f the management issues in applying new 
technologies had been realised. Too many instances had been reported by officials, when visiting 
companies, of seeing equipment purchased and commissioned with previous DTI support lying 
idle. This Sowden argued, was because no consideration had been given as to how individual 
implementations should be interfaced with other manufacturing systems. For example, machiner>' 
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interfacing with a robot arm has to work to closer tolerances than when working with a human 
operator. People position work where they see the machine requires it. Robots, not normally fitted 
with visionary sensors at the time, had to rely on work being placed within a well defined area. 
Management needed to take into account the operating characteristics of all equipment when 
setting up an FMS facility. As a result, addressing the management issues within supported 
consultancy projects was introduced with CI. 
From discussion with colleagues in the normal course o f his duties, the author is able to confirm 
Mr. Sowden's observations. The author would go further, observing that officials were also 
concerned with firms improving their management skills across the entirety of business functions 
(HMSO, 1988, p. 24), and taking a more holistic, strategic view of their operations. Furthermore 
the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988) emphasised the then government's desire to help the broad 
spectrum of SMEs, rather than focusing solely on those operating in the manufacturing sectors. It is 
o f interest to note that in the 'Quality Initiative', a significant proportion of firms supported lay 
outside manufacturing, (approximately 30% of certifications were in the service sector), (PERA, 
1992, pp. 17-18). 
CI was based on the earlier advisory schemes and its elements were targeted at improving 
management in similar business areas, but developed to refiecl the requirement for firms to take 
account of the wider management issues [Interview 8], Rationale for the continued targeting o f 
these areas was based on evaluation of the earlier advisory schemes, which had demonstrated 
persistence of problems and the value of their amelioration. The CI ROAME refers to CI being 
designed to focus the attention o f SMEs on specific areas o f management, which i t argued 
contribute to competitiveness and growth. 
Inspection of the C! ROAME shows the areas targeted were 'Marketing', *Design\ ^Quality', 
'Management (of manufacturing systems)', 'Business Planning', and the introduction of'Financial 
and Information Systems', (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 2.7. Reading of the ROAME also reveals 
the shift in emphasis towards encouraging firms to become more strategic in managing their 
businesses. For example under 'Marketing' the CI ROAME refers to the strategic nature of this 
topic over and above its singular components, 'Design' as being strategically important to market 
success, and 'Business Planning' as providing a framework in which marketing objectives can be 
set. 
F.4 Delivery Strategy 
The CI ROAME (DTI, 1988b) quotes the delivery strategy for CI as: 
"7b raise the level of management performance in key fimctions in SMEs by subsidising the greater 
use of outside consultant services", 
(DTI, 1988b, paragraph 4.1). 
Officials argued that the continued market failure o f firms being suspicious of the value of 
consultants, meant that SMEs would probably only embark on consultancy projects under CI i f 
they received cash grants, (paragraphs 1.1-1.2, 2.1-5.1). The CI ROAME (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 
2.3) referred to the evaluations also showing that the previous schemes had provided evidence of 
the mechanism of subsidising consultancy, to be effective in influencing firms attitudes towards the 
use of consultants. The large majority o f applicants had indicated their intentions to use specialised, 
outside help again, at the f i i l l economic rate, that is, without grant fijnding. Officials therefore 
concluded that the mechanism of providing subsidised consultancy was an effective strategy for 
reducing the identified market failures. Subsidised consultancy was therefore used to encourage 
firms to commit to projects for change. 
The previous advisory schemes had demonstrated sufficient additionality to justify continued 
funding at a level of 50% of the consultancy fees (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 2.3, El , 1989, p. 4). 
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However the CI ROAME records how feedback from Regional Directors (senior civil servants 
employed in DTI's then Regional Offices), together with the experience of operating the earlier 
schemes, had indicated that firms in the nationally aided areas typically made less use of 
consultancy services, (paragraph 2.4). A higher level of support o f two thirds was therefore argued 
as being justified. The ROAME refers to agreement having been reached with the European 
Commission (EC) to finance the additional grant spend from out o f the EC's European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). 
The-CI ROAME described how the market failure of there being insufficient information available 
on the services provided by the sources o f help, would be addressed (see chapter 5, sub-section 
5.2.4.1). The ROAME described the aim of the delivery strategy as being also to "^encourage the 
spread of best practice by increasing the awareness among non-assisted firms of the cost 
effectiveness of consultancy services by encouraging a demonstration effect through emulation of 
those who have successfully improved their management strategy" (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 4.2). 
The ROAME went on to say how publicity would form an integral part o f CI delivery, which is 
discussed further in section F.9 below. 
The CI ROAME refers to the evaluations of the previous advisory schemes as recommending that 
ways be found to increase the penetration of consultancy into the SME base, to secure a permanent 
change in attitudes towards the use of outside help. The strategy adopted in CI was to meet this 
goal through use of the 'demonstrator effect'. The intention was to create a sufficiently large 
number o f firms who had experienced the benefits of using consultants, such that through their 
contact with managers in other businesses generally, these companies on witnessing 'success' 
would be encouraged to hire consultants themselves, at the fu l l market rate. In employing the 
demonstrator effect, officials were exploiting the natural desire o f people to emulate their peers. 
Experience drawn from operating the previous advisory schemes had shown the need for better 
definition of projects to be undertaken, prior to their start (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 2.4). In response, 
the CI ROAME (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 5.2) specified the introduction of'Business Reviews', 
undertaken by 'Enterprise Counsellors' to scope project work (SQW, 1992, pp. 2-3). The business 
reviews and the role of the 'Enterprise Counsellors' is discussed later under 'Programme 
Implementation', in section F.8. 
F,5 Setting Objectives 
The CI ROAME (DTI, 1988b, paragraphs 6.1-6.12) describes the setting of CI's objectives. The 
ROAME (paragraph 6.1) refers to the requirement to meet the DTI White Paper's objectives o f 
completing 1,000 assisted consultancies per month during the financial year 1988/89, rising to 
around 1,500 in 1990/91 (HMSO, 1988, p. 25). The ROAME compared these more stringent 
figures with the target set for the preceding advisory schemes, o f 350 per month. A total o f 45,000 
consultancies were to be completed by March 1991. By setting these targets the ROAME explained 
that it was intended to achieve a market penetration rate for CI o f about 3% of the eligible firms. 
This target was set in response to recommendations o f the eariier advisory scheme evaluations, 
which had recommended a target figure be set as the first step in achieving the demonstrator effect. 
The estimate of 1.2 Million as the total number o f eligible firms was derived from the V A T 
Register at December 1986 (CSO, 1986). 
Targets were also set for the number of applications and the business reviews, by working back 
from the target numbers of completed projects. Experience of running the previous advisory 
schemes had shown there to be attrition at each stage o f the project approval process. Based on 
previous experience targets o f 1,250 and 1,875 business reviews per month were set for the 
numbers of business reviews for 1989/90 and 1990/91 respectively, with the number of 
applications to be between two and three limes these figures. 
99 
The fact that firms complete their consultancy projects does not prove their value. Value stems 
from the benefits perceived by the recipients o f grant funding. In CI officials sought to measure 
value by asking the Enterprise Counsellors to capture the firm's perceptions of the value o f their 
projects. In the light of operating the previous advisory schemes officials set targets for customer 
satisfaction as follows: 
"(a) more than 75% of users will rate the schemes as representing value for money; 
(b) more than 65% of users will or plan to implement the recommendations arising from 
their consultancy; 
(c) more than 40% of users citing additional ity will intend to use external advice in the 
future at full tnarket rates", 
(DTI, 1988b, paragraph 6.4). 
The obvious objective of any scheme must be to reduce the market failures which it is designed to 
address. Targets are set such as to render the net effect on market failure visible. Inspection of these 
targets shows that they were set such that i f met, a reasonable reduction o f problems could be seen 
to have been achieved, (b) relates to the number o f firms implementing their consultants' 
recommendations by way of indicating improvement in management systems, (c) measures the 
proportion of companies which would be prepared to hire consultants at the market rate, as an 
indicator of changed attitudes to their use. That the 'Initiatives' had achieved value for money was 
in part assessed by (b) which looks for most firms perceiving their consultancy projects to have 
been o f value. 
F.6 Programme Monitoring 
The CI ROAME DTI (1988b, paragraph 5.2) and the companion document setting out the 
monitoring strategy (ROAME, 1988c) set out the arrangements for programme monitoring. The 
ROAME (ROAME, 1988c) staled that the monitoring strategy would be implemented substantially 
through the scheme's administrative procedures, (paragraphs 3.1-9.0). The details are given below. 
The ROAME describes the objectives o f 'Monitoring' to include measuring progress of CI against 
targets, to check the effectiveness o f budget management, to provide information on programme 
efficiency, and directly and indirectly through 'Evaluation', to inform the process o f policy 
formation. In the case of 'Evaluation', the CI ROAME informs that the monitoring strategy wil l 
provide an input to the task by: 
'Y*^  ) providing data on firms receiving business reviews and consultancy; 
(b) offering bases for survey sampling; 
(c) the analysis of business review questionnaires and of business review reports; 
(d) providing data on Enterprise Counsellor's, consultantsandfirms' expectations of the 
benefits of consultancy projects; 
(e) qualitative reporting on business reviews and consultancy projects; 
( f ) tracking research on increasing awareness among firms of the importance of management 
functions and the benefits of consultancy'\ 
(DTI, 1988c, paragraph 9.0). 
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In a conversation with the author, Sowden confirmed that quarterly progress meetings were held 
with DTI officials. During these meetings topics such as project through-put, quality in terms of 
firms' reactions to their projects, and financial, including programme spend and forecasting, were. 
discussed, Sowden also confirmed that progress meetings were similarly held with the other 
scheme contractors, and that the contractors were brought together eyery six months to discuss best 
practice. Over and above making use of existing administrative procedures to collect data, 
'Monitoring' also employed external contractors to undertake activities such as market research 
(SQW, 1992, p. 6). 
F.7 ROAME Approval 
The CI ROAME was submitted to and approved by the Individual Programmes Committee (IPC), 
as indicated by the document being identified as an IPC paper, IPC (88) 69. The author observes 
that approval was assured because the planned initiatives would fu l f i l l the policies o f the DTI 
White Paper, with its emphasis on the need for more effective business development. The approval 
path also took in ministers, H M Treasury and the European Commission, as confirmed by a 
colleague, Mr John Oakley. 
F.8 Programme Implementation 
The CI ROAME and the fourth (and final) evaluation report on CI (SQW, 1992) (the Segal Quince 
Wicksteed report contains 92 pages) sets out the administrative arrangements for running the CI 
programme, (pp. 2-4). The programme was operated by the Enterprise Initiative Division (El 
Division) of DTI, and administered through the Enterprise Units located in DTI's regional and 
satellite offices, (ROAME, 1988b, paragraph 5.3). For each of the six initiatives, day-to-day 
management was undertaken by a scheme contractor who appraised funding applications and 
managed the grants, (SQW, 1992, p. 3). Discussion with colleagues showed that the scheme 
contractors were appointed on the basis that they had run the previous advisory schemes 
effectively. Competitive tendering was not employed. 
Assistance was available to firms operating in most business sectors including the service 
industries. A few sectors such as agriculture were excluded as these were supported by other 
government departments. Under CI, independent firms, or groups of companies who employed less 
than 500 people were normally eligible for assistance. SMEs could apply for funding under any o f 
the initiatives. In the early phases o f the programme companies were eligible to receive up to two 
grants, selected from one or any nvo of the initiatives. From April 1991 onwards eligibility was 
reduced to one grant per applicant (SQW, 1992, pp. 2-4). The CI ROAME records how the 
previous evaluation o f the earlier advisory schemes had also recommended greater flexibility in the 
length of projects. Officials decided on a strategy o f allowing applicants to have support for 
consultancy projects o f duration between 5 and 15 days. 
CI was delivered in three stages (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 5.2), (SQW, 1992, pp. 2-3). The purpose 
of each stage is now discussed, based on inspection o f the CI ROAME statement (DTI, 1988b) and 
the final programme evaluation report (SQW, 1992). 
Stage 1, Business Reviews - Companies sent their applications for assistance to dedicated 
Enterprise Units in the regional DTI offices, where they were vetted to ensure that basic eligibility 
criteria were met. The Enterprise Units then arranged for an Enterprise Counsellor to visit the 
applicant and undertake a strategic business review. The Enterprise Counsellor's were experienced 
business people, recruited from commerce and retained by DTI. The author was informed by 
colleagues that many individuals had experience o f running their own businesses, or had held 
senior positions within companies. 
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For the business reviews the counsellor spent up to two days with the firm at no cost to the 
apphcant. The business reviews were introduced in response to the perceived need lo better define 
project work (see section F.4 above). In conjunction with the company, the Enterprise Counsellors 
prepared a report which: 
• Recommended whether the company was likely to benefit from a consultancy, and if so, which 
initiative was the most appropriate, and what subject matter should be covered. The final choice 
of initiative was left to the applicant, but discussed with the Enterprise Counsellors in the light 
of the business review. The mechanism of using Enterprise Counsellors had a further advantage. 
Colleagues reported to the author that the Enterprise Counsellors often undertook the first step 
in helping SMEs, by identifying actions which firms could take immediately to improve their 
businesses. 
• Assessed the company's abilit>' lo pay their share of the estimated project costs. 
• Made recommendations for participation in other schemes within EI - (signposting). 
Stage 2, Selecting a Consultancy - The scheme contractors who were seen as independent 
agencies in the selection process, matching the needs of firms consultancy projects to suitable 
consultants. To support client-consultancy matching the scheme contractors maintained lists of 
consultancies, deemed as being qualified to undertake work within CI. The management role of the 
scheme contractors was also to ensure that proper terms of reference were set for consultancy work, 
to negotiate consultancy fees, to monitor the quality of project work, and ensure that projects were 
completed on time. 
Sowden [lnter\'iew 8] was particularly helpful in providing detailed insights into the day to day 
administration of CI. The process began with the business review reports being sent to the 
applicant, the local Enterprise Unit and the scheme contractor managing the initiative 
recommended. The local Enterprise Unit approved the grant towards the cost of a consultancy, and 
forwarded details of the Enterprise Counsellor's recommendations to the scheme contractor. 
Sowden explained that the scheme contractors maintained a database of the details of consultants 
who had proved their professional fitness to undertake work within the scheme. Each consultancy 
organisation requesting listing filled in an application form, detailing resident skills, the length of 
time the organisation had been trading, (a minimum of two years), and four client references. The 
minimum period of two years for trading could be reduced to one year, i f the head of the 
consultancy had worked as a senior partner in a previous position for a minimum of five years. 
Scheme contractors also requested project reports on work carried out for clients, and interviewed 
senior partners lo substantiate the quality of their work and assess their capabilities. 
Following the receipt of a business review, the scheme contractor then telephoned the SME about 
its project. I f a firm had a particular consultancy in mind, the scheme contractor would check the 
database to see whether it was listed. If not, or i f the applicant had no consultancy in mind, the 
name of three listed organisations were put fonvard from which the firm chose a consultancy. Fee 
rates, agreed with each consultancy and held on the database, were passed with consultancy details 
to the applicants. The scheme contractor sought to provide a consultancy with experience 
appropriate to the proposed project, and geographically near to the applicant. Although firms were 
responsible for selecting their consultants, scheme contractors unofficially provided guidance for 
the few firms who needed help. 
After an SME advised the scheme contractor of their choice, the contractor asked the consultancy 
to draft a proposal based on the Enterprise Counsellor's visit report. The proposal echoed back the 
recommendations of the counsellor (so checking that the consultant understands what is required), 
which was followed by a description of the work to be carried out. The scheme contractor vetted 
the drafts, recommending modifications as necessary. The final version of the project proposal was 
agreed with the applicant who sent a letter of authorisation to the scheme contractor. 
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Following amhorisaiion, the scheme contractor would raise an order with the consultancy for DTI's 
share o f the costs, (the gram). The contract was between the scheme contractor and the consultancy 
organisation. Separately the applicant would raise a contract with the consultant for his share of the 
consultancy fees. 
On completing the project the consultants prepared a report, copies of which were forwarded to the 
client firm and scheme contractor (SQW, 1992, p. 4). The scheme contractor checked that the 
project's terms of reference were met and the work undertaken represented good value. The 
scheme contractor also asked the applicant i f its consultancy had been satisfactorily completed, and 
recorded the performance on the database. In this way the performance of each consultancy was 
tracked, so that those giving poor service could be de-listed. The tracking mechanism was also used 
to build up specialism profiles of the listed consultants. 
Sowden was again helpful in highlighting the advantages seen as arising out of these contractual 
arrangements. The scheme contractor had a controlling influence over the consultancies. The 
potential grant monies which a consultancy could receive was large, but at the discretion of the 
scheme contractor. Thus good performers could be rewarded, while bad organisations could be 
brought into line by withholding monies where SMEs were dissatisfied, or cut out completely for 
consistently bad performance! 
The final evaluation report (SQW, 1992, p. 4) shows how the copies of the consultants reports were 
also forwarded to the Enterprise Units for checking. Payment of DTPs share of the project costs 
was triggered by both the scheme contractor and the Enterprise Unit being satisfied with the 
outcome of consultancy work. The firms were independently responsible for paying their share. 
Stage 3, Post Completion Visits - Following completion of project work, it was arranged for the 
enterprise counsellor to then make a post-completion visit. This final visit aimed to add value to the 
consultancy, by discussing with the firm their plans for implementing the recommendations 
contained in their report, and assessing the likely impact on the business. The visits also provided 
an additional opportunity to monitor a consultant's performance, and contribute to assessing thai o f 
CI as a whole, by obtaining the company's perception of the value of its consultancy exercise (DTI, 
1988b, paragraph 5.2, ROAME, 1988c, paragraph 6), (SQW, 1992, p. 4). 
The Enterprise Initiative introductor>' booklet (DTI, 1989, pp. 10-20), shows that a number of 
different types of organisation were appointed as scheme contractors. As already indicated, PERA 
were responsible for operating the Manufacturing Initiative. PERA were also awarded 
responsibility to administer the Quality Initiative, but in collaboration with Salford University 
Business Services Limited who were assigned responsibility for running the initiative in the North 
West of England. The Charted Institute of Marketing administered the Marketing Initiative, 3i 
Enterprise Support Limited the Business Planning and Financial Infomiation components, and the 
Design Council the Design Initiative. 
F.9 Promote Programme 
The CI ROAME had referred to the previous evaluation of the earlier advisor>' schemes, as 
recommending that specific steps should be taken to secure permanent change in the attitudes of 
SME managers towards using external sources of help. It was proposed that a target penetration 
rate of firms be specified, which i f achieved would create a sufficient number of SMEs which 
would act as a critical mass to motivate others to hire consultants at market rates. 
Appendix D, section D.4, discussed the promotion of EI, and as part o f this activity CI also. By 
promoting CI, firms' awareness of consultancy services was also increased. The CI programme 
ROAME statement (DTI, 1988b, paragraphs 5.4-5.5) provides more detail on the promotion of CI . 
Described as an integral part of the scheme, the campaign acted as the mechanism to overcome the 
market failure of insufficient information being available to SMEs. on the availability of help and 
the value of employing these sources of aid. Thus the campaign acted as the initial step in raising 
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the quality o f management in firms. An underlying objective o f adopting this mechanism was to 
also stimulate demand for consultancy, based on firms paying the fu l l (unsubsidised) price for their 
consultancies. 
The CI ROAME also pointed to another way in which CI was promoted. It highlighted the ability 
of firms to receive grants being limited to two consultancy projects as a key promotional feature. 
Limiting the number o f grants maintained pressure on the marketing agency to bring forward new 
firms who normally would not have sought external help. In so doing the campaign would also 
serve to improve the overall additionality of CI. During a separate discussion with Sowden, he 
reported that the consultants themselves helped to promote CI. In their normal day to day contact 
with firms they would identify SMEs who would benefit from a consultancy project, and advise 
them of the assistance provided under CI. In this way potential projects were identified, a process 
that was referred to a 'seeding'. 
Under CI an information booklet containing details of each of the component initiatives and how 
people could apply for funding, was produced (EI, 1989). The booklet was circulated to firms 
requesting details of the scheme. In operating CI, officials found that listed consultants would 
themselves promote the 'Initiatives', motivated by the sales opportunities created by the advertising 
campaign (SQW, 1992, annex A, paragraph 11). 
F.10 Close Programme 
Inspection of papers held on file shows that the Consultancy Initiatives were due to be closed on 31 
March 1994, but on 9 December 1993 the President had announced that a further 10,000 
applications would be accepted under the scheme. This quota had been met by September 1994 and 
the last application was received on 15 September 1994. Inspection of the 'files' shows that closure 
was announced through a 'press release' which advised that the role o f CI was now covered by the 
Consultancy Brokerage Service (CBS), which was operated through the Business Links. 
Colleagues informed the author that formal notice of the closure of CI was given through a planted. 
Written Parliamentary Question (see also chapter 7, section 7,8) immediately prior to the 
announcement of a further 10,000 projects being funded. The additional number o f applications 
were announced as a result o f the arrangements to replace CI with CBS being delayed. 
F,11 Evaluation Strategy 
Evaluation of the CI programme was undertaken by Segal Quince Wicksteed (SQW). In their final 
report of CI (SQW, 1992, pp. 8-13) which covers the operation of the intervention from its launch, 
SQW state the objectives of evaluation as being to: 
• assess how well CI has met its objectives; 
• provide information allowing value for money to be assessed; 
• indicate where changes in the delivery of CI may be necessary. 
In the case of the last, SQW recorded that the overall delivery approach had remained substantially 
unchanged. 
The evaluation report SQW (1992, pp. 8-12) described the methodologies employed and their 
rationale. Evaluation was based on surveys conducted on face to face interviews with what are 
referred to as two panels (samples) of assisted firms. Each sample comprised firms who had 
completed their consultancy projects. 
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The first panel involved early applicants, who were initially interviewed in late 1988 and early 
1989. The aim of conducting this first panel was to provide early feedback on any problems with 
the performance and administration of the scheme, so that corrective action could be taken quickly. 
For each initiative a sample o f 35 *high assistance firms' and 35 Mow assistance companies' were 
identified at random. The figure of 35 was regarded to be sufficient to accommodate any 
subsequent drop out of firms required for the second interview. The size o f the total sample was 
420 cases. 
The second panel, which comprised firms who applied approximately one year later, allowed the 
possible effects o f bias in the initial panel to be corrected. It was felt that the first sample might 
have been untypical. Early users of the scheme may have included the more dynamic firms, or 
those who already had consultancy projects in mind and would have gone ahead with these 
irrespective of grant funding. Such cases would represent very low or even zero additionality. 
For both panels, a sample of firms were interviewed shortly after completing their projects, 
followed by a second interview of essentially the same sample, between one or two years later. The 
first interview assessed the immediate impact of the programme. Recognising that many 
participating firms might not have implemented, or have not yet decided to implement, the 
recommendations of their consultancies at this stage, the second interview was conducted to assess 
the longer term impact of CI, in terms of the actions eventually taken as a result o f the scheme. 
The findings of evaluation are discussed in appendix K, which discusses the good practice lessons 
which can be drawn from the programmes researched as part of this thesis. Section K.2 looks at 
some general examples, with section K.3.3 focusing on the operation of the Consultancy Initiatives. 
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APPENDIX G T H E MANAGING IN T H E 90S P R O G R A M M E 
G.I Introduction 
Managing into the '90s (M90s) was an awareness programme aimed at improving the performance 
of companies by encouraging them to adopt best practice in managing their businesses. Best 
practice was promoted via mechanisms such as seminars, presentations, videos, and written 
material. After first making firms aware o f *the need', the programme's second objective was to 
encourage companies to commit to projects for lasting change. For M90s best practice was 
interpreted as adopting a co-ordinated approach to company management, with a management 
strategy developed to allow the company to respond effectively to the demands set by the market 
drivers. 
M90s thus differed fundamentally from previous awareness programmes, where individual 
business topics had been treated substantially in isolation. Earlier schemes also tended to restrict 
activities to showing firms 'why' they should adopt best practice, without showing them *how' 
they could embark on projects for change. M90s went further by showing firms how to improve 
their competitiveness. 
Inspection of the programme ROAME statements (ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 8, 1991a, paragraph 
12) show that M90s was targeted mainly, but not exclusively, at manufacturing SMEs (DTI , 1995, 
p. 9). It was a phased programme with each phase intended to cover a period of approximately 3 
years. The first phase, entitled Managing into the 90s, was launched in early 1989. The second 
phase started in April 1992 under the modified title Managing in the 90s. Expenditure of Phase 1 
was projected to be £3.3M a year, with expenditure in the first year o f Phase 2 estimated to be 
beuveen £3.0M and £3.2M. 
Evidence for describing the processes involved in M90s were gathered through conversations with 
colleagues, including Dr. Draper (Grade 6) who had overall responsibility for M90s and who was 
the author's line manager, plus information gathered in contract meetings, file documents and 
interviews. 
G.2 Issue Identification: Phase 1 
G.2.1 Conception and Validation of the Idea: Phase 1 
Before the launch o f M90s in 1988, the department operated several awareness activities covering 
topics such as manufacturing and quality. These schemes were operated autonomously by the DTI 
divisions responsible. One of these schemes was the Towards Integration (Tl) programme, which 
aimed to raise firms' awareness of the need to integrate computer based systems such Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM), Shortly after the publication of 
the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988) officials sought ministers' approval to extend funding for the 
scheme [Interview 5]. Approval was not forthcoming. To extend the T l activity in isolation was 
contrary to government policy as set out in the white paper, which had stated the aim to co-ordinate 
DTI's services to business. The Secretary of State therefore rejected officials' request. 
The Secretary of State's rejection prompted the bringing together of DTI's awareness activities, 
under a single umbrella programme. That programme was M90s, which served to integrate the 
previously separate activities. 
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After the rejection of the T l proposals, the Heads o f the divisions running the existing awareness 
activities met to examine the viability o f bringing them together as a cohesive set o f initiatives. The 
meeting found the idea practical and formed the M90s Steering Group to oversee the development 
and operation of the new programme. Membership of the Committee comprised o f representatives 
at Grade 5 or 6 levels drawn from each participating division that was responsible for awareness 
activities- The DTI North East Regional Office also provided a member to represent the interests o f 
all the departmental 'Regional Offices'. The committee was responsible for the development, 
implementation and review of all M90s activities. 
The make-up of the M90s committee ensured individual divisional interests were represented, and 
facilitated access to a wide range of the department's corporate expertise in running awareness 
programmes. When planning activities, officials would therefore be able to draw on wide set o f 
experience. 
G.2.2 Development of Rationale: Phase 1 
Rejection of proposals for extending the old Towards Integration programme had caused delay, and 
with the programme about to end, M90s planning had therefore to be undertaken in haste. Pressures 
now existed to obtain approval quickly, in order to maintain continuity of the previous activities. 
As a result, a significant proportion of M90s development took place after the programme was 
launched [Interview 5]. Hence the development of Phase 1 of the programme did not follow the 
usual sequence described in chapter 6, section 6.3 of this thesis. 
The case for introducing the first phase was set out in the programme ROAME statement 
(ROAME, 1988a, paragraphs 1-7). The ROAME began arguing the rationale by referring to there 
being substantial evidence which indicated the importance for firms in achieving competitive 
advantage, o f factors such as design, quality, manufacturing, management, good purchasing 
policies, and for these to be managed in conjunction with each other as part of an integrated, 
corporate strategy. The ROAME then drew attention to there being still too few firms who 
recognised the importance of these facts, and then acted upon them. 
Several examples o f the nature o f problems were quoted. The M90s ROAME suggested that too 
much emphasis was placed on technology in isolation, to the exclusion of the substantial benefits 
which might be realised from changes in the organisation of manufacture and its connection with 
other business systems. In the area of purchasing, the ROAME identifies firms as adopting simply 
a 'cheapest is best' policy to ordering. Quality is often implemented piecemeal, with firms doing 
the minimum necessary to obtain accreditation from those they supply, and not moving on to 
continuous quality improvement. In summary, few firms were performing well in all functional 
areas, and most were failing to manage them as part of an overall, corporate strategy. 
It was then argued that previous awareness campaigns operated by DTI had helped increase 
recognition of the importance of the above factors, but they had tended to focus on raising 
awareness of the issues; that is the reason *why' action is required, rather than 'how* to take 
corrective action. The department had not helped itself by operating its awareness schemes in 
isolation from each other. Thus, the ROAME (ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 4) continued, market 
imperfections remained. 
G.2.2.1 Identiiying Market Failure 
The M90s Phase I ROAME (ROAME, 1988a, paragraphs 5-6) indicates how the evidence o f 
market failure was derived. Reference is made to statements in the DTI White Paper which related 
evidence o f individual firms failing to develop their management competencies, which is not 
helped by the lack o f information. (The author notes that these references were also cited in the CI 
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ROAME statement (ROAME, 1988b). It was stated that market forces alone were not expected to 
bring about the necessary improvement in the quality o f management in SMEs. This observation, 
coupled with the paper's reference to DTI's role in spreading awareness, was seen as justifying 
intervention with M90s. 
The ROAME (ROAME, 1988a) also recognised that whilst the DTI White Paper had highlighted 
the importance o f Design, Quality, and Manufacturing Systems to competitiveness, no mention had 
been made regarding the purchasing function (paragraph 6). However the ROAME related how, 
following the publication of the white paper in January 1988, the Secretary o f Slate had agreed 
with officials that 'Purchasing' was o f sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in M90s. 
From his experience of involvement with M90s activities and discussions with colleagues, (see also 
Interview 5), the author is able to provide insights into how other sources of evidence were 
employed in developing the programme's rationale. These sources contributed to the weight of 
evidence referred to in the Phase 1 ROAME. 
Evidence that firms were not using good practice was collected from several sources. The Advisory 
Council for Applied Research and Development (ACARD) report New OpportimUies in 
Mainifacturing: Tfte Management of Technology (ACARD, 1983, pp. 46-48) found that few 
companies had applied A M T t o their manufacturing process as an integral part o f business strategy, 
and that the level of training was low (ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 5). 
ACARD's findings were reinforced by the results o f an inlemal study conducted by officials. The 
author located a copy of the interim report o f the study on a DTI file. Inspection o f the report 
Matmfactiiring Management, Interim Report ( M A M , 1988), showed it to have revealed a low level 
o f systems integration. Over a period of about two months, officials interviewed manufacturing 
companies selected from the Towards Integration Demonstration Firms Scheme, software 
suppliers, research associations, and consultants. Few firms were found to have implemented 
production methodologies such as Just-in-Time (JIT), and the majority remained inward-looking, 
and relied on their reputation to secure new business. 
In cases where business operations were being integrated firms were beginning to gain significant 
benefits. Experience of operating the MAP advisory scheme had shown that firms emphasised the 
technology, without integrating their business operations. Few firms understood the need to take 
the wider view or knew how to plan strategically. 
Awareness within DTI that a lack of knowledge in firms was constraining better management grew 
as a result o f officials listening to questions asked in the seminars run under the Towards 
Integration (awareness) programme. Questions showed firms were unaware of the benefits accruing 
from the adoption o f best practice, and did not know how to implement exemplar methodologies. 
In the case of the former, attendees first line of questioning tended to focus on establishing what the 
benefits were. Furthermore in discussing potential projects with companies, officials found their 
staff unaware of the need for strategic implementation of technologies. 
G.2,2.2 Establishing What Represents Best Practice 
That it was best practice for firms to manage their component business ftinctions in conjunction as 
part o f a comprehensive, integrated strategy, was evidenced by ACARD (ACARD, 1983). The 
report said that firms which implemented A M T as part of their corporate strateg>' achieved 
improved competitiveness, and recommended the integration of these technologies into the overall 
system. The report continued by stating: "Our principal conclusion is that senior management must 
see the evaluation and implementation ofAMT as a fundamental part of corporate strategy and 
therefore as one of their own major responsibilities" (ACARD, 1983, p. 7). 
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ACARD went on to conclude that corporate strategy must include strategies for manufacturing, 
production, commerce, finance and marketing, with the ' implementation of AMTtaking into 
account the desirability of eventual integration into an overall system'' (ACARD, 1983, p. 8). The 
report emphasised the task of systems integration as being that of the greatest difncult>' for firms. 
G.2.3 Post ROAME Design of Delivery Strategy in Phase 1 
It is helpful at this stage to discuss the aspects of programme development which took place 
following approval of the Phase 1 ROAME statement. Post ROAME development centred around 
the commissioning of a study by DTI into the procedures which should be adopted in strategic 
planning (PA, 1989), backed with experience gained from operating previous programmes. 
G.23.1 PA Report: "Manufacturing into the late 1990s" 
DTI commissioned a study by PA Consulting into business drivers operating in the commercial 
environment, and how business driver information could be used to help develop business 
strategies (PA, 1989). (The idea for this study originated from earlier discussions with PA 
Consulting, during the previously mentioned, internally led investigation). Their findings were 
published by DTI in a report called Manufacturing into the late 1990s (PA, 1989), which played a 
major role in helping firms understand the need for planning their operations in the context of the 
market. 
In a discussion with the author, Mr. John Putiick, a Senior Consultant with PA Consulting, 
informed him of how PA approached the task of developing their report. They decided to analyse 
how their own consultants executed strategic research of markets on behalf of clients, and how 
firms arc then advised in their approaches to responding to the market drivers. They identified the 
drivers under the general headings o f Economic Factors, Demography and Lifestyles, Market 
Factors and Technology. Mow the links between these factors and the mechanisms employed in the 
development of the competitive strategy were investigated, and how this in (urn informs the 
construction of an appropriate organisational and management system for a company was 
investigated. 
The report (PA, 1989) was a primary source of reference in designing M90s. Officials designed the 
scheme so thai both its content and structure of presentation mirrored the advice given in the PA 
Report. In this way officials ensured that the programme would be effective in reducing the 
perceived market failures. The information content was specified in terms of the best practice 
knowledge required by Chief Executives, to develop their business strategies. Increased participation 
in programme activities was obser\'ed, because the conveyed messages matched CEOs actual needs. It 
was also evident that transfer of infonnation was enhanced when the activities mirror the actual 
process of business management. SMEs then recognised the value of the messages presented, because 
they could identify with them. 
The PA report had again emphasised the need to integrate business activities, and, as mentioned 
earlier, contrasted M90s with previous awareness schemes where business issues were treated as 
discrete topics. (However to avoid prejudicing the Marketing Initiative operated under El, 
marketing was not treated as a specific topic within Phase 1 of the programme, but was covered in 
Phase 2, see sub-section G.4.2.1 below). 
As discussed earlier, M90s aimed to first explain the need for firms to adopt a strategic, co-
ordinated approach to the planning of company operations, and then dealt with each business topic 
in the context of corporate planning. To achieve these objectives, M90s vvas constructed to provide 
a co-ordinated set of help packages, each providing practical advice and signposting to other 
sources offering further advice; both within and external to the programme. The aim was to 
enhance the probability of securing management action towards achieving improved competitive 
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performance. In this M90s fundamentally differed in its approach from earlier awareness schemes 
Previous programmes focused their attention on advising firms of the business reasons for adopting 
best practice (awareness), whereas M90s aimed additionally to show companies how they might 
embark on programmes for.Iasting change (i.e. provision of help). . 
G.2.3.2 Previous Experience 
Secondly, officials drew heavily on their experience gained through previous awareness 
programmes to encourage firms to adopt best practice in their operations. The Tl programme 
previously mentioned and the National Quality Campaign (DTI, 1989) were the main contributors 
A number o f the delivery mechanisms that had previously been exploited to good effect were 
incorporated into the programme. 
G,2.4 Development of Rationale: Phase 2 
G.2.4.1 Changes from Phase 1 
Phase 1 of the programme had addressed manufacturing and service companies alike. Phase 2, 
however, provided greater focus on manufacturing, with yet further emphasis on providing firms 
with help in adopting best practice, that is, knowledge o f *how to'. The latter activity was seen as 
helping to motivate firms to engage in activities for lasting change, as discussed earlier. This was a 
reaction to observations by officials that during Phase 1, too many firms were not committing to 
best practice projects. Discussions with firms indicated that whilst they saw the need, they did not 
know how to take things forward and required a higher level of education [Interview 7]. 
Other changes introduced in the second phase o f the programme included the addition of a new set 
o f topics, including marketing, and the scheme was renamed Managing in the 90s - abbreviated 
form Man '90s. The list of new introductions were as follows: 
• New Product Introduction - Helping companies realise the full market potential of their 
inventions, through reduced time to market and greater efficiency in taking initial ideas forward 
to the market. 
• Marketing - conversion of ideas into commercially successful products. 
• Business Planning - preparation of comprehensive business plans to raise finance for product 
developments and the development o f strategies for their implementation. 
• Management of Information - management methods and techniques for defining and the 
handling of business related information. 
Another important feature of this phase was the introduction o f innovation as a discrete theme, 
following advice from the DTI Innovation Unit. 'Innovation' was not seen as just concerned with 
the development of new technologies or products, but the application of technologies and 
management approaches which were new to the firms implementing them. 
G.2.4.2 Rationale for Continuation and Enhancement of M90s (Phase 2) 
The rationale for Phase 2 was set out in the M90s Phase 2 ROAME statement 
(ROAME, 1991a, paragraphs 4-10). Inspection of the Phase 2 ROAM E (annex B), reveals that the 
delivery approach remained substantially unchanged from Phase 1, and would be based on the well 
tested mechanisms of seminars, visits to exemplar companies, a mobile presentation ('road show'), 
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literature and videos. However, interestingly, the ROAME fiagged a move to collaborate with other 
bodies in delivering activities. 
The content of the programme was enhanced to refiect officials' awareness of market problems. 
The ROAME refers to new topics being introduced, listing them as New Product Development, 
Marketing, Business Planning, and the management of information. Phase 2 of M90s was to have a 
life of three years covering the period 1992/1993 to 1994/1995, with a spend of approximately £3 
Million. 
The Phase 2 ROAME states that the aim of the first phase was to address the demand-side 
imperfection of SMEs having insufficient awareness of good, business practice. The market failure 
was perceived as continuing and the second phase would continue to tackle this problem. 
Inspection of the ROAME shows an awareness of the need for firms to adapt to a rapidly changing 
world. In presenting the programme's messages, emphasis was placed on the need for firms to 
embark on and manage projects for change to remain competitive. 
The M90s Phase 2 ROAME (ROAME, 1991a, paragraph 5) describes the basis for perceiving a 
continuing market failure. The ROAME referred to company surveys, DTI's experience, and 
reports by official bodies providing evidence of firms still failing to adopt best practice, with many 
being unaware of the need to improve and how to do so. An evaluation study of Phase 1 M90s, 
undertaken by consultants on behalf of DTI's then MTS Division, had confirmed this evidence, and 
the effectiveness of the approaches adopted in Phase 1 of the programme. 
Annex A of the M90s Phase 2 ROAME (ROAME, 1991a) usefully details the information sources 
used to provide evidence of a continued market failure. The ROAME began by referring to the 
report prepared by the Advisory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST): Advanced 
Maniifacturhig Technology {ACOST, 1991), which had reinforced ACARD's findings (ACARD, 
1983) by stating that most gains in manufacturing firms would come from the radical 
reorganisation of planning processes rather than from adopting individual technologies. A further 
report the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (HMSO, 1991) had 
supported ACOST's view and highlighted the most effective way of encouraging the take up of 
best practice was by employing those who apply it (the demonstrator effect). 
The ROAME cited a paper by the Strathclyde Institute (Strathclyde Institute, 1990) as 
demonstrating the substantial benefits which can accrue through adopting best practice. The PA 
report (PA, 1989) contained case studies showing the benefits arising from specific applications of 
best practice. 
Evidence of firms not taking appropriate action was derived from a Survey of Small Firms in South 
Derbyshire (SQW, 1991) and a Survey of Organisational Trends in British Manufacturing 
Businesses (Ingersoll Engineers, 1991). Furthermore the ACOST report Overcoming Barriers to 
Growth in the Small Firms (ACOST, 1990) reported a lack of long-term management strategy 
existed in firms which presented a barrier to growth. 
From discussions with Dr. Melvyn Draper, the Grade 6 then responsible for M90s in DTI's MTS 
Division, the author was advised of other evidence which had contributed to the rationale for 
continuing with M90s. Industrial surveys contained in The Machine that Changed the World 
(Womack et al, 1990) contrasted the traditional mass production approach, largely adopted in 
Western Economies, with the Lean Production techniques employed in Japanese industry'. The 
book showed the benefits obtained from a co-ordinated approach to the minimisation of waste, 
including the integration of manufacturing systems. Departmental experience gained from 
operating the Consultancy Initiatives, M90s Phase 1, and the MPl programme, showed most SMEs 
continued to fall substantially short of best practice, and exhibited little or no awareness of the need 
to improve, nor how they should go about doing so. (Evidence of the latter was contained in the 
above mentioned evaluation study of the first phase of M90s). 
For the on-going development of Phase 2, PA Consulting were commissioned to update their 
report. Manufacturing into the late 1990s (PA, 1993). The second edition involved restructuring 
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o f the content, and took account of changes in the business environment. Subjects such as the 
development o f business strategies, for example, were now placed in a dedicated section, and new 
topics were added. New product introduction was a particularly significant addition: PA 
highlighted the importance of being fast enough to be first into the market with the right product, as 
worth more to most businesses than any other single management or manufacturing action. 
The appearance o f new product introduction in Phase 2 (Man *90s) is therefore not surprising, but 
the idea of covering this topic within M90s predated the PA Report. In the latter stages o f Phase 1 . 
there was much discussion within the department and elsewhere, about the proven ability o f the 
British to innovate, but their inability to exploit the potential o f innovations in the market. 
DTI thus commissioned ICPMG to investigate the performance o f firms in bringing products to 
market. The Consultancy reported in August 1991 (KPMG, 1991), recommending that the time was 
right for DTI to launch an initiative that would stimulate action and bring about an 'innovation 
renaissance' in UK manufacturing firms. The report set out the argument for such an initiative and 
recommended the approaches to be adopted. Most firms were found to have failed to understand 
and improve the overall process of introducing new products. 
The potential benefits in terms of profitability, through improved efficiency in product 
introduction, were discussed. Performance was found poor compared with many Japanese firms. 
KPMG also drew attention to the lack of market information in firms, with very few questioning 
their customers about their future plans. This latter point helped reinforce the case for continuing 
with Phase 2 o f M90s. The content o f the report was used as the source material for M90s literature 
and events. 
G.3 Objectives 
G.3.1 Phase 1 Objectives 
Bearing in mind the extent o f market failure, the overall objective was set as at least 60% of those 
attending an event would change their management methods. In the Phase I ROAME (ROAME, 
1988a, paragraphs 8-11) under the heading of OBJECTIVES, the quantitative targets were set as: 
"o/ least 25 management action briefings a year, total attendance of2,000 firms; 
at least 25 workshops a year on aspects of M90s, attended by 1,250 firms; 
mobile demonstration unit visits to 30 sites a year, total attendance J0,000 people; 
400 visits to demonstration firms a year involving 2,400 people'', 
(ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 10). 
It was intended to revise these targets after the first and second years o f the programme. 
G.3.2 Phase 2 Objectives 
The Phase 2 ROAME (1991a, paragraphs 11-16) set the following targets for M90s for the second 
phase as follows: 
"77/e strategy roadshow will visit at least 30 sites with total attendance of at least 6,000 people; 
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At least 80 seminars and workshops will be held on aspects of the programme, with total 
attendance of at least 4,500 people; 
At least 400 visits to demonstration firms will be organised involving at least 3,000 attendees; 
At least 400,000 booklets will be dispatched and 30,000 videos loaned to interested companies; 
A new private sector quality award will be created, building on the achievements of the British 
Quality awards"; 
(ROAME, 1991a, paragraph 15). 
G.4 ROAME Approval 
G.4.1 Approval of M90s Phase 1 
Officials eased the approval process by being able to demonstrate the conformity o f their proposals 
with government policy. As discussed above conformance was shown by referencing problems 
identified in the DTI White Paper, and the department's role o f spreading awareness of best 
practice. The Phase 1 ROAME statement also showed how M90s would operate activities in each 
of the areas highlighted as important in the white paper, such as design and quality: Because all 
programmes now had to fit into the Enterprise Initiative hierarchy, M90s was portrayed in the 
ROAME as underpinning the EI. 
M90s was seen as particularly supportive of the Consultancy Initiatives, helping to increase VFM. 
It was argued that M90s would add value in two ways. Firstly firms with limited knowledge of the 
business topics could participate in M90s prior to starting a consultancy project, thus gaining an 
inhial understanding of the issues and how they may be solved. Secondly firms successfully 
completing their consultancies could participate in M90s activities to gain further help. In this way 
M90s was seen as adding value to firms projects. 
Officials also took steps to ensure that the ground was made fertile for approval, by ensuring that 
ministers and senior management were receptive to proposals for M90s [Interview 5]. 
As mentioned earlier, originally officials submined a case for the continuation of T l to the 
Secretary of State, Lord Young, immediately prior to the announcement of the Enterprise Initiative 
(EI) in January 1988. The Secretary of State believed the Tl scheme conflicted with the 
Consultancy Initiative component o f EI, and rejected the case. An observation at the time was that 
the Secretary of State regarded EI as very much his 'baby', and therefore was unlikely to approve a 
scheme which might prejudice the performance o f the 'Initiative'. This was considered to be a 
contributory factor in the failure to obtain his approval [Interview 5]. 
Six months after the rejection of the case for extending the T l scheme, officials submitted proposals 
to ministers for the M90s programme. Revised approval criteria required divisions to submit 
proposals for self-contained programmes of work, rather than for the single 'stand alone' projects 
which had previously been the norm. The Secretary o f State also required all programmes to be 
operated under El. To satisfy the revised criteria the case now described a set of activities dealing 
with four subject areas, in contrast with T l which had focused on manufacturing as a single topic. 
Officials successfully secured approval for Managing into the 90s. 
However the operating concepts for M90s were little different from those of T l . The fact that the 
novelty of EI had worn o f f and was becoming established was believed by the officials concerned 
to have been a significant factor in the Secretary of State agreeing to another scheme within El. 
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i l i^is s c i r ^ ^ ^ of timing submissions to ministers is indicated by the order o f events detailed 
G.4.1.1 Approval Sequence 
The author spoke to Mr Peter Munday (a PR9 in D T f s Small Business Service) who was directly 
involved in the development o f M90s. Munday was able to confirm that initial proposals were 
submitted to AMTC for members' discussion, (the A M T Requirements Committee), after which 
the case for M90s was formally presented to the IPC and thence to ministers for their approval. 
This was the case for both phases of the programme. (Presentation o f the phase 1 ROAME to the 
IPC is also indicated by the IPC reference number appearing on the document, that is IPC(88)I63. 
Presentation to ministers in both cases is indicated in the record of the interview with Dr Draper 
[Interview 5]). 
G.4.2 Approval of M90s Phase 2 
Steps were taken during Phase 1 to make the ground fertile for approval for Phase 2. For Phase 2, 
Project Officers made ministers receptive to proposals for extension o f M90s, by educating them 
about the problems faced by firms, and the suitability of the programme to alleviate them. Firstly, 
following the October 1989 Cabinet reshuffle, the Manufacturing and Information (MIT) Division 
persuaded the Under Secretary for State for Industry (Mr Hogg) via his private office, to attend a 
M90s Management Action Briefing seminar. Later, he was invited to launch a M90s report (the PA 
report) at a press conference in November 1989 [Interview 5]. A submission to the Minister dated 
24 November 1988 'reminds' him of his previous agreement in principal, to attend. In support o f 
his launching the report, the submission refers to a ministerial brief being attached. The brief 
contained details of who from the press had been invited, and the recommended text for his 
opening statement. The prepared statement outlined the content o f the PA report, and how its 
recommendations were to be implemented within the Managing into the 90s programme. A list o f 
anticipated questions, and suggested answers were also provided. The Minister was also informed 
that officials and representatives from PA would be on hand to help field questions, and that the 
minister's formal briefing, including questions and answers, was not expected to last more than 30 
minutes. Senior civil servants reported that the Under Secretary o f State became very supportive. 
Later a briefing for the Secretary of State apprised him of the current activities undertaken by the 
Division and their status. This briefing coupled with the support o f the Under Secretary for State 
were seen by officials as probably being instrumental in the Secretary of State agreeing to Phase 2 
o f the programme. 
Other points of influence in the approval process were also 'educated' and thereby rendered 
receptive to proposals [Interview 5]. The M90s report by PA Consulting was sent to the Deputy 
Secretary of ACOST, so influencing their recommendations. Consequently, recommendations 
supportive of continuing M90s were published. Copies o f the PA Report were also circulated to 
ministers and senior officials, which also served to influence their thinking positively towards the 
programme. 
G.5 Programme Implementation 
G.5.1 Programme Delivery Strategy: Phase 1 
Evidence had clearly shown the need for firms to adopt best practice in specific areas o f 
management, and integrate the management of these business functions. It also showed that 
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encouraging firms to adopt an holistic approach to their management should be an important 
feature o f M90s. Officials also recognised thai it was important for firms to have access to the 
knowledge required to implement best practice i f they were to become committed to change. 
Access was provided in two ways. Firstly M90s undertook to educate firms in the subject of best 
practice, and secondly to signpost them to additional sources o f advice and help. 
Experience of operating the previous Towards Integration (Tl) programme had shown the 
effectiveness of adopting a hierarchical structure to programme activities, in which participants 
could receive increasing levels of advice and help, dependent on their specific interests. The 
approach was further developed in M90s, and continued to be consistently successful in its 
application within the Programme. Experience had also shown the importance of face to face 
contact in transferring knowledge, and this mechanisms was exploited in a number o f the activities 
supported, for example in seminars and workshops. 
The objective of the deliver^' strategy was to motivate firms to commit themselves to business 
strategies for lasting change. The approach adopted was to target board directors and other senior 
managers within firms [Interview 5]. Emphasis was placed on making these senior personnel aware 
of their need to adopt best practice. Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are the decision makers, and 
their 'conversion to the cause' was seen as fundamental to achieving commitment to change 
(ACARD, 1983). Raising initial levels o f awareness within companies represented the first step in 
the education process. The author observes that the principle of'sensitisation', a term he found 
often used in EC meetings which he had attended, was employed in which the business rationale 
for adopting best practice is explained to CEOs, and the benefits demonstrated by example thus 
creating an interest in 'change'. 
Once sensitised, firms become receptive to the deliver>' o f follow up activities that reinforce the 
initial messages. Follow up activities focused on providing firms with information on how best 
practice approaches can be adopted. Answering the question 'why' was designed to create a desire 
for change, and describing the 'how' of implementing best practice then helped secure a 
commitment to change. Creation o f interest in adopting best practice at every stage motivated 
CEOs to find out yet more, and prompted them to participate in other M90s events, thereby 
continuing to build their knowledge and commitment to change. The author notes that the process 
of making firms aware and motivating them to take action, is achieved through influencing 
people's cognitive structures (Lewin, 1952, pp. 79-84). 
Inspection of the M90s, Phase 1 ROAME (DTI, 1988a, annex A) reveals the overall structure o f 
the activities supported. Because plans for Phase 1 of M90s were prepared in haste 
[Interview 5], a significant proportion o f programme development took place after the programme 
was launched. Therefore proposals for the alleviation of failures in the first ROAME statement 
were described in general terms, and listed the following activities: 
a) Main Brochure; 
b) Management Action Briefing Seminars (MABs); 
c) Workshops and Seminars; 
d) Mobile Demonstration Units; 
e) Demonstration Firms. 
Activities (a), (b), and (d) were the main vehicles for sensitisalion and initial education in best 
practice. Items (c) and (e) sought to build a lasting commitment for change. 
Exploitation of the signposting mechanism was an important feature of M90s. To make programme 
participants aware of related activities, anyone attending an event or reading M90s literature was 
informed about all other M90s events. Programmes such as the Consultancy Initiatives and the 
Manufacturing, Planning and Implementation (MPI) programme, where practical help in managing 
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projects for change could be obtained, were also signposted. It is interesting to note that colleagues 
reported to the author that a number of participants received help in this way. 
G.5.2 Programme Delivery Strategy: Phase 2 
Many of the delivery mechanisms adopted for Phase 1 continued in use for Phase 2. The MABs 
were replaced as the flagship activity by the Strategy Road Show, which was a mobile seminar 
based on three road trailers. 
Inspection of the Phase 2 ROAME revealed a further difference. The second stage saw the 
introduction of a hierarchical structure to programme delivery; that is, a programme comprising o f 
national, regional and local activities. Phase 2 saw an increased use o f intermediaries such as the 
professional institutions, the TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils), and bodies such as the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). 
Examples o f M90s activities (Phases \ and 2) are explained in detail in section G.8 below. 
G.5.3 Programme Administration and Promotion: Phases 1 and 2 
M90s was administered by officials employed in DTI's then Management and Technology Services 
(MTS) Division (DTI, 1995, p. 3). External contractors were appointed to manage the day to day 
running o f the individual programme activities. Their responsibilities included the detailed design 
and production o f events such as seminars, including audience building and the production of 
promotional literature. In support of event design contractors talked to consultants and 
representatives of industry in the development of event content. Contractors were normally 
appointed using competitive tendering procedures. For example, HP ICM were appointed by 
competitive tender to manage the Management Action Briefing Seminars. 
Regular meetings to monitor progress and spend, were held with each contractor. The author held 
such meetings with HP ICM where progress, problems arising, spend, and the need for additional 
fijnding was discussed. Mr John Launchbury, the official responsible for the operation o f the Inside 
UK Enterprise (lUKE) scheme, informed the author that he makes monthly monitoring visits to the 
contractor. Status Meetings Limited, who are responsible for delivering the initiative. During the 
visits he checks with the company scheme progress including marketing, and monitors how DTPs 
money is being spent. Launchbury also confirmed that the contractor was appointed through 
competitive tendering. 
G.5.4 Appraisal: Phases 1 and 2 
The Phase I ROAME (ROAME, 1988a, paragraph 13) considered the appraisal o f applicants in 
M90s to have been inappropriate, because there was no direct financial assistance to participating 
firms. Unlike the R & T Initiative or CI, M90s did not involve the award of grants to companies by 
way o f encouraging them to take action. Any firm could participate. However inspection of the 
Phase 2 ROAME (1991a, paragraphs 17-19) indicates that an appraisal function was involved in 
the overall programme. This role was largely the responsibility of the M90s Steering Committee, 
which co-ordinated the strategic planning of M90s and reviewed the depth o f programme content. 
The Committee reviewed and approved plans for individual activities, and the production o f 
guidelines to assist in the administration of these activities. The Committee was also responsible 
for overseeing the process ^Monitoring*. 
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G.5.5 Monitoring: Phases 1 and 2 
The monitoring procedures were set out in the phase 1 ROAME (ROAME, 1988a, paragraphs 14-
16) and were designed to allow regular review and adjustment of the programme, and obtain data 
for the planned evaluation of the scheme. A number o f quantitative and qualitative methods were 
employed as follows: 
( i ) Quantitative: 
"(measurement of ) the distribution of literature etc.; 
volume of take up of activities under the programme; 
volume of take up offurther sources of advice and assistance under the signposting service", 
DTI, 1988, paragraph 14). 
( i i ) Qualitative: 
Short, simple questionnaires were issued to all participants attending Mive events'. These aimed to 
test reaction to the events, and ask what action participants planned to take as a result of attending. 
A 10% sample of those attending were approached later to see how many companies subsequently 
took action. 
Monitoring of programme performance was undertaken on behalf of DTI by consultants, St. John's 
Innovation Centre, Cambridge (St. John's, 1992). St. John's prepared quarterly Tracking Reports 
which evaluated scheme performance by activity, to check the programme met its ROAME targets. 
Based on an analysis o f performance the reports recommended changes in the design of the 
programme when appropriate. 
The Phase 2 ROAME (1991a, paragraph 24) speaks o f qualitative monitoring being affected by 
exit questionnaires from live events, questionnaires circulated on a sample basis to recipients of 
literature and videos, and event attendees. The M90s Steering Committee regularly reviewed 
reports on the monitoring out-turns o f individual activities, checking progress against objectives. 
G.6 Wider Benefits 
fp?f^S°?QO^.^"^ P"^''^ ""^^^'^ ^'^'^ons the PA report 
planning ' ' ' ' ^ ^^ ' ' ' ' "^ ^ " " ^ understand the need for strategic 
G.7 Programme Evaluation 
Inspection of the M90s evaluation report (DTI, 1995, pp. 6-7), (evaluation was undertaken by 
DTI's Assessment Unit and their report comprises 22 pages) reveals the evaluation method which 
was adopted. It comprised discussions with academic experts on the validity of the programme 
rationale, and examination of the programme monitoring returns, which were described as 
extensive. Information collected was supplemented by some field work. 
Six experts, four in academia and two in consultancy, were questioned over the validity o f the 
programme. Specifically they were asked for their views on whether precepts on best practice 
existed which were wide enough on the one hand to be generally useful, whilst on the other are 
sufficiently specific to be followed. 
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Monitoring data was used as an information source in determining programme performance. In 
addition to exit polls the monitoring data included information gathered from 340 responses to a 
telephone questionnaire. Face to face interviews with a small sample of M90s participants were 
also conducted, to gauge whether the content of activities was appropriate to firms' needs and to 
assess the value of the benefits accruing to them. The number of firms visited was small. The 
evaluators explained that unlike the case in grant award schemes, there was no obligation placed on 
M90s participants to take part in DTI follow up studies. It was thought that many firms would not 
agree to being interviewed. 
In the light of the above observations it was decided to approach the 38 companies who had 
previously indicated their willingness to take part in an evaluatory study. In the end only 18 firms 
were visited, the lower number due principally to the relevant people having 'moved on'. 
G.8 Examples of Programme Delivery 
G.8.1 Specific Mechanisms 
G.8.1.1 Sponsorship 
The Managing into the 90s programme saw DTI enter into commercial sponsorship for awareness 
activities for the first time. The Management Action Briefing Seminars and Strategy' Roadshows 
attracted significant funding by commercial organisations. When developing the M A B programme, 
insufficient funds were available from the Innovation Budget to support the seminar design 
proposed by the successful contractor. Funding received from Lloyds Bank supplemented DTI 
funds enabling events to be staged using a no-compromise design. Officials found sponsorship by 
'household names' brought another advantage. The credibility of delivered messages, and hence their 
acceptance as good advice, was raised by involving a large company that was viewed by participants 
as being exemplary in business management. 
Among organisations involved were Lloyds Bank (which as discussed previously sponsored 
MABs), and then the Trustee Savings Bank (TSB Bank pic), IBM, COMPAQ and Microsoft 
(which all sponsored the Strategy Roadshow). Sponsorship took the form of financial support 
(Lloyds Bank and the TSB), or the provision of free equipment, software, and services (e.g. 
COMPAQ provided 'laptops' with colour screens). 
Corporates wil l normally only sponsor activities i f they are able to derive commercial benefits. 
Lloyds Bank was provided with access to potential clients. Its services were promoted by having its 
logo on the MAB promotional literature and on the event display boards. A bank official addressed 
attendees at each event, and information about bank services was contained in the delegate packs. 
G.8.1.2 Undenvriting of Awareness Activities 
The author interviewed Mr. David Ellis, the Grade 7 responsible for operating a series of quality 
seminars under M90s [Interview 10]. In these seminars, the contractor responsible was asked to run the 
events without direct finance from DTI, and allowed to charge delegates to recover his costs. To lessen 
the risk and secure agreement by the contractor, the department agreed to make good any incurred loss 
to an agreed maximum. The seminars were so successftjl that DTI never had to compensate the 
contractor for a loss; in fact he made a good profit. 
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This shows the value of underwriting a contract of this sort as a means of reducing departmental 
expenditure. However part of the success in this case must be attributed to the high level of interest in 
'Quality' at the time of the events. Whilst underwriting costs has potential, die likely success of an 
event must be assessed in terms of the public interest in the subject material to be delivered. 
G.8.2 Examples of Activities Supported 
G.8.2.1 Management Action Briefing Seminars 
These seminars were the flagship activity during the first year of Phase I . They broke new ground 
in the delivery of awareness messages. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the policy o f their firm. A campaign o f awareness activities 
must first target senior executives at director level. The initial phase of M90s needed to deliver the 
'best practice message' to them in a way which would convince them of the need to commit 
themselves to change. 
A programme of purpose designed presentations called Management Action Briefing Seminars 
(MABs) was the mechanism chosen. A total of 25 events were staged between 20 March 1989 and 
23 November 1990, with Lloyds Bank contributing significant sponsorship funding. 
For a seminar to be successful, the target audience must attend, and their interest captured and 
maintained so that they become and remain receptive to new knowledge. For MABs the awareness 
criteria chosen to achieve these aims were: 
• The programme to have a high profile; 
• Activities tailored to suit work arrangements o f SME board members; 
• Seminar format to contain an element of novelty; 
• Seminar content relevant to the operation of manufacturing companies. 
High Profile - A high profile gives events an image of importance, fostering the desire to attend. 
This was realised by having a minister to introduce the events and Lloyds bank, a *high street 
name', to sponsor the programme. 
Tailored activities - Directors of SMEs are usually short of time. To increase the probability of 
directors attending, each seminar was limited to one half day, and the events staged on a regional 
basis to reduce travel time for the senior executives. 
Novelty - The seminar used Mive action' to achieve novelty in the M A B presentations, a 'first ' for 
DTI. Actors acted out typical boardroom scenes in a sequence of playlets. The idea of playlets had 
been successfully used by British Airways in staff training. These illustrated typical business 
problems and showed the responsive actions taken to make the business more competitive. After 
each playlet a panel o f experts from exemplar companies reinforced the playlet messages by 
discussing the points raised. Then discussion was opened to 'the floor'. 
Location was also used to provide novelty. Each event took place at the premises of a large 
prestigious company known for its exemplar role: the hosts included JCB, Boots and British 
Airways. Their involvement raised the profile of the events and reinforced the credibility of the 
messages delivered. Smooth running of proceedings was achieved by using a professional 'link 
man' to manage each element of a seminar. His role was critical to the M A B programme realising 
its objectives, and comprised the following elements: 
to maintain a seamless handover between each programme segment, and at the end of each 
seminar, to signpost delegates to the M90s programme and activities; 
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o to begin message reinforcement by summarising the message of each playlet, and, to use his 
summary to give the panel a starting point for discussion. (The composition of each panel was 
different for each event); 
« 10 keep panel discussion to the point, ensure that important issues are aired and each panel 
member has the opportunit>' to contribute. 
• to summarise the message emanating from the panel to stimulate the audience to contribute in 
open debate, to ensure that the debate remains relevant, and that as many people are heard as 
possible; 
o to close the open discussion session at the appropriate moment, and to introduce the next 
segment of the presentation. 
The role of the link man is demanding. He must be business literate so he can summarise the points 
raised correctly and usefully contribute to the debate. He must be a good communicator, skilled in 
co-ordinating diverse activities to form a well structured 'whole', and able to reinforce and expand 
the messages being delivered. The person chosen was TV presenter Cl i f f Michelmore, whose 
celebrity status also raised the profile of the events. 
Seminar Content - The playlet scripts were based on real life experiences of SMEs and so were 
perceived as relevant. The department organised a meeting comprising the script writers, officials, 
consultants and representatives of lndustr>', to inform the scripting process. The expert panels 
themselves always included staff from small firms. The panel of the day had spent an evening with 
the Link Man who guided them about the issues to be discussed. This allowed him to develop a 
rapport with the panel, to advise them of playlet content making sure that in responding the best 
practice messages were built upon. The meeting also engendered a feeling of being part of a team 
amongst the panel members. 
The author set up the MAB programme and ran the scheme during its initial stages, and the above 
is drawn mainly from his own obscr\'ations. 
G.8.2.2 Strateg>' Road Show 
The Strategy Road Show was a mobile seminar unit touring the commercial centres of the UK. 
Replacing the MABs it introduced the topic of best management practice to senior management. 
The seminars explained how the adoption of best practice contributes to competitiveness, and 
demonstrated the potential benefits. Ideas for change were presented which delegates could 
implement in their own companies. 
As the show introduced the whole M90s programme, it provided signposts to all the other M90 
activities. These were referred to during the presentations and attendees received a delegate pack 
containing M90s brochures (see below) on leaving the show. The delegate packs also included a 
summar>' of all current government schemes which provided assistance to firms. 
Mobility contributed to success by making the messages more accessible to the target audience: the 
messages were taken to the audiences. The presentation format was developed from the successful 
Management Action Briefing seminars. A set of short, thought provoking 'message modules', 
grouped under a number of main management themes, were linked together by a master o f 
ceremonies, whose role was important in providing a structure to the events. 
No two shows were the same. The participants steered the show by selecting the topics most 
relevant to them. Selection was democratic, those attending voting on the issues to be discussed. 
The sense of ownership of a unique show generated by the voting system was seen as key to 
capturing and maintaining attention. An interactive video system was used for message deliver)'. At 
the heart of the system was a CD-ROM system with around 1000 'message modules'. Each module 
had screens of bullet points and video clips filmed at exemplar companies. The selected sample of 
video segments was different for each session, according to the results of delegate voting. 
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The voting system was used by DTI to obtain feedback on the concerns of SMEs. Delegates also 
rated the relevance of the show in the running of their companies, and their intentions to take 
resultant action. The information collected was used to tune message content, and develop further 
awareness programmes. The road show was administered by the contractor Crown 
Communications Limited, who were appointed using competitive tendering procedures. 
G.8.2.3 Literature and Videos 
As with the programme itself, a hierarchical structure of brochures, categorised by their level o f 
detail, was adopted for the literature. The level one introductory booklet. Managing in the '90s, 
was designed to complement the Strategy Roadshow. It helped senior managers understand the 
relevance of best practice. Key to the success of the educational process was the use of self 
assessment checklists. Under a series of business themes such as 'Marketing' and 'Quality', the 
reader is made aware of the issues involved, the best practice actions, aind invited to check the 
status of his own company in addressing the issues. This helps educate him and builds his 
commitment to take action. To encourage him to take further steps the booklet directed him to 
other schemes offering help and advice. 
Supporting the main brochure, was a set of Level 2 booklets provide more detail on each of the 
M90s themes. Level 3 brochures discuss specialist topics such as the application o f Just-In-Time. 
An action pack helps companies to manage their supply chains. 
A newsletter 90s News was circulated quarterly to event participants and other interested parties. 
Well received by SMEs 90s News gave an event calendar, reports on M90s events and featured 
case studies o f successful projects for change. Videos describing projects implemented by 
exemplar companies were at one time also available on loan. 
G.8.2.4 Inside U K Enterprise Scheme 
In the Inside UK Enterprise (IUK.E) scheme, SMEs are invited to visit firms which are exemplary 
in the application o f best manufacturing practice. This reinforces the messages received by visiting 
the Roadshow or reading the main booklet, helping firms make positive commitments to improve. 
Visitors can see for themselves the benefits accruing from adopting the best practice. A lecture 
from a champion o f best practice projects is followed by a conducted tour o f the 'shop floor'. 
Visitors can ask staff questions about how projects were implemented. Host organisations also 
benefit: many find new suppliers and learn of new developments from talking to visitors. Mr John 
Launchbury, the official responsible for the operation of lUKE, informed the author that the 
initiative had been adopted by the Canadian, German, and Austrian governments. The lUICE model 
has also been adopted in the Netherlands, and in the Basque region of Spain. 
G.8.2.5 Total Quality Seminars 
The main activity in phase 1 was a series of one day. Total Quality Management (TQM) seminars. 
They sought to help firms understand the concept of total quality and show how it contributes to 
competitiveness [Interview 10]. 
Each quality seminar started with an introductory talk explaining TQM and its relation to 
improving business performance, followed by a series of presentations dealing with specific 
aspects of TQM. 
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Four main delivery mechanisms were used to convey the awareness messages. First a high profile 
chairman, performing a similar role to the link man employed in the MABs, with good 
communication skills and a knowledge of the subject matter, was engaged. The T Q M seminars 
employed Vincent Kane OBE, a broadcaster on TV Wales: he had a personal commitment to 
quality, receiving the OBE for his part in establishing the Wales Quality Centre. The second strand 
was a presentation by a leading expert on quality. Professor Oakland of Bradford University. 
His role of expert presenter was later expanded to make him available all day for consultation by 
delegates. Thirdly a DTI speaker reinforced the best practice messages and signposted delegates to 
other M90s activities and the Consultancy Initiatives. Finally, case studies were presented by 
representatives of organisations which had adopted TQM. The concept of'industry people talking 
to industry people' was important to establish the perceived relevance of the programme content. 
The approach was reported as well thought of by delegates. 
Organisation of the quality events, including audience building, was contracted to a specialist 
company (IBIS), which received no fee from DTI. Under the terms of their agreement, they 
charged a delegate fee with their costs underwritten by the department. The seminars were so 
successful that DTI never had to comijensate IBIS: indeed its staff reported that IBIS made a good 
profit! 
G.8.2.6 Purchasing and Supply Seminars 
The Purchasing and Supply seminars were the main activity in the 'Purchasing' module of M90s. 
These spread best practice amongst firms in the areas o f purchasing and supply. An interview was 
held with Mr. John Oakley, the Grade 7 responsible for developing and operating this element of 
M90s [Interview 7]. Mr. Oakley was able to provide details describing the background to 
introducing the Purchasing Seminars, and insights surrounding the choice of the delivery 
mechanisms employed. 
Mr. Oakley began by stating the overall objective of the scheme was to make firms aware of the 
benefits to purchasers of building closer working relationships with suppliers, in particular the 
benefits arising from: 
• faster and more effective product development by involving suppliers directly in the design 
process, 
• calling on the strengths of the many to overcome weaknesses in the individual organisations (a 
win-win scenario), 
• being privy to a purchaser's vision: suppliers can work with him to realise the vision, to mutual 
benefit, 
• lower costs through increased efficiency. 
The rationale for operating the Purchasing and Supply module of M90s grew from the following 
observations: 
• Research by Cardiff and Glasgow Business Schools together with others (the details are not on 
file) showed SMEs were unaware of the need to adopt best practice, because they did not know 
of the benefits afforded. (The Cardiff research was undertaken to support the book Tfie Machine 
that Changed the World C^omackcta\, 1990). 
• The need to establish firms capable o f working closely with Inward Investor companies, such as 
Sony. 
Two series of seminars were held, aimed at senior purchasing staff and at other managers. The first 
series comprised 25 one-day events at different locations around the country. These focused on 
increasing awareness of the benefits of, and hence the need to adopt, good practice in the 
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purchasing of goods and services. The format comprised of presentations by a 'guru' in Purchasing 
and Supply, (Dr. David Farmer), an industrialist from a nationally renowned company, an 
industrialist drawn from the local community of firms, and a Cardiff Business School academic. 
Using this well known expert and an academic from a leading university helped the messages to be 
taken seriously. The industrialist reinforced.the message from his real life experience, establishing 
credibility, and thereby building commitment to change. Short formal presentations were followed 
by an interactive session, when delegates could question the experts. The question lime reinforced 
the messages, further building commitment to act. 
The second series of events were half-day workshops held at various locations across the UK. The 
format comprised a presentation on supply chain management by a resident expert (Mr. Ted ' 
Lindsey, ex IBM), backed by videos of case study material. The workshops contrasted with the 
earlier series of events, in that greater emphasis was placed on the 'how' of implementing best 
practice. Again an interactive session followed, when delegates could ask questions. The resident 
expert was also available for private one-to-one discussion at the close of each event. 
Again this used the principle of gradually building commitment, with attendees offered successive 
levels of help. The facility to discuss topics one-to-one with the expert was particularly important, 
as it provided firms with an opportunity to discuss solutions to their particular problems. 
The seminars and workshops were located in areas of the countr>' with low levels o f awareness. 
Research had shown that in certain areas of the country' (Central Scotland, including Fife and 
Deeside, the North East of England, South Wales, and Telford) suppliers were already working 
closely with purchasing organisations. Firms in these areas were influenced by, in particular, the 
large Japanese Investors, who required close working relationships with their suppliers (and the 
adoption of best practice generally). Elsewhere, the 'partnership sourcing' culture was absent, so 
the seminars were targeted on these areas. 
While running both series o f events, officials witnessed the success o f their inter\'ention through 
listening to questions asked by delegates. Initially, questioning had the common theme of "what are 
the benefits?". Later, attendees were largely aware of the benefits, but wanted to know what to do 
to realise them. The success of the workshop format in bringing firms into contact with experts, 
helped seed the idea for the Supply Chain Network Groups, discussed below, which were also 
located according to the need. 
G.8.2.7 Supply Chain Nct>vork Groups 
Operated under the Purchasing and Supply section of M90s, and forerunner to the business Self 
Help Clubs (see below), the Supply Chain Network Groups (SCNGs) were a response to feedback 
from the workshops on best practice in Purchasing. Attendees' comments revealed very limited 
knowledge of Supply Chain Management, motivating DTI to act to correct the failure. Based on a 
Scottish model, officials introduced the SCNGs initiative in 1994 to improve awareness, and 
advance supplier development. Organisations were invited to submit proposals for grants to support 
development and operation of the groups. Parties interested in supply chain management, including 
SMEs, large companies, universities. Business Links, and Regional Supply Offices, were brought 
together. 
For each group, the lead organisation formed a steering committee to oversee the development and 
operation of their group. Group activities t>'pically included lectures on supply chain management, 
visits to exemplar companies, training workshops, and the formation of consortia to respond to 
large purchase opportunities. 
DTl's support was implemented as 'Pump Priming', with grants awarded to provide two years 
funding at a level of 50% of costs, plus a further discretionary' year with support reduced to 25%. 
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To-date 21 groups have been set up. The author became responsible SCNGs, on 1 April 1996. 
SCNG participants regard the groups as highly successful and adding value. 
G.8.2.8 Action Packs 
As another weapon in the armoury to improve competitiveness of suppliers, an action pack called 
Managing the chain from suppliers to customers was introduced. Written for DTI by Logistics 
Consulting Partners, the pack functions both as a training vehicle and as a toolkit for firms to use to 
optimise their supply chain operations. 
The pack, comprising an educational booklet and a set o f performance matrixes, uses the principle 
of self-assessment. The booklet discusses supply chain issues and their resolution, and lists the 
important performance metrics. Then firms are invited to assess their standing in each area of 
supply chain management. Each performance matrix is dedicated to a particular area of 
measurement and printed on a separate card. 
TTie booklet guides the reader through the assessment process by explaining what is to be achieved 
at each stage. It shows how performance is measured and gives possible scenarios for any 
shortcomings detected. Firms are helped by examples; the matrixes are pre-completed for an 
imaginary company, showing the types o f data to be collected and how to use them. Instructions 
printed on the cards also help by itemising each step needed to complete a matrix. 
Feedback from users of the pack to DTI officials has been very positive. 
G.8.2.9 Self-help Clubs 
Self-help or Competitiveness Clubs are communal activities involving predominately but not 
exclusively SMEs, with activities that seek to improve the competitiveness o f members. The 
improvements arise through helping the diffusion of best practice by mutual encouragement. The 
idea of encouraging business clubs to form among SMEs came from the success o f the Supply 
Chain Network Groups, discussed above. 
The clubs are based on the fact that people often learn through their peers. Clubs provide 
opportunities for people to create personal relationships across firms, facilitating discussion of 
problems and solutions. Inter-firm links also encourage collaboration between companies to share 
resources and risks. 
The second phase of M90s encouraged the formation o f Competitiveness Clubs by providing 
support material. No financial aid was given for club formation: this was a significant departure 
from previous departmental policy. 
A directory of clubs and a club starter pack offering advice on how to establish a club was 
produced. A guide for Club administrators encouraged them to promote best practice actively. 
G.8.2.10 Benchmarking Guide 
To motivate improvement, a benchmarking guide, called Tlie Winning Report, was produced. In 
this, directors of 100 exemplar firms give their views about what had contributed to the success o f 
their companies in applying best practice to the management of their business operations This helps 
firms compare their performance with the achievements of the 'best'. 
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The guide was based on a survey undertaken by officials and consultants. To identify firms to be 
interviewed, the department drew on contacts made by industrial secondees employed in the 
Innovation Unit, officials' own experience, and staff employed in intermediary organisations. 
The good practice mechanisms employed in M90s are evaluated in appendix K, section K.3.4. 
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APPENDIX H THE MANUFACTURING, PLANNING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES PROGRAMME 
H.1 Introduction 
the Manufacturing Planning and Implementation Studies Programme (MPI), was a consultancy 
scheme. Launched on I June 1991, the programme was conceived to help manufacturing SMEs use 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) more effectively. MPI provided grants of up to 
£50K, to help SMEs fund projects for the strategic planning and implementation o f AMT. MPI was 
targeted at SMEs employing between 100 and 500 people. 
H.2 Issue Identification 
H.2.1 Developing Programme Ideas 
The next two sections show how the development of programme ideas comprises the two elements 
of conceiving ideas and then seeking approval to develop initial proposals into ROAMEs. 
H.2.2 Conceive Idea 
The author, as a member of DTI's former Manufacturing Technologies Division (MTD), was 
directly responsible for developing and implementing MPI. He is thus able to call on his own 
experience in relating to the circumstances that led to the development of the programme. His 
observations are backed by the findings o f an interview with Dr. Melvyn Draper (a Grade 6), who 
at the time was deputy head of branch assigned with overall responsibility for the introduction of 
MPI [Interview 5]. The idea began with the perception that SMEs needed to adopt a strategic 
approach in planning their business operations. Officials perceived this requirement as a result of 
evidence derived from a number of sources: 
o Reports on previous DTI schemes, especially the Micro Electronics Application (MAP) 
programme and the AMT Planning Studies Consultancy Scheme. The official responsible for 
MAP and the author's line manager Dr. Melvyn Draper, told the author in conversation he had 
become aware that firms lacked knowledge o f the benefit new technologies afforded, and of 
how to realise these benefits. The report of the previous A M T Planning Studies Consultancy 
scheme (NEL, 1992) showed that additional benefits could be realised i f A M T planning was 
undertaken strategically: that is, in the context of the market. 
o A paper The Development of Information Integration: Beyond CIM? (Fleck, 1988) reported the 
absence in many western companies of the improved levels of productivity presumed to follow 
the introduction of new technology. Fleck (Department of Business Studies, Edinburgh 
University) prepared his paper under the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 
"Programme on Information and Communications Technologies" (PICT). He cited cases where 
a general decline in productivity had accompanied greatly increased use of new technology. By 
contrast, Japanese Industry had improved productivity by adopting low technology approaches 
like Just In Time (JIT) and Total Quality Management (TQM). JIT and TQM philosophies in 
manufacturing integrated people into the total operating system of the manufacturing 
organisation. 
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• A book. Innovation and Industrial Strength, (Cox and Kriegbaum, 1989), published by the 
Policy Studies Institute, investigated the role o f technology in improving competitiveness, and 
reinforced many of the findings o f Fleck's paper about the need for integration. It used 
economic performance as the measure of success, analysing how companies generate and use 
wealth. It describes a manufacturing enterprise "as a highly complex and sensitive organism -
with boundless options in its choice of markets, processes and product range", (p. xiv). 
Reference is made to the ripple effect whereby any decision by one area of an organisation 
affects operations elsewhere. 
• An article, "Britain's Best Factories", (Management Today, 1989, pp. 68-96), showed how 
performance in firms might be improved and the size of the benefits attainable through the 
appropriate use of technology. 
• An internal DTI Manufacturing Management study ( M A M , 1988) (see appendix G on M90s) o f 
the problems faced by manufacturing SMEs in using new technology and management systems 
provided evidence o f lack of knowledge in the strategic implementation o f A M T . SMEs could 
not give continuous time to projects for implementing new technology and management 
systems, and were unable to field suitably qualified staff to resource project work. Firms often 
learned (sometimes too late) by their own mistakes. This lack of resources suggested SMEs 
should make good their management shortfall by hiring external consultants. 
The evidence had shown that most SMEs were not realising the benefits of new technology, and 
consequently there was a market failure. Integration o f business applications was seen as 
fundamental to competitiveness, and failure to achieve the expected benefits was put down to 
A M T not being employed strategically and to achieve system integration. Moreover, firms failed to 
adopt a holistic approach in planning and implementation through a lack o f understanding of what 
was viewed as a complex subject. 
As SME management generally has limited time to plan, and as CI had successfully shown the 
effectiveness subsidising consultancy in compensating for a lack of qualified resources within 
SMEs, officials felt that the best approach in reducing market failure was to encourage firms to hire 
external advisors by offering grants. 
H.2.3 Test Validity of Idea 
A minister's request at a meeting with the Head of the Research and Technology Policy (RTP) 
Division triggered the formal structuring of ideas for MPI. The Minister was concerned by the low 
rate of expenditure of the Innovation Budget and asked for proposals for new initiatives. Officials 
in DTl's MTD seized the opportunity to proceed, and sent a minute to senior management (Grade 5 
level) outlining the case for MPI. The minute suggested there was enough evidence to justify 
funding MPI and that resources should be committed to develop a formal case for support. The 
minute briefly described the perceived market failures and outlined the strategy for addressing 
them. Fleck's paper (Fleck, 1988) was presented in parallel to reinforce the argument for support. 
At the same time, other parties with an interest in any resulting scheme were advised of initial 
thinking and invited to comment. The comments received supported the proposals and were 
forwarded to line management to strengthen the case for proceeding. DTI budgetary authorities 
were advised of proposals so that they could provisionally confirm the availability of funds. Their 
response set the *ball park' figure for programme costs which was presented in the outline case to 
management. Permission to proceed was received in the form of a minute. 
H.2.4 ROAME Development: Identification of Market Failure 
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The first step was to substantiate and define the market failures more accurately. Work involved 
closer examination of the previously identified sources, and research of the following additional 
sources of information: 
• An internal paper prepared by.ACOST Sub-Committee on Emerging Technologies, 
• The PA report, (DTI, 1989) (see appendix G, on M90s) 
• A Survey of UK manufacturing, largely of SMEs, conducted by A T Kearney (AT Kearney. 
1989a). 
• A paper on Manufacturing as a Competitive Weapon, (A T Kearney, 1989b). 
• A report for the former Scottish Development Agency (SDA) on The penetration of AMT into 
100 companies, mostly SMEs, (SDA, 1988). 
• Inter\'iews by the author with officials, SDA, senior consultants in large consultancies, a scheme 
contractor, and in Germany with Professor Hans-Jurgen Warnecker, then Managing Director of 
the Institute for Industrial Manufacturing and Management, Universit>' of Stuttgart. 
H.2.4.1 SMEs failing to realise the benefits afforded by new technology. 
An unpublished paper (held on file) prepared by the ACOST A M T Sub-Committee claimed that 
the rapid advances in manufacturing technology offered major opportunities for increased 
competitiveness. Further support came from the article "Britain's Best Factories" (Management 
Today, 1989, pp. 68-96) which looked at case studies of firms which had employed AMTs 
effectively. By way of reinforcing the significance of these benefits, the poor results of the General 
Motors (GM) Saturn project was quoted as an example which was given in Fleck's paper (Fleck, 
1988). Fleck reported an overall reduction in productivity in the GM plant following the 
introduction of new technology. 
H.2.4.2 Integration of Business Operations is Key 
The wisdom of adopting a strategic approach in the implementation of AMT, in terms of the 
benefits which could accrue, was then argued. ACOST (1991, pp. 11- 13) had referred to the 
importance of new technologies being fully integrated into a company's strategic plan, i f their 
application was to be effective. The paper stressed the need for a wider definition o f AMT to be 
taken, in whicii management techniques such as MRP and JIT are also treated as technologies, with 
all of them implemented within an integrated framework for the whole enterprise. 
ACOST's findings were reinforced by Fleck's view that it is the effective use of technology which 
is important in achieving competitiveness. Effectiveness arises from the integration of all 
components within and associated with the manufacturing process. Fleck attributed fails in 
productivity to technologies being installed on an application by application basis (bottom up 
approach), without taking account of the inter-operational requirements between component 
systems. Fleck also presented the case for information integration, so that the system components 
act as a cohesive whole. 
A T Kearney (1989a, 1989b) also saw integration as a key element in the path to success, so 
supporting Fleck's arguments. DTI quoted A T Kearney's reference to integration as being much 
more than a manufacturing concern. For A M T to be successful, factor>' automation needs 
involvement and an understanding of other areas, such as market requirements. Officials concluded 
that 'integration' should be a key feature in the design of MPl. 
To discover the topics likely to be important to SMEs in holistic planning, officials turned to the 
first version of the PA report (PA, 1989). This drew anention to the importance o f companies 
adopting strategies which promoted nexibilit>' in what they produced, and which could respond 
quickly to market changes, thereby achieving competitiveness (pp. 126-128). 
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In support for the holistic approach, DTI commissioned the Production Engineering Research 
Association (PERA), to research six of their A M T consultancy cases (PERA, 1990). PERA 
compared three projects which had failed through the firms not adopting a strategic approach with 
three others where the use of A M T had been planned in the context o f the whole business. The 
evidence was clear: success stemmed from adopting a strategic approach. 
H.2.4.3 Ineffectiveness due to failure to employ AMT strategically to achieve system 
integration. 
The survey conducted by A T Kearney on the status of A M T in UK Industry found high use of 
AMT, but integration of the component systems (e.g. CAD, and MRPII), to be limited. A M T had 
been introduced on a largely piecemeal basis. A bottom up approach had been adopted, treating 
problems as isolated technical solutions, with no integration with management. 
The report commissioned by the SDA confirmed A T Kearney's findings, recording little integration 
of AMT implementations (SDA, 1988, pp. 5, 6). SDA also stated ''Overall firms have not achieved 
the cost, efficiency, and flexibility benefits they expected . . ."(p. 16). It concluded that whilst the 
penetration of A M T was high, the technology was not being implemented for competitive 
advantage, that is, strategically (p. 6). 
H.2.4.4 Failure to adopt a holistic approach to implementing AMT due to not 
understanding a complex subject. 
Officials needed evidence to demonstrate the barriers preventing firms from adopting a strategic 
approach to planning their use of A M T . The SDA report was cited: managers of A M T projects 
were generally recruited from 'technician' grade staff, who were inadequately skilled to resource 
strategic projects. SDA reported a lack o f the necessary training in the firms surveyed, highlighting 
low investment in management training in A M T and manufacturing strategy. The report found 
companies consequently frequently lacked the vision to become industry leaders in their market 
sectors. 
A face to face interview was conducted with SDA as part o f the task o f developing the rationale for 
MPI). SDA confirmed the findings of their A M T study from their staffs direct involvement with 
Scottish SMEs. Interviews with leading consultancy organisations further substantiated these 
conclusions. (SDA also said that SMEs were generally unaware of their needs. Many larger 
companies still operated in a compartmentalised way, with departments working in isolation. 
Consequently their new graduates, being a minority, become embroiled in the existing culture. 
When they move on to work for an SME, they take this isolation culture with them, so maintaining 
the status quo.) 
Fleck argued that the rules of planning and implementation were complex and not understood. 
Discussions with large consultancies confirmed Fleck's views and the inability o f firms to plan 
holistically. 
Officials now had the weight of evidence from which to conclude that most SMEs were unlikely to 
possess the multi-disciplinary skills to resource projects for the strategic implementation o f new 
technologies: a market problem. 
H.2.4.5 Additional Areas of Market Inhibition 
Nan Availability of Tools: The internal Manufacturing Management study found the supply o f ' s e l f 
help packages m the holistic application o f A M T to be inadequate. Fleck's observation (Fleck, 
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1988) that research was needed to identify best practice in strategic planning and implementation 
lent weight to this finding. 
Shortage of Supply in the Market-place: Colleagues in the EI Division, were asked about the skill 
profiles of the listed consultancies. EI Division told the then Manufacturing Technology Division 
(MTD) that their projects were largely narrowly confined to specific areas of a business, such as 
design and quality. Whilst the number of listed organisations was large, the experience of each one 
was limited in scope. MTD also interviewed several of the larger consultancy organisations, who 
suggested that although they were now beginning to work on the strategic planning of AMT for 
clients, they themselves were still on a 'learning curve'. 
Discussion with large consultancies led MTD to believe that wide experience was limited to about 
six larger companies, insufficient to meet the potential demand. Furthermore, even in these 
organisations, staff were also still on a learning curve as the holistic approach was relatively new. 
These consultancies targeted their services at companies larger than SMEs, because they were 
better able to fund the project costs involved. 
Lack of Suitable Training Packages - MTD was aware of a lack of traiiiing packages to help 
people gain the necessary skills in holistic planning. Its view was later confirmed in a study by the 
Engineering Training Authority, jointly sponsored by DT! and the Employment Department. 
H.2.4.6 The rewards of appropriate use of technolo^ provide good reason to find 
ways to help SMEs 
"Britain's Best Factories" (Management Today, 1989) had included case studies demonstrating the 
substantial benefits which could accrue through the strategic use of AMT. During an interview, 
Herm Professor Wamecker provided evidence of the benefits enjoyed by German companies 
through good integration. He shared DTPs view that a holistic approach to planning is the key to 
competitiveness. 
Officials had collected substantial evidence of the fundamental importance of firms adopting a 
holistic approach in the use of AMT. Few SMEs were doing so, an important reason for their lack 
of competitiveness. Lack of multi-disciplinary skills was the main reason for failing to use 
technology effectively. This was a primary market failure. The commercial benefits of appropriate 
implementation were demonstrable, providing the rationale for DTI to act to help firms. 
Research showed that market failure was not confined to the SMEs, but also applied on the supply 
side of the market. This needed to be addressed if firms were to receive the range of services they 
needed to undertake strategic projects. Officials therefore concluded that MPI should not restrict 
assistance to SMEs, but should aim to advance competence in the implementation of new 
technologies throughout the AMT market, to extend the benefits of the programme beyond the 
participants. 
H.3 Developing the Delivery Strategy 
The internal Manufacturing Management (MAM, 1988) study found that senior management in 
SMEs were unlikely to commit sufficient time to manage AMT projects fully. Coupled with a 
general lack of the required skills, MTD concluded that firms would need to augment their 
resources by hiring external advisors. Evaluation reports for the previous AMT Consultancy 
scheme and CI, showed such an approach was effective, MTD adopted the same proven strategy of 
encouraging the use of advisors by awarding financial grants. How the delivery strategy was 
developed to address perceived problems is now discussed. 
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H.3.1 Barriers to Commitment to Strategic Planning 
During interviews with consultancies, MTD \vas told that the complexity of the planning and 
implementation tasks required staff at senior consultant level. Early experience suggested that a 
project fee of £ 1OOK typically covered the cost of planning and the initial stage of implementation. 
The consultancy staff interviewed thought that such a high level of costs would deter SME 
managers from committing to strategic projects. Experience of the former AMT Studies scheme 
and operation of the Consultancy Initiatives supported the argument. Furthermore, companies were 
faced with a high level of risk, because the methodologies and procedures for the strategic planning 
and implementation had not been adequately researched. The combination of cost and risk was 
judged likely to deter firms from adopting a strategic approach. 
These barriers provided officials with the *Additionality' case for MPI. Without financial support, 
SMEs would not commit resources to plan holistically. 
H.3.2 Selection of Delivery Mechanisms 
H.3.2.1 Overcoming the Barriers to Use of Consultants 
Central to the operation of MPI was encouragement of SMEs to hire external advisors to help with 
their strategic projects. MPI used grant funding to reduce the barrier of cost and risk which 
prevented SMEs from committing the necessary resources. 
H.3,2.2 Lack of Consultancy Service Provision 
The marketing opportunity represented by the scheme grants was used to motivate smaller 
consultancies and academic departments to form advisor consortia having the collective expertise 
to resource holistic project work. 
H.3.2.3 Raising AMT Competencies - Within MPI Companies 
Officials wanted supported firms to be left with a lasting ability to plan holistically. Where 
appropriate, advisors provided on site training to meet identified deficiencies. More important was 
the insistence that a 'hand in glove' relationship must be built between SME project staff and the 
members of their advisor teams. Knowledge was transferred from the individual consultants to the 
SME staff through mutually shared experience. 
H.3.2.4 Raising AMT Competencies - Within MPI Advisor Organisations 
Similarly close working relationships allowed transfer of knowledge from company staff to their 
advisors. Fleck had argued the case for the contribution made by firms in helping advisors 
understand the art of strategic planning (see also below). 
H.3.2.5 Raising AMT Competencies - The Wider A M T Community 
Holistic planning needed research. Fleck had argued that the rules were complex and not 
understood. He suggested the factory should become a laboratory where best practice approaches in 
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planning and implementation would emerge through experiment. He emphasised the important role 
of manufacturing staff in the experimentation process, with their experience providing a valuable 
contribution towards good practice methodologies. Fleck's observations gave rise to analytical co-
ordination within MPI, which was carried out by the London Business School (LBS) under 
Professor Hill. 
The objective of Analytical Co-ordination, (or Technical Tracking as it later became known) was to 
ensure that the 'good practice' lessons learnt through experiment within the MPI projects were 
formally recorded. This would enable DTI to extend the benefit beyond those directly involved in 
the programme, using dissemination activities like those of M90s. 
The team from LBS first monitored work within the programme on a project by project basis, to 
identify those planning and implementation mechanisms which contribute to success or failure. The 
team then reviewed each mechanism looking across the whole programme for instances of repeated 
application and its correlation with consistency of performance. By comparing results across 
projects in this way, a set of best practice approaches to the application of AMT would be 
compiled. 
The LBS team also tracked project work, developing two other sets of data. Team members 
recorded and identified potential areas for research, where solutions in the form of commercially 
available products do not exist. They also compiled statistics about the training recommended by 
the advisers, with information to be eventually fed back to the training providers. 
Analytical co-ordination was also designed to identify case studies of worthwhile demonstration 
projects. These would form the 'seed corn' of best practice messages, upon which new awareness 
activities could be founded. It was also expected that the results of MPI would feed into university 
courses, by the members of the LBS team talking to their colleagues and via findings published in 
academic journals. The author is able to confirm that a number of such articles were published. 
A further role of the LBS team was to feed back the findings of auditing projects to the project 
teams in firms embarking on an MPI project. This feedback acted as a sweetener to encourage later 
firms to be receptive to auditing of their projects, as they would learn from the experience of others 
and thereby enhance the value of their own work. 
H.3.2.6 Lack of Self Help Tools 
It was expected that the lack of tools to aid the planning process might be alleviated in two ways. 
Firstly it was hoped that new products would emerge as members of the Tracking Team advised 
others of the good practice methodologies discovered. Secondly it was intended that the case study 
information could form the basis of'self help' packages. 
H.3.2,7 Lack of Awareness in SMEs of the Need for Holistic Planning 
Feedback from M90s events showed a lack of awareness amongst SMEs of the need for holistic 
planning. Firms targeted by MPI would have to be educated about its advantages. This would be 
best done by professionals within advisor organisations, talking to board members on a one-to-one 
basis. The potential for firms to receive grants represented a marketing opportunity for advisors. 
This feature was successfully used to motivate advisor organisations to employ their experts in a 
sales role, so helping to market the scheme and securing agreement by SME boards to commit to 
strategic planning (see also appendix K, section K.3.5). 
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H.3.2.8 Targeting of MPI 
MPI was largeied at SMEs employing between 100 and 500 siafF, (ROAME, 1990, paragraph 
2.10). The upper figure was set by the European Union (EU) and government policy, which defined 
an SME as a company employing up to 500 people. The lower figure was arrived at from the PA 
Report and inter\'iews with consultants. PA (1989, pp. 126-128) drew attention to the need for 
firms to reorganise to adapt to the market. Consultants affirmed this and said that companies faced 
serious difficulties in responding to the market drivers because of poor communication within their 
departmental structures. 
This served further to reinforce the rationale for good integration: firms needed to achieve better 
integration of their business systems. DTI was advised that only the larger SMEs, employing more 
than 80 staff, would be likely to have formal structures and be able to benefit significantly from 
MPI. Thus 80 staff was set as the lower limit for eligibility. 
While writing the ROAME (ROAME, 1990) officials accepted that some firms employing less than 
80 people might benefit from an MPI project (paragraph 2.10). And so it turned out, with a several 
firms with 50 to 100 staff managing successful projects. 
Officials were also anxious to avoid conflict in the ^market' with the Consultancy Initiatives, and 
especially the Manufacturing Initiative. Differences in operational characteristics differentiated the 
two programmes. CI programmes offered support for consultancy in specific areas of business 
planning, like Design and Quality. By contrast MPI encouraged firms to take a holistic approach to 
planning, and all aspects of running a business can be examined under the scheme. 
Secondly, the Manufacturing Initiative statistics (held by PERA) which detail the take up of grants 
according to company size, revealed that companies employing more than 100 staff represented 
only a small proportion of all applications. 
Colleagues in El Division suggested that the lower level of participation by larger SMEs arose 
from the upper limit of 15 man-days consultancy. It was argued that this was sufficient for smaller 
firms, but in larger firms a substantial proportion of the 15 days would be spent by consultants in 
'getting to know and understand' the firms operational environment. This left too little time for 
analysing problems and developing recommendations, and was not perceived by larger SMEs as 
representing value-for-money. Furthemiore the 15 man-day limit made a holistic approach 
difficult, almost irrespective of company size. MPI overcame this situation by offering larger grants 
to support more consultancy man-days. 
The role of Technical Tracking also differentiates MPI from CI. In CI the lack of tracking means 
that any new knowledge gained within supported projects remains with the applicant and his 
consultant. As previously described, the tracking mechanism within MPI allows a wider audience 
to benefit from the fruits of project work. 
H.3.3 Setting Objectives 
H.3.3.1 Number of Grants 
The target number of projects to be funded under MPI was set at 175. The target partly refiected 
financial constraints, but sufficient projects were needed to provide meaningful analysis of their 
success. In setting the target, the BSO Report on the Census Production (BSO 1990), indicated that 
there were about 3,500 eligible SMEs in the target range. Officials thought it sensible to aim at the 
participation of 5% of these firms (175 firms), in the light of the following considerations: 
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• The previous AMT studies programme suggested an average rejection/withdrawal rale of about 
25% would be likely for MPI (NEL, 1992, pp. 6, 13). Hence around 235 applications would be 
needed to achieve 175 grants. Experience from elsewhere, for example in operating the previous 
advisory schemes and CI, suggested it would be unrealistic to expect a greater response. 
• 175 projects would give a reasonable spread of projects across industry sectors and regions of 
the country, and provide a large enough sample for the results of Technical Tracking to be 
meaningful. 
The budgetary authority within DTI had already, agreed a figure of around £IOM for the scheme. 
Administration and 'tracking' costs had been estimated as amounting to £I.85M, leaving some 
£8M for grant support. The £8M figure constrained officials from going above 175 projects, 
assuming a consultancy fee of around £100K, 50% funded. 
H.3.3.2 Increase in Advisor Resources 
The target of creating 30 advisor consortia was based on a consensus reached after discussions with 
colleagues and AMT practitioners. The figure of 30 consortia was achieved. 
The estimate of six consultancies with the necessary expertise provided the starting point in setting 
targets. A five fold increase seemed reasonable to ensure the viability of the new consortia during 
the life of MPI and beyond. If projects were equally distributed, then each consortium could expect 
five projects, a sufficient business incentive to seed their formation. If, as was more likely, business 
was not equally distributed, each consortium was likely to receive a minimum of three projects. 
Three still represented a sufficiently good business opportunity to make it worthwhile for partners 
to invest in the necessary stafF training. 
H.3.3.3 Dissemination of the Lessons 
It was intended to exploit the demonstrator effect in MPI, as a means of encouraging other firms to 
plan their implementations of AMT hoHstically. It was planned that a high proportion of the 
successful firms which received support, would agree to becoming demonstrator firms within the 
M90s Inside UK Enterprise ( lUKE) programme. Only those firms whose projects were successful 
and merit worthy would be invtited to join the programme. A target of establishing 100 
demonstration firms from the SMEs receiving support, was set. 
To enable other 'spread of best practice' activities to be developed which could further disseminate 
the good practice captured in MPI, the analytical co-ordination team was required to prepare a 
report recording the best practice lessons that had been learned. 
H.3.3.4 Objectives for the S M E Participants. 
Value for money considerations required market failures to be addressed. It was insufficient to 
measure success by the uptake of grants. A more accurate measure of performance was the level of 
demonstrable benefits accruing to applicants. The business metrics in Britain's Best Factories 
Survey (Management Today, 1989, pp. 68-96), were used as a benchmark in setting targets for 
improvement. Targets were set for items such as Work in Progress, Finished Goods Stocks, and 
On-time Delivery, and were defined in terms of the average achieved across the projects supported. 
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H.3.3.5 Project Features 
To obtain support under MPI firms had to satisfy the DTI's standard set of Eligibility Criteria. The 
projects also had to help the SMEs overcome the difficulties perceived for this sector. The projects 
therefore had to display a number of characteristics associated with planning holistically. The 
evidence collected to define the market failures showed the actions firms must take to become 
'world class'. These actions were listed in the ROAME statement (ROAME, 1990, annex i, 
paragraphs 7-9) as features to be included in eligible MPI projects, as follows: 
• projects must encompass the whole business; 
• projects must cover both planning and implementation of new technologies and management 
systems; 
• firms must commit to provide the necessary training. 
H.3.3.6 Administration of Funding within Projects 
MPI projects were divided into two main phases, the first dealing with strategic planning, and the 
second covering the initial stage of implementation. The level of grant funding was 50% of the 
total fees levied by the advisors, up to a maximum of £50,000. 
Of the total grant awarded, firms could use between £25K and £40K for the planning phase, with 
the rest allocated for implementation. The reason for splitting grants in this way was firstly to help 
firms overcome the difficulties encountered as they respond to planning recommendations, and 
secondly to motivate applicants to commit to implementation. 
The logic behind having a fixed range for the planning grant, with the balance for implementation, 
was as follows. Smaller SMEs, falling in the lower part of the range of company size, were thought 
unlikely to incur sufficient fees during planning stage to qualify for the full £40K of funding. 
However, these firms were less likely to be able to resource implementation than their larger 
counterparts and so needed more assistance with implementation. 
Strategic planning is known to be expensive and even for smaller firms in the target range, costs 
were unlikely to be less than £50K., and with a 50% grant this justified the lower limit of £25K. 
Applications for less than £25K suggested the SME had already undertaken substantial work, and 
hence no additionality existed, and so it was ineligible for support. 
The administration of grant payments differed from those in the CI. Firms had to pay all the 
consultancy fees, and then submit a claim for payment. This avoided criticism that applicants might 
be supported beyond the permitted level of grant funding. 
H.3.4 Prepare and Submit ROAME for Approval 
As the official responsible for the introduction of MPI, the author is able to confirm that the 
sequence of approval for MPI was the presentation of draf\ proposals to the AMT Requirements 
Committee (AMTC), then submission of the formal case to the Individual Programmes Comminee 
(IPC), and finally ministers. Evidence of proposals for MPI going before AMTC is also contained 
in 'the files'. Inspection of the file papers shows that MPI was presented to A M T C on 10 April 
1990, where the proposals received the committee's endorsement. A minute dated 21 November 
1990, introduces a paper to be presented to AMTC, detailing proposals for the role of the 
Analytical Co-ordinator. The minute records MPI having received ministerial approval. The 
minutes of the 4 December meeting of AMTC, record the committee's discussion of the Analytical 
Co-ordination role. It was noted that "Tltere had to be a degree of independence to avoid criticism 
of biased operators''. It was further suggested that DTI look "at the Business Schools for an 
individual as opposed to an institution". File papers further record the MPI ROAME being 
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submitted to the Treasury, and the scheme being notified to the European Commission under the 
State Aids Rules, (see chapter 6, section 6.4.5). 
H.4 Making the Ground Fertile For Approval 
Officials prepared the ground for obtaining approval for MPI in a number of ways. A contract was 
let to Edinburgh University to prepare a digest of the main points raised in Fleck's paper. This was 
passed to Mr. John Barber of DTI's former Economics Division, who was a prominent member of 
the IPC. The digest convinced him of the need to act and secured his support within IPC. 
Secondly, officials circulated draft versions of the ROAME statement to other members of IPC for 
their comments, which were incorporated into the final draf^ . In this way officials built support for 
their proposals through involving members of IPC in the design process, giving them a sense of 
ownership. It also placed them in a position where it would be difficult not to lend their support in 
committee, as they would be seen to be arguing against themselves. 
ACOST was advised of further deficiencies in the market-place and were passed outlined proposals 
to address the failures. This infiuenced the recommendations in ACOSPs report, paving the way 
for ministerial backing, making it more difficult for [PC to reject the proposals. 
In conversations the author was advised by Dr Draper, and Mr John Barber, a senior economist in 
DTI, that a tour of manufacturing SMEs was arranged for the Industry Minister concerned. During 
his visits to companies he learnt first hand of their problems. Dr Draper believed that his influence 
(the Industry Minister) was critical to the Secretary of State giving approval for the programme. 
H.5 Programme Implementation 
H.5.1 Administer Programme 
Consultancy programmes involve the award of large numbers of grants, and the total expenditure over 
the life of a programme can be high. Officials therefore regard it as essential take steps to ensure good 
value for money. The arrangements made for administering MPI to ensure value are now discussed. 
The ROAME objectives and project eligibility criteria were included in the Invitation to Tender 
specification for the appointment of the scheme contractor and in the scheme guidelines, so that the 
contractor would deliver the programme in accordance with the policy agreed by the IPC. 
Organisation of MPI centred around the Scheme Contractor, SAC Hitec, and subsequently re-
named Ricardo Hitec, who was appointed by Competitive Tender. The Scheme Contractor acted as 
the department's agent, responsible for the day to day operation and administration of the scheme. 
The main tasks included: 
• appraisal of project proposals against the scheme's eligibility criteria; 
• award of grants, monitoring the progress of project work, payment of claims; 
• promotion of the scheme as described above; 
• listing of Advisors; 
• programme monitoring, including the overseeing of Technical Tracking. 
In support of both appraising applications and project monitoring, Ricardo's staff undertook site 
visits to the applicant companies. 
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H.5.2 Listing of Advisors 
To ensure success in project work and the achievement of programme aims, Ricardo were required 
to Mist' only advisors qualified to undertake strategic planning. Here officials were adopting best 
practice derived from the previous advisory schemes and CI. Applicants for listing had to submit 
papers on how they would approach strategic planning and implementation of AMT, and declare 
their team members. Teams likely to be suitable were then interviewed to confirm their 
understanding and hence their qualification to undertake work. 
The term Misted' was employed to describe programme advisors, because it does not imply a 
guarantee. 'Approved' might imply a government-backed quality of service guarantee from the 
advisors. If an SME did not receive an acceptable service, it might sue the department for 
damages.. 
H.5.3 Supervision of the Contractor's Work 
H.5.3.1 Progress Reporting 
The contractor had to keep expenditure within budget, and report progress to officials in monthly 
management meetings with the department. Ricardo also submitted quarterly management reports, 
together with a final end of scheme report recording their view of performance. Dissemination of 
the lessons being learnt was undertaken in workshop events for participating SMEs and 
consultants. Ricardo's quarterly reports on all scheme activities (including work undertaken on 
technical tracking) recorded the progress of the scheme including expenditure, spend profiles and 
projections. These allowed the performance of the programme to be monitored, and tuned in the 
light of experience. Quarterly progress meetings chaired by a senior official (Grade 5) were also 
held with the scheme contractor, to monitor expenditure and discuss performance. 
H.5.3.2 Preparation of Scheme Guidelines 
DTI produced and issued a set of scheme guidelines to guide Ricardo in the administration of MPI. 
and maintain government standards of administration and operation. The guidelines contained 
details such as the scheme Eligibility Criteria, programme objectives, and the types of projects to 
be funded. Ricardo used them to develop their operational procedures, and to assess the eligibility 
of programme participants. By their use of the guidelines, Ricardo's staff became effectively an 
extension of the DTI Mn-house' team. 
H.5.3.3 MPI Review Board 
The administration of MPI was overseen by an independent 'review board' which operated in an 
advisory capacity. The role of the panel was to arbitrate in marginal cases about the award of grants 
and the listing of advisors, and make recommendations in cases where consultants had to be 
forcibly delisted. The board monitored performance of the programme, and recommended changes 
in design. Members of the board were representatives from Industry, Consultancy, DTI and LBS, 
with Ricardo Hitec providing the secretariat. 
From the department's point of view, the review board usefully protected officials and contractors 
staff from criticism arising from implementing the actions they recommended. Officials could 
argue they had acted on impartial well-informed advice. 
139 
It proved unnecessary for the Review Board to consider any cases of marginality or the delisting of 
organisations, but it did recommended minor changes to programme design which served to 
enhance its performance. For instance, it recommended that DTI relax a requirement for SMEs to 
use competitive tender to appoint advisors because many firms did not have the skills to use 
tendering effectively. 
H.5.3.4 Administration of Individual Projects 
In administering grant funding, the scheme contractor found that planning was so complex that this 
stage had to be sub-divided into the separate phases of definition and final planning. When 
submitting applications for fiinding, firms did not understand their problems well enough to plan 
for their real needs. The definition phase enabled the operation of the business and its markets to be 
fully researched, and the scope of the final planning phase appropriately defined. 
H.5.4 Promote Programme 
It was intended to launch MPI a few months after appointment of the scheme contractor, allowing 
him time to become ready to support the administration of the scheme. However, immediately 
following his appointment, the Opposition tabled a debate in the House of Commons, challenging 
the government's commitment to Industry. The Secretary of State (SoS), asked his officials to 
prepare the evidence for him to give the House to counter the Opposition's claim. Officials listed 
the current programmes for Industry and by way of reinforcement gave details of the forthcoming 
MPI programme. The SoS in presenting evidence of the governments' commitment to Industry in 
the debate announced the future introduction of the programme, and effectively launched the 
scheme. 
A submission to the SoS (Peter Lilley) dated 18 February 1991, refers to the SoS agreeing to a 
fonnal launch of MPI (alongside the launch of the SME Technical Advisory Service). Attached to 
the covering minute of the submission were the press notice, the main points for his opening 
remarks, and a 'Question and Answer' briefing. The SoS is asked if he is 'content' with these. The 
press release gave the reasons for introducing the programme and outlined the operational details. 
Numerous articles appeared in trade journals (copies held on the MPI Launch File), which served 
to promote the programme. The launch took place at 4 p.m. on 19 February 1991. The press launch 
was successful in achieving wide press coverage.. 
The scheme contractor, Ricardo Hitec, was given the main responsibility for promoting MPI. 
Unlike EI, MPI had no budget allocated for a national advertising campaign. Not only were funds 
inadequate for expensive advertising, but it was not the best way to communicate MPI's message to 
SMEs. Promotional activities were aimed at Uvo sections of the community, the target SMEs and 
the advisors. Ricardo produced a four-colour brochure explaining the aims of MPI, the need for 
firms to adopt a strategic approach to business planning, and provided details of the support 
available. 
The brochure was circulated to target firms, with a covering letter inviting applications. Firms were 
identified by asking a publications house for a mailing list of firms meeting the MPI eligibility 
criteria. The brochure contained a tear off form, which recipients were invited to complete and 
return to express interest. The form requested only basic details, such as the general line of business 
and company size. The MPI team filtered out ineligible firms and sent the rest a ftill application 
form with guidance notes for completion. 
The two stage approach allowed firms to complete a simple initial form, increasing the chance of 
them coming forward. The main application form asked for detailed information about the 
applicant companies, which captured the current status of their business activities, and the board's 
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vision for the future. This allowed the 'technical tracking' to compare the 'before and after' 
situation. 
Consultancy and other advisor organisations were also informed of programme details including 
the need for advisor listing, and invited to participate in the scheme. Organisations were identified 
by DTI staff and Ricardo's from their own knowledge of their market. Ricardo and DTI both 
secured further exposure for the programme by encouraging relevant trade joumals to print articles 
about the scheme. Ricardo, in collaboration with DTfs Regional Offices, organised promotional 
seminars to which consultants and target firms were invited. The seminars brought advisor 
organisations into direct contact with potential business in a non-threatening way. To underpin 
these promotional activities, Ricardo provided a help line to answer questions from SMEs and 
advisor organisations: this encouraged firms to return expression of interest forms and provided 
CEOs with help to complete their formal applications. Tlie consultants themselves also helped 
promote MPI, motivated by the market opportunities created by the programme (see also appendix 
F, section F.9, which provides a similar example). PA Consulting, for example, mounted a 
promotional seminar for potential clients. Other consultancies informed their eligible clients of the 
support available under MPI, as part of their routine contacts with firms. 
H.5.5 Close Programme 
When MPI was launched, no public announcement was made about when the programme would 
close. Officials expected that by the end of the programme, sufficient cases would have been 
completed (displaying technical diversity) to present a strong case to ministers for an extension. 
This prediction was based on the take-up profiles of existing grant programmes. The initial low 
take-up rate, due mainly to the recession, weakened the case for extension. In the event, however, 
extension was precluded by changes in government policy. An arranged Written Pariiamentary 
Question gave notice of closure, (see chapter 7, section 7.8). 
H.6 Evaluation Strategy 
At the time of writing this thesis, the drafting of the MPI evaluation report had not been completed. 
The author was however able to study a draft version (DTI, 1997a, pp. 3-4) prepared by DTI's 
Assessment Unit which recorded the evaluation strategy. 
The evaluation method involved face to face interviews with the scheme contractor, the DTI 
programme manger (the author), the analytical co-ordinator (Professor Hill), assisted 
companies and programme consultants. A postal survey was conducted with questionnaires 
sent to all of the firms receiving support. In total 22 face to face interviews were conducted 
with applicants, and 104 postal questionnaires sent out and 47 replies received. The final 
analytical Co-ordination report, prepared by Professor Hill (Hill, 1996a), was also employed 
as a source of evidence. 
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APPEIVDIX I ANALYSIS OF EXISTING GUIDANCE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
This appendix describes the work undertaken to identify areas where the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines are inadequate, in providing guidance to officials engaged in the design and 
implementation of support programmes. The approach adopted was to look at the support provided 
by the Guidelines, in each of the areas identified in chapter 8, section 8.10, and using the process 
model built in chapters 5 to 8, determine where guidance was inadequate. Where the Guidelines 
were found to be deficient, recommendations for new, additional guidance were proposed. 
Section 8.10 found the main stages of the process and their component parts to be as follows: 
(i) Issue Identification (chapter 6) 
• Conception and Validation of Programme Ideas (chapter 6, section 6.2) 
• Develop Programme ROAME statements (chapter 6, section 6.3) 
• ROAME Approval (chapter 6, section 6.4 and 6.5) 
(ii) Programme Implementation (chapter 7) 
(iii) Evaluation and Feedback (chapter 8) 
The following text details the results of analysis in each of these areas, and the recommendations 
made. 
1.2 Issue Identification 
1.2.1 Constraints on the Process 
0 
Chapter 5 section 5.2 discussed the factors which constrain the design process. They included 
determinants such as the overarching UK and European Commission (EC) State Aids policies. Acts 
of Parliament, the conditions under which it is appropriate for government to intervene in the 
market, and the financial constraints. It was highlighted in section 5.2.7 how these factors act 
universally throughout the design process, but in the author's view it is during 'Issue Identification' 
where officials are called upon most often, to take account of these constraints. Guidance on each 
area of constraint is now discussed in the order raised in chapter 5, section 5.2. 
E C State Aids - European policy on State Aids is well detailed. Guidance (DTI, 1999a, pp. 
95-97) describes the conditions, which are set by the European Competition Directorate 
(DG IV), for how member states may fund project work in their territories. DTI (1999a) 
explains how the State Aids Rules apply "to aid granted by the State through State 
resources", p. 95. How this expression is interpreted by the European Court of Justice to 
include central, regional, or local government, or any body appointed to administer aid, is 
described. 
The levels of funding allowed are detailed, the special funding rules applying in the EC 
'assisted areas' are defined, and definition of a small and medium sized enterprise (SME) 
set out. Procedures to be adhered to for notifying the Commission of funding plans are 
summarised and the procedures for reporting the progress of programmes to the E C are 
detailed. The Commission's powers to halt aid and require the repayment of aid are also 
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described. That such actions can be extremely damaging to companies and governments 
alike, is emphasised by the Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, p. 97). 
The information provided in the Guidelines is observed to be sufficiently comprehensive to allow 
officials to undertake design of support policy such that they are conformant with the EC's State 
Aids Rules. That all interventions must conform to State Aids rules implies that the guidance 
provided be also equally applicable to R & T and advisory schemes (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1). 
Modification of guidance is therefore considered unnecessary. 
The UK Legislative Framework for Industrial Support - Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 
described the role of Acts of Parliament. They were described as providing the legal 
authority for government departments to spend money (HMT, 1999, paragraphs 2.1.2-
2.1.5), and thus their role fundamental. 
However inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines shows that whilst earlier versions of the 
guidance (DTI, 1992, p. 11) refer to the Science and Technology Act, the recent versions (DTI, 
1996a, 1999a) do not. This is viewed by the author as an important omission. The term 'guidelines' 
is deliberately employed rather than 'rules', the latter suggesting a rigid interpretation of a 'code of 
conduct'. To be effective officials must be left some room for manoeuvre in interpreting guidance 
to accommodate the requirements of new or complex situations. In the author's opinion, guidance 
can only be correctly interpreted in these circumstances if officials not only understand ministers' 
wishes, and the detail of the State Aids Rules, but also only if they are also familiar with the 
powers which have been bestowed on the Secretary of State for Trade and'Industry, through the 
'Acts'. 
The DTI Finance Handbook {DT\, 1996b, chapter 5, annex 5.1) outlines the role of'Acts' and lists 
those of relevance to DTI. However as previously mentioned, officials responsible for developing 
programmes make little reference to the 'Handbook' in seeking advice on preparing ROAMEs. The 
situation is not helped by the fact that the document is not widely distributed. Unlike the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines copies of the Finance Handbook are restricted to the management 
units of the directorates. Thus officials engaged in the design process must ask staff in the 
management units for access to the document. 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.2, showed the principal acts employed as a legal basis for providing support 
to be both the Science and Technology and Industry Development Acts. Whilst the current version 
of the Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 2-31) advises officials that in preparing ROAMEs, they should 
consult the Finance Handbook, officials are not specifically referred to the section dealing with the 
Acts of Parliament. 
Officials should be better apprised of the role of'Acts'. In particular how the Science and 
Technology, and Industry Acts empower the Secretary of State to support businesses, should be 
incorporated into the proposed Design Handbook. Their relationship with what officials can and 
cannot fund would be explained. 
UK Government Policy - Chapter 5, section 5.2.3 showed that government policy is 
usually set out in government white papers. The 1996 version of the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines (DTI, 1996a, p. 8) referred to three white papers which have set out the broad 
policy aims in the area of innovation support policy (HMSO, 1993, 1994a, 1995a). 
Inspection of the 1999 version of the guidelines (DTI, 1999a) reveals that whilst it sets out 
DTI's objectives to promote 'enterprise' and 'innovation' (pp. 7, 9), no reference is made to 
those government white papers which impact on programme development. 
This omission is regarded as problematic. As described in section 5.2.3 it is important to 
continually remind officials of the government's priorities, such that interventions match 
policy requirements and proposals are thus more likely to be approved. White papers are 
the primary source of reference for statements describing government policy, and clear 
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advice needs to be added to guidance for officials to consult these documents to understand 
how programmes should be designed to be conformant with policy. 
Conditions for Government Intervention - Chapter 5, section 5.2.4 had shown the 
advisor>' type of scheme not to be supported, with market failures in such programmes not 
listed and discussed. Sub-section 5.2.2.2 analysed and described a proposed list of market 
failure categories for advisory programmes. 
Inspection oflhe Innovafion Budget Guidelines shows them to provide a detailed 
description of the conditions which must be present for it to be considered appropriate for 
the government to intervene in the 'market'. These are discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2 
and include the presence of market failure, additionality and the likelihood of securing 
VFM. What constitutes additionality and the factors which determine VFM, are well 
detailed in the guidelines. 
For the former, additionality is clearly described as situations in which government 
intervention is necessar>' to bring about changes that would not otherwise have happened. 
Examples of additionality cases are given, such as the acceleration of project timescales. 
For the latter, VFM is explained as being present when total project expenditure, that is 
government support plus the private sector contribution, is outweighed by the expected 
benefits of programme work. 
The additionality and the value for money arguments are applicable to the development of 
both R & T and Advisory programmes, as is indicated in the Finance Handbook (DTI, 
1996b, section 9.3, paragraph 9.3.5, and section 4.1, paragraph 4.1.8 respectively). Thus for 
both types of programme, current guidance in the Innovation Budget Guidelines on these 
topics is regarded as adequate, and enhancement of guidance not required. 
In the case of market failure, the Innovation Budget Guidelines provide a good definition of 
this condition, which is applicable to programmes generally. Market failure is defined as a 
circumstance where a defect exists in the working of market forces, or the functioning of 
the institutions which help the operation of firms (DTI, 1999a, p. 32). However the 
definition can be improved upon. Chapter 6 section 6.3.2 observed that what are described 
as market failures, are more accurately describable as 'inhibitors to firms taking action'. 
The author suggested that an alternative definition of market failure be adopted; that is, 
market failure is deemed to exist when firms face difficulties which they do not have the 
means to resolve, either because of a lack of resources within their organisation, or because 
the product or ser\'ice they require is not available in the market place. It is proposed that 
this definition be adopted in guidance. 
As discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2.4, the categories of market failure in R & T programmes are 
listed, and for each categor>' an expIanaior>' text is given which describes the nature of each t>'pe of 
failure in detail. Guidance therefore gives officials a clear picture of what conditions constitute 
market failure in R & T schemes. 
However sub-section 5.2.4.2 identified a major deficiency in the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines, which helps prejudice its suitability for wider use. As discussed above the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 32-33, 91-94) list the categories of market 
failure in R & T programmes, but not those of advisory schemes. Sub-section 5.2.4.2 
recorded the analysis of developing policy for advisory programmes, and proposed a list of 
categories of market failures for these schemes. It is proposed that these be listed and 
described in the new Design Handbook. 
Ministerial Priorities - Chapter 5, section 5.2.5 discussed how regular interaction between senior 
officials and their ministers enables officials to stay abreast of what issues are important to them. 
Guidance makes no reference to this input to the design process, which although to many may 
appear an obvious phenomenon, may to newly appointed civil ser\'ants be less so. In reminding 
people of the need to bear ministers priorities in mind when designing programmes, it would be 
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helpful to recommend that they monitor the dialogue between ministers and officials to become 
aware of what those priorities are. 
Finance - The financial issues surrounding the funding of programmes are well covered in the 
Intiovation Budget Guidelines, and enhancement of the guidance given is not seen as being 
required. Inspection of the 1999 version (DTI, 1999a) shows the permitted levels of funding to be 
detailed (pp. 19-20), the components of project expenditure which can be regarded as eligible costs 
in calculating the level of grant clearly staled (e.g. salar>' costs, overheads, and purchasing of 
equipment), (pp. 118-126), and the approval path detailed, (pp. 43-48). Chapter 6, section 6.4 
describes the approval process, and reveals the Innovation Guidelines to contain comprehensive 
guidance in this area. 
Coverage of financially related matters in terms of an official developing a scheme is considered 
adequate for the design of both R & T and advisor>' programmes, as the advice given is generic and 
equally applicable to the two categories of intervention. This supposition is founded on two 
observations. Firstly, chapter 5, section 5.2.1 showed that any intervention must be conformant 
with EC State Aids policy. Thus the Innovation Budget Guidelines in setting out and interpreting 
EC policy do so for schemes generally. Secondly, section 5.2.6 showed the DTI Finance Handbook 
(DTi, 1996b, section 3.4) to describe the approval process, and inspection of the Innovation 
Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 43-48) reveals the guidance given to conform with thai described in 
the Finance Handbook. 
1.2.2 Conception and Validation of Ideas 
Chapter 6, section 6.2 revealed that the stage of conceiving and validating ideas for schemes is not 
discussed in the Innovation Budget Guidelines. Conceiving ideas is important. The white paper. 
Modernising government Cabinet Office (1999, pp. 6-19) highlights the government's 
responsibilit>' to renew Britain, making it better able to meet the challenges of the world economy. 
As part of meeting this remit, the Competitiveness White Paper on building the Knowledge Driven 
Economy (Sx^\\ox\Gry Office, 1998) emphasises the importance of the government's role in 
strengthening businesses (pp. 6, 9-13). The Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, p. 10) takes 
up the theme, recognising the key part played by innovation in contributing to firms being 
competitive, and the role played by the Innovation Budget to help firms innovate. The Innovation 
Budget Guidelines state: 
'Innovation is central to competitiveness and success. In a world of rapid change, the pressure on 
firms to innovate, and the speed at which they must adapt and change, become ever greater. 
Change creates business opportunities as well as threats. Most of what firms do to survive and 
prosper consists of innovation in one form or another, so activities under the Innovation Budget 
have a central role to play in DTl's achievement of its main mission'', 
DTI (1999a, p. 10). 
However the Guidelines make no reference to the need for officials themselves to be 'innovative' 
in the policy design process. Officials have a responsibilit>' to generate new ideas for programmes, 
in response to changes in the market drivers for companies. The white paper Modernising 
government, (Cabinet Ofilce, 1999, pp. 6-7) speaks of the government's remit to develop the 
policies which businesses need. The Competitiveness White Paper (Stationery Office, 1998, p. 60) 
refers to the need for government to improve its performance by becoming more innovative. 
It is suggested that officials attention should be drawn to the process of conceiving and validating 
ideas, as it is fundamental to officials in making timely responses to changing support 
requirements. The author thus recommends that the need for officials to track the market as a 
means of seeding new ideas, be included in the proposed Design Handbook, as a specific topic. 
Drawing on the knowledge recorded in chapter 6, section 6.2, guidance should describe how initial 
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thoughts are generated and then developed into outline proposals and validated to test their 
credibility. 
1.2.3 Develop Programme ROAME Statements 
As indicated in chapter 3, section 3.3.1, and chapter 6, section 6.3, the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines provide a detailed description of how ROAME statements should be -
constructed. The Guidelines summarise the reasons for producing ROAMEs, and advise 
that officials must show how plans are conformant with policy, and are responding to the 
priority issues. Guidance continues by informing officials that they must have the evidence 
which supports the presence of market failure, and the need for 'Additionality' is explained. 
How 'Monitoring' and 'Appraisal' strategies must also be included, along with plans for 
subsequent evaluation is also set out. 
In comparing the process of developing ROAMEs as described in the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines with that experienced in practice, attention was focused on the tasks of building 
'Rationale' and setting objectives. Chapter 6, section 6.3.5 had shown only outline plans for 
'Appraisal', 'Monitoring', and 'Evaluation including Feedback' to be given in programme 
ROAME statements, and closer comparison of guidance with actual practice was undertaken when 
discussing 'Implementation' (see section 1.3 below). 
In the areas of developing 'Rationale' and 'Objective Setting', the 'Innovation' guidance 
was found to be comprehensive, but nevertheless some gaps in guidance were detected, and 
proposals for improvement are now developed. 
Developing Rationale - Whilst the principal stages in preparing ROAMEs are well 
described, it was felt that the process of developing 'Rationale' could be better explained. 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.2, suggested the task comprises four, discrete steps as follows 
• Step 1: Build Evidence of Market Problems 
• Step 2: Identify the Factors Inhibiting Organisations from Adopting Good Practice 
• Step 3: Developing the Delivery Strategy 
• Step 4: Demonstrate the Value of Proposed Interventions 
Inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines shows the above steps not to be specifically 
identified. To help officials understand and focus on the work which they must undertake, it 
is proposed that these steps be identified in guidance. For each step what is to be achieved 
should be explained, and the work to be undertaken detailed. Proposals for additional 
guidance to be provided in execution of each of these steps is now discussed. 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 proposed that the first two steps are concerned with identifying cases of 
market failure. Further inspection of the Innovation Budget Guidelines revealed a deficiency in this 
area. The guidelines while describing well each category of market failure (in R & T programmes), 
advice on how the evidence confirming the presence of 'market defects' can be built up is 
incomplete. Officials are advised to consult with DTI's Sector Directorates (these directorates are 
responsible for promoting specific industrial sectors such as automotive and aerospace), and the 
Business Link Directorate, to obtain information on market trends. Such interrogation of colleagues 
knowledge was discussed in chapter 5 section 5.3.5 and chapter 6, sections 6,2.3 and 6.3.3. 
The researching of market failure is a key activity in the design process. Chapter 6, section 6.2 
showed how ideas for schemes, or the idea of continuing with an existing initiative, arise as a result 
of officials detecting instances of market failure. Chapter 5, section 5.3, chapter 6, sections 6.2.3 
and 6.3.3, listed and discussed a number of sources of information which have been previously 
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consulted, in gathering evidence of market failure. Research also showed that these sources can 
often suggest strategies for the resolution of problems. 
in order that officials develop well researched and therefore 'solid' cases for support, they must 
interrogate the broad range of information sources. The Innovation Budget Guidelines refers to 
' Rationale' being based on ''a thorough analysis of the situation on the ground as it relates to the 
justification of the programme", (DTI, i999a, p. 33). Inspection of the Innovation Guidelines 
shows them to make no reference to how officials can interrogate a number of information sources 
to obtain the evidence they require, and this is seen as a significant gap in current guidance. 
Drawing on the findings of chapters 5 and 6, it is proposed that the sources of evidence available to 
officials and how they are accessed, be included in the Handbook for Programme Design. Some 
other problems 'came to light' in evaluating the support provided by guidance in identifying market 
failures as follows: 
Step 1: Build Evidence of Market Problems 
This stage is concerned with collecting the evidence of symptoms in the marketplace of SMEs 
being uncompetitive. Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 revealed that officials look for two groups of 
evidence. The first is associated with establishing symptoms of poor trading on the part of 
organisations, with the second concerned with identifying instances of organisations exhibiting 
poor business characteristics. The Innovation Budget Guidelines do not draw this distinction, and 
description of the two groups in the new guidance is suggested. 
Examination of ROAME statements revealed that officials place some reliance on evidence 
presented in white papers, to substantiate a lack of competitiveness in firms. It is however viewed 
as better i f officials were to be guided to place greater emphasis on interrogating the primary 
sources of reference, as described in chapter 5, section 5.3, and chapter 6, sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3. 
Step 2: Identify the Factors Inhibiting Organisations f rom Adopting Good Practice 
As discussed in chapter 6, section 6.3.2, the work in this stage is concerned with identifying the 
underlying reasons why organisations are not adopting good business practice. The reasons 
constitute the conditions of market failure. As indicated in chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1, market 
failures in R & T programmes are well described in the Innovation Guidelines. But as discussed in 
chapter 5, categories of market failure in advisory programmes are not detailed, and it is proposed 
that they be identified and described in the new guidance (see chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.4.1 for 
details). 
Step 3: Developing the Dclivcrj ' Strategy 
As discussed in chapter 6, section 6.3.2, this step is concerned with choosing the delivery 
mechanisms to be employed to reduce the identified market failures. It was proposed that the 
process involves two stages of thinking. First there is the requirement to show how delivery 
strategies will function to encourage organisations to adopt best practice methodologies to address 
the identified problems. The author views this task as one of matching the deliver>' mechanisms to 
the identified market failures. 
The 1999 edition of the Innovation Budget Guidelines states that officials must "explain how the 
proposed activity will address and resolve the market failure identified ...'\ (DTI, 1999a, p. 33). 
The Guidelines continue that ROAMEs must describe the deliver>' mechanisms which wil l be used. 
Guidance quotes as examples Business Links and Industrial Organisations, (p. 33). However the 
author would point out that these are not in themselves delivery mechanisms, rather they are bodies 
who execute mechanisms which help reduce problems. An example of a delivery mechanism the 
author argues, would be the issuing of grants to encourage organisations to undertake good 
practice. 
The author suggests that the performance of officials could be enhanced i f they were informed in the 
guidance, of which mechanisms can be employed to negate each category of market failure. Such 
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relationships should be identified first from analysing what delivery mechanisms have proved 
previously successful in reducing problems. Chapters 6, section 6.3.2 provided a few examples of 
delivery strategies previously employed by DTI. Further examples are exhibited in appendix K, 
which looks in more detail at good practice delivery strategies which have been adopted in 
previous schemes. It is argued that such information coupled with better guidance on how to 
determine market failure, would result in the introduction of programmes which, by their design, 
are more likely to meet the needs of firms. To avoid mistakes being repeated, the examples of poor 
practice identified in appendix K would also be given (Brooking, 1999, p. 5). 
Chapter 6 section 6.3.2 secondly emphasised the importance of officials understanding how the 
best practice activities which they are encouraging organisations to adopt wi l l in themselves lead to 
enhanced competitiveness. The need is not highlighted in current guidance, and is necessary in 
demonstrating that a proposed delivery strategy wi l l ultimately lead to better economic 
performance. The author recommends that in the interests of helping demonstrate potential VFM, 
guidance advises officials to detail in ROAMEs the 'mechanics' o f how interventions are expected 
to result in raised market performance. 
Step 4: Demonstrate the Value of Proposed Interventions. 
This final stage is concerned with estimating the likely impact of a programme, in terms o f the 
estimated financial and other benefits. The aim is to ensure that the government's 'investment' in 
terms of a grants for example, wi l l result in net gains which are well in excess of the 'pump 
priming' funding. Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 showed that this work is normally covered in setting out 
a programme's objectives,- for which adequate guidance in R & T programmes is provided in the 
Innovation Budget Guidelines. The guidance is also thought to be sufficiently comprehensive to 
support officials developing cases for advisory schemes. 
1.2.4 Programme Approval 
As indicated in chapter 6, section 6.4, the Innovation Budget Guidelines DTI (1999a, pp. 43-48, 
101), set out in detail the procedures for obtaining approval to introduce new programmes. The 
topics covered include a description o f the systems for approving budget allocations, the role o f the 
Individual Programmes Committees (IPCs), a typical timetable for submitting ROAMEs to an IPC, 
and the approval 'escalation' procedures, the level of escalation dependent on the amount of 
funding requested. 
However inspection of the Innovation Guidelines shows them not to refer to the good practice o f 
'Making the Ground Fertile for Approval', as described in chapter 6, section 6.5. Section 6.5 
discussed some of the mechanisms by which officials can help 'make the ground fertile' for the 
approval of schemes and it is recommended that details of actions which officials can take to help 
ensure the acceptance of proposals, be included in guidance towards increasing efficiency. 
1.3 Programme Implementation 
1.3.1 Appraisal 
Chapter 7, section 7.2 discussed 'Appraisal', and showed the topic to be mainly concerned with the 
appraisal of project applications. Section 7.2 referred to the advice given in the Innovation Budget 
Guidelines, which focused on projects in R & T programmes. Guidance appears to cover the 
subject well and enhancement considered unnecessary, but understandably reference to project 
appraisal in advisory schemes is not made. In achieving comprehensive guidance for general 
application, these types of initiatives must be catered for. 
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Much of the guidance provided for R & T projects is applicable to consultancy projects (DTI, 
1996b, section 9.3), particularly ensuring the availability of resources, and the presence of 
additionality. That these properties are also required to be present in consultancy projects needs to 
be explained in the new guidance. 
However importantly, section 7.2 highlighted the differences in approach to project appraisal, 
between programmes for which R&D is the principal focus, and those which are consultancy based. 
For the former appraisal is normally undertaken by officials, whilst the latter may be delegated to 
contractors. Again guidance should advise officials of this difference in approach, explaining that the 
complexity of R & T projects often precludes the use of outside bodies. 
1.3.2 Monitoring 
Chapter 7, section 7.3 discussed 'Monitoring'. Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 showed how monitoring 
comprises of two activities, firstly that o f monitoring the overall progress of programmes, and 
secondly tracking the progress of individual projects within a programme. The former is always the 
responsibility of officials to undertake, but project monitoring can be undertaken by both officials 
or the staff employed by scheme contractors. It was again shown diat who is able to undertake 
project monitoring is dependent on whether work is R&D focused, or advisory based. The 
complexity of the policy issues associated with R&D programmes dictates that officials normally 
carry out project monitoring, but this need is not conveyed in either the Innovation Budget or the 
Continuous Monitoring guidelines. It is recommended that in future guidance, this distinction be . 
made and the reasons why explained. 
The role of the Continuous Monitoring Gtn'delines (DTI, 1999b) was introduced in section 7.3.1 
shows them to be reasonably comprehensive, but with some significant gaps. To begin with the 
monitoring guidelines slate that they only apply to programmes funded under the Innovation 
Budget (p. 2), and as indicated in section 7.3,1 wording needs to reflect their applicability for 
advisory schemes. 
Inspection of guidance on programme monitoring DTI (1999a, pp. 67-77, 1999b) reveals there to 
be significant room for improvement in the information given on the development of monitoring 
regimes. It was observed that in the Continuous Monitoring Guidelines there is no section which 
deals specifically with what mechanisms may be employed in monitoring. To gain such 
information the reader must pick his or her way through the case study examples given in the 
Continuous Monitoring Guidelines DTI (1999b, pp. 18-23). It is proposed that a section dedicated 
to describing monitoring strategies in both R & T and advisory programmes should be included in 
new guidance, with examples employed in both types o f activity included. 
1.3.3 General Administration 
Financial Management - The Innovation Budget Guidelines DTI (1999a) provide comprehensive 
advice on the procedures which must be adopted, to make sure that the risks of public funds being 
misappropriated is minimised. They set out the procedures which must be adopted in the financial 
administration of programmes. Chapter 9 of the Guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 67-77) sets out the 
monitoring, payment and management controls to be put in place in the administration of 
programmes within the Innovation Budget. 
The author considers the level of guidance to be fully adequate in helping officials ensure that 
public funds are appropriated correctly. The author also judges the advice to be applicable to 
programmes and projects in general, being conformant with guidance contained in the Finance 
Handbook, and is hence not in the need of enhancement. 
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General {Management - As described in chapter 7, a number of matters of administration are 
covered in the Innovation Budget Guidelines. Areas where the Innovation Budget Guidelines were 
found to be deficient are now discussed. 
Chapter 7 section 7.6 discussed the process of competitive tendering, based on experience and the 
content of guidance (DTI, 1999a, pp. 61-66). Guidance is observed to be applicable to both project 
work funded on both R & T and advisory' schemes. Whilst the guidance appears comprehensive, 
comparing the content of the Innovation Budget Guidelines with the process as identified in chapter 
7 highlights several deficiencies. Guidance fails to advise officials that tenderers' proposals often 
form the basis of subsequent contracts. Therefore when writing ITTs, officials must make sure that 
clear guidance is given to tenderers such that their bids contain no proposals which have the 
potential to embarrass the Secretar>' of State. Chapter 7, section 7.6.1 highlighted that officials 
often quote ROAME objectives and programme eligibility criteria in ITT specifications, to help 
ensure policy conformance. Guidance should be enhanced accordingly. 
Chapter 7, section 7.6.1 also showed officials to write non-prescriptive ITT specifications, which do 
not assume a preconceived approach. Being non-prescriptive it was argued, helps ensure VFM as 
tenderers must think through their proposals. It further allows them the freedom to be innovative in 
their proposals. This approach is not detailed in the Innovation Guidelines, and the need for tender 
specifications to be non prescriptive should be stated and explained in guidance. 
1.3.4 Promoting and Closing Programmes 
Chapter 7, sections 7.7 and 7.8 respectively, described the processes of promoting and closing 
schemes. Taking promotion first, inspection of the Innovation Budget guidelines (DTI, 1999a, pp. 
12-14), show them to discuss the topic in the context of the Innovation Budget's objective to 
''improve the innovation performance of the UK economy leading to a better productivity and 
quality of life" (p. 12). To help meet this objective officials are advised that they should seek to 
promote cross-sectoral and cross directorate activities to share knowledge and ideas, and to avoid 
duplication of effort and avoid confusion. In this way, officials are told, the effectiveness of DTI's 
activities and the money the department spends, is increased. Guidance makes no reference to those 
promotional activities aimed specifically at raising the awareness among the target audiences, o f 
the support which is being provided. This is regarded as a serious oversight, since in the former 
case enhancing the likelihood of participation by target audiences should help ensure VFM. In 
addition it is important that the public's expectancy o f a programme's life is realistic. The 
government the author observes from discussion with colleagues, sees its role to 'pump prime' 
activities, only funding schemes while there is the presence of market failure, or it is politically 
acceptable (see chapter 6, section 6.1.1). 
The requirement to formerly promote programmes and, at the time of their launch to pave 
the way for closure, should be added to guidance. Importantly the DTI Finance Handbook 
recognises the need for promoting departmental programmes, suggesting that civil ser\'ants 
consider official launches involving the appropriate minister (DTI, 1996b, section 9.1). 
Chapter 7, section 7.7 detailed a number of promotional activities, including a description 
of how the participation of ministers is handled, which have been used successfully in the 
past. These examples should be included in guidance. 
Section 7.8 illustrates the importance of identifying the means by which programmes can 
be closed in ways such that ministers and their departments do not run the risk o f being 
legally challenged over support being withdrawn. Such a contingency is not discussed in 
guidance. It is therefore proposed that officials be advised in the 'Handbook' on the need to 
officially notify the public of scheme closures, and that the mechanisms which ihey can 
employ should be described. These mechanisms are discussed in section 7.8. 
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1.4 Evaluation 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines DTI (1999a, p. 42) restrict themselves to simply saying that 
officials should use ROAME Statements to set out the evaluation issues, and the evaluation 
timings. As discussed in chapter 8, section 8.2, for further guidance on evaluation officials are 
referred to supplementary guidelines, Guidance on the Preparation of Evaluation Plans (DTI, 
1999c). The author observes the guidance on evaluation planning to be comprehensive and 
applicable to both R & T and advisory programmes. Action to further improve on the advice given 
is not judged to be necessary, but it is advised that a summary of the supplementary guidance be 
included the Design Handbook, together with cross-referencing benveen the two documents. 
1.5 Process Map 
Blosch (2000, pp. 13-14) highlights the importance of providing people with a map of the 
process in which they are engaged, to help inform them of its make up and scope. 
Inspection o f successive versions of the Innovation Budget guidelines (DTI, 1988, 1996a, 
1999a) reveals that they do not provide such a map. The 1987 version o f guidance provides 
a now chart for the now closed Support For Innovation (SFI) scheme (DTI, 1987). 
However the chart majors on the approval and payment process, identifying stages such as 
"Receipt and Processing of Application", "Appraisal Against Project Criteria", "Appraisal 
Report to Offer" - preparing appraisal reports showing how applications stand against the 
scheme criteria etcetera, and 'Monitoring'. In a similar vein, the 1992 guidelines provide a 
flow diagram illustrating the sequence of checks which officials must go through in 
developing supportable proposals. Among steps quoted are "Fit in with DTI Remit?", "Fit 
in with Divisional Priorities?", and "Budget Allocations Allow Commitment?". But neither 
of these examples represents a map which fully describes the extent o f the design and 
administration process. It is therefore proposed that the flow chart described in figure 8.3 
(see chapter 8» section 8.8), be presented in the proposed Handbook for Programme Design 
and Operation. 
It is further proposed that guidance be restructured in the new 'Handbook'. For each stage of the 
design and administration process it is suggested that the tasks to be undertaken be described in 
dedicated sections, together with explanations of the reasons why (Marchand, 1998, p. 255), (see 
chapter 10, sub-section 10.5.7.2). Such data may be obtained through inspection o f the analysis 
work recorded in chapters 5 to 8 inclusive. Blosch (2000, pp. 13-14), emphasises the need for 
people to be provided with the data which underpin the business processes. Chapter 5, section 5.3, 
chapter 6, sections 6.2.3, 6.3.3, and 6.3.6, chapter 7, section 7.9, and chapter 8, section 8.6, 
discussed the information 'inputs' to the design and administration process. It is recommended that 
the information thus identified as being required by the design and administration process, be 
placed in the new design handbook. 
1.6 Process Drivers 
Blosch (2000, p. 13) refers to the importance of identifying the events which drive a business 
process. Chapter 5, sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 refer to statements o f policy being contained in 
government white papers, with policy also being expressed by ministers' personal priorities. Policy 
was viewed as representing a constraint on the design process, as unless programmes are 
conformant with policy they wi l l not receive approval. However, it can be alternatively argued that 
such stimuli also act as inputs to the process, by informing officials o f what they need to do. In this 
way policy statements represent directives. Indeed, examples of ministers asking officials to 
introduce schemes have been given in this thesis (see chapter 6, section 6.2.3.8). Examples of 
officials taking action as a result of policy statements in white papers are given in chapter 6, 
sections 6.2.3.9 and 6.3.3.5, and appendix D, section D.4, appendix E, section E . I , and appendix F, 
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section F.3. Chapter 6, section 6.2.1, showed how tracking the market for emerging problems acts 
as a driver for officials to develop programmes, as they are required to address new market failures 
by way of helping firms to remain competitive. 
Given the importance of people having knowledge of the factors which drive the system of which 
they are part, it is proposed that the details o f the three drivers be set out in the new handbook. 
Understanding of the drivers, their importance, and how they act on the design and administration 
process, is regarded as fundamental to officials being fully effective in the design and 
administration role. Therefore it is further recommended that this information be placed in the 
introductory pages of the new guidance. 
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APPENDIX J ANALYSIS O F T H E S T R U C T U R E O F P R O G R A M M E 
EVALUATION WITHIN DTI 
J.1 Introduction 
The author was aware that steps had been taken to share best practice from evaluation. As 
discussed in chapter 8 section 8.3, OTPs Evaluation and Policy Improvement Committee (EPIC) 
has the role of overseeing evaluator>' work, and as part of this remit to draw the broad lessons. 
However the author had reser\'ations concerning the ability of current arrangements to lift out and 
disseminate best practice. For example in examining the policy process, he could not see any 
documentary evidence of reports being analysed to draw out the best practice lessons. 
The author decided to examine the evaluation and feedback process more closely and conducted an 
interviewed Dr. Ray Lambert (Deputy Director and Economic Advisor: Technology and 
Innovations Policy, in DTl's Innovation Policy and Standards (IPS) Directorate) [Interview 18]. 
Dr. Lambert was able to provide useful insights relating to how the evaluatory process operates, 
and pinpoint issues concerning deficiencies. 
J.2 Discussion of the Evaluation Process 
Dr. Lambert suggests that there are problems in attempting to draw best practice lessons in 
programme operation by looking across evaluations. In part, he suggests, the problem is 
conceptual. It has to be shown that what has been learnt in the past is relevant to addressing 
'present day' issues. Unfortunately circumstances change and new priorities emerge, which can 
alter the strategic relevance of evaluation findings. This situation is not helped by all evaluation 
reports being narrowly focused on specific programmes, and steps need to be taken to provide 
something which is more comprehensive. 
Steps have been taken in the past to help provide better access to evaluation findings. A database of 
evaluation reports was previously set up, containing the summaries of the main findings of each 
report. Officials could look across these to see what had previously worked. In practice this was 
used by evaluators rather than the programme managers or budget holders, the people directly 
concerned with the development of deliver>' policy. The database has since fallen out of use. 
There is a further problem in drawing conclusions on best practice by comparing evaluations. 
Difficulty arises from a lack of coherence in reporting, which in turn results from continual changes 
in policy, such that in the strategic sense, that is, in terms of meeting DTI's objectives, comparing 
like for like is made more difficult. There are also practical difficulties. People wi l l instinctively 
argue the relevance of previous evaluations to current market situations. 
However for Lambert the Mack of relevance argument' is not credible, as much, he insists, can be 
learnt from what has been done before. But he suggests the proviso is that analysis is conducted 
from the perspective of identifying and addressing the fundamental economic issues, and seeing 
how, generically, the mechanisms function to address these issues. This approach allows 
inter\'entions to be compared more independently of policy change, allowing regularities between 
programmes to be discovered, and best practice conclusions to be drawn. 
There are, however, at present, yet other factors which mitigate against across the board 
comparisons. Delegation of responsibilit>' for administering budgets down the chains of command 
has resulted in a structure in which the evaluation is 'distributed'. The evaluators are mostly 
working in particular policy areas within the line directorates, (plus the Assessment Unit (AU) in 
the IPS Directorate). The author notes here that Dr. Lambert's obser\'ations coincide with the 
structure detailed in the DTI Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b, section 3.4, paragraphs 3.4.9 to 
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3.4.19). They thus have responsibility for evaluating the schemes in their particular area, and 
operate largely independently of each other. It is first obser\'ed that, overall, the current structure 
leaves the evaluation process largely uncoordinated, leaving people to do things in their different 
ways. 
Additionally, there is a focus in delegating responsibility on the administration of budgets, which 
causes the evaluation process to be weighted towards informing budget management. This, Dr. 
Lambert obser\'es, creates tensions between programme and budget managers over the differences 
in interpretation of evaluation findings. Budget holders will focus on the VFM related findings of 
evaluation. On the other hand programme managers wil l look more closely at the operational 
findings. In summary, determining best practice across DTI is difficult to achieve. 
However Lambert was able to show a way forward. There is, he argues, a requirement to evaluate 
programme strategies in terms of their ability to meet departmental, policy objectives. Towards 
addressing the evaluation issues, he proposes moving towards a more centralised framework for 
evaluation, which would enable comparisons of programme performance across DTI , in terms of 
value for money or contribution towards departmental PSA objectives. Good knowledge 
management should be introduced as a way of overcoming the current 'silo mentality'. As a first 
step, evaluation staff in the separate units could be brought together into a single evaluation unit. 
The author concurs. By grouping the evaluators together the sharing of tacit knowledge may 
facilitated through adoption of a personalised approach, using mechanisms such as face to face 
dialogue and brainstorming sessions. 
Lambert acknowledges that there are sound arguments for placing the evaluators within the 
individual directorates. They become more knowledgeable about the policy areas of their 
directorates, and are thus better qualified to make credible judgements on the effects of policy, as 
against staff placed centrally. However on balance, the author considers the balance in terms of 
benefit is weighted in favour of the centralised structure. An option Lambert suggests is for the unit 
to be housed in FRM Directorate. This would allow it to use the status of this directorate as DTFs 
ultimate controller of finance, to add clout to evaluation findings and recommendations. The 
Departmental Strategy Group (DSG) is thinking along these lines, but no plans were available at 
the time of interview. 
The single evaluation unit, Lambert suggests, could look across past schemes and draw out the best 
practice lessons. These should then be recorded in the knowledge base. It is proposed that the good 
practice derived in appendix K, should form the basis of a good practice source o f reference in the 
knowledge base. But in the process of identifying and recording good practice, there is a need to 
look forward as well as to the past. As part of Evaluation's role in informing policy, it is also 
necessar>' to research markets and industries to help inform the setting of policy objectives, and 
then see how to meet those objectives. The author again agrees, the world market place is highly 
dynamic (Butler Group, 1995; Cliffe, 1999, pp. 18-19) and is in constant, rapid change. He 
suggests that, once set up, the evaluation unit should not only 'publish' the best practice lessons 
from evaluation, but also provide information on how markets are developing to help steer officials 
in determining new areas of market failure. The author further recommends that such knowledge be 
made available through the proposed knowledge base. 
Lambert referred to the requirement to draw lessons from the experiences of Other Government 
Departments (OGDs), which is set out among other things in the HM Treasur)' 'Green Book'. In 
relation to the wider picture however, DTI officials tend to work in their own well established 
tradition, tending to ignore what goes on elsewhere. The author notes that interaction between the 
Whitehall departments at the working level has been historically poor, although at the time of 
writing this thesis the situation was beginning to improve as part of the government's aim for 
policy making to involve joined up thinking (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 6). 
Nonetheless the author considers there to be value in making a more concerted effort to encourage 
knowledge sharing in the development and implementation of support policy, across Whitehall. It 
is suggested that the role be assigned to the government's Centre for Management and Policy 
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Stijdles, (Cabinet Office, 1999, pp. 20, 57) whose remit is to identify and spread best prtictice in 
policy makmg. ^ 
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APPENDIX K DISCUSSION O F B E S T AND BAD P R A C T I C E BV 
P O L I C Y DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
K.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5 to 8 described the development of the system model for the design process, and chapter 9 
recorded the testing of the model, finding it to provide a credible description of what the task of 
designing programmes entails. 
Using the knowledge gained in developing the model, chapter 10 then proposed a number of 
strategies for improving the process, in particular, section 10.4.2 introduced ideas for a new set o f 
guidelines, Tlte Handbook for Programme Design and Operation, and section 10.4.3 discussed 
deficiencies in current guidance, which could be made good in the design o f this new manual. In 
this respect it was proposed that gaps in the current guidance be addressed by recording the 
practices adopted by officials in the respective areas, and including examples of good and bad 
practice in programme delivery (see sub-section 10.4.3.1). However the need to build confidence 
in the design model in terms of it being representative of good practice, was identified. 
The purpose of this appendix is to evaluate the case study examples contained in Appendices D to H, 
to confirm the efficacy of the strategies adopted in their development and implementation. 
Conclusions on what mechanisms represent potential good and bad practice are also derived. 
Analysis of performance draws on experiences of the author, his colleagues, and the findings 
contained in DTI evaluation reports on, or of relevance to, the case study programmes. 
K.2 General Lessons Learnt from Programme Operation 
Below are listed some observations which came to light during the course o f research. 
K.2.1 Analysis of Project Requirements 
When working on the SFI scheme, the author was informed of numerous instances where colleagues 
had visited firms who had previously received grant funding for the development of new products, it 
was often observed that projects had not proceeded beyond the prototype stage, and that the 
department's time and money had effectively been wasted, as well as that of the applicants. 
Investigations by officials revealed the problem to have principally occurred because firms had not 
undertaken research of the requirements before commencing project work, to establish what was 
wanted. As a result of this observation, the department subsequently insisted that firms in their 
applications, demonstrate that their proposals reflect market requirements. 
K.2.2 Insistence on Definition Phases In Projects 
In collaborative R&D programmes, it was often found that partners had insufficient 
understanding of the needs to define the research task adequately at the time of submitting 
proposals for support. As a result, objectives were not ful ly met. To address the problem a project 
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definition phase was introduced to scope the research task. Even then, officials still found it 
necessary to reappraise the project specifications with applicants about 9 months into the main 
phase of project work. 
Experience of operating R&D programmes over the years has taught officials to insist on including 
definition phases in programmes, to be completed before starting the main project work [Interview 
9]. To ensure effort is focused where it is most needed, project partners undertake technological 
and/or market research to define the scope of research and the project objectives. 
K.2.3 Team Building 
In R&D projects, long experience has taught officials in appraising applications to make sure that 
people from the organisations involved can work together, and know each other well. It has been 
found that personality clashes have previously caused serious disruptions in project work, and 
prejudiced the meeting of objectives. Also, officials had experienced poor management skills in 
applicant organisations, which had also prejudiced project work through lack of proper control. 
The appointment of a 'qualified' manager is now a condition of funding [Interview 9]. 
K.2.4 Help to Draft Proposals 
Experience of working with a broad range of organisations showed that applicants often have 
difficulty in setting out their ideas on paper, and providing reasons why proposed work should be 
grant funded. A summary of the Innovation Budget Guidelines was therefore produced to help 
companies understand what issues they had to address. It was also realised that officials also 
needed to directly help applicants in drafting their proposals [Interview 9]. 
K.2.5 Dangers of Tapered Funding in Programmes 
Study of the June 1992 edition of the Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992, p. 8) shows use of 
the 'tapered funding' principle in the grant funding of projects. The Guidelines explain the rationale 
for tapered grant funding as helping to relieve situations where project participants experience 
excessive 'up-front' costs. The idea was that under these circumstances participants could for 
example receive support exceeding the normal 50% during the first year, and then in subsequent 
years receive lower levels of grant such that overall funding did not exceed one half Tapered 
funding could also be applied in cases where the work became closer to the market, justifying lower 
levels of support as the risks reduced. 
However experience shows that the rate of reduction in grant level over time must be chosen 
carefully. In an interview Dr. Ian Harrison, Deputy Director in DTTs Management Best Practice 
Directorate relayed his experience of setting up the Regional Technology Centres (RTCs); 
[Interview 17]. Here DTI tapered the funding over a period o f three years. When the RTC 
initiative was being developed, officials were under management pressure to ensure that the 
department fully spent its financial allocations within the financial year, a consequence o f the 
Treasury's Rules on 'Annuality'. 
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In consequence, grants to RTCs were front loaded, with 50% to be spent in the first year. The 
decision failed to take full account of the time and effort needed to set up and establish such 
information centres (finding accommodation, recruiting staff, building up networks of clients and 
providers etc.) and set up activities extended well into the second year. As a result, many were not 
fully operational during the first year, and could not use their allocation of funds. Annuality 
prevented carry over of residual funds into the following year. Year two funding was insufficient 
to support the outstanding work, and officials believe this was the reason for the subsequent 
closure o f a number of Centres. Moreover most commercial payments are made in arrears, and 
projects tended to slip behind schedule preventing payment for work undertaken at the extreme 
end of the financial year. 
When applying tapered funding, officials should therefore avoid excessive front loading which 
could cause the later stages of a programme to fail to meet its objectives. 
K.2.6 Handling of DTI Funds by Scheme Contractors 
For consultancy schemes, it was once normal practice for the department to advance grant money 
to the scheme contractors, from which they paid grant claims. OTPs Internal Audit criticised one 
Division for not requiring scheme contractors to hold the money advanced in a separate 
interest-bearing bank account. The Treasury requires that it should not lose as a result o f 
advancing money, hence the requirement for the holding account, with the interest repaid to the 
Treasury at the end of the programme. Holding the money separately from the contractors 
day-to-day business account simplifies the task of calculating the money due, avoiding the 
confusion experienced in some Initiatives, where it was difficult to separate the interest earned on 
DTI money from that of the contractors. A nominated account also protects the department in the 
event o f the financial failure of the contractor, and is good practice. 
K.3 Analysis of the Case Studies 
K.3.1 The Enterprise Initiative 
The author is not aware of any evaluation undertaken of the El promotional campaign. However as 
discussed in appendix D, the campaign appears to have been successful in promoting the up-take of 
DTI programmes. It may dierefore be concluded that the mounting high profile campaigns is an 
eff*ective mechanism for improving access to schemes. 
K.3.2 Research and Technology Initiative 
Appendix E discusses the Research and Technology (R & T) Initiative, and shows it to have 
comprised a number of component schemes. Below the performance of three examples are 
investigated, these being the General Industrial Collaborative Programme (GICP), the Small Firms 
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Merit For Award for Research and Technology (SMART), and Support for Products Under Research 
(SPUR) schemes. 
K.3.2,1 General Industrial Collaborative Programme 
GICPs aimed to encourage collaborative research projects that would in particular benefit SMEs, 
with the majority led by Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs). 
Issue Identincation:-
Rationale: Identifying Market Failure 
The evaluation report DTI Fimded Research Projects At Research And Teclmology Organisations, 
(DTI, 1996c) (45 pages in length) found the original programme rationale to be valid and the 
delivery strategy appropriate stating: 
"0?i the whole during the life of the GICP Programme the rationale for the programme and support 
for RTOs was valid and proved successful in addressing those market failures identified', 
(DTI, 1996c, p. 10) 
The rationale (DTI, 1996c, pp. 9-10) centred around factors inhibiting SMEs undertaking R & D 
projects. Technological and financial risks, and lack of information on the potential benefits were 
cited as amongst the principal causes. 
The evaluation report found DTI support to have directly and indirectly helped the RTOs to 
overcome these barriers to collaborative research in SMEs, (DTI, 1996c, pp. 9-12). The technical 
objectives of projects were substantially met, with 85% of projects quoted as meeting all o f their 
stated objectives and tasks. Over 90% of the remainder were deemed to have met their task related 
objectives. Generally the rationale and support for the GICP programme was thus found to have been 
valid and had proved successful in addressing the identified market failures (pp. 10, 24). 
Most of the projects had generated wider benefits (pp. 11-12, 23, 25), The RTOs were reported as 
having been able to pass on some of these to members and collaborators, and the majority o f projects 
had resulted in unforeseen benefits such as new revenue streams being created, for example paid 
consultancy, and the development of new expertise within the RTOs. Additionality was high (pp. 13-
14). Only 2% of projects were found to be non additional, with 33% found to display full 
additionality. The remainder displayed partial additionality, with new technologies reaching the 
market more quickly and research being more detailed. The level of innovation was described as 
reasonably high, particularly for the UK, with some RTOs feeling projects to have been Svorid class' 
(pp. 14, 24). 
The rationale was thus shown to be valid and objectives generally met, which suggests that the 
mechanisms employed by officials in determining market failure were effective. The following 
section discusses the performance of the approach deployed. 
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Identifying Market Failure: 
Chapter 6, sub-sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.2 illustrated the principal sources of infonmation 
interrogated by officials in determining market failure, and how such evidence is then used to build a 
rationale for intervention. RTOs were among bodies listed as being as good sources of 'intelligence'. 
Inspection of the RTO evaluation report (DTI, 1996c, pp. 8-9, 24) indicated that they are well 
informed sources of information. The report refers to RTOs having knowledge of their sectors, which 
helps ensure that R&D reflects market and industrial needs. Given confirmation of a valid rationale, 
it is thus concluded that the mechanism of interrogating RTOs as an information source on market 
failure in R&D programmes is an effective one. 
Objectives: 
The RTO evaluation suggested that there was some evidence that the tight setting of objectives 
which had to be rigorously adhered to in project work had inhibited the full realisation of the 
potential benefits of research. Areas of benefit which could not been foreseen at the start o f project 
work, had been identified as research progressed. New lines of potentially fruitful research could not 
be followed up because of the lack of flexibility inherent in the way objectives had been set. It is 
proposed that inflexibility in the setting and maintaining of objectives is potentially an instance of 
bad practice. 
Programme Implementation:-
Delivery Strategy: 
The RTO Evaluation Report (DTI, 1996c, p. 8) gives the programme objectives as: 
(i) to promote co-operative and collaborative, pre-competitive research involving industrial 
SMEs, and, 
(ii) to encourage technology transfer into industry sectors, particularly into small firms. 
The principal mechanism deployed in GICP programmes was to use the resources available to 
RTOs to help promote R&D in these firms. The power o f this mechanism to address the market 
failures is conveyed in the RTO Evaluation Report (DTI, 1996c, p. i , 9-10, 12-13, 24). The RTO 
report found the principal of funding RTO hosted, collaborative projects reduced the identified 
market failures. The mechanism was found to have overcome the barriers to collaboration such as 
suspicions over the motives of partners, disregard for the possible wider benefits, and to 
compensate for the technological and financial risks (pp. 7, 9, 12-14). As well as the effects of 
financial assistance, it was also noted that collaboration allowed the sharing of risk, reducing each 
participants' exposure. 
SMEs it was felt were able to gain from the work of the RTOs, as they do not normally fund pre-
competitive research (pp. 7, 9, 13-14). By using an RTO's services or through involvement in co-
operative/collaborative work, SMEs are able to benefit from the supported R&D at a substantially 
reduced cost (pp. 9, 12-13, 16). SMEs are not required to 'tie up' capital in equipment purchases 
or floor space, and can instead offer in kind contributions which do not involve capital 
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expenditure. It was observed that such arrangements suited the RTOs and their clients well, (DTI, 
1996c, pp. 12-13). 
The evaluation report concluded "// was dear that the GICP fwiding encouraged co-
operative/collaborative research at RTOs", (DTI, 1996c, p. i ) . Thus objective (i) above was met, 
and it may be concluded that the mechanism of employing RTOs to lead collaborative projects 
represents good practice. The programme evaluation report on support at RTOs confirms this 
view, referring to RTOs leading collaborative projects to be a valuable mechanism for furthering the 
competitiveness of SMEs (pp. i , 9-10,24-25). 
The report comments that RTOs are geared to rimning collaborative projects. RTOs, it is argued, 
have built up knowledge of collaborators who are well acquainted with work undertaken and its 
market potential. The ability to exploit this knowledge to help ensure that the results of collaboration 
are brought to market is valued. The evaluators comment that co-operative research leading to 
marketable products usually emanates from RTO membership, and this it was concluded could be 
seriously prejudiced without on-going govemment support for research programmes. 
A number of unexpected, wider benefits were identified from employing RTOs as project co-
ordinators, which serves to demonstrate the added value of adopting this delivery mechanism. The 
Report (DTI, 1996c, pp. 23-24) highlighted that the research projects had served to maintain the 
skills bases of the RTOs, Including the development of new expertise. This had allowed the RTOs to 
ensure that company employees were kept aware of new technologies and were trained in their use 
(p. 15). This it was reported had allowed industry to stay ahead of the 'competition' (p: 24). A 
number of project participants had been encouraged to embark on 'spin ofiP projects from the DTI 
funded work, at their own expense (p. 24). 
The RTOs had also been able to increase their portfolio of services (pp. 15, 23). New markets had 
been developed for the RTOs and a number of new projects for future funding had been identified. 
The evaluation report also observed that the promise of DTI funding at the initial stages o f putting 
project proposals together "added an extra level of credibility to the projects that attracted 
prospective collaborators^^ {DJX, 1996c, p. 14). 
These observations together with the report*s (DTI, 1996c) reference above to all market failures 
being addressed, shows that objective (ii) was also met. Thus it was also concluded that the use of 
RTOs to aid technology transfer represents good practice. 
Underpinning the operation of GICP, is the principle of the govemment providing financial grants by 
way of overcoming firms inhibitions to participate in collaborative research. That the application of 
this funding mechanism represents good practice, is implied in the "Conclusions" of the RTO 
evaluation report. In concluding the evaluators reported: 
""We feel that the funding ofprojects wider the GICP has been valuable and sitccessfid initiative in 
enabling R&D to be undertaken at RTOs to benefit a wide range of industry. Co-operative projects 
were often speculative and benefited the whole membership of the RTO, collaborative research 
enabled companies to participate in R&D which they would have been unable to do otherwise". 
Importantly the Report continues: 
"// is imfortunate that this type of funding has ceased\ 
(DTI, 1996c, p. 24). 
164 
Programme Administration:-
The monitoring of projects by officials was found to be unsatisfactory. Officia! files did not contain 
records of action taken following the quarterly, project review meetings. Little evidence was seen of 
officials feeding back their comments on the quarterly progress reports prepared by the RTOs. Many 
of Uie RTOs had reported that they would have found it constructive to have received feedback, and 
would have felt encouraged by it as it would have indicated that officials were taking a greater 
interest in their work (DTI, 1996c, pp. 20-21). This is an example of bad practice. 
During the life o f GICP there had been several policy changes, as signaled in successive whitepapers 
(see chapter 2, section 2.5.6). The report (DTI, 1996c, pp. 20,25) concluded that officials had not 
informed RTOs of the impact of policy changes in a timely manner. As a direct result, considerable 
time had been wasted in drafting project proposals, which were then invalidated by policy changes. 
Looking for a cause for the above problems, the evaluators (DTI, 1996c, pp. 20-21) found that 
following reorganisation of the sector divisions within DTI, project officers had inherited large 
numbers of projects moved across from officials elsewhere. This had resulted in them having 
excessive caseloads, which had seriously restricted their ability to adequately monitor project work. 
The author concurs, being aware of many of his colleagues complaining of the levels o f case work 
which they had been given. A situation to be avoided in the future. 
K.3.2.2 The S M A R T Scheme 
Issue Identincation:-
Rationale: 
The 1991 SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1991b) (comprising 39 pages) covers the period from the 
launch of the pilot scheme in 1986 until the end of the second round in 1990. (The report was issued 
in January 1991 with the evaluatory work undertaken and completed in 1990), The report (DTI , 
1991b, p. 3) highlighted the principal area of market failure on which the original rationale was 
based, as that of small firms having a disproportionate difficulty in raising capital for high 
technology projects. To address this problem, two principal aims for the scheme were set: 
a) That the difficulty would be directly offset for some, the SMART winners, 
b) That the majority o f small, high technology firms wi l l be helped by the presence o f SMART 
in the market. Successful projects would help demonstrate the value of financing R & D in 
small firms and hence change the attitude o f investors to providing capital to such high 
technology businesses. 
The 1991 evaluation report (DTI 1991 b, p. 4) supported the first o f these arguments, finding a very 
high level of additionality. High additionality had been demonstrated by around 45% of the SMART 
winners reporting that they had failed in their attempts to obtain funding elsewhere, with many others 
165 
considering that it was not even worth trying. Programme additionality was considered further in the 
subsequent 1994 evaluation report (DTt, 1994a, p. 8), and is discussed in later in this section. 
The second argument was seen as tenuous. The report (DTI, 1991 b, p. 4) found there to be no 
evidence of SMART having influenced the attitudes of investors since its introduction. The 
evaluators had conducted face to face interviews with financiers, that is banks and venture capitalists, 
which found the impact of SMART to be minimal (pp. 34-35). Whilst there was general agreement 
on SMART being perceived as a positive factor by financiers when first considering investment 
proposals, the programme was not considered as replacing the stringent checks made by investors. 
These checks placed emphasis on the quality of the people involved and the marketing plans, rather 
than on the technical aspects focused on by SMART. The 1991 evaluation report concluded that 
given the '''hardnosed' criteria that they (the financiers) adopt (DTI, 1991b, p. 35) it was 
unreasonable to expect SMART to influence their thinking. The objective was considered as 
unrealistic, and was dropped from January 1991 onwards, (DTI, 1991b, p. 23, 27, 1994a, p. 3; 
ROAME, 1991b, paragraphs 5-6). 
The Innovation Budget Guidelines (DTI, 1992) in advising on setting objectives recommends 
officials "6e ambitions but realistic", (p. 19). Clearly this advice was not followed. The author 
suggests that it would have been better practice to have discussed SMART'S delivery strategy at the 
proposal Stage, which may have provided an indication of the viability of setting tliis second target. 
The 1994 evaluation report (DTI, 1994a), (comprising 29 pages) updates the earlier 1991 evaluation, 
covering the additional period of 1991 to 1994. It describes the rationale for extending SMART for a 
third phase as continuing to centre on the reluctance of venture capitalists to invest in R&D projects 
undertaken by small, high technology firms (pp. 3-4). Start-ups and other small firms are therefore 
starved of the finance they require to resource their proposed R&D projects. 
Market Failure: 
The SMART ROAME (ROAME, 1991b, paragraphs 4-7) identified two principal sources o f market 
evidence, which informed the process of developing the programme rationale for extending SMART 
for a third phase. These were outside bodies, and importantly the results of the previous evaluation 
(DTI, 1991b). For the former, the ROAME shows how a letter received from the Bank of Scotland 
had confirmed the difficulty o f firms raising small sums of money for equity investment. In the case 
of the latter, the earlier SMART evaluation (DTI, 1991b) had confirmed the continuing problems 
faced by small firms in raising finance. 
The 1994 evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. i i , 8) found additionality to be high at 85%. In keeping 
with the earlier evaluation, the report found many firms had been able to embark on high technology 
projects that otherwise they would not have been able to do. Thus, the author suggests, the market 
failure based around a lack of external finance was valid, and thus provides an example of the value 
of consulting previous evaluation reports and extemal sources of expertise in the field of interest, 
when gathering evidence of market imperfections. 
SMART Aims and Objectives:-
The 1994 evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 3-7) continues by discussing the specific aims of the 
programme which were continued following the 1990 evaluatory work, and the scheme's 
performance in meeting these aims. These were concerned with measuring the contribution of 
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SMART in making good the lack of alternative finance, and thus stimulating R&D in small firms 
and start-ups. The findings of the report are now described. 
Two primary aims were detailed: 
a) "7b encourage andfacilitate the formation of viable and durable science and 
technology based businesses" (DT\, 1994a, p. 5). 
The evaluators noted that 22% of firms in the sample were start-up companies, and many had 
reported their survival as owing to SMART. Only 5% had gone into liquidation. However it was 
felt too early to draw definite conclusions on SMART'S ability to help the formation and enhance 
the probability of the continuing survival of firms. Many respondents across the whole sample 
had however reported that their SMART projects had contributed to other development 
programmes. 
b) 'To stimulate small businesses to develop and market ne\y science and technology 
based products" (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). 
This aim was seen to have been met. The evaluation report concluded that SMART had 
stimulated a consistently large number of applications, and that additionality was found to be high 
(DTI, 1994a, pp. i i , 6, 16, 8). Grant levels were considered to be generous in comparison with 
other programmes, but SMART had allowed many firms to proceed with development projects, 
which they would otherwise have not have been able to finance. 
The specific targets set in SMART which would allow the performance of the scheme in meeting 
the broader aims to be gauged were listed as: 
• "To stimulate at least 25% more wortfnvhile ideas per year meriting a Stage I award than 
there are awards available" (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). 
SMART was over subscribed for each competition, but the evaluators felt no precise criteria had 
been set for assessment, and hence a figure for over subscription could not be accurately 
determined. The objective was considered as meaningless as there was no comparator or 
benchmark against which to make a judgement (p. 6). 
• "By the end of Stage II, to have caused at least 10% of Stage I winners in that competition to 
be viable small firms established or registered after winning'^ (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). 
The objective was easily met. Responses had indicated that in 22% of the SMART cases, the 
firms concerned would not have been able to launch themselves without an award. 
• "To stimulate at least one-third of Stage I winners to market a SMART derived product 
within three years of getting an award' (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). 
The target was seen as almost achieved. Thirty percent o f Stage I winners had launched their 
products on to the market. 
• "To achieve ratings for 'value for money' and 'innovation' at least equal to those achieved in 
the 1990 evaluation and on the same basis" (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). 
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It was felt that these targets could not be assessed via the postal questionnaires. It should have 
been possible to collect the necessary information via project monitoring, but the policy o f 
avoiding the placing of burdens on small businesses, together with limited resources in DTI's 
Regional Offices (ROs) (who were responsible for administering SMART), proper monitoring 
was not possible. It was recommended that a more effective monitoring regime, involving 
continuous monitoring, be introduced (pp. 7, 15-16). 
In concluding, the evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 16-17) found that whilst not all the original 
components of the rationale had been validated, partly because they were incorrectly founded (i.e. 
the ability to influence the attitudes of venture capitalists), SMART was nevertheless a valuable 
scheme, and should continue. However it was recommended that the target of "number o f 
awards" be changed to one which allows judgement of results, that is measurement of impact. 
This latter comment serves to reinforce the need for officials, when setting objectives, to 
concentrate on parameters which allow a programmes effect on reducing perceived market 
failures to be directly measured. 
SMART was viewed as achieving good value, the scheme having demonstrated high 
additionality. The evaluators calculated the ratio of grant to sales value of the mature projects to 
be 1:6. This was judged as reasonable given that in the SMART companies, the marketing and 
distribution infrastructures are typically less well established, (DTI, 1994a, p. 10). 
Programme Implementation:-
Delivery Strategy: 
The role of grants to encourage firms to take action is well demonstrated in SMART. Pivotal was 
the use of grant funding to help reduce the identified market failure o f small firms being unable to 
go ahead with proposed R&D projects due to lack o f investment capital. The efHcacy o f 
providing such support to single firms is indicated by the evaluation report's comments recorded 
above. SMART had been successful in contributing to the formation of viable high technology 
firms, (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). A reasonable proportion (22%) of winners had been start-ups. That 
30% of SMART applicants had successfully launched new products further serves to indicate 
enhancement of the potential survival of firms. In some cases SMART awards had led to the 
development of other products, and thus helped build a basis for establishing small companies 
(DTI, 1994a, pp. 6, 8). It is therefore concluded that the grant mechanism is an effective means to 
seed the formation of firms, and to contribute to their longevity. 
SMART also had stimulated many small firms to develop new products which they would not 
have otherwise started. The scheme's effectiveness in this area is witnessed by the high level of 
Stage 1 applications, and the high level of additionality experienced. Many firms had embarked 
on R&D projects which they would not have otherwise been able to do. In addition, as previously 
mentioned, 30% of Stage I applicants had launched products and it may be thus concluded that 
the grant mechanism had been successful in encouraging firms to embark on R&D work, 
triggering the development of new products. The author additionally observes that the over 
subscription of the scheme indicates the efficacy o f having actively promoted the scheme through 
the media. 
The objective of stimulating more ideas than grants available was seen as a poorly set objective, 
as no precise criteria had been specified (DTI, 1994a, p. 6). The Innovation Budget Guidelines 
(DTI, 1992, pp. 19-21) refers to the need for objectives to be testable whenever possible, and 
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presented in a form which is "unambiguously verifiable''. Clearly best practice had not been 
followed. The need for officials to set quantifiable targets, i f credible conclusions on programme 
performance are to be reached, is stressed. 
The 1991 evaluation (DTI, 1991b, pp. 10-13) found SMART to be making a strong overall 
contribution, in terms of innovation, additionality, commercial returns, and employment 
indicators of expansion. The 1994 evaluation report found SMART to be providing valuable 
support to firms. The grant:sales ratio was estimated as I ;6, (DTI, 1994a, pp. 10, 17). Precise 
ratings for value for money and innovation could not be determined, as the necessary information 
had not been collected during the day to day administration o f the scheme (pp. 7, 15). The DTI 
Finance Handbook (DTI, 1996b, section 4.1, paragraph 4.1.8) emphasises the importance of 
officials achieving good value in everything which they do, and hence the lack o f continuous 
monitpring ran contrary to guidance and thus represented a bad practice. 
SMART also displayed achievement of wider benefits (DTI, 1994a, p. 7). Credibility, prestige 
and company profile were cited as among benefits accruing to scheme winners. Within the 
individual companies, increased technological knowledge and expertise in the teams along with 
greater commitment among people were also observed. The author argues that the grant 
mechanism is effective in increasing company viability, by acting to increase knowledge and 
securing peoples' commitment to project work. 
For the government it was noted that the competitions provided an excellent opportunity to 
publicise the importance of firms undertaking R&D. It was also found that 52% of actual and 
estimated sales of the mature products represented export business. The author hence suggests 
that the competition approach to identifying projects represents a useful mechanism for 
promoting the wider aspects of the government's work. 
Colleagues have advised the author how in the past, banks have made offers of loans to firms 
applying for DTI funding, conditional on them receiving their DTI grant. Previously banks have 
not had the expertise to judge the commercial merits of R&D proposals, and effectively relied on 
the appraisal of projects by officials to judge the quality of plans. The evaluators observed a 
similar phenomenon operating in SMART, reporting that SMART had been successful in 
levering support from banks in the form of secured loans, and noted how bank support had 
usually depended on the receipt of a DTI grant (DTI, 1994a, p. 4). Therefore it may be concluded 
that the promise of grant funding also represents a mechanism for levering funds from banks. 
Administration Procedures:-
The SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 14-15) draws attention to the administrative 
problems which an annual competition creates for the DTI's 'agents'. People were reported as 
having difficulties dealing with the peaks in work load resulting from the call and application 
processing. It may therefore be concluded that holding annual competitions represents poor 
practice. 
However the evaluators found the ROs placed high value on the publicity and prestige which they 
derived from the annual competitions. They suggested that one way around the problem would be 
to hold award ceremonies annually or biannually, but with individual proposals assessed 
continuously. The Support for Products Under research (SPUR) scheme (see sub-section K.3.2.3 
below) was cited as an example of where continuous assessment had worked well (DTI , 1994a). 
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The author spoke to Mr. John Papworth in DTI's SME and Technology (SMET) Directorate, who 
has responsibility for the operation of SMART. Mr. Papworth informed the author that the 
report's recommendations had been accepted in principle and acted upon, but instead it was 
decided to allow the 'Regions' to invite proposals on a monthly basis rather than annually or 
biannually. The latter is judged as better practice. 
It was noted above that administration of grants did not include the monitoring of projects against 
specific objectives (DTI, 1994a, p. 15, 17, 201-22). Two reasons were cited. The first was put 
down to limited resources which, the author observes, is compounded by the heavy burden of 
case work created by operating the competitions. Second was the policy of avoiding the 
placement of burdens on small firms. Both had restricted the ROs' ability to monitor and measure 
the success of their efforts to help businesses. Furthermore the ROs had been unable to aid firms 
in exploiting their developments. The evaluators felt that proper monitoring would have enabled 
valuable information relating to scheme performance to be fed back into the selection process, but 
also to identify post development support needs to have been quantified. Clearly senior managers 
need to ensure that the bad practice of overloading staff is avoided in any future reorganisations. 
The SMART evaluation report (DTI, 1994a, pp. 20, 24) refers to the procedure of DTI Headquarters 
staff regularly checking the standards applied by the ROs in assessing the SMART proposals. It is 
suggested that this represents good practice, serving to ensure consistency in appraisal and guarding 
against proposals exhibiting good potential from being rejected. 
K,3.2.3 Support for Products Under Research Scheme 
Issue Identification:-
Rationale: 
The market failures underpinning the programme rationale for the Support for Products Under 
Research (SPUR) scheme are described in the SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. 3-4) (17 
pages long), and may be summarised as follows: 
Innovation - the importance of SMEs in innovation was cited, which in turn depends on them 
undertaking R&D. 
Finance - SMEs face particular difficulty in obtaining finance to fund R&D projects. In 
consequence promising work is not undertaken, delayed, or restricted in scale. Thus left to market 
forces alone, R&D carried out by SMEs would be less than optimum to the detriment to the 
whole economy. 
Risk - several components of risk were identified: 
• SMEs lack the range and scale of business activities which would enable them to 
accommodate project losses. 
• Financiers may be deterred from investing in R & D projects, because they lack the necessary 
information and expertise to evaluate the risks involved. This latter factor, the author argues, 
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is more appropriately placed under the heading of "Finance", as it contributes to the difficulty 
of firms raising capital from external sources. 
The SPUR report also observed that participation in collaborative projects as funded in other parts 
of the Research and Technology Initiative, was difficult for small firms because the associated 
costs are high and due to their tendency of not wishing to share knowledge (DTI, 1994b, pp. 3-4). 
Identification of Market Failures: 
The reason for introducing SPUR was to 'plug the gap' left by the withdrawal in 1988 o f the SFI 
scheme (DTI, 1994b, p. 4; ROAME 1990b, paragraphs 7-8, annex A)), which the author is able to 
confirm from his experience catered for both small and medium sized companies (DTI, 1987, 
section: "SFI OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE", paragraphs 1-8, section "SFI GUIDELINES -
SUMMARY", paragraphs 1-22). Following the demise o f SFI a substantial drop in applications 
from firms was experienced, due to SMEs' reluctance to participate in collaborative projects, 
(ROAME, 1990b, paragraph 8). Colleagues informed the author that the financial inducement to 
join in collaborative projects was often insufficient to overcome their suspicions of the other 
partners, or the risks involved (ROAME, 1990b, paragraph 7). This experience confirmed a 
continuing market failure of firm's inhibitions towards collaborative R&D and, taking account of 
SMART which aims at the small firm, there was the need for single company funding geared 
towards the 'larger' SME (ROAME, 1990b, paragraphs 4-14). The scenario is an example of how 
lessons learned from programme operation may be employed as a mechanism to help identify the 
requirements for future schemes. 
The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. 4-5) supports the preceding observations. It makes 
reference to the changes in R&D support which were introduced in the late 1980s (HMSO, 1988, 
pp. 33-37). These it argued, ''had an unforeseen and disproportionate effect on SMEs", (DTI, 
1994b, p. 4). Reference is made to the previous Support for Innovation (SFI) scheme, which had 
shown that significant benefits arose from supporting smaller firms. Additionality was considered 
more easily identifiable and higher with the SME projects, than in those supporting larger 
companies. 
The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b) found the programme rationale to be valid, stating ''we 
found no evidence to undermine the rationale", (DTI, 1994b, p. ii) . Support for arguing the 
validity of the rationale could also be drawn from the high level of additionality which had been 
found to be present. In the majority of cases firms claimed that either their project would not have 
gone ahead or work had been accelerated. Of the firms which applied for funding but had failed 
to receive support, only a few were found to have gone ahead with their proposals. 
The report continues by providing other evidence which supported the rationale, hence serving to 
indicate the credibility of the methods adopted originally to identify the market failures. The 
report found most firms had introduced or were planning to launch new products, and 63% (126) 
of the successful applicants had expanded their R&D capability as a result of SPUR funding (p. 
4). Thus the overall aim of the scheme to encourage more firms to embark on R&D projects was 
satisfied (p. 9). 
Difficulty in raising finance for projects was found (DTI, 1994b, pp. 5-6). Firms were questioned 
during the evaluation over the raising of money to fund R&D work. Great difficulty had been 
experienced in securing funds for R&D projects. SMEs had reported that the levels of finance 
they required were either too small to interest venture capital companies, or too much equity was 
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required from them as surety. Another problem quoted by applicants was a fear o f high 
technology investment, and of bankers not understanding technology [Interview 9]. 
Risk had also been identified as a factor inhibiting firms to undertake R&D. When questioned 
some applicants said whilst they had available funds, they considered the risk associated with 
their projects as too high to proceed without support. 
From these observations the author concludes the value of looking at past experience in running 
schemes cannot be over emphasised. The mechanism of grant funding firms to overcome risk is 
also again demonstrated. 
Objectives: 
The SPUR evaluation report lists the specific programme objectives, and records the scheme's 
performance in meeting these objectives. The report's findings are now discussed. 
"Objective I: to support at least 60 projects in the first full year of the scheme and ISO projects 
annually by the third year which lead to significant advance", (DTI, 1994b, p. 9). 
111 projects were supported in the first year, which was well in excess of the target figure, with 
136 in year two. Sixty eight projects had been supported up to August 1993, and the evaluation 
report concluded that the target of 150 projects funded by year three end was likely to have been 
achieved. 
"Objective 2: to stimulate at least £25 Mper year additional investment in R&D, which could not 
otherwise have occurred, bySMEs by the third year", (DTI, 1994b, p. 10). 
The evaluators reported that it was too early in the life of SPUR to assess performance against 
this objective. But at the time of the evaluation it was found that 63% of firms had increased their 
spend and R&D capability, as a result of SPUR funding. 
"Objective 3: at least 80 new products to be marketed successfully by firms (grant holders and 
other firms) within two years of the end of the initial three year scheme", 
(DTI, 1994b, p. 10). 
The object was likely to be met. Of the 199 firms which had responded to the questionnaire, 94 
stated their intention to have their products on the market by the end of 1993. A further 72 
expected their developments to be on the market by the end of the following year. Of the 22 firms 
visited, 14 already were marketing their products with six planning to launch theirs within a year. 
The evaluators commented on the effect which SPUR was having on speeding the release of 
products and processes into the market. 
"Objective 4: to generate additional profits in the companies supported, which when aggregated 
over the four years following the end of the project, amount to three times the grant", (DTI , 
1994b, p. 10. 
The assessment team suggested that it was too early to measure this objective. Companies, it was 
observed, tend not to identify profits generated from specific products. Nonetheless applicants 
were asked to provide estimates of increased turnover created as a result o f sales from the SPUR 
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supported products, and the evaluators in turn estimated that profits were approximately twice 
that of the grant values. On this basis, progress was concluded to be reasonable (pp. 10-11). 
''Objective 5: 70% of projects should achieve most or all of their specified technical objectives", 
(DTI 1994b, p. 12), 
This objective was achieved. Overall 75% of projects met their objectives. It was found that 
objectives were changed during the life of the projects, often resulting in a better product. 
''Objective 6: to streamline administrative procedures so that at least 75% of offers are made 
within 4 months of the date of the initial application'', (DTI, 1994b, p. 12). 
Overall this objective was also met, and a tightening o f the target from four to three months was 
recommended. 
In helping to ensure that the SPUR scheme was in practice addressing the needs of the larger 
SMEs, and thus differentiating from SMART, the evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, p. 13) records 
that an additional objective was introduced by officials that 50% of successful applicants be 
SMEs employing between 50 and 500 people. The postal responses suggested the meeting of this 
objective, with 53% of firms employing more than 50 staff. It may therefore be concluded that 
support of 30% to a maximum of £150,000 offered under SPUR represents a sufficient 
inducement to encourage the larger SMEs to undertake R&D work. 
Programme Implementation:-
Delivery Strategy: 
The delivery strategy adopted for SPUR is considered to have been effective overall in addressing 
the perceived market failures. The SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. i - i i , 16-17) in 
summarising found SPUR to have had a positive effect on the R&D undertaken by SMEs, and 
recommended its continuation. It was found that, in general, the impact of project work on 
competitiveness was high. 
Study of the evaluation report's findings on SPUR's perfomiance in addressing the perceived 
problems and in achieving the objectives I to 3 described above enables several observations to be 
made regarding the design of the deliveiy strategy. The SPUR evaluation points to two principal 
areas of market failure which together prevented firms from undertaking R&D work. Firstly firms 
faced difficulty, in securing the investment capital necessary to resource project work, and secondly 
they were risk adverse. In the case of the former, the SPUR evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, pp. 8, 5-
6) reported additionality to be very high. The report found most firms had applied for SPUR 
funding because the required funds were not available from elsewhere. High additionality 
suggests that application of the grant funding mechanism to make good the unavailability of 
investment capital represented good practice for negating this type o f failure. 
For the latter, grant funding in SPUR was shown to have offset the negative effects of risk. When 
questioned some applicants had said they considered the risk associated with their projects as too 
high to proceed without support (DTI, 1994b, p. 6). Similarly to the case of SMART, the SPUR 
evaluation report (DTI, 1994b) found grant funding to be "an effective mechanism for providing 
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the impetus to SMEs to go forward with their ideas for new products and processes", (DTI, 
1994b, p. 17). Again this finding, coupled with the observation o f high additionality, suggests 
application of the grant funding mechanism to represent best practice in reducing inhibition due 
to risk. 
The evaluation report had highlighted the need for SMEs to play their role in innovation (p. 3). The 
evaluators found that although not all the projects were innovative, projects oflen exhibited 
significant technological advance (DTI, 1994b, p. 7). The mechanism of grant funding can 
therefore be considered as helpful in promoting innovation. Further evidence o f the effectiveness 
of the mechanism was indicated by Objective I being greatly exceeded. 
Providing support at a level of 30% of the eligible project costs appeared to be the correct decision. 
The evaluation report (DTI, 1994b, p. 8) records that companies were asked during the interviews 
for their views on the level of grant funding. Most were reported as judging the level of 30% to 
about right, but also considered the figure to be the minimum necessary. 
From the progress which had been achieved towards meeting Objective 2 at the time of 
evaluation, the report concluded that the majority of companies were found to have increased 
their R&D capabilities as a direct result of SPUR funding (DTI, 1994b, p. 10). Regarding the 
meeting of Objective 4, the evaluators had found it too early to measure results with absolute 
confidence (pp. 10-11). Thus no conclusions are drawn in this thesis regarding the value of single 
company, grant funding in helping raising profitability in firms. 
The evaluation DTI (1994b, pp. 9-12) reported a number of other benefits, which illustrated other 
gains which can accrue from applying the mechanism of grant funding. It was found that the 
products and processes developed by the SPUR applicants reached the market very quickly, and 
early evidence had suggested good levels of success were being achieved. Evidence was also 
derived from looking at the scheme's performance in meeting Objective 3, where good progress 
had been observed in firms bringing new products to market. The evaluators had commented on 
SPUR's effect on speeding the release of these products. Thus it can be concluded from these 
observations that the mechanism of grant funding is effective in stimulating investment in R&D 
within firms, and stimulating the development of new products. 
As with SMART, the SPUR evaluation noted the effect of DTI grant funding to lever bank 
support. Responses to the questionnaires showed that the gaining of SPUR grants had given the 
banks greater confidence in the projects rendering them more willing to loan money (p. 5). 
Programme Administration:-
Project Appraisal - Mr Papworth, the official responsible for the overall management of SPUR, 
informed the author that in SPUR, workshops were run by the Regional Offices to apprise 
applicants of the scheme eligibility criteria, and how proposals should be structured. Firms were 
required to first submit outline proposals, from which potentially good applicants would then be 
selected and invited to develop full proposals. Papworth reported to the author that this strategy 
had worked well, with the quality of proposals received being high. Papworth was not sure i f all 
of the Regional Offices (ROs) were running workshops for SPUR prior to the 1994 evaluation. 
Papworth was not involved with SPUR at its inception. The author spoke to Mr. Roy Evans, who 
had responsibility for operating SPUR in the period 1992 to 1997. Evans was o f the opinion that 
the ROs were holding workshops to promote SPUR and asking for outline proposals to ensure the 
submission of quality proposals, from an early stage in the programme's life. 
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The evaluation report had shown that Objective 5, concerned with the number o f projects meeting 
their objectives, had been achieved, (p. 12). The author, suggests that the combination of running 
briefing workshops, and the filtering effect of selecting applicants from outline proposals, helped 
ensure only good, well thought out projects were funded thereby contributing to the good result. 
Taking Papworth's observations also into account, deploying the mechanism of combining 
applicant briefings and vetting initial ideas is thus considered as best practice in identifying viable 
projects. 
K.3.3 The Consultancy Initiatives 
Issue Identification :-
Rationale: 
Appendix F discusses the rationale for CI and the market failures that CI was aimed at addressing. 
The author proposes they may be summarised as follows: 
a) . Staff in SMEs lacking the necessary management skills to manage business operations 
effectively, such that firms are competitive in the market place. 
b) That SMEs tend not to hire outside expertise as a means of 'making good' their lack of 
competence in key management areas. SMEs also perceived consultants as irrelevant and 
expensive, and hence considered their services to be of poor value. 
In identifying the market failures, three sources of information were consulted as follows: 
o Inspection of programme evaluation reports, 
o Inspection of White Papers, 
o Personal Experience. 
The final evaluation report of CI (SQW (1992); (comprising 92 pages) describes the performance of 
the scheme in meeting its objectives (pp. i-viii). From inspection of the evaluation results, the author 
concludes that the programme's rationale was valid, indicating the efficacy of adopting the above 
mechanisms in identifying problems. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the sample of 
firms questioned during the evaluation were representative of the wider population of.SM Es. Ernst 
& Young support this view. In their review of the Scheme Contractors, Ernst and Young find the 
Consultancy Initiatives to "represent a substantial record of achievement. Over 10,000projects will 
have been completed by the end of1989 and client satisfaction levels are remarkably high", (Ernst & 
Young, 1990, p. 6). 
In particular the author would cite the reported 37% of projects displaying additionality in the form 
of prompting firms to hire consultants, (plus 18% of firms commissioning larger projects, and a 
further 17% of projects were brought forward as a result of grant funding), as implying that a 
reluctance to use extemal expertise existed, (SQW, 1992, p. iii). SQW also reported that 52% of 
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firms felt their management skills to have been improved, indicating existence of management 
weaknesses in SMEs (p. vii). 
Setting Objectives: 
Examination of the approaches adopted in drawing up the objectives for CI, revealed the principal 
mechanisms employed as: 
• Taking account of Government policy - In setting the objectives officials took their lead 
from the DTI White Paper (HMSO, 1988, p. 24-27). 
• Analysis of previous experience recorded in evaluation reports 
• Obtaining the 'crit ical ' mass necessary to demonstrate the value of consultancy to the 
wider population - The importance of establishing a target number of firms having 
experienced successful consultancy projects (3% of the eligible firms) was stressed in 
achieving a sufficient nucleus of companies for the demonstrator effect to have impact. From 
his experience, the author would judge the figure as being of a sufficiently small proportion 
of the total population of firms as to render the figure as probably attainable. 
SQW do not indicate in their evaluation the extent to which CI supported firms subsequently 
influenced the decisions of others, and hence no conclusions can be drawn regarding the efficacy 
of choosing the 3% figure. 
The EI evaluation report (SQW, 1992, pp. i-viii) indicates CI as being overall successful in 
meeting its objectives, and the procedures adopted in setting the schemes objectives are therefore 
considered as further examples of good practice. 
Programme Implementation:-
Delivery Strategy: 
For each of the market failures (a) and (b) described above, the operation and performance of the 
key delivery mechanisms selected to correct them is now discussed. 
Market Failure (a): Staff in SMEs lack the necessary management skills to manage business 
operations effectively such that firms are competitive in the market place. The overriding objective 
was to correct a situation of poor management. The overall delivery strategy was to improve the 
management performance in firms by encouraging them to hire consultants. 
Inspection of the final evaluation report on CI (SQW, 1992, p. iv) provides the evidence which 
indicates the consultancy mechanism to be effective in improving company management. Around 
80% of firms receiving support implemented the recommendations of their consultancy projects. 
SQW found that in 57% of these cases, implementation had resulted in fundamental change in 
approach to business operation (p. 51). SQW comment that CI was successful in causing fuTns to 
rethink and change the way they operate (p. 51). As discussed earlier, 52% of firms experienced 
enhancement of management skills, with half of these exhibiting a dispersion of skill among the 
management teams, rather than residing in just a few individuals (p. 56). 
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However before consultancy can be applied, there was the second area of market failure to 
overcome: 
Market Failure (b): SMEs are reluctant to hire outside expertise as a means of 'making good' their 
lack of competence in key management areas. 
The objective was thus to overcome this reluctance. This was achieved by employing the delivery 
mechanism of grant funding:-
Provision of grants - To encourage SMEs to use consultants by offering them grants towards the 
costs of their consultancy projects. 
The CI evaluation report (SQW, 1992, p. i i i) found that 37% of firms would not have embarked 
on their consultancy projects without grant funding. A further 18% of projects were found to have 
been enhanced as a result of assistance, with an additional 17% projects exhibiting a bringing 
forward of the start date. From these results the author would observe that the mechanism of 
subsidised consultancy is effective in increasing the use o f external expertise. 
An aim of officials was to change attitudes to the use of outside consultancy. Around 40% of 
applicants stated that they were more likely to hire consultants at the full price in the future (SQW, 
1992, p. 81). A similar percentage was quoted for the number of firms having hired consultants at the 
full market rate as a result of their CI projects. It may therefore be concluded that subsidising 
consultancy is also effective in helping SME managers perceive the use of outside help to be 
valuable. 
In addition to the two areas of market failure (a) and (b) set out above, the programme ROAME 
statement (DTI, 1988b, paragraph 5.4) also highlighted a lack of information about sources of 
specialist help. The evaluation report usefully comments on the value of the demonstrator effect to 
help raise awareness more generally about die value of using consultants. It was found that around 
60% of the assisted firms had informed other businesses about their consultancy projects, and of 
these businesses approximately 30% had hired consultants themselves albeit mainly with CI 
assistance (some 70% of these cases), (SQW, 1992, p. 82). Nonetheless the demonstrator effect had 
been shown to be effective in helping to promote the value of using consultants, and is hence 
regarded as a best practice mechanism. 
Programme Administration: 
The final programme evaluation report (SQW, 1992, pp. 2-4) looks at several of the steps taken to 
ensure effective management of the CI, and the contribution of the individual initiatives to the 
success of the scheme. SQW's findings are now discussed. 
Business Reviews- Enterprise Counsellors visited applicants and undertook strategic business 
reviews. They assessed whether firms would benefit from consultancy and helped them select 
which of the component initiatives of CI, would best suit management needs. They also assessed 
the applicant's ability to pay their share of the consultancy costs. The Enterprise Counsellors 
were experienced business people, recruited from commerce and retained by DTI. The author 
observes that the role of the enterprise counsellors was very much that o f project appraisal and in 
essence is essentially the same task as that performed by officials under the R & T initiative. 
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The business review as a mechanism to help ensure good consultancy projects, and hence the 
meeting of programme objectives, may be considered as best practice. SQW reported that around 
60% of firms were well satisfied with their consultancies; 68% of firms were reported as being 
happy with their consultants ability to identify problems, 6 1 % pleased with the relevance o f 
project recommendations, and with 60% of applicants rating them highly in terms o f value for 
money (SQW, 1992, p. 68). Over 90% of firms were quoted as having accepted their consultant's 
advice (SQW, 1992, appendix A, p. vii) . Officials' desire to see the Enterprise Counsellors help 
firms identify areas where 'quick fixes' could be introduced immediately appeared to be partially 
realised. SQW found approximately 60% of participants gained some benefit from their reviews 
beyond the positive appraisal of their grant application (appendix A, p. vii i) . The Enterprise 
Counsellor role in project appraisal is therefore considered to be an example of good practice. 
Post Completion Visits - Following completion of project work, the Enterprise Counsellors 
made post-completion visits. This final visit aimed to add value to the consultancy, by discussing 
consultancy recommendations and their implementation. The visits also enabled the performance 
of the programme to be monitored, by assessing companies perception of the value of their 
consultancies (DTI. 1988b, paragraph 5.2), (SQW, 1992, pp. 3-4). 
SQW reported that only around a quarter of firms perceived added value as arising from the post 
completion visits (appendix A, p. vi i i ) . The author suggests the figure too low to conclude that 
officials' aspirations had been realised. However the author would suggest that the visits 
represented best practice, in that they enabled officials to check consultants performance. 
K.3.4 Managing into the 90s 
Phase 2 of M90s was the subject o f an evaluation, and the evaluation report (DTI, 1995); 
(comprising 22 pages) provides useful insights into the operation and performance of the scheme. 
The report summarises the overall aim of the programme to improve the performance o f firms 
through better management, by disseminating information about best practice using seminars, 
presentations videos and written material. The second phase covered the period April 1992 to 
March 1995 (DTI, 1995, pp. 5-6). 
Issue identification:-
Rationale: 
The evaluators confirmed the existence of a valid rationale for the M90s programme. The 
rationale for Phase 2 of M90s was described as: 
a) "Many UK firms, especially Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), 
could perform better than they do; 
b) an improvement is in the general interest: it would enrich us all, not Just 
them; 
c) their managers lack the knowledge and the information which would help 
them improve"; 
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(DTI, 1995, p. 2). 
For (c) the report continues: 
"777/5 missing information is not readily supplied via the operation of the market forces mainly 
because consultants do not find it profitable to deal with small firms and because firms 
themselves are wary of buying information and advice whose value cannot be assessed until some 
time after the event", (DTI, 1995, p. 2). 
Identification of Market Failure: 
That the rationale was valid and hence the methods adopted to determine market failures sound, is 
indicated by the evaluation report (DTI, 1995), which concluded that there was ''a clear role for 
DTI to provide such information about best practice both because of market failures which 
inhibit commercial provision and because of the reputation accorded to the Department by 
participants and its commercial impartiality", (DTI, 1995, p. i). 
Benefits to these firms, it was argued, were the provision to previously unaware companies of 
examples of successful applications of best practice by other firms, these acting to provide a 
stimulus to take beneficial action, rather than providing examples o f codifiable, generic best 
practice. 
A number of approaches were involved in collecting the evidence of problems and what best 
practice methods firms should adopt (see appendix G, section G.2.3, G.2.4). Among them were: 
Reference to Govemment White Papers 
Inspection of Advisory Council Reports 
In-house studies 
Experience of Officials 
Listening to delegates' questions at events 
Commissioning of Consultancy Research 
Previous Experience of Operating programmes 
Evaluation Reports 
Reading of research publications 
The DTI evaluation report of Phase 2 of M90s (DTI, 1995, pp. 6, 8) confirms that the rationale 
for both Phases of the programme was valid. The M90s Evaluation Report found 'Additionality' 
to be high (p. 11). The assessors concluded that i f the programme had not operated, then most 
participants would not have obtained the information which they received from other sources. 
Over two thirds of participants were found to have taken action as a result of participating in the 
scheme, and it was thought that they would not have done so i f the programme had not existed. 
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Concluding the M90s evaluation report (DTI, 1995, p. 11) found the programme to be well liked, 
and the programme had achieved its objective o f raising competitiveness in firms. It is hence . 
concluded that the approaches used in identifying market failures represent good practice. 
Objectives - The objectives for M90s may be summarised as follows: 
"Overa// to improve the competitiveness, especially but not exclusively in SMEs. To access firms 
which have not yet benefited from its message"^ (DTI, 1995, p. 9). 
"7b present events earning ratings of "good" or "very good" from 75% of attendees for 
presentation, from 70% for content, and to get 60% to subsequently implement changes", (DTI, 
1995, p. 9). 
These objectives were partly met. 75% of firms attending events were found to be satisfied with 
the presentation and content giving at least an 'average' rating, but only one third responded with 
a benefit rating of good or very good. However over 70% were estimated to having taken action 
as a result of participation (pp. 10, 15). 
The M90s evaluation report (DTI, 1995, p. 11) found that M90s had provided information to 
firms which they would not have been able to get elsewhere. Thus the lack o f information aspect 
of the programme rationale was found to be valid. 
Programme Implementation: 
Delivery Strategy - The evaluation report (DTI, 1995, pp. 4-5, 14-21) comments on the hvo 
areas o f delivery mechanisms employed in M90s: awareness events such as The Strategy Road 
Show, and media based awareness tools such as 'Literature and Videos'. Three quarters o f 
respondents attending events were found to be satisfied with them (p. 15), and just under 75% 
reported as having implemented changes to become more effective in their management (p. 16), 
as a result of attending. Training of staff was noted as the important change (approximately 75%). 
With the literature and videos, the evaluators found the needs o f recipients being met, and a high 
level o f satisfaction expressed by the recipients, (p. 19). 
Finally M90s was seen as providing value for money (pp. 9-11). It was thought that the benefits 
of firms taking subsequent action would equal the cost of running Phase 2 in one to two years. 
Evidence the report suggested indicated a very high level o f additionality (p. 11). M90s was 
found to be well liked by participating firms, (p. I I ) . The report found that the programme was 
having a positive impact on the firms participating in the programme's activities. Almost three 
quarters of the firms questioned reported expected increases in quality and profitability, with 
around half anticipating manufacturing costs decreasing as'a result of attendance, (p. 17). 
SMEs' subsequent actions were found to beneficial and estimates of added value suggested a pay-
back time as short as one year had been achieved (p. 10). Around 75% of companies were SMEs, 
and the majority of these (64%) employed 100 or more staff. The programme was thus successful 
in gaining the attention of the target firms. Companies were almost at one in saying that M90s 
should continue (98% of delegates attending events, 100% of respondents in the face to face 
interviews), (DTI, 1995, p. 19). 
The above observations suggest that M90s had addressed the perceived market failures, and had 
done so effectively and efficiently, such that VFM was seen to have been achieved. A high 
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proportion of those firms attending had taken action to implement management changes to good 
effect, thereby beginning to improve the problem o f poor management in SMEs. A lack o f 
training in firms, an issue raised in the M90s ROAME statements, also appeared to have been 
improved with many firms having embarked on training programmes. Thus it may be concluded 
that the application of the delivery mechanisms of'Events' and 'Literature and Videos' represent 
best practice in providing firms with the information they need to improve, and engendering 
sufficient motivation for them to embark on projects for change. In may also be concluded 
therefore that they are effective in addressing the market problem of 'Information Failure'. 
K.3.5 The Manufacturing, Planning and Implementation Programme 
Issue Identincation:-
Rationalc: 
The draft MPI evaluation report (DTI, 1997a); (27 pages in length) summarises the rationale for 
MPI (p. 5). The essential components of the rationale may be listed as: 
• The strategic use of A M T can increase the competitiveness o f manufacturing SMEs, but 
surveys of companies indicate that technologies are being installed for immediate needs, and 
not the in the context of the whole business operation; 
• The strategic implementation of A M T is a complex task and SMEs do not have the expertise 
to resource the task and must seek outside help; 
• Knowledge o f how to implement A M T strategically was fragmented, residing in individuals, 
consultants, and academics. Fragmentation acted to inhibit the strategic planning o f A M T 
because it was difficult for firms to identify the specialised sources of expertise. 
• The consultancy fees associated with the strategic planning and implementation of A M T are 
large, and therefore also likely to inhibit firms from committing to projects for strategic 
planning. 
In concluding the MPI evaluation report states: 
"77;e MPI rationale is valid. Companies which carry on with their existing business practices 
may expect modest growtli/efficiency while companies which undertake MPI type of work are 
more likely to realise higher growth/efficiency. Business executives and decision makers need to 
be encouraged to embrace proven best practice rather than cling to the 'old ways of doing things' 
- doing the right things rather than doing things right. An MPI type of programme is a useful aid 
to spreading this message", 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 23). 
The report continues by finding the overwhelming majority o f applicants and consultants 
considered that their projects were successful, that they had benefited, and thought the scheme 
worthwhile. 
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The author takes confirmation of the validity o f the rationale to indicate the efficacy of the 
methods adopted in identifying the market failures. The approaches used in collecting evidence 
(see appendix H, sections H.2.2 and H.2.4) may be summarised as follows: 
Programme evaluation reports, 
Previous Experience, 
Research Papers and other Publications, 
In-house studies. 
Commissioned Studies, 
Studies commissioned by other bodies. 
Government Advisory Councils, 
Discussion with practitioners. 
That the rationale was upheld by the evaluators suggests that the above methods were effective 
and are representative of good practice. 
Objectives: 
me's The draft MPI evaluation report discusses MPI's specific objectives and the program...- . 
performance in meeting its targets, (pp. 9-13). The report's findings are now summarised 
Objective 1: The scheme wil l become self funding by the end of year three - the evaluators 
found this objective to have been unrealistic. Implementing A M T strategically is a complex 
process with firms not possessing the necessary skills or finance to resource project work. The 
evaluators concluded that with a lack of dissemination o f programme results (see below), it was 
not feasible for a critical mass of firms to be created, such that non participant SMEs could be 
encouraged to undertake projects for holistic planning without support. 
The author observes that setting of the self funding target did not take into account Mife in the real 
world', and perhaps represents poor practice. However from his personal knowledge the author 
would make two important observations in defence of setting the objective. First it was intended 
that a second phase of MPI be launched as the end o f the second year, when it was planned to 
close the initial phase for new applications. The demonstrator effect could be seen to be having a 
beneficial effect in CI, and it was hoped that the combination o f phase 1 and 2 applicants would 
create the critical mass required for the demonstrator effect to work. Officials in setting the target 
could not have anticipated a subsequent reduction in budgets across DTI, which required the 
allocation for promotion to be cut significantly and prevented adequate exposure o f MPI. This 
resulted in a reduced the flow o f applications (see below). 
Secondly the draft evaluation report (DTI, 1997a, p. 22) refers to the lack o f dissemination of 
project results. Officials were particularly keen for MPI companies to participate in the M90s 
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Inside UK Enterprise ( lUKE) scheme, which relies on the demonstrator effect as a principal 
delivery mechanism. Only a handful did so. 
However the author again argues that i f the scheme had not suffered reductions in budgets, then 
the potentially larger number o f projects identified would have helped the demonstrator effect to 
have been experienced. The author also suggests that the above scenario illustrates that depriving 
schemes of approved funding is a bad practice, as the performance of a programme can be 
adversely affected to the extent whereby its ability to meet objectives and in consequence achieve 
VFM, are both severely prejudiced. The importance of scheme promotion is also emphasised. 
Objective 2: 200 projects wi l l be identifled by the end ofyear 2 - This objective was not 
achieved with only 122 projects funded. The evaluation report refers to two problems, one the 
premature announcement of the scheme in Parliament which stimulated initial interest, before 
systems were put in place by the scheme contractor to handle applications. Thus interested firms 
were turned away and lost interest. Secondly, as discussed above, the lack of promotion meant 
applications were not brought forward in the necessary numbers. 
Objective 3: A number of targets were set for profi t and efficiency - On 'profits' the 
evaluators commented that experience of operating SMART and SPUR had shown it to be very 
difficult to gauge with certainty the measure o f improvement in profitability due to an 
intervention. The reason given was that it was very hard to differentiate the exact origins o f 
profits in company accounts. Setting profitability targets may therefore be regarded as bad 
practice. On 'efficiency' the scheme contractor had not collected the source data required, and an 
assessment o f MPl's performance in raising operations efficiency could not be assessed. 
Objective 4: Averaged across projects, M P l wi l l secure annual training of 600 man weeks 
for each of the planning and implementation phases - The evaluators observed that the 
objective was not sufficiently well defined to determine the schemes performance with accuracy. 
Training had occurred, but by staff at different levels in different projects. Firms could not 
quantify the levels of training as they did not keep records and some were confused over the role 
of training. With hindsight, the author observes that officials should have given more thought to 
the setting of this target, perhaps by being more specific by describing the areas in which training 
was expected to take place. Firms should have been required to maintain training records. 
Objective 5: Approximately 100 projects to be incorporated into the M90s "Inside U K 
Enterprise ( l U K E ) " scheme by the end ofyear 5 - The programme failed to meet this 
objective, with only five MPI firms joining the scheme. The evaluators confirmed the role that 
IUK.E could have played in adding value to MPI activities: 
''The lUKE scheme could have formed a iisefid vehicle for wide dissemination of the worth of 
MPI activities and potentially could have encouraged more companies to see the value of an MPI 
approach to their business''\ 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 12). 
The evaluation report continued by the flagging the problems which prevented more MPI 
applicants taking part in lUKE. The evaluation found very few companies aware of their 
'obligation' to take part in the scheme. Many when questioned further indicated that they would 
not have been prepared to participate for reasons of not wishing to divulge the 'secrets o f their 
success'. The evaluators highlighted that communications between officials and the scheme 
contractor could have been better. The author disagrees, as he and the scheme contractor 
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discussed the subject at length, but agreed that applicants could not be forced to jo in lUKE. 
However they were asked on their application forms to confirm their intention to participate. 
Given the report's findings, the author suggests that it is possible that firms simply chose to 
ignore the requirement. He however recognises that firm's possible unwillingness to take part on 
confidentially grounds, should have been taken account o f 
The evaluators also refer to reorganisation within DTI causing responsibility for MPI to move to 
other officials in another directorate. Previously responsibility for both MPI and M90s resided 
within the same division, and there was close communication between MPI and lUKE. The link 
was effectively broken with the reorganisation, and the MPI projects were largely overlooked 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 13). It is the view of the author that it is this latter factor which was the root cause 
of few MPI projects entering lUKE, a fact which once again serves to illustrate that care needs to 
be taken to maintain continuity during reorganisation. 
Objective 6: Annual seminars targeted at consultancies, HEIs, and RTOs, involved in 
research, development, and implementation of A M T wi th lOD organisations participating 
during the life of the scheme -
This object was not met. Four seminars were held at the end of the programme for participant 
firms and consultants. The results were disappointing with only 24 companies attending the 
events. No events for the broader audience of organisations were held, which the author is able to 
advise was due to budgetary constraints. 
Objective 7: M P ! case studies to be published quarterly: -
Although these were not published initially, the evaluators reported that the target was achieved 
during the latter period o f running MPI. The evaluation report also records the work o f Professor 
Hill of the London Business School and his analytical co-ordination team, who submitted papers 
to be published in professional journals. Analysis o f the lessons learned in the MPI projects were 
also used as the basis for the production of a DTI booklet on customer focused manufacturing 
caWed Making it Pay, (DTI 1997b). 
me Objective 8: To establish 30 advisor consortia during the life of the program 
This objective was exceeded, with in excess o f 60 new consortia formed. However the evaluation 
report found that at the time of the evaluatory work, many had disbanded or were no longer 
undertaking MPI type o f projects. 
Programme Implementation:-
Delivery Strategy: 
The principal elements of the delivery strategy are summarised, and their performance in meeting 
objectives, and hence the reduction in perceived market failures, is now discussed. 
Overcoming the Barriers to Use of Consultants - Central to the operation of MPI was 
encouragement of SMEs to hire external advisors to help with their strategic projects. MPI used 
grant funding to reduce the barrier of cost and risk which prevented SMEs from committing the 
necessary resources. As shown above, this was a principal area of market failure. Of the firms 
contacted 22 claimed that they would not have started their MPI projects without grant support 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 17). A further 38 reported that their projects were either enhanced or brought 
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forward as the result of grant funding. Only six were found to be non additional; that is the firms 
would have gone ahead anyway (p. 18). 
The author regards these findings as demonstrating a good level o f additionality, providing a 
further example of the role of grant funding in overcoming firms* inhibitions to risk. Application 
of the grant mechanism to overcome inhibition is hence viewed as a best practice approach. 
A further problem identified was that firms were not implementing A M T strategically. The MPI 
report found that 'for most companies the grant provided the catalyst and a platform for change 
without which the management and matwfacturing practices \yould have carried on as before'', 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 18). This suggests that MPI was successful in triggering improvement within the 
applicants' management. 
Lack of Consultancy Service Provision - The marketing opportunity represented by the scheme 
grants was used to motivate smaller consultancies and academic departments, to form advisor 
consortia having the collective expertise to resource holistic project work. The MPI evaluation 
report showed the mechanism to be effective, with over 60 advisor consortia formed (DTI , 1997a, 
p. 10). The author notes consultants similarly being motivated to in effect promote DTI activities, 
as evidenced by consultants promotional role in CI (see appendix F, section F.9). 
The approach is therefore considered as good practice, having addressed the fragmentation of 
expertise in holistic planning, rendering it more accessible to SMEs through the formation of the 
consortia. 
Installing good management in firms - As was the case with CI, the MPI evaluation report 
suggests that the consultancy mechanism was successful in helping install effective management 
into the assisted firms. 
Improvements in management were evidenced by most participants reporting having experienced 
considerable benefits, such as increased profits, greater efficiency in production and other 
processes, increased market share and exports (DTI , 1997a, p. 17). Reduced inventories and lead 
times had been achieved, along with a more flexible and responsive approach to the market, and 
better integration of new equipment. Interestingly two companies stated that they would have 
ceased trading without MPI! Importantly some companies reported a better understanding of 
strategic planning, and many of the family businesses found their projects to have produced major 
surprises, indicating that previously they had not understood how their markets operated (p. 15). 
It is therefore concluded that the encouragement of firms to use external expertise helps educate 
personnel in strategic management issues. The mechanism therefore represents good practice in 
helping to install permanent expertise into companies. 
Raising A M T Competencies within Firms and Consultants - Knowledge was to be transferred 
from the individual consultants to the SME staff through mutually shared experience. Similarly 
close working relationships allowed transfer o f knowledge from company staff to their advisors. 
The evaluation report (DTI, 1997a) makes no specific observations in this area, but concludes that 
both companies and consultants had become more aware o f the need for strategic planning (p. 
23). Thus competencies were raised on both sides, but it is not possible to conclude with 
confidence that the 'hand in glove* relationship sought in MPI projects, was an effective 
contributor to the learning process. 
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Raising A M T Competencies: The Wider A M T Community - The objective o f Analytical Co-
ordination, (or Technical Tracking as it later became known), was to ensure that the 'good 
practice' lessons learnt through experiment within the MPI projects were formally recorded. This 
would enable DTI to extend the benefit beyond those directly involved in the programme, using 
dissemination activities like those of M90s. The aim was to capture the best practice lessons as 
they were learnt. 
Professor Hill drafted a detailed and comprehensive report on the Technical Tracking process 
(Hil l , 1996a), covering the conduct of project work in MPI. Much of value is contained within its 
pages, but as far as the author is aware officials have not made use of its contents. Professor Hil l 
was asked to produce a short summary of his findings (Hil l , 1996b) from which officials drew 
some information in preparing the booklet Making it Pay (DTI, 1997b). However essentially, due 
to reorganisation and changes in support policy, where emphasis was shifted from directly 
helping firms to one of providing them with the information they need, (for example the 
introduction of the Business Links) no use has been made of the lessons contained in Professor 
HilTs final report. This is a waste and is to be regretted. 
Analytical co-ordination was able to identify case study material, which as discussed above was 
disseminated via articles in journals. 
Lack of Self Help Tools - It was expected that the lack o f tools to aid the planning process might 
be alleviated in two ways. Firstly it was hoped that new products would emerge as members of 
the Tracking Team advised others of the good practice methodologies discovered. Secondly it 
was intended that the case study information could form the basis of self-help packages. 
There is no evidence to suggest that any tools were prepared as a result of MPI, and the value of 
this approach cannot therefore be verified. 
Overall the MPI evaluators found the majority of participants and consultants judged their 
projects to be successful, and viewed MPI as a very good scheme (DTI, 1997a, p. 23). 
Consideration o f continuing with MPI like schemes to provide advice and best practice guidance 
to SMEs was recommended (p. 24). The overall thrust of the delivery strategy, taking account o f 
what was achieved, is hence considered appropriate for dealing with the market problems which 
had been identified. 
Administration: 
Competitive Tendering - In the early stages o f MPI, DTI insisted that firms select their 
consultants via the competitive tendering process. Competitive tendering was seen as a good 
practice approach which firms should learn to undertake. However the evaluators confirmed the 
experiences of the author, that many firms found the process too difficult for them to undertake 
(DTI, 1997a, p. 20). A number did not know how to approach drawing up a tender specification, 
or how to evaluate consultants and their proposals, given the complexity of the holistic planning 
task. The insistence of competitive tendering was subsequently dropped. 
The author would propose that the initial policy was in fact bad practice, as it did not take account 
of the levels of expertise within firms. With hindsight the author further suggests that the 
imposition of competitive tendering flew in the face of what officials had on the one hand 
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perceived as a market failure, that is firms lacked an understanding of the holistic planning of 
AMT! 
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